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Abstract 
This thesis investigates some key aspects of intellectual 
life in the interwar years. It examines a nU11ber of significant 
debates which took place in this period. It begins with a survey 
of the crisis literature which appeared at the end of the Great 
War. This is followed by an exa•ination of arguments in favour of 
the scientific control of social development. The next debate is 
about the nature of science in the light of modern physics, and 
the lessons that modern physics was deemed to hold for other 
areas of intellectual inquiry. The fourth debate concerns the 
philosophy of pragmatis•, its various meanings and proposals for 
social and intellectual reconstruction. The principal debate 
examined in this thesis covers the broad question 
concerning the political manifestations of pragmatism and 
pluralism. Making sense of this debate requires detailed 
historical and philosophical analysis. The final issue that 
this thesis considers is the impact of the philosophy and 
vocabulary of pragmatism on certain economic debates in the 1920s 
and 1930s. In discussing these topics this thesis demonstrates 
that the interwar years witnessed vigorous intellectual exchanges 
across a broad range of disciplines. This thesis shows that 
participants in these intellectual debates shared and retained 
faith, despite many instances of misunderstanding, in the unity 
of all knowledge. 
Introduction 
This thesis is primarily concerned with intellectual life 
in the interwar years. It begins with a study of the sense of 
crisis, or more generally, with the sense of uncertainty that was 
seen to prevail in Western civilisation during that period. This 
sense of crisis was exhibited in different areas of discussion. 
Within this context, the thesis focuses on the philosophy of 
pragmatism: its influence, how it was understood and 
misunderstood, and how it was variously related to other 
responses to crisis. 
In one sense, what I have uncovered in researching and 
writing this thesis is a confusion of tongues. Various 
intellectuals were often talking at cross-purposes with each 
during the interwar years. Yet, at the same time, there was a 
degree of coherence and concordance in these debates. 
Furthermore, there are lines of thought which were continuous 
throughout the period. 
One thing that might spring to mind on reading this thesis 
is the question as to why one would accord the interwar period 
any special coherence at all. This is a question which I deal 
with in the first chapter. Hy argument in that chapter is that 
the pervasive sense of uncertainty, manifested in the talk of 
crisis, constitutes one reason why we can draw lines of 
demarcation around this period. But there are other themes which 
were either peculiar to or given added emphasis during this 
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period. In chapter two, I illustrate the drive to find scientific 
solutions to social problems. This in itself is a good example 
of the way in which intellectuals responded to crisis. That is, 
one can observe amongst intellectuals a tendency to see social 
uncertainty as a consequence of intellectual uncertainty or the 
failure to apply the intellect to practical difficulties. As I 
said, the attempts to establish scientific control of social 
development were only one manifestion of this. Philosophers 
often had quite a different response to crisis and could be heard 
calling for the need to achieve spiritual understanding. 
The debates about the philosophy of pragmatism which 
developed in the interwar period are crucial to this study. 
Pragmatist philosophy, in its various forms, was both widely 
embraced and widely scorned during the inter-war years. Arguments 
both for and against pragmatism appeared regularly in 
philosophical, political science and economic journals. 
Pragmatism is important because it claimed to close the yawning 
gap that was believed to have opened up between science and 
morality - this was yet another perceived cause of crisis. 
Two other identifiable features of the period are related to 
the philosophy of pragmatism. Firstly, many intelletuals during 
this period were preoccup; ied with developments in modern 
physics. Relativity theory and quantum theory were intepreted by 
scholars (including philosophers, social theorists and even 
scientists} in ways that made it seem as though physics provided 
justificatipn for a range of already existing philosophical 
positions. For example, modern physics was seen to give support 
to the idea that reality is composed of flux or mind-energy; it 
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was seen as giving support to the principle that being is being 
perceived, and as giving support to the pragmatist belief that 
knowledge is useful rather than true. Developments in modern 
physics were interpreted by some to mean that even science, the 
last bastion of certainty, had succumbed to irrationalism. There 
was talk of the "collapse" of science and this of course, only 
added to the sense of crisis. 
The second identifiable feature of the period which I 
discuss in relation to pragmatism was the growing prominence of 
economics in relation to public-policy debates. In constrast 
with the interest in physics, the prominence of economics in 
public life continued after the Second World War, but it emerged 
during the 1920s and 1930s. A great deal of methodological 
literature appeared pertaining to issues such as the relation 
between economic theory and practices and the place of values in 
economic analysis. As we shall see, the philosophy and 
vocabulary of pragmatism played a role in these methodological 
debates. 
These are some brief indications of the sort of debates 
which emerged in intellectual circles during the inter-war years. 
I am not suggesting that this list is exhaustive; other important 
topics were debated during this period. Nevertheless, these 
themes do emerge strongly in any examination of the literature 
produced by academic commentators in the English-speaking world 
during this time. 
I should stress that those who participated in the debates I 
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have examined were nearly all professional scholars. These 
scholars were mainly drawn from the areas of philosophy and the 
social sciences. However, the work of some non-academic 
intellectuals has also been referred to where relevant. 
Most of my sources are derived from English-speaking 
countries, in particular America, Britain and Australasia. Where 
I have cited scholars from Australia or New Zealand this is not 
in order to suggest that there was a particular antipodean 
response to crisis. Rather, much of this material may be regarded 
as further evidence of British intellectual opinion. I should 
point out that many of the scholars working in Australasia at 
that time had either originally come from Britain or bad 
undertaken graduate or post-graduate studies there. 
The evidence I have gathered has mostly been drawn from 
books and journal publications in the areas of philosophy, 
politics and economics. The material published in journals was 
particularly useful in helping me establish a pattern of 
intellectual debate. A study of the journals gave me a good 
indication of what books were being read, 
criticised. 
discussed and 
Some works published by European intellectuals have also 
been examined for purposes of both comparision and contrast. 
Edmund Husserl's - interpretation in the 1930s of the crisis in 
science as a crisis in European man could not be overlooked in 
any discussion of the uncertainty of that time. The Russian 
philosopher Nicholas Berdyaev is mentioned because his arguments 
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either pre-dated or paralleled the arguments put by Husserl and 
others in relation to the causes of crisis. A number of European 
sources have also been dealt with because of the interest 
expressed in them by members of the academy in English-speaking 
countries. The writings of the French philosopher Henri 
Bergson, in particular his challenge to the cult of science, 
generated 
important 
a 
to 
great deal of excitement and 
English-speaking audiences 
criticism. Also 
was the alleged 
association between Bergson's philosophy and the activities of 
the syndicalist movement in France. Most of the European sources 
I have examined were translated into English at that time and it 
is the English translations I have used. In the case of a few 
French sources I have had to rely on the French language source. 
Many European intellectuals were also contributing articles to 
journals in 
originally 
publishers. 
English-speaking countries and 
written in English or were 
these were either 
translated by the 
The use of current or recent sources has been sparing. Where 
they have been used it has been for the purposes of clarification 
or because they help to extend or illuminate a discussion. In 
some cases, where I have discussed a topic related to my 
immediate field of interest, such as the history and development 
of the sy~clicalist movement, secondary sources drawn from both 
contemporary and current works have been more extensively used. 
It should be noted that my main interest in relation to the 
synd!Calist movement is the alleged association between it and the 
philosophies of Bergson and Willia• James, not the actual 
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movement itself. However, in order to establish the validity of 
the claims concerning the influence of these philosophers I have 
had to look at the actual history of the movement during the 
interwar period and not just at the proclamations of its 
theoreticians and critics. 
The syndicalist movement was important because some 
intellectuals claimed that it was but an extreme version of 
political pluralism. Indeed, some argued that it was the logical 
conclusion of political pluralism. James was seen as exerting an 
intellectual influence on the syndicalist movement precisely 
because he was seen as giving inspiration to political pluralism 
in general. 
I have included a substantial discussion on the development 
of pluralist thought, including an examination of the 
intellectual and empirical conditions that gave rise to it. I 
included this material in order to demonstrate that the 
association between pluralist thought and pragmatist philosophy 
was not inevitable - although it might appear otherwise from 
reading some of the criticisms of pluralist theory put forward 
after the Great War. Nevertheless, there were certain points of 
conceptual and political agreement between the pragmatists and 
the pluralists which I explore in depth. 
The approach I have taken is both thematic and historical. 
Each chapter covers a basic theme expressed in the academic 
literature of the period. In turn, each chapter is organised 
into a number of sub-themes, which represent certain aspects of a 
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more general debate. I have sought in these chapters, and in 
particular within the parameters of each sub-theme in each 
chapter, to present debates in a chronological fashion in order 
to demonstrate the persistence and development of certain topics 
over a period of time. Again, where sources have been used 
outside the immediate time-frame, this is for the purposes of 
comparison and contrast. 
This thesis describes and examines the arguments and 
opinions of a great variety of scholars. Many of these scholars 
are obscure. Nevertheless, they have been used either because of 
the veracity of their arguments or because they provide 
supporting evidence for some of the claims made by other scholars 
about ideas and events at that time. It should also be pointed 
out that while many of these writers are unknown now they were 
publishing in the major intellectual journals of the period; in 
some cases, their books were being reviewed in these same 
journals. As a more general point, it could be argued that an 
attempt to characterise the intellectual life of a period should 
involve much more than a discussion of a handful of well-known 
thinkers. Indeed, thinkers who are well-known to us today may 
have failed to achieve prominence during the time in which they 
The were writing 
converse is 
due to the vagaries of intellectual 
also true. That is, that there may 
fashion. 
be scholars, 
little regarded today, who nevertheless were widely read and 
talked about during their own time. Whether these thinkers are 
worthy of our attention on purely intellectual grounds or not is 
irrelevant to this thesis. Famous or not, the scholars I include 
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in this thesis are those I consider to have cast light on or 
achieved currency in their own time. 
The interwar discussions of the themes that I have examined 
exhibited a remarkable degree of continuity. This is also true of 
the criticisms of pragmatism. From the outset pragmatism was 
dismissed as something that would give rise to political 
opportunism at best and an ethics of power and domination at 
worst. It was a criticism that was seen to receive its final 
confirmation when Mussolini began invoking the name of James as 
one his mentors. Furthermore, he invoked Nietzsche and Sorel 
along with James. 
There are certain problems inherent in any study of the 
history of ideas. In particular, there is the problem of trying 
to strike a balance between exposition and criticism. Obviously 
both are important. What I have tried to do is to illustrate the 
arguments which were put during the period and examine the 
criticisms that they generated. I have also, where appropriate, 
developed my own criticisms of the arguments and the counter-
arguments which appeared. Much of the thesis thus consists of 
the responses of certain intellectuals to each other as well as 
my responses to them. However, given that this is a history of 
ideas rather than a straightforward philosophical study, the 
focus of my attention cannot only rest on examining the logical 
structure or accuracy of the arguments put by those scholars I 
discuss. 
One has to be careful that in looking for the deficiencies 
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in any argument one does not lose sight of the idea itself. 
Consideration must be give to the meaning or significance of an 
argument in relation to a broader intellectual context, and why 
it proved or did not prove persuasive within that context. 
Although of course, logical consistency and factual accuracy may 
be part of the reason why an argument proved persuasive. 
Furthermore, testing for the accuracy of the claims made by 
thinkers about other ideas is also crucial if one wants to know 
whether an author or event has been misinterpreted or 
misunderstood. This I have attempted to do. 
Nevertheless, my main interest remains with the work that 
certain ideas or vocabularies were called upon to perform. 
Arthur 0. Lovejoy described ideas as highly migratory. (Lovejoy 
1940:4) What he was really referring to was the process by which 
words and ideas are developed and criticised, interpreted and 
misinterpreted and redeployed outside of their immediate 
intellectual environment. The notion that ideas migrate from one 
area to another, in the way in which I have defined it, is 
crucial to this thesis. As we will see, the journey on which an 
idea was taken was often one which involved continuous 
reintepretation, redefinition and misinterpretation. My aim is 
not to correct misinterpretations although I certainly draw 
attention to them. Such corrections are secondary to the study of 
how certain ideas circulated and were responded to, including the 
misinterpretation of those ideas. 
I should point out that one of the great difficulties in 
analysing these debates is the fact that the vocabulary used by 
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many of the participants in them included so many terms of a 
general nature. This is an issue that I examine in detail in 
chapter four - although it is a point that is stressed through-
out my discussion. In particular, the problem lies with the fact 
that so many of the terms used in these debates were words that 
end in ~ An examination of the books and journals published 
at that time, especially in the area of philosophy and political 
theory, sees the ~fly past at an alarming rate. We hear of 
not only pragmatism, but positivism, voluntarism, intuitionism, 
mysticism, empiricism and so on. 
I must stress that I use these terms because they were part 
of the general intellectual currency of the period. One cannot 
examine these debates without referring to these categories. 
However, one must try to analyse the meanings of these terms and 
this is where problems arise. For the more closely one examines 
them, the more ill-defined and ambiguous they become. Often these 
terms referred to a number of different tendencies, some of 
which, as I argue in the case of both positivism and pragmatism, 
could contradict each other. The fact that these terms could be 
construed in different ways is part of the reason why 
intellectual confusion was a feature of these debates. Of course, 
these points do not simply apply to the use of ~· For we also 
witness debates (ostensibly philosophical) which are essentially 
about definitions. We see this in the debate between the 
philosophers and Einstein about the real meaning of simultaneity 
and time. Again my interest here is not so much in getting to 
either the real aeaning or to even the •ost suitable meaning that 
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these terms should possess; rather, it is in examining how these 
terms were used and the various meanings that they were given. 
I should also point out that a nwnber of the debates I 
examine were explicitly about the nature of reality (in the areas 
of philosophy, politics and economics) yet implicitly they were 
about metaphors. In particular, they were debates about what 
sort of metaphors, whether of a mechanical or biological kind, 
describe reality best. Here we find two things. Firstly, we see 
attempts to eliminate mechanical metaphors from philosophical, 
political and economic description. Secondly, we see attempts to 
reconceptualise nature or machinery as tools or instruments. 
These moves can be detected in the arguments of Bergson and the 
pragmatists and were important to both political and economic 
debates. 
The ideas and debates that I have drawn attention to are of 
historical interest because an examination of them allows us to 
characterise certain aspects of intellectual activity in the 
interwar years. Many of the ideas I have examined are also of 
historical interest because they were taken up and applied to the 
realm of practical activity. It is interesting to observe how 
obscure and difficult concepts and theories were passed on from 
thinker to thinker until they finally reached the social domain 
in what was frequently a distorted form. Indeed, some of these 
ideas or rather words that philosophers and scientists employed 
actually gained currency in political, economic and 
admininstrative debates. We find Bergson's idea of the vital 
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force, a notion he developed several years before the Great War, 
being applied to the study of public administration in the late 
1930s. The vocabularly and arguments of the pragmatists were 
another example. Pragmatist arguments were used by economists, 
students of administration and academics who became policy-makers 
in order to stir up political debate and to rearrange political 
priorities. We 
their pragmatism, 
find both scholars and policy-•akers averring 
by which they could mean that one should adopt 
either a scientific or a practical attitude towards social 
problems. In either case, when used in these ways, the word 
pragmatism had different meanings to those that it was endowed 
with by Sorel and Mussolini. 
As I have noted, the gaps between science and morality and 
between intellectual and social life were seen as a cause of 
crisis. The pragmatists sought to reconcile intellectual and 
practical activity. A major part of this thesis will be an 
examination of where they were deemed to have been successful and 
where they were deemed to have failed. It is this discussion that 
allows me to raise some general points, which I think are 
implicit in many of the debates of the period, about the 
relation between intellectual and political life and between 
intellectual and practical activity. 
Each chapter is an attempt to characterise an intellectual 
debate which took place in the period. In the following pages I 
will give a brief summary of each chapter and point to some of 
the key terms that were used in the course of these debates. I 
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shall also provide a definition of key terms which is consistent 
with the way they have been used in this thesis and the way in 
which they were used at that time. I have in all cases but one 
taken as my source for these definitions two works by the 
American scholar Ralph Barton Perry, himself a significant 
contributor to the scholarly debates of the time. I shall mainly 
rely o~a.n early and major work, IJli. Present Conflict gj, Ideals, 
(1918) which was an examination of all the conflicting 
philosophical doctrines which he claimed lay behind the military 
struggle which was the Great War. (Perry 1918:2) I shall also 
refer to a work he wrote twenty years later called ID. ~ Spirit 
Q.t William~ (1938). 
I should point out that any further modification of the 
usage of these terms which is required due to their ambiguity or 
due to a particular meaning they may have in other contexts, 
shall be recorded in the main body of the thesis. This list is 
not complete; not every ~ that appears in the text has been 
defined herein. Where I have not done this it is because the term 
does not appear frequently or because its meaning is obvious from 
the context. 
In the first chapter I discuss the literature of crisis or 
uncertainty. This was not a school of thought. Rather it 
comprised a disparate range of thinkers who to a degree shared a 
co11D1on vocabulary (that is, words such as crisis and uncertainty} 
and a common concern with what was seen as a dangerous •oment in 
the history of Western civilisation. The reasons given for the 
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appearance of this climate of uncertainty were manifold. However. 
we can isolate a number of sub-themes. Not surprisingly the 
authors of this crisis literature were largely concerned with 
events such as the Great War and its aftermath. the economic 
depression and the appearance of tyrannical governments in 
Europe. 
But there were other less obvious concerns. Intellectuals in 
particular were concerned that, despite all the mechanical 
wonders that bad appeared as a result of scientific progress. 
society was becoming increasingly empty of a moral or religious 
spirit. The First World War was viewed as a demonstration of the 
dangers that scientific progress could unleash if unmatched by a 
similar moral development. In addition to this, there was the 
fear that a scientific, secularised and cosmopolitan culture. one 
which was being hailed as the force of the future. would see 
human existence become passive and trivial. Furthermore. it was 
feared that this would lead to increasing outbursts of irrational 
behaviour. What was characteristic then of many of the 
intellectual responses to crisis was the belief that it had deep 
philosophical or spiritual roots. 
Chapter two deals with what was the most obvious response to 
crisis. This was the belief that crisis could be solved by the 
stricter application of scientific methods to the organisation 
and running of society. This was precisely the sort of belief 
that many philosphers and those holding religious beliefs rallied 
against, because they thought it would only worsen the crisis. 
Nevertheless. I show in this chapter that there was amon& social 
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scientists a great deal of faith in what science could achieve 
when applied to social life. 
It is in this chapter that I introduce the term scientism, 
by which is meant the cult of scientific methods. (Perry 
1918:45ff} Also in this chapter, I introduce the term empiricism 
(or "the philosophy of experience"} which dictates that knowledge 
must begin with that which is given in experience; that is, that 
which is i1111ediately disclosed by our senses. (Perry 1938:44) 
We should, however, draw a slight distinction between 
empiricism and what was called radical empiricism, which I 
address in chapters three and five. Radical empiricism is a much 
stricter term than empiricism insofar as its emphasis is wholly 
on the given - on pure sensations. The radical empiricists were 
less concerned with those formal procedures by which a particular 
sensory event could be verified, proving a certain hypothesis. 
Radical empiricism was distinguished from pragmatism to the 
extent that pragmatism is a method which tells one how to 
approach experience and not just an account of what lies in the 
content of experience. (Perry 1938:66) 
The conjunction of empiricism with techniques of 
verification was what characterised the positivist, which is a 
term introduced in chapter two. The core of the positivistic 
approach was the "acceptance of a determinate sensory event as 
constituting the final verification or proof to which every 
theory aust be submitted." (Perry 1938:51) However, I will 
demonstrate in this and later chapters that the vocabulary and 
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methods of science as adapted by social scientists did not quite 
accord with this definition. Frequently, the claim to be a 
positivist entailed no more than the assertion that one was 
paying attention to facts or was impartial in one's approach to 
a particular subject. Furthermore, the description positivistic 
was also used to refer to the idea that society should be run by 
fact-finding bodies. Like rationalism, (defined below) it had a 
political as well as an epistemological significance. To this 
extent, invoking the language of science was a rhetorical 
exercise and did not actually entail the transference of 
laboratory procedures to the social arena - even if that were 
possible. 
Chapter three looks at the development of positivism, in 
particular, its transformation into logical positivism (sometimes 
known as logical empiricism) in the hands of the Vienna circle. 
The important thing to note about logical positivists is that 
they. like pragmatist philosophers. stressed the importance of 
both "formal logic and an empirical criterion of the 
scientifically meaningful concept and hypothesis." (Horris 
1970:148) We should also note that positivism and empiricism were 
opposed by a group calling themselves the new or neo-realists. 
The neo-realists argued that because the positivist only spoke of 
sensations or experience. and not of any reality that existed 
independently of those things. the implications of their position 
were solipsistic. Pragmatists were also accused of being anti-
realist in this sense. However, we should note that the neo-
17 
realists did share with the positivists a faith in scientific 
methods. 
Chapter three also examines the reaction against the cult of 
science in the early part of the 20th century, 
the philosophy of Henri Bergson. Bergson was 
particularly in 
opposed to the 
mechanical understandings of nature which he held to be prominent 
in both classical and modern science. Bergson's philosophy, as 
with the philosophy of the pragmatists, was also defined in 
opposition to what was called rationalism -the belief that 
reality 
appeal 
could be divined by the use of "pure intellect" without 
to experience. (Perry 1938:170) We should note here, 
however, that the word rationalism also acquired other senses in 
the 1920s and 1930s. At first, it was used as a term of praise 
and referred to the rationalization movement or the new 
rationalism which developed after the Great War and which sought 
to apply scientific principles to the running of government and 
industry. Later however, the term rationalism was used to 
condemn formulaic approaches to the running of society. This 
understanding of the term rationalism is important for our 
discussions in chapters two, six and seven. 
Because of its opposition to rationalism, Bergson's 
philosophy was often described as a form of intuitionism or 
voluntarism. The former referred to non-intellectual forms of 
understanding and the latter referred to the elevation of will 
over intellect. (Perry 1938:29) The term voluntaris• was also 
frequently applied to the pragmatists. 
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The discussion in chapter three demonstrates the problems 
one faces in attempting to clearly define positivism and 
empiricism. In the case of empiricism this was because the 
apprehension of sensations could be related to Bergson's idea 
that true knowledge came from the intuition of the immediately 
given. Here, the empirical and the intuitive were combined. 
Indeed, we should note that because Bergson's philosophy placed 
great emphasis on intuition it was also described as a form of 
mysticism - a label which Bergson rejected. Perry defined this 
term (although not in relation to Bergson) as the belief that our 
intellects cannot, due to their "abstract and indirect" methods, 
enter a "deeper reality" which can only be reached by "feeling, 
immediate insight, ecstasy and intuition." (Perry 1918:28) 
In relation to positivism, it was frequently pointed out 
that it was prone to "collapse" into a form of personal or 
subjective idealism; that is, the belief that the individual was 
the ultimate origin and source of all meaning. (This position 
contrasts with that of absolute idealism, which viewed reality as 
the "aggregate of phenomena arranged by a single mind•, and 
ethical idealism, which held that all individuals were driven by 
the one moral will. [Perry 1918:190,235]) This is because the 
positivist and the empiricist (and this was also true of Bergson 
in soae respects}, deny that phenomena need to be supported by an 
extra layer called reality. The argUJBent was that without this 
layer of reality the retreat into subjectivism was inevitable. 
It is not surprising that where aodern physics (especially 
the theory of relativity) was seen as giving support to a fora of 
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subjective idealism or pheno•enalis•, it was associated with the 
name of Bergson. Phenomenalism was the view that the contents of 
experience were mental in character. (Perry 1918:189) However, 
relativity theory and quantum physics were also seen as 
supporting a form of panpsychism, the belief that phenomena were 
actually comprised of a substance which was •mind-stuff" (or 
sometimes mind-energy) and that all that one saw in the world 
were shifting arrangments of this stuff. (Perry 1918:190) I 
demonstrate in chapter three that such interpretations of modern 
physics were wrong. Nevertheless, I also reveal their importance 
in relation to the development of pragmatist philosophy. It 
should be noted that the discussion of the meaning of the terms 
relativity and time in this chapter is also crucial in relation 
to my discussion in chapter seven of certain developments within 
economic thought in the interwar years. 
Pragmatism as a philosophy is the central theme in chapter 
four. The meaning of pragmatism is extensively explored in this 
chapter while its political influence is discussed later in 
chapter six. In chapter four, I first examine the origins of 
pragmatism and its early development. However, my main focus is 
on its later development in the hands of John Dewey and Sidney 
Book, as a form of experiaentalism or instrwnentalism. 
Experimentalis• •eant the scientific technique of verification. 
That is, the idea that a hypothesis was proven where its 
verification was successful. InstrUJ1entalism, however, was a 
broader ter• which applied the experi•ental criterion of success 
to a auch broader range of pheno•ena - such as •oral behaviour, 
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econo•ic policy and public administration. It was also construed 
in more a voluntaristic manner to mean whatever can satisfy a 
passion or desire. 
Dewey denied that instrumentalism implied subjectivis•. 
Hook stated that the pragmatism of Dewey was scientific, unlike 
the mystical pragmatism of James. Dewey and Hook tried to give 
pragmatism an objective status in order to avoid the charge of 
subjectivism that was levelled at the positivist and empiricist. 
In order to do this they embraced a form of naturalism; this 
term ref erred to the view that man was a part of nature and that 
his behaviour should be seen as a process of adaptation to the 
environment which was guided by his own instinctive and 
intellectual capacities. This view was of ten labelled 
deterministic because it appeared to view man's behaviour as a 
mechanical function of his environment. Dewey and Hook however 
implications of their naturalism were denied that 
deterministic. 
the 
They argued that naturalism allowed for and even 
facilitated human freedom because it encouraged men to seize the 
scientific tools they had created and turn these to good ends. 
For Dewey, the reason for putting man back "inside" nature was so 
that he could rediscover his creative powers. He could recall the 
fact that industrial civilisation was the result of his capacity 
to adapt to the physical environment. This was similar to an idea 
that Bergson had put forward some years earlier that man must 
rediscover his creative powers. Again, this discussion points to 
the fact that •any different meanings can be given to the terms 
used in the course of these debates. Depending on the meanings 
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given to terms such as instrumentalism and the concept of nature, 
there may be a range of philosophical outcomes. This fourth 
chapter concludes with a discussion of the pragmatists' attempts 
to bridge the gap between science and morality. 
In chapter five I begin to examine some of the political 
implications of the philosophies I have discussed, In this 
chapter I discuss the development of pluralist political 
The pluralist was one who held that the group and 
theory. 
not the 
individual or the state should be the real unit of political 
autonomy. This was a political theory that developed in reaction 
to what the pluralists called political monism - the belief in 
the all-encompassing state. This belief was said to be derived 
from the philosophical position that "nature is one interrelated 
system." (Perry 1918:227) This view was most commonly associated 
with the neo-Hegelian movement in Britain. Bernard Bosanquet, 
whom I discuss in chapters five and six, was one of the chief 
targets of pluralist thinkers. Bosanquet was held to be a 
representative of the view that the state, as the representative 
of the general will (which itself was based on the idea of a 
"spiritual community") should be the body charged with the 
ultimate adjustment of social relations. (Perry 1918:271) 
The philosophy of pragmatism was frequently associated with 
this attack on political monism. However, in this chapter I also 
discuss the development of pluralist political theory in relation 
to a much wider range of historical and intellectual forces in 
order to be able to determine the actual influence of pragmatisa. 
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In this chapter, as well as addressing the pluralist theory of 
Frederic William Maitland and John Neville Figgis, I examine the 
syndicalist movement. Syndicalism was seen as an extreme form of 
pluralism and this identification helps explain the hostility 
that pluralist theory aroused both before and after the Great 
War. I examine the influence of syndicalism in France, America, 
Britain and Italy. As noted above, studying this movement is 
important because of the alleged association between it and the 
ideas of Bergson and James. The syndicalist movement, in terms of 
its motivations, was seen as a politial manifestation of 
romanticism and irrationalism. The former was the "cult of 
spontaneity of passion", and the latter referred to any 
philosophy which ndisparages intellect" and nexalts instinct, 
passion and intuition." (Perry 1918:285:294) 
Syndicalism was said to stand mid-way between anarchism 
(which posited the individual as the unit of political autonomy) 
and collectivism (in which the state as the representative of the 
collectivity is supreme). However, I also show that syndicalism 
and pluralism were used to refer to a form of social organisation 
other than one composed of autonomous groupings. I discuss in 
this chapter what was called administrative syndicalism or 
adminstrative pluralism. These terms were usually applied to 
arguments in favour of the independence of the public services 
from the political power, which stated that the sole duty of 
government was the efficient delivery of public services. 
When used in this way, syndicalism or pluralism was held to 
be close to the fascist idea of the corporate state, in which 
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individuals practising a certain vocation (or with a certain 
function to perform) were organised into groups which were 
subject to hierarchical discipline and which were under an 
obligation not to endanger the well-being of the corporate body. 
Also in this chapter. I briefly discuss guild socialism (which 
was described as the British variant of syndicalism) which was 
said to stand aid-way between the idea of the corporate state and 
those who argued that groups should be largely autonomous. The 
guild socialists also envisaged a society in which functions were 
organically arranged but, unlike the theorists of the corporatist 
state. their vision would allow each of these functional groups 
to be represented in the system's overall governing body. 
This chapter finally examines the marriage between pluralist 
political thought and what was called internationalism; that is. 
the belief that the national boundaries which separated people 
were artificial and should eventually be dissolved. I demonstrate 
that within pluralist theory there existed a conjunction of the 
particular (that is, an emphasis on the power of groups within 
the boundaries of the state) with the universal (that is, the 
emphasis on the ideal of an international community.) This 
picture was the mirror-image of the one held up by many of their 
opponents. 
In chapter six I directly examine the influence of 
pragmatist philosophy on political theory and theories of 
jurisprudence. Here. the political possibilities opened up by 
pragmatism are shown to have been manifold. I begin this chapter 
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by developing the relation between the philosophy of James and 
the pluralist theory of Harold Laski. On James' pluralistic view, 
the universe is a shifting arrangement of partially united 
forces. It is a universe in which some things are continuous with 
each other and others are not. It is a universe where there was 
only a limited place for exact causal prediction. In this 
chapter, I explore Laski's transformation of James' philosophy 
into political theory. The world depicted as a result of this 
transformation was comprised of shifting arrangements of only 
partially unified groups and collectivities. 
Laski saw his political philosophy as a way of preventing 
the state from accumulating too much power. However, the critics 
of pluralism and pragmatism argued that Laski's political theory, 
in conjunction with James' philosophy, led to exactly such an 
outcome. That is, it gave rise to fascism. There were two reasons 
put forward in order to argue this point. The less serious charge 
was that pluralism led to social chaos and the eventual 
imposition of rule by force. The second charge was that there 
were things intrinsic to pragmatism itself (its emphasis on 
voluntarism, on the malleability of the universe and on the 
understanding of truth as success) which gave rise to fascism. 
The argument was that any group which embraced this creed would 
attempt, not only to assert their own autonomy against the state, 
but would also to seek to dominate all other groups within the 
state. I explore in some detail this form of criticism of 
pragmatism, as well as the responses to it. In addition to this, 
I examine the charge that the ideas of the French philosopher of 
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jurisprudence Leon Duguit (as well as those of John Dewey} had 
also prepared the basis for fascism because they were seen as 
supporting the idea of the state as a functional arrangement. Of 
course, my analysis of explanations for fascis• in the interwar 
period considers only ideas which were related to pragmatism. 
This chapter concludes with a discussion of the shift away 
from pluralist theory in the 1930s in response first to the 
depression, and then to the onset of the Second World War. 
Pragmatist philosophy is discussed in relation to this. It was 
pragmatism in its more scientific form (that is, as a philosophy 
imitating the experimental sciences) that came to the fore then 
This is a theme that I also develop in chapter seven. Chapter six 
concludes with a general discussion about the problems of 
defining pragmatism and pluralism, and a consideration of the 
fraught question about the relation between political thought and 
political action. 
Chapter seven is a concluding chapter which looks at the use 
that was made of pragmatist philosophy and the ideas derived from 
the new physics in the area of economic theorising. In this 
context, I examine the various ways in which the concepts of 
time, indeterainiacy and the metaphor of creative evolution were 
imported into the realms of economic theorising. These ideas 
provided the means by which traditional theories could be 
destabilised, and be forced to acco1t111odate different patterns of 
thought. I argue that in reconceptualisng economic life, 
economists were better placed to respond to the political demands 
of the time. Furthermore, I argue in this chapter that it was 
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largely through the gateway of economics that pragmatism, and 
the vocabulary associated with it, entered the language of public 
administration in the English-speaking world. Hence, we find in 
the administrative and economic journals of the late 1930s and 
1940s an emphasis on the need for administrators to be practical 
and empirical in their approach to social planning. Indeed, it 
was economics conceived as an empirical science that was above 
all seen as the answer to the crisis of the 1930s. Not 
surprisingly, however, when pragmatic •ethods became just one of 
many techniques of social experiment and adjustment, they ceased 
to be controversial. Pragmatism came to be seen as a word used to 
describe justifications of the status quo. Ironically, given its 
earlier challenges to intellectualist theories, it even came to 
be called a form of rationalism. 
. -
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Chapter 1: The Age Of Uncertainty 
1. The Literature of Crisis 
The spectre of crisis loomed large in the literature 
produced by intellectuals from both within and without the 
academy in the period between the end of the Great War and the 
onset of World War II. The word was used to give expression to 
distinct yet also overlapping concerns about the trajectory of 
Western civilization. Military crises, economic crises and 
political crises came one after the other. After 1918 it also 
became common to speak of an intellectual and spiritual 
caused by a collapse in the foundations of knowledge and 
As we shall see, a scepticism of foundations was one 
defining features of the age. 
crisis 
belief. 
of the 
By the 1930s a substantial amount of material centred on the 
idea of a "crisis" in the Western world had appeared. While 
frequently used to highlight short-run political or economic 
problems, the word was also used to describe certain long-range 
tendencies which had profound implications for the Western way of 
life. In these years we can observe the flourishing of a whole 
vocabulary of crisis and social turmoil. For instance, in 1936 in 
the preface to Karl Mannheia's Ideology AD.4 Utopia Louis Wirth 
noted that, in response to the spread of conflicts both within 
and between nations, there had "arisen an extensive literature" 
which spoke "of the ·end', ·decline', ·crisis', ·decay', or 
'death' of western civilisation." (Mannheim 1936:xiii) 
28 
These platitudes and ideas about the collapse of Western 
civilisation can be found throughout the interwar era. Of course, 
we could say that fears about the end of the world are evident 
through-out history and that therefore, there is little reason to 
argue that this period constitutes a special case. Further to 
this, we could argue that any attempt to isolate a discrete set 
of writings on crisis is to impose an artificial unity on what 
may be quite unrelated concerns. 
It is true that warnings of social chaos and 
not peculiar to this period. The mere fact 
collapse 
that 
are 
some 
intellectuals warned of danger might not be remarkable. Indeed, 
it is in the nature of intellectuals as a group, insofar as they 
see themselves as the guardians of civilised customs and habits 
of thought, to issue such warnings from time to time - although 
they may often be ignored. Yet what is notable about the 
interwar years is the high degree of visibility and currency that 
the rhetoric of crisis obtained. Crisis was acknowledged to be a 
central preoccupation of the times in both the intellectual and 
political spheres. Laski spoke for many in the English-speaking 
world when he announced in 1933 that there was abroad a temper of 
•profound and widespread disillusionment•, and that the only 
successful literature was that of despair and protest. (Laski 
1933:16-18) 
Crisis literature also exhibited a degree of self-
consciousness. Writers could not have been ignorant of the fact 
that they were contributing to a body of work centred on themes 
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of social and intellectual chaos. Nor could they have been 
untouched by it. As each new difficulty or problem arose, it was 
possible to attach it to and interpret it in terms of previous 
expressions of alarm. 
Another thing to note about these writings is that it was 
often suggested that the modern crisis might be much more serious 
and long-lasting than those which had occurred in previous 
centuries. Laski wrote in Democracy in. Crisis that the chaotic 
conditions which prevailed in bis own times were not unlike those 
which appeared in the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars. 
Furthermore, he suggested that, just as the Western world had 
recovered after a generation from those terrible times, it was 
quite possible that after a period of crisis so too would the 
Western world recover from its present discontents. Yet he said 
that there were symptoms that pointed to the onset of massive 
social convulsions. {Laski 1933:15) One could not simply assume 
that the modern crisis was merely a passing phase. That is one 
reason why mention of crisis was often converted into 
declarations about the end or collapse of civilization. 
It should be stated at the outset that we are not going to 
search for the real causes of crisis. Nor are we going to debate 
the question as to whether a crisis existed as an objective 
reality. The focus here is entirely on perceptions as expressed 
in the writings of intellectuals. It is by focussing upon these 
that we can see bow various intellectuals responded to the 
widespread belief, expressed by Gilbert Hurray, that there was 
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"something wrong." He observed in the 1930s that: "There is a 
loss of confidence, a loss of faith, an omnipresent, haunting 
fear. People speak as they never spoke in the Victorian days of 
the possible collapse of civilization." (Harrington 1965:32) 
This is not to suggest that the idea of "crisis" was only 
in the mind of intellectuals. The word gained widespread use in 
this period and many of the writings of intellectuals on this 
topic entered the mainstream of political life. This suggested 
that crisis rhetoric did manage to adequately describe the 
circumstances and give vent to the feelings of both English and 
non-English speaking peoples. 
Most of all it is the vocabulary of crisis which helps unify 
those preoccupations. If we can show that a distinctive 
vocabulary was invoked frequently and with intensity in these 
years, then we have further grounds for imposing some unity on 
the writings of the period. In this case, as Wirth's comment 
suggests, it is the constant reiteration of words such as crisis, 
decline and chaos and their arrangement around particular sets 
of issues that lends coherence to this enterprise. To scan the 
titles of many of the texts published in this period is to be 
struck by the frequency with which the word crisis appeared. 
Andre Siegried's books Europe's Crisis and Endand' s Crisjg, 
Harold Laski's Democncy iJL Crisis and Edaund Husserl's lb 
~d~i:i g,L ~ European ~c;i ~IHifj:Ji are a few exuples. Indeed, one 
1. Michael Harrington cited Hurray in l:Wl Accidental Ceptury 
(1965) which itself is an example of post-war crisis literature. 
I should stress however, that in intellectual circles in the 
post-war era, the idea that there was a cr1s1s in civilisation 
was not nearly as widely held as it was in the interwar years. 
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reviewer of Siegfied's Europe's Crisis wrote, "these days 
'crisis' is a much overworked and sorely abused word." 
(Guillebaud 1935:736) Again, this is not to suggest that the use 
of the word crisis in order to ref er to a wide range of social 
and intellectual problems is peculiar to this era. Yet the term 
did become something of a catch-cry in these years, much more so 
that it bad in earlier times. Nevertheless, I should add that 
while the use of these terms does suggest that there was a 
linguistic identity in debates about crisis, it does not suggest 
that there was an actual unity of beliefs. In many cases there 
was agreement about the nature and the source of crisis. However, 
the word crisis could also be used to refer to quite different 
phenomena. 
Randolph Starn in his essay on Historians w;y;l 'Crisis' would 
seem to support this view. In his study of the history of the 
term he made special mention of the crisis literature which 
appeared after the Great War and also developed around the Second 
World War. (Starn 1971:10-12) Starn detailed how a word which 
began life with a medical meaning in the 5th century B.C., 
describing that moment in ti•e when an illness either intensifies 
or subsides, was extended by analogy to include momentous 
occasions in the conduct of political and military affairs. Starn 
wrote that the term was used in all of these senses several times 
in Thucidydes' Historv sU, tb.i, Pelopponesiag ~. (Starn 1971:4-
5) However, in the Ro•an, medieval and Renaissance eras crisis 
was returned to its technical medical roots. The term really did 
not burst forth again until the 17th century - a century 
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described as one of general crisis. (Starn 1971:5-6) After the 
17th century it came to be applied to any number of intellectual, 
social, political and economic matters, obtaining particular 
prominence in Marxist theories of history. (Starn 1971:5-9) As 
Starn notes, the advantage of the term and the reasons for its 
popularity among historians lies with its essential ambiguity. 
Crisis has both technical and theatrical appeal; it can be 
applied to both short-run and long-term tendencies; it can serve 
cyclical understandings of history as well as ones which are 
open-ended; it can function as a warning of danger as well as a 
call to arms and finally it can encourage both hope and despair. 
(Starn 1971:4-5) 
Whether a crisis was seen as terminal or transitory also 
depended on the sorts of metaphors with which it was ·described. 
For instance, the American historian Henry Adams appeaked to the 
law of entropy, which insisted that there was a tendency in all 
creations to decay, in order to argue that civilisation was 
sliding towards chaos. (Shumate 19 34:600-1) In addition, a 
growing awareness of the relative character of cultural habits 
and beliefs encouraged pessimism about the future of Western 
civilization. H.R Raven in Civilization ~ Divine Superman (1932) 
claimed that 20th century thinkers, breathing in the spirit of 
relativity, recognised that every civilization and the moral 
principles it upheld would in the end descend into an •anarchic 
barbarism out of which a new rejuvenated culture would emerge." 
(Raven 1932:225) 
Thus, the use of certain quasi-scientific metaphors could 
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give a logical force to claims about the inevitability of social 
decline. Perhaps the most notorious example of this genre was 
Oswald Spengler's two volume work Illi. Decline g,L ~ ~. which 
first appeared in 1918 and which put forward an "organismic" 
interpretation of crisis. (Ogg 1942:4) Crisis, according to 
Spengler's biological interpretation, was a cyclical phenomenon. 
As he argued later in tlim, Awl Techpics, the ongoing cycle of life 
docreed that every creation, every thought and every deed was 
foredoomed to decay and oblivion. (Spengler 1932:14) The 
appearance of civilization, Spengler wrote, marked a culture's 
highest stage yet also sounded its death-knell. Thus, whether it 
was called crisis, decline or collapse, what Western man was 
witnessing in the interwar years was the "death agony of Western 
Culture" for which there was no cure. (Sorokin 1941:16) 
In announcing the death of Western civilization Spengler was 
carrying on the task of "sceptical unmasking" that Nietzsche had 
begun. (Spengler 1926:xiv) In I.b.e, U,ecline Q.1, ~ ~ he 
attempted to show that the very concepts of mankind (which he 
termed "an empty word"} and Western civilization were illusions. 
(Spengler 1926:21) It did not take the onset of the Great War to 
suggest this to him. Spengler saw hiaself as a prophet of decline 
and not just its observer. He wrote in the preface to the first 
edition of Ihi, Decline gL ~ ~ that he had conceived of the 
title in 1912. (Spengler 1922:xv) Nevertheless, the Great War 
very auch permeated this work. He conceded that he had 
extensively rewritten the text in the midst of the "storm and 
stress" of those years. (Spengler 1926:xiii-xv) 
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While Spengler's specific claims about the state of Western 
civilisation now seem somewhat operatic in scope, Dul Declipe g1, 
t1ut, ~ did cause an "unprecedented sensation" in Germany on 
its release. It encapsulated the "dreary mood of pessimism" 
which had so absorbed the German people in the aftermath of the 
Great War. (Liebert 1933:34) Indeed, Spengler wrote in the 
preface to the revised edition in 1922 that the "misery and 
disgust" of the post-war period had provided additional 
confirmation of his earlier diagnosis. (Spengler 1922:xiv) 
While Spengler and before him Nietzsche made early 
predictions of crisis, a more general preoccupation with the 
notion that Western civilization was in a state of collapse began 
to emerge with the closing chapters of the Great War. Interest in 
the putative death of Western civilization was by no means a 
peculiarly German concern. We find that fears about the collapse 
of Western civilization were frequently articulated in the 
English-speaking world. While no doubt partly inspired and 
confirmed by the war against Germany, the sources of these fears 
often resided in developments which bore no direct relation to 
German political affairs. 
For example, concerns were expressed about the growing 
materialistic ethos in Western societies and the consequent 
diminution of Christian belief. In 1928, writing in the 
Australasiap Journal iU, ~olgg~ ~ PhiloAQpbJL, the Reverend 
H. K Archdall argued that because people had become solely 
concerned with material advancement they were now living "under 
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the sign of the collapse of Civilisation." (Archdall ~928:15) R.H 
Tawney had earlier expressed the sa•e view. Be wrote in the 1Jw, 
Acguisitiye Society (1920) that what made the •odern era 
distinctive was that religion was seen to be irrelevant to the 
"habitual conduct and organisation of society". (Tawney 1920:234) 
What made modern life distinctive also made it more precarious 
because only Christianity, with its absolute stantiards·of right 
and wrong, bad stood between civilization and the "rule of the 
sword." (Tawney 1920:234-5} Modern crises were bound to be much 
worse than in the past, as man had no religious beliefs to bold 
onto and no ultimate confirmation that men should be free and 
equal. 
This was a consistent theme in' crisis literature and one 
which was related to such problems as the encroachment of 
technology, the rise of the masses and growing intellectual 
scepticism, all of which were seen as unique to modern times and 
as causes of modern anxiety. Lippmann wrote in 1927 that three of 
the things that made the modern experience unique were the 
impersonal character of the modern •etropolis, the fact that 
knowledge was in a constant state of flux and the lack of any 
authoritative body of morals to which man could appeal. (Lipp•ann 
1946:174) As a result, the modern experience was "uprooted", 
"incoherent"; •odern man was lost. (Lipp•ann 1946:69) The word 
•odern, while still suggestive of things that were perfect and 
new, also came to take on rather negative connotations·:-· The word 
•odern, in many respects, came to stand for uncertainty, 
confusion and even crisis. 
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2. The Collapse of Utopia 
Reinterpretations of the significance of aodern life 
flourished after the Great War. We find in the post-war 
literature that 1914 was frequently used to mark the beginnings 
of modern man's fall. Contrasts were sharply drawn between the 
temper of intellectual and social life in the pre and po~t-war 
eras. While 1913 was described as an "age of security", 1931 was 
described as an "age of dreadful insecurity"; an "age of fear" 
which bad begotten tyranny. (Portus 1939:95) 
If we are to believe the comments of some writers, the sense 
of disappointment after the conclusion of the Great War was so 
strong because a period of great optimism and confidence had 
preceded it. Optimism in particular was expressed about the 
possibility of social reform and the gradual elimination of 
violent or military solutions to political conflicts. The 
Australian writer F.W. Gisborne noted that up to 1914 optimists 
had insisted that war between nations was impossible, because of 
the "advance of civilisation" (manifest in the spread of culture, 
education, commerce and democracy) and an "assumed growth of ·a 
feeling of fellowship among all the world's races". (Gisborne 
1925: 77) 
While the depiction of the pre-War era as one of confidence 
and security may have been to some a myth created·by those who 
wished to depict their own times as particularly dark and 
dangerous, it did have a historical basis. In the years before 
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the Great War, aany people did look forward to a new englightened 
age in the conduct of domestic and international affairs. The 
American historian Samuel Morison notes that President Wilson had 
declared in Ihg, lili Freeda• that: •This is nothing short of a new 
social age, a new era of hwaan relationships, a new stage-setting 
for the drama of life." (Morison 1965:812} Morison further adds 
that even the "chronically pessimistic" Henry Adaas had written 
in his Education that following the settling of the Russo-
Japanese War it seemed that "for the first time in 1500 years a 
true Roman ~was in sight." (Morison 1965:841} 
Perhaps if pre-war progressives or world improvers, as they--
were called, had not exhibited such confidence in their schemes, 
their ideas may not have been branded as "failures" following 
"that fateful year" of 1914. (Gisborne 1925:77} As Gisborne 
wrote, all the confident anticipations of the new era of peace 
were "falsified by events." (Gisborne 1925:77) Wilson's "New 
Freedom" turned out to be nothing more than a hollow hope. Laski 
wrote that the Great War had dealt a deadly blow to the 
foundations of religious belief and this criticism of religious 
foundations had been extended to civilization as a whole. (Laski 
1933:16-17} Such views were also being expressed in Europe. PaGl 
Valery wrote his article ~ Crisis ~ WJMi just after the Great 
War. He wrote in 1931 of the sentiaents he had been trying to 
express when he penned that it: 
The Crisis of Mind, which I wrote iuediately - after dte'''-"-
peace, contains merely a development of the thoughts that 
came to ae alaost twenty years earlier. The immediate result 
of the Great War was, as it could not avoid being, to 
emphasize and precipitate the declining trend of 
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Europe ... that crisis, which had been prepared long in 
advance by all sorts of illusions, and which has left in its 
wake so many problems, enigmas, and fears, a more uncertain 
situation, more troubled minds, a more gloomy future, than 
ever existed in 1913. (Valery 1951:27) 
Perhaps the most shattering effect of the Great War, at 
least for many intellectuals, was the destruction of the 
Victorian confidence in the progress of Western civilizaton. 
Laski wrote that it was against the background of this growing 
scepticism of foundations in the West that challeges to colonial 
rule were taking place in India and China took place. With the 
undermining of this belief there was no answer to the demands of 
the colonies for independence, except that of force. (Laski 
1933:18) Armed conflict was perceived to be as much a part of the 
modern world as it was of the old. In fact, modern warfare seemed 
much more devastating, 
A Western scepticism of foundations was something that 
characterised the interwar period. Elton Mayo, writing at the 
end of the Second World War, described bow in a matter of thirty 
years all the grand plans for reform of the Victorian era had 
been reduced to chaos. (Mayo 1945:3) He described this as a 
"Greek tragedy" on an unprecedented scale. (Mayo 1945:3) As the 
allusion to classical tragedy suggests, there was a degree of 
hubris involved here. For the confidence of the Victorian era 
also contained within it the seeds of its own destruction. Mayo 
wrote that it was because of the blind belief that he could 
master his fate that man had called "down upon himself the wrath 
of the gods.• (Mayo 1945:3) References to the arrogance of 20th 
century man had been made since the end of the Great War. 
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Archdall wrote in 1928 that humanity had entered the "20th 
century with an unshakable conceit" in itself; it was even 
doubtful, he wrote, whether "the worst war in history" had 
shaken it out of its "self-complacency." (Archdall 1928:15} But 
as suggested above, such warnings were not always heeded. The 
fact that there was a delayed recognition of these warnings on 
the part of politicians and the public only served to fuel 
intellectual perceptions of crisis. 
One reason for pointing to a crisis in social or 
intellectual affairs is to aid in the manipulation of priorities. 
Alerting others to perceived dangers may be a way of promoting 
one's own desired solutions. For instance, to insist that there 
is a crisis in social or intellectual life may be a backdoor way 
of calling for a return to past customs or ways of thinking. It 
may lead to a reassertion of the importance of "real morality and 
the fundamental 
(Hunter 1929a:SO) 
period frequent 
regeneration. 
virtues" 
Indeed, 
calls 
- the true foundations of society. 
we can find in the literature of the 
for spiritual renewal and moral 
It should be easy to see why talk of crisis gave way to talk 
of foundations, involving claims and counter-claims about the 
"real" nature and source of a civilized existence. We should 
also note that the insistence that there was a crisis in Western 
civilization gave rise to reflections on the role of the 
intellectual in relation to the rest of society. The claim that 
Western spiritual life was in a state of decay and that this was 
the cause of political turmoil was often attached to arguments in 
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favour of the paramount importance of contemplative activity and 
the pre-eminence of philosophical modes of thought. Only 
philosophy could show the way to true morality because only 
philosophy took notice of those imponderable things such as love, 
justice and brotherhood. It was claimed that only philosophical 
understanding of these higher truths could secure the well-being 
of the social order. Archdall wrote that unless social life was 
underpinned by a commitment to such atemporal values, then it 
would be "soured at the source" and would slide from "disunsion 
to anarchy" and to the "methods of the jungle." (Archdall 
1928:23) 
While the symptoms of crisis were largely agreed upon 
colonial revolts, the rise of dictators, economic depression and 
class antagonisms - differences arose over the inner significance 
of these symptoms. We should note in this context that the word 
foundations is also ambiguous. Foundations need not always be 
located in the atemporal sphere; they may be time-bound the 
products of human design and manufacture and may require 
rebuilding now and again. Thus, distinct from those who saw the 
true meaning of crisis and the true foundations of society in 
religious terms is the British scholar E.H Carr, who saw both 
crisis and foundations as essentially political phenomena. 
Indeed, crisis for Carr stemmed largely from the nature of 
political life itself. In particular, in his famous text first 
published in 1939 and called IJw. Twenty Years' Crisis (spanning 
the years 1919 to 1939), Carr focussed upon conflicts in the 
international arena and the failure of the League of Nations to 
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control them. 
Carr noted that periods of "crisis" had been common in 
history, but he said that the crisis of the interwar years had 
its own characteristic feature. For Carr, this was the "abrupt 
descent from the visionary hopes of the first decade to the grim 
despair of the second." (Carr 1946:224} During the "mirage of the 
twenties" politicians continued to express confidence about the 
prospects for future world peace. (Carr 1946:224} According to 
Carr, the extent to which they were deluding themselves only 
became evident during the Manchurian crisis of 1931. But crisis 
stood for more than an end to the illusions and optimism of the 
twenties. Carr thought the "inner meaning" of the crisis was the 
"collapse", after a century and a half, of the utopian belief in 
the "harmony of interests". (Carr 1946:226:62} Totalitarian 
dictatorships were but the symptoms of this more fundamental 
disease. (Carr 1946:226} 
One could also describe Carr's work as an attempt at 
"sceptical unmasking" of cherished 19th century ideals about the 
progress of international affairs. For in I.hi. Twenty ~ Crisis 
Carr argued that the concept of a "coherent ·western' 
civilization whose conflicts could be harmonised" lacked any 
substance. (Carr 1946:224} Behind all the solemnities about 
Western civilization and the brotherhood of mankind, and the 
attempts to "moralise international relations", lay vested 
interests. (Carr 1946:225) This only became obvious in the 20th 
century because in the 18th and 19th centuries wars had been 
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conducted by the "civilised" against the "uncivilised" and so for 
many the persistance of conflict went unnoticed. Now however, it 
was the civilised world that was tearing itself apart and thus 
crisis had become a stark and palpable reality. (Carr 1946:225) 
Furthermore, the crisis revealed that utopian ideals of 
harmony and rationality were not only inappropriate but were also 
dangerous when applied too rigorously to political life. The 
political conflicts of the 1930s made it clear that institutions 
like the League, based on the optimistic assumption that the good 
of each lay with the good of all, were unable to cope with or 
control those who sought to change the status quo. 
The disappointment that followed the discovery that 
interests of the civilized do not always harmonize and that 
conflict would remain an often sordid reality saw a sharp swing 
away from optimism towards pessimism. The interwar years showed 
that disorder was not simply due to stupidity or wickedness which 
could be eliminated through scientific or moral education. (Carr 
1946:39-40) The years of crisis demonstrated that what Carr 
called political "realism" - defined as the pursuit of self-
interest - was the dominant force in political life and that this 
could never be overcome. (1) It was not the failure to properly 
implement utopian programmes that was the proble•, it was the 
fact that all such prograDlDles were falsely based. 
1. Machiavelli, Marx and Freud were said to show "typical 
realism" in drawing attention to the links between opinions and 
interests. (Fox 1938:193) 
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It was the fatalism which was consequent upon the breakdown 
of utopian beliefs that was both tragic and dangerous. Carr wrote 
that "the men of the nineteen-thirties returned shocked and 
bewildered to the world of nature." (Carr 1946:225) (1) In the 
years dating from 1919 to 1939 civilization had shifted its 
embrace from a utopia which paid little attention to reality, to 
a reality which had erased every element of utopia. (Carr 
1946:224} 
While Carr certainly did not embrace the Spenglerian 
nightmare, believing that the foundations of a new international 
order could be built afresh, (Carr 1946:226) he nevertheless 
rejected the idea of a society run in accord with either high 
principles of justice or scientific rules of behaviour. For 
Carr, the crisis in international affairs exemplified the 
fundamental problem of political life. This being th~ continuing 
and never-ending struggle between realism and utopianism. It was 
in international affairs that this struggle was most rawly 
displayed. Nevertheless, Carr's analysis suggested that crisis is 
incipient wherever politics appears. 
3. Crisis and the Significance of Time. 
Talk of crisis can lead one to pursue an infinite regress of 
causes. Even where we speak of it as the result of moral or 
intellectual illnesses, these themselves can be seen as symptoms 
1. R.G Collingwood also noted that the conflicts of the 
seemed to give credence to the Hobbesian truth that war was 
natural condition of mankind. (Collingwood 1942:iv} 
tiaes 
the 
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of something else. Social pessimism could be seen as one 
particular response to a more general sense of unease about the 
pace and processes of modern industrial civilization. If the 
British scholar Graham Wallas was right, a sense of historical 
rupture and feeling of inability to control hllllan destiny were 
also apparent in intellectual and political circles. He wrote in 
1920 that one could detect in the political ~nd literary life of 
the twentieth century a fear that "the civilization which we 
have adopted so rapidly" would bring with it neither harmony or 
stability. (Wallas 1920: 14) 
Henry Adams put it more strongly. He had written in 1918 
that the 
seen an 
course of twentieth century science and 
"avalanche of unknown forces" fall upon 
industry had 
the world. 
(Adams 1918:461) Robert V. Shumate, in an article called "The 
Philosophy of Henry Adams" in ~ American Political Science 
Review, noted Adams' observation that the very tempo with which 
these had been absorbed by modern societies had "merely 
accelerated the pace at which we are moving toward our ultimate 
doom." (Shumate 1934:603) It was this association between 
modernity and mechanization, the latter being seen as a pathology 
rather than panacea, that Adams saw as a source of anxiety. The 
new and the novel were not always a cause for celebration. 
Furthermore, the disruptive effects of these new forces rendered 
the modern experience of time a particularly discordant one. 
Adams wrote that the "convulsions" of •odern technology had not 
only seen the time process quickened; they had also seen it 
fractured. Evolution had been "warped" and "broken by freaks of 
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force." {Adams 1918:401) 
One perceived effect of this feeling that modern life was 
all pressure and speed was a philosophical preoccupation with the 
question of time. This was because time awareness is at its most 
. 
sharp where there is a strong sense of discontinll'ty between past 
and present. This sense of discontinuity is also a characteristic 
feature of periods of crisis. The concept of time and the 
concept of crisis are ambiguous in similar ways. Nicholas 
Berdyaev wrote in ~ Meaning Qt History (1923) that time had a 
"dual significance" for humanity. (Berdyaev 1949:98) While it is 
the mark of "creative activity" it is also associated with 
"fear and anxiety", because as time moves on it can leave death 
and destruction in its wake. (Berdyaev 1949:98) This equivocal 
nature of our understanding of time is paralleled in our 
............ 
understanding of crisis. For, as Lewis Mumford noted, the 
Chinese symbol for crisis signifies both danger and opportunity. 
(Mumford 1944:394) As Starn's analysis suggested, this is one of 
the keys to the term's rhetorical power. 
Discussions of the significance of time become more intense 
where there is a heightened awareness or even fear of change. An 
examination of the philosophical journals of the early years of 
the interwar period reveals a strong interest in time and its 
significance for humanity. The French philosOpher Henri Bergson, 
credited with being one of the most outstanding contributors to 
modern ideas about the creative aspects of time, wrote in 
Duration w;uJ. Simultaneity (1922) that while no question had been 
so neglected by philosophy, all philosophers now agreed that it 
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was of "capital importance ... The key to the most difficult 
philosophical problem lies there." (Bergson 1965:6) As we shall 
see in chapter three, Bergson frequently likened time to the 
perpetual and indeterminate flow of life. The importance of this 
conception for Bergson was that it denied all notions of finality 
and hence gave rein to hU111an freedom. 
Yet where Bergson saw freedom others saw chaos. Writing in 
tliw1 Radhakrishnan argued that the universe Bergson disclosed was 
utterly unintelligible, capricious and arbitrary. (Radhakrishnan 
1919:276) In it there existed nothing but flux. Where there are 
no laws, no ends nor even any moments of rest and stability, 
Radhakrishnan wrote, "Chaos is God." (Radhakrishnan 1919:276) 
This view of Bergson's philosophy of time could be related to 
those aspects of contemporary city life which Adams and others 
had remarked upon. Radhakrishnan wrote that Bergson's philosophy 
was a "mirror of the twentieth century soul, who lives in an 
atmosphere of constant hustle and excitement, in a perennial 
maelstrom of events." (Radhakrishnan 1919:276) 
For Berdyaev. intellectual and moral nihilism along with the 
emptiness of modern city life really derived from the rejection 
of the religious attitude in favour of an immersion in time and 
human existence. (Berdyaev 1935:39) The whole point of human 
existence, for Berdyaev, was to seek to transcend time and 
history. For him, time and history really marked the failure of 
hwnanity and of culture as well as the collapse of human plans. 
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Time, he wrote, is "eternity collapsed in ruins." (Berdyaev 
1949:207) (1) 
For this reason. Berdyaev attacked many trends in modern 
science and philosophy which, whatever else they advocated. had 
in common a denial of the higher purpose of man and bis special 
relation to God. He wrote that contemporary philosophy had 
"dissolved man", (Berdyaev 1935:33) that Existentialism was a 
"philosophy of despair", and that Freudian metaphysics offered 
only "death and nothingness". (Berdayev 1935:36:39) 
4. Intellectual Causes of Crisis 
One could therefore find both the causes and symptoms of 
crisis in modern intellectual life. Intellectual ferment was 
manifest in disputes over the foundations of scientific and 
philosophical knowledge, the place of values in intellectual 
inquiry and the nature and significance of the real. That there 
were disputes over these issues was at times taken as a sign of a 
crisis in knowledge. 
In the early 1920s when physicists presented rather new 
images of the macroscopic and microscopic physical universes, 
there was seen to have developed a "crisis in science". This was 
1. Nicholas Berdyaev, although attaching a different significance 
to the concept of time that Bergson, noted that it remained the 
"fundamental problem of human existence", adding that it was "no 
accident that Bergson and Heidegger, the two most considerable 
philsophers of present-day Europe" had centred their philosophies 
on this problem. (Berdyaev 1949:97) 
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because the new physics upset the traditional Newtonian 
foundations of scientific belief - something which was said to 
have implications for all concepts and systems of knowledge. 
(Nichols 1923:390) Dewey noted in 1930 that it had become 
commonplace to speak of a "crisis" in thought caused by the 
growing divorce between science and ethics, where the former was 
said to have no moral or spiritual basis. (Dewey 1930:40) 
Outside of the scientific realm, the adoption of sceptical, 
agnostic or nihilistic outlooks was taken as evidence of a 
"general pathology in philosophy." (Melekian 1932:410) And in 
the areas of political and social theory, where there was a new-
found emphasis on the role of change and novelty, it was said 
that the "chaos of irrationalism reigned". (Curtis 1925:495) 
While these apparent crises in the intellectual field were 
often seen as mere expressions of the uncertainties of the age, 
they could also be presented as the real source of social evils. 
"Pathological" strains in science and philosophy were seen to be 
directly implicated in the eruption of political violence. The 
American philosopher Ralph Barton Perry wrote in the introduction 
to ~ Present Conflict Qt. Ideals (1918) that the Great War could 
be regarded not just as a clash between nations but more 
fundamentally as a clash between philosophies and the ways of 
life that they encouraged. (1) (Perry 1918:2) Perry wrote that: 
1. Note that C.T. Harley Walker wrote in a review of Perry's ~ 
Present Conflict g,1 Ideals that it was common to view the war as 
a result of the philosophical tendencies current in the countries 
taking part. Walker, in t1iD4, Vol. XXVIII, No. 112, 1919, p.483 
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We must see this war as Ilw, ~ ~ - not in the numbers 
of nations and men engaged, not in its volume of death and 
destruction, but in the greatness of the issues which are at 
stake. (Perry 1918:2) 
Not surprisingly, Perry saw the conflict as one between the 
American, British and French ideal of freedom and the German 
desire for domination. (Perry 1918:398f) We should note that the 
conflict was also described as a "Euro-Nietszchean" war. 
(Schiller 1919:107) 
This same analysis was also applied to the emergence of the 
Nazi regime. Hermann Rauschning wrote in ~ Revolution Q,i 
Nihilism, (1940) that the political success of the Nazi movement 
in Germany could not simply be traced back to economic 
depression, defeat in war or an imperialistic temper. Its roots 
lay in deep "moral and intellectual processes", that is in moral 
and intellectual nihilism. (Rauschning 1940:vii) Again, this 
focus on nihilism suggested that crisis was a general rather than 
specific problem and one which overflowed national boundaries. 
Louis Wirth wrote in 1936: 
The intellectual problems which at one time were considered 
as the peculiar preoccupation of German writers have 
enveloped virtually the whole world. What was once regarded 
at the esoteric concern of a few intellectuals in a single 
country has become the co1RJ11on plight of the modern man. 
(Mannheim 1936:xiii) 
Stressing the philosophical or spiritual causes of crisis 
meant that the dangers which beset the world were more ineffable 
than war or economic depression. It was suggested that the 
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problems humanity faced were perhaps more permanent and 
underlying than the dangers that the passing storms of political 
life threw up. While one could speak of an economic or military 
crisis, one could also convey the sense that underneath these 
happenings lay profound difficulties that could be intimated but 
not easily articulated because they were associated with the life 
of the mind or spirit. Paul Valery wrote in IbJl Crisis g,t, t1irui 
that unlike military and economic crises, "the intellectual 
crisis being more subtle and, by i:hnature, assuming the most 
deceptive appearances •.. will hardly allow us to grasp its true 
extent, its~-" (Valery 1963:25) 
It should be evident then that part of the attraction of the 
term crisis was 1 its very lack of specificity. Terms such as 
crisis and chaos which are rich in allusion and evocation made it 
possible to generalise from specific problems and treat them as 
symptoms of larger or veiled disorders. They enabled a shift from 
reflecting on the particularities of war or depression to raising 
questions about the nature and purpose of the human race. It 
became possible to ask as Lovejoy did, "What's the matter with 
man?" {Lovejoy 1940:8-9) 
5. Philosophy and the Crisis of the Sciences. 
As we have mentioned, there was talk of a crisis in science. 
For some writers, developments in science in relation to the 
theory of relativity and quantum physics symbolised the confusion 
and uncertainties of the times. Certainly Laski saw the 
discoveries of modern science as further evidence that the 
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Western way of life was a "melting pot." (Laski 1923:18) 
The foundations of science dissolved when its laws, once 
thought of as necessary and given, were treated as mere rules of 
convenience. Thus, where once science had promised to rationalize 
the whole cosmos - providing an accurate description of the 
structure of the whole as well as accurate predictions of the 
workings of its parts - it now embraced a metaphysics of chance. 
(Drucker 1939:53-54) Peter Drucker wrote that science, the most 
wondrous child of the rationalist order: 
... has already taken the decisive step toward the 
destruction of its own basis of rationality. Whatever the 
physicists may mean by their denial of causation and its 
replacement by Chance, they imply that they have reached and 
even overstepped the limits of a mechanical conception of 
the world. (Drucker 1939:55) 
It seemed as though faith in science, as a symbolic 
replacement for a loss of faith in a supreme spiritual being, 
might be short-lived. Having already adopted a neutral stand in 
relation to questions of value, science could now no longer even 
offer a rational and coherent interpretation of the world. Laski 
wrote that modern science was "so void of purpose as to repr~sent 
nothing so much as the omnipresent anarchy of values." (Laski 
1933:18) While able to offer "material comfort• it could not 
provide any formula for "spiritual satisfaction." (Laski 1933:18) 
If we want to really understand the depth of the causes of 
this crisis in science then we must turn to the arguments put 
forward by Edmund Husserl in Ib£ Crisis g1 t1w. European Sciences. 
It was an argument that Husserl originally presented as a lecture 
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on May 7, 1935, at the University of Prague. (Lauer 1965:6-7) In 
this lecture Husserl gave expression to sentiments that were also 
apparent in the English-speaking world. He said that positive 
science had "decapitated" philosophy. In treating of rationalism 
solely in accord with "naturalistic" or "objectivist" criteria 
and being sceptical about the "possibility of metaphysics", 
positive science had presided over not only the "collapse of the 
belief" in the idea of a "universal philosophy", but also over 
the collae of the belief in "reason" itself. (Husserl 1970:12-
13) Reason which is not grounded in the ideal of truth or 
accorded some spiritual purpose is doomed to collapse. This was 
an argument which was constantly repeated by intellectuals 
concerned about the direction of both science and philosophy in 
the modern world. Philosophers like John Dewey were concerned 
that increasingly hostile reactions to the narrow intellectualism 
which characterised positive science would lead to a wholesale 
rejection of the scientific enterprise itself. 
Husserl's particular concern was with philosophy and the 
fact that many younger European philosophers were turning away 
from the philosophical quest for truth, and were in danger of 
succumbing to a "skeptical deluge." (Husserl 1970:14) Renewed 
interest in occultism, spiritualism, and paganism as well the~ 
promotion of Nazi beliefs were all evidence of this sceptical 
tide. Most importantly, irrationalist philosophies had become 
prevalent, as evident in the increasing fashion for 
existentialism. (Husserl 1970:xxvi-xxvii) The flowering of such 
philosophies confirmed the point that a dry and dessicated brand 
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of rationalism would only unleash a romantic or irrationalist 
philosophical and then political reaction. David Carr writes in 
bis introduction to Ih§. Crisis that Heigdegger's defection to the 
Nazis only confirmed for Husserl the link between irrationalist 
philosophies and irrational political creeds. (Husserl 
1970:xxvii) 
The true struggles that were taking place in the world, 
therefore, were the struggles taking place between philosophies. 
For Husserl, this was the essence of the crisis. As be stated in 
his Vienna Lecture, this crisis was neither an "obscure fate" nor 
an "impenetrable destiny"; when placed against the background of 
the "teleology of European history", it became quite 
transparent. According to Husserl Europe was more than a 
geographical or political expression; the concept of Europe also 
suggested a spiritual mission and a belief in the rule of reason. 
It was in the 18th and 19th centuries that the spiritual purp<>S<e'-
whicb imbued European reason and rationality was diluted and 
thereby Europe slowly slipped into crisis. (Husserl 1970:299) 
The crisis of the sciences then was really an expression of 
the "radical life-crisis" of European humanity. (Husserl 
1970:xvi) Husserl wrote that the "extinction" of philosophy, in 
the sense of a way of thinking which insisted on the 
indivisibility of reason and the good, inexorably led to the 
destruction of a Europe which was "founded on the spirit of 
truth." The "crisis of the sciences" then had political as well 
as intellectual ramifications. Without a continuing co1Rmitment 
to the quest for truth and the idea of a universal philosophy, 
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international solidarity could not be achieved. (Husserl 
1970:xxvii) 
If we accept this relation between philosophical nihilism 
and political chaos, then it would follow that reconstructing the 
world must involve reconstructing systems of reason and value. 
That intellectuals should hold this view was understandable given 
that it is they above all who tend to privilege the role of 
conceptual work in destabilising or stabilising other spheres of 
activity. 
In particular, the assertion of a causal relation between 
spiritual decline or scientific scepticism and social chaos was 
intended to focus attention on the role and status of philosophy 
at a time when more and more realms of experience were being 
broken up and colonized by the positive sciences. The advantages 
of philosophy in regard to this seemed obvious. Only philosophy, 
0 
in the classical sense, could offer a synpitc view. 
Without an ultimate viewpoint it was feared that social life 
would sink into a purposeless materialism. It was this fear that 
drove philosophers and religious thinkers to stress the 
importance of the realm of value. Insofar as philosophy was 
chiefly concerned with this real• only it could provide the real 
basis for a civilized existence. Although events in Germany gave 
this argument added importance, it was an idea that that predated 
the advent of the Nazis. Archdall warned in 1928 that the •odern 
academy's renunciation of the very idea of a uniyersjtas of 
knowledge threatened humanity's "hold on real civilization." 
(Arc.hdaH 1929: 22, 16) 
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In addition to this, it could be argued that dividing up 
intellectual life into tightly bound boxes presented an 
artificial picture of contemplative activity. Arthur Lovejoy 
argued that while specialization was in many respects 
indispensable it also tended to efface the continuity between our 
ideas. Ideas, Lovejoy wrote, are "most migratory"; thought does 
not "run in enclosed channels" tracing the lines which formally 
separate university departments. (Lovejoy 1940:4) That the term 
crisis roamed so freely across various disciplines would seem to 
confirm Lovejoy's point. 
Yet perhaps it was words rather than ideas that migrated 
most successfully across intellectual boundaries. That discussion 
of crisis was of ten at cross-purposes shows that the common 
concern with crisis was often more apparent than real. 
Nevertheless, while the rhetoric of crisis pointed to the absence 
of a universal vocabulary or set of meanings, it also revealed a 
strong impulse towards universality. Insofar as the effect of the· 
erection of disciplinary borders was to inhibit the flow and 
exchange of ideas, Lovejoy's statements about the nature of 
thought could have been aimed at persuading intellectuals to 
break down academic fences and to recover that common language or 
pool of meanings which they had lost. In fact, Lovejoy said this 
was happening as the result of the study of the history of ideas. 
Again the significance of this goes beyond the attainment of 
intellectual satisfaction. Lovejoy argued that it was only by 
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studying the history of ideas and the linkages between them that 
man could obtain the sort of knowledge which was most urgently 
needed at that time - that is, knowledge of man himself. In 
addition to this, he wrote that a study of the history of ideas 
could also lead to a re-appraisal of the role of rationality and 
logic in human affairs, both of which had been severely 
undermined by a contemporary fascination with the role of the 
irrational. (Lovejoy 1940:16-17) 
This impulse to universality cannot be detached from 
concerns about the conduct of political debate in the interwar 
years. The absence of shared meanings was most depressingly 
apparent in political life. Thus, one of the points behind 
calling for an end to intellectual divisions and for an ultimate 
point of view was in order to address those social divisions 
which existing modes of political discourse had failed to heal. 
The interwar years were seen as characterised by the 
breakdown of that "open-minded" aode of argumentation that 
characterised diplomacy and parliamentary activity. (Penton 
1942:140) With the erosion of tolerance, social antagonisms 
deepened and people became subject to manipulation by a new bree~ 
of demagogic orators. Rauschning said that political debate had 
come to be characterised by the "magic of extremism•, in the 
presence of which "argument" had become "completely impossible." 
(Rauschning 1940:36) From this point onwards the descent into 
violence seemed assured. Demagogues often called for direct or 
pure action which lacked any rational motivation or ideal 
content. The breakdown of tolerant forlls of discourse blurred 
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the distinction between rhetoric and violence. The demand for an 
inclusive vocabulary was very urgent. Not only was it necessary 
to find a common language in order to unite people, it was also 
necessary to counter the savage speeches of dangerous 
visionaries. 
6. The Rise of the Masses. 
One of the sub-themes of the crisis literature was a concern 
about the deleterious effects of a mass society on civilized 
values. In the past it had been hoped that democratic reform 
would see the growth of an enlightened and educated citizenry. 
Instead, however, the extension of democratic rights was seen as 
leading to the entry into political life of great numbers of 
people who had little sense of political obligation or identity. 
When such types were massed together they became a crowd governed 
by emotion rather than reason. 
The crowd was seen as a product of congested city life. 
Analyses of the danger that crowds could pose to an ordered 
public life were increasingly made after the outbreak of the 
Great War. The eruption of nationalist fervour during that· 
conflict had focussed attention on mob behaviour and assisted 
in the growth and development of what was called social 
psychology. (1) Increasing industrial conflict, and most 
especially the Bolshevik revolution, aroused further debate about 
1. See Sir Hartin Conway's Ib,i. ~ iD, ~ AW1 H,iU,;. (1915) and 
W.B. Trotter's Instincts S2t, tb£ ~ iD, ~ a.wi ill. (1919). 
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the actual mental and physical qualities of the lower orders. 
Lothrop Stoddard's ~ Reyolt Against Cjvilizatign claimed to 
explain revolutionary unrest in psychological and biological 
terms. (Stoddard 1922:v) 
Similar responses were made to the rise of fascism and 
Nazism. Drucker rejected pseudo-scientific analyses which held 
that the masses "fall easy prey to any superior salesman, 
whatever his goods". (Drucker 1939:8) He also criticised those 
who practised what he called a "fake aristocratism" which 
bemoaned the decline of liberty yet (echoing Ortega Y Gasset} 
feared the "revolt of the masses." (Drucker 1939:8) For him, the 
popularity of the "ideology of fascism" was to be found in the 
despair of the masses following the collapse of the spiritual and 
social order of Europe. In particular, Drucker argued that with 
the death of the belief that economic values reigned supreme in 
society, something which he said occurred between the end of the 
Great War and the year of Hitler's accession to power, man could 
no longer provide a rational explanation of his function in 
society. It was because they had no creed to adhere to, not 
because of any inherited degeneracy of character, that the masses 
asked for miracles from magicians who promised "to make the 
impossible possible.• (Drucker 1939:21} 
Ideas regarding the operation of the primitive and 
instinctive in modern social life were also treated in terms of 
rather occult theaes relating to the age-old struggle between 
good and evil and the principles of life and death. Drucker wrote 
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that the emergence of tyrants revealed "that existence in this 
society is governed not by rational and sensible, by blind, 
irrational and demonic forces." {Drucker 1939:56) The success of 
the "fascist ideology," be wrote, marked the "return of the 
daemons" - the irrational forces of death and dismay. Thus, 
while in one sense the modern experience was unique, in another 
sense it only marked a reawakening of underlying impulses. (1) 
This idea was well entrenched before the appearance of fascists 
and Nazis. R.G Collingwood would later pursue this theme in Ihi, 
~ Leyiathan published in 1942. He wrote in that book that it 
was in 1919, on comp~ting his war services, that be "realized, 
dimly and incompletely, what the situation was that had been 
confronting us: namely what I should now describe as a new form 
of barbarism." {Collingwood 1942:v) 
We must also remember that Nazi publicists quite 
deliberately exulted in and manipulated the imagery of barbarism, 
celebrating in the struggle for existence and calling upon their 
followers to "think with their blood." {Collingwood 1942:377) 
Mllllford said this "Ideology of Barbarism" was also evident in 
the works of Nietzsche, Sorel, Pareto and Spengler. {Mumford 
1944:365-366) All of these writers, be argued, had debased the 
"function of intellect before the power of 'blood.'" {MUJ1ford 
1944:365) Spengler provided ample exa•ples for Mumford to draw 
1. Drucker also saw the "fascist ideology" as more than a 
European phenomenon. It was he said, aanifest in such things as 
"new nationalism" in the Near East, "the old feudalism" in Asia, '-
·~ d'etat and 'racial awakenings'" in Latin America as well 
as in religious revolts in Asia and Africa. {Drucker 1939:3) 
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upon. In ~ !Ul.d. Technics he wrote that it was only the delusion 
of the idealist and theologian to take seriously the notion that 
man was anything more than a "beast of prey." (Spengler 1932:19) 
For Mumford, the exponents of the barbarist ideology bore 
responsbility for helping to create the intellectual or cultural 
climate in which Nazi beliefs could flourish. This was a common 
perception at the time and the reason why the "charlatan 
dogmatism" of Spengler, as one reviewer described it, did not 
receive a warm welcome in the English-speaking world in the 1920s 
and 1930s. {Catlin 1935:589) It was in response to the pessimism 
propagated by writers like Spengler that the American scholar 
Charles A. Beard edited a collection entitled Hbither Mankind: A 
Panorama g,,( Modern Civilization (1928). Beard's intention was 
to subsitute a more optimistic appraisal of the future of 
civilization for "visions of despair." (Beard 1928:v) 
This should not lead us to neglect the fact that there were 
significant parallels between Spengler and those who had a 
religious perspective on crisis. ~Decline g1 th,i, ~ foretold 
the steady erosion of all ideals and spiritual beliefs in the 
rationalist and utility maximising West and how this would 
eventually lead to the return of barbarism. Spengler wrote that 
modern plutocrats would be forced to shed their liberal and 
democratic guise, because where once these principles had 
faciliated the free movement of finance they now hindered it. In 
' 
the midst of this final act of unmasking, Caesars would arise who 
would assert the power of blood over aoney - a battle which blood 
would win. (Spengler 1922:506-7) Repetitions of this reading of 
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modern history can be found in Tawney and then later in Drucker 
However, unlike Spengler who regarded the coming battle as part 
of an inevitable world-historical process, Christian thinkers saw 
it as a tragic result of the utilitarian turn taken by Western 
societies in the 18th and 19th centuries. Hence their urgent 
calls for a return to spiritual values. The argument was that any 
philosophy which was sceptical of ideals, no matter how 
moderately this scepticism was expressed, would contribute to a 
decline into barbarism. This argument could apply to 
philosophies which were widely held in the English-speaking 
world, including positivism and pragmatism. 
7. The Dangers of Scientific Reason 
Another sub-theme in the crisis literature was the fear of 
modern science and technology. In addition to being seen as a 
source of confusion and disorientation, some authors saw science 
and technology as the modern Leviathan 
enslavement and brutality. In this context, 
- a new means 
they spoke of 
of 
the 
"terror of the advancing machine." (Ross 1933:39) There was no 
little irony in this assessment of the value of this product of 
human reason. The irony lay in the fact that the very 
technological and sci1Hltific means by which man sought to achieve 
freedom and control of his surroundings now threatened to become 
"a new bondage." (Burgmann 1937:13) 
This fear of enslavement by technology must also be seen 
against the background of military conflicts. Poison gas, which 
had been used in the Great War, became a potent symbol of the 
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dangers of scientific and technological advance undisciplined by 
moral codes. ( 1) 
Some found this union between the passions of war-fever and 
rationalist science somewhat paradoxical. For example, the Nazi 
movement could be seen as a direct challenge to rationalism and 
the economic creeds deduced from it. (Drucker 1939:xii) Yet if 
we accept the argument that rationalism breeds irrationalism then 
the relationship becomes quite understandable. Indeed, this 
argument was used to explain why the Germans turned to Nazism in 
the 1930s. It was argued that the Germans •embraced Fascism" so 
readily, not because they were backward, but because they were 
the "most scientifically advanced" and indeed adored science. 
(Penton 1942:139) Similarly, Raushchning thought the •total 
nihilism" of Stalin was the inevitable logical and historical 
outcome of Lenin's •unshaken belief in human reason.• (Rauschning 
1940:56) Though other writers such as Stoddard considered that 
the Bolshevik revolution sprang from primitive urges rather than 
from the dictates of reason. 
This however does not complete the philosophical cum 
political cycle we are tracing. For just as we have pointed to 
the paradox of rationalism breeding irrationalism, we •ust also • -
point to the paradoxical fact that this revolution of nihilism in 
1. In this context, we should note Spengler's clai• that science 
and technology were not the creations of mankind's rationality 
but were really created in order to •satisfy its rapacity.• 
(Liebert 1933:34) 
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turn had bred a Nvery authoritarianN age. (Berdyaev 1935:19) The 
same processes that saw the emergence of irrationalism out of the 
ashes of rationalism also dictated that nihilism, which is 
predicated upon a rejection of all doctrines and standards, "must 
develop of necessity by its own logic into an absolute 
despotism." (Rauschning 1940:56) Berdyaev wrote that in the face 
of extreme social and intellectual confusion men found the only 
way to avoid "final chaos" was "obligatory organisation." 
(Berdyaev 1935:18) Indeed, Drucker argued that the "abracadabra" 
of fascism was precisely this substitution of compulsion and 
organisation for a rationally founded order and creed. (Drucker 
1939:48) Thus, the celebration of such virtues as rigour and 
discipline by authoritarian leaders of the time was only a formal 
restriction on what was in essence a frenzied gospel of hate. 
We see this same paradox when we come to examine what was 
called the philosophy of nihilism. Rauschning pointed out that 
the only rule that the nihilist abided by was the rule of the 
sword. (Rauschning 1940:xii} However, be also noted that nihilism 
was still able to be given the appearance of intellectual order 
and system. He wrote, for example, that the barbarism that was at 
the heart of the Nazi way of thinking was wrapped up in "an 
absolutely binding, 
'philosophy'", elevated 
1940:56) 
more or less rationally argued, 
to the status of religion. {Rauschning 
As we have constantly stressed, moral and intellectual 
nihilism was seen by so•e intellectuals as a Western rather than 
specifically German problem. It was argued that its real cause 
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lay in the "inner moral decay" of an impersonal "mechanised" 
society. (Kraushaar 1942:421) 
But such concerns were swamped by the need to shore up 
Western ideals in the years immediately prior to and after the 
onset the Second World War. The rhetoric of crisis in the public 
sphere was thus subject to a considerable transformation and 
clarification. All the doubts expressed about the project called 
Western civilization in the wake of the bloodshed of the Great 
War, and then in the midst of ~ crippling depression, were muted 
if not silenced. Despite the frequent assertions of the demise of 
Western civilization as a unified concept, we find that on the 
eve of another great war, as an ideal to be upheld this notion 
gained added force. In the midst of the Second World War there 
was little room for ambiguity. 
Thus the war became attached to much larger themes about the 
future of humanity, the advance of Armageddon and the centuries 
old struggle between civilization and barbarism. (Ogg 1942:3) 
In the early years of the war President Roosevelt described the 
Nazi onslaught on Europe as part of a "World Revolution" aimed at 
the subjugation of the world's people. {Brooks 1941:2-3) 
These descriptions provided ways of framing and 
understanding conflicts in Europe, Asia and Africa and 
establishing a continuity between the•. Furthermore, these 
themes allowed the war to be seen as not just a raw political 
struggle over territory or resources but as a war over 
fundamental values and conceptions. Thus, during the war years 
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Carr's reading of the claims of the d~fenders of the existing 
international order as the claims of the merely politically 
satisfied could in no way be publicly accepted. 
But the moral overtones of this rhetoric had implications 
beyond galvanizing support in the struggle against the enemy. To 
speak of the war effort as the struggle of civilization against 
barbarism suggested that it was not enough to simply defeat the 
enemies of democracy and reason on the battlefield. Otto 
Kraushaar argued in a review of Lewis Mumford's f.iliJ;.b. ~Living 
that if the allies were to "meet the challenge of fascism 
successfully and permanently", then they had to undergo a shift 
in values. (Kraushaar 1942:420-1) Similarly, Richard Robinson 
wrote in Ihg Philosophical Review that if peace were to be 
lasting then it was crucial that the United Nations were fighting 
for what was right and not merely for what they· approved. 
(Robinson 1942:420) It was in this context, as we shall discuss 
later, that the allied war-effort also came to be linked to the 
promise of a better world after the war. Statesmen began to speak 
of a post-war world order that was free, not just from military 
conflict, but also from poverty. 
Crisis rhetoric did not end with the defeat of the Axis 
powers. In the post-war period concerns continued to be 
expressed about Western civilization and its frantic pursuit of 
material satisfaction. Harrington's book Ib,g, Accidental Century, 
is testimony to the continuation of this concern with the 
disappearance of the spiritual dimension of Western civilization. 
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The writings of the Frankfurt School provide other pertinent 
examples. Some intellectuals of the post-war era saw their 
concerns as of a piece with those expressed ever since the Great 
War had, in Franz Kafka's words, opened the "flood gates of 
chaos.• (Harrington 1965:32) Harrington introduced bis thesis 
with the remark that the Western world had for •ore than fifty 
years "haunted itself with rumours of its own death•. (Harrington 
1965:13) However, unlike the years surrounding the Second World 
War, outside of the academy fewer people appeared to be 
listening. 
8. The Rhetoric of Crisis 
The rhetoric of crisis in academic discourse during the 
interwar years may give the impression that there was a clear 
focus of attention on a specific problem, with a purposive, 
unified and coherent exchange taking place across a number of 
different fields of interests and specializations. Yet this was 
not the case. Despite the possession of a common vocabulary, the 
continuity in this rhetoric was sometimes more apparent than 
real. There were different understandings over the root causes 
and the symptoms of crisis. In many respects, the vocabulary of 
crisis travelled freely and lightly across varying intellectual 
contexts, as well as across the boundaries which divided the 
political from the intellectual domain, creating an illusion of 
discussion where there was only conversation. 
The invocation of crisis was a way of specifying particular 
sets of moral, political and philosophical priorities. Much of 
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the rhetoric of crisis that we have highlighted focussed on what 
was seen as the moral decadence of the modern era - in particular 
the failure of Western civilization to maintain its Christian 
faith. That is why so many of the responses to crisis we have 
identified called on people to re-embrace the spiritual and to 
put the growth of human personality, rather than material wealth, 
at the centre of social action. 
Nevertheless, this chapter did isolate strong threads in 
interwar debates about crisis. This typically involved the 
orchestration of a number of themes on which I have touched in 
due order. For instance, I have shown that crisis leads to a 
preoccuption with ideas; with foundations and with time. Ideas 
are important where it is assumed that the philosophical tone set 
by intellectuals ultimately determines the course of social 
affairs. Foundations are important because when they seem to be 
in decline bursts of irrationalism are said to be the result. 
The discussion of time is important because where one loses the 
sense of one's of place in time, where peop.e feel swallowed up 
change, society appears much more fragile. We should also note 
that a number of manifestations of crisis were consistently 
identified. Such things as the urban crowd and the fear of 
enslavement by technology were seen as typical expressions of the 
modern condition. 
It should be noted here that despite the repeated insistence 
on the part of intellectuals that pessimism was one of the 
dominant features of the time, the views of Spengler and the like 
were not widely embraced by intellectuals in the English-speaking 
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world. Indeed, insisting that Western societies were 
characterised by a profound sense of despair was often a prelude 
to recommending solutions to crisis. As we have seen, some 
thought the crisis could only be cured by aoral or spiritual 
renovation and that this could only be achieved by the quiet 
contemplation of the eternal or by acceptance of the existence of 
certain ethical ideals. Others however, as I will : discuss in 
the next chapter, thought the times required greater application 
of scientific methods to social problems. 
Both of these approaches are comparable to the extent that 
they were characterised by a quest for certainty: a desire to 
escape time and contingency and to found existence on solid 
foundations. But an alterative was offered. This alternative was 
the philosophy of pragmatism. As we shall see, the pragmatist 
claimed that the crisis in Western civilisation was not solely 
due to an absence moral feeling nor solely due to the failure to 
apply reason to human affairs. For the pragmatist, the crisis in 
civilisation was in fact the gap which existed between morality 
and science. What the pragmatist claimed to do then, was to chart 
a middle course in attempting to reconcile what he saw as a 
series of related cleavages in Western civilisation: between 
science and aorality; between philosophy and science and 
contemplative and practical activity. Yet as we shall also see, 
whilst attempting to reconcile these opposed categories, the 
pragmatist was also being accused of deepening the crisis in 
Western civilisation. 
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Chapter 2: Salvation Through Science 
1. The Presence of Optimism 
So far I have argued that one common feature of political 
and intellectual debates in the interwar years was the notion of 
crisis. In addition, I argued that this sense of crisis was often 
attributed to the fragility of man's hold on those virtues which 
form the basis of a civilized existence. Here intellectuals were 
especially implicated. They were accused of iR1B1ersing themselves 
in specialist studies or resigning themselves to philosophical 
scepticism. In either case, intellectuals were failing in their 
duty to contemplate and promote those moral codes which were 
crucial for the well-being of the whole community. 
As I have suggested, not all the writings which appeared 
between the wars were drenched with fear and pessimism. The 
American academic William Kay Wallace wrote in ~ Passing g,L 
Politics in 1924 that, while a "prevailing pessimism" was evident 
in the work of many writers, he saw "faith in the possibility of 
social regeneration• as one of the outstanding features of the 
times. Never before, he wrote, had the world seen such a "galaxy 
of inventive genius" come to the fore and put itself in the 
service of mankind. (Wallace 1924:277) Not all intellectuals saw 
worldly difficulties as caused only by an absence of virtue. 
Faith in social reconstruction was frequently aligned to a faith 
in the power of science and its growing ability to solve social 
problems. 
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Hence, the aim of this chapter is to draw attention to a 
strain of thought which was somewhat opposed to the one which I 
examined above. I will show, again by examining the writings of 
intellectuals, that there were many who attributed social 
difficulties to a lack of scientific knowledge, rather than ~o 
too great an emphasis upon it. The argument was that it was 
ignorance of the principles which governed social development, 
something which only science could reveal, which was hindering 
social progress. Too often, those charged with prescribing, 
analyzing and implementing social policy were ignorant of the 
laws of human behaviour. Furthermore, a lack of scientific 
training meant that policy makers were often inclined to let 
emotional attachments and intuitions get in the way of their 
assessments of appropriate social techniques. 
I do not mean to suggest that those who sought to put 
policy-making on a scientific footing were totally uninterested 
or contemptuous of moral evaluations. To present the ideas of 
social planners of the interwar years as devoid of such things 
would be to caricature them. Many of those who argued in favour 
of social reconstruction along scientific lines expressed the 
hope that their plans would result in a better life for all. 
Indeed, when decrying the interference of emotions or intuitions 
in decision-making, they were attacking not a passion for justice 
or equality but the attributes of greed and selfishness. Yet 
expressions of social co•passion were often overwhelmed by 
strident declarations attesting to the wonders that science could 
achieve when applied to social life. 
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This suggests that in those years arguments which appealed 
to science were seen to be more effective than those which relied 
on moral suasion. Thus, whereas the arguments for social reform 
put by new liberals in the late 19th and early 20th century had 
only rejected the hedonistic tenets of classical liberalism on 
moral· and spiritual grounds, science could now show that 
classical liberalism was not only unjust but was also 
inefficient. 
But science was seen as more than simply efficient. 
Scientific description was also deemed persuasive because it was 
seen as disclosing the true nature of things. Just as there was a 
large body of writings that saw social problems as a direct 
result of the cultivation of the scientific attitude at the 
expense of the higher feelings, there was also a large body of 
writings which expressed the view that the foundations of society 
could only begin to be secured with the adoption of precisely 
that attitude. 
The belief that it is with science that we can find a basis 
for the social order is not unique to the modern era. The 
American scholar Harry Elmer Barnes wrote how the French 
philosopher Auguste Comte {following Francis Bacon) had developed 
the idea of a positive commonwealth grounded in scientific 
understanding and governed by "highly trained sociological 
priests" devoted to social betterment. {Barnes 1925:148} {1) 
1. Barnes added that: "Perhaps the most effective statement 
however, which has been made of the necesity for trained and 
unprejudiced fact-finding bodies and for adequate avenues of 
dissemination to the public is that contained in Lippmann's 
Public Opinigp." (Barnes 1925:148} 
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This was a notion which gained added force in the interwar years. 
In addition, we can say that the belief that science can provide 
the key to social order was in fact borne of a sense of crisis. 
The idea of crisis and the hope placed in scientific rationality 
went hand in hand when crisis was seen as a result of assaults on 
society by irrational forces. 
It should be stressed that this idea that science could be 
applied to all aspects of social life and provide the foundations 
of order was not the only version of modernity that was current 
at that time. As I will show in following chapters, paralleling 
and sometimes overlapping with the view presented herein were 
sceptical philosophies and pluralist political theories which 
rejected both the nostrums of scientism and the associated 
theories of state centralized planning. One should not interpret 
all of the writers included in this chapter as speaking solely 
with one voice or one particular version of •odernity in mind, as 
in many cases they embraced elements of scientism and state 
centralism as well as elements of scepticism and pluralism. 
2. Science and Philosophy. 
The attack on the play of feelings in public and 
intellectual life was often an attack on the play of egoisa and 
prejudice rather than on the intrusion of social sympathies. 
Yet, because of the strong association between egoism or 
prejudice and feeling or emotion, these latter ter•s had acquired 
negative connotations and were counterposed to the purity of the 
scientific ideal. Even where certain senti•ents could be adaired 
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for their nobility, their cultivation could be regarded as 
secondary to the need to acquire and apply scientific knowledge. 
The question marks which were placed against the role of 
feelings should be seen against the background of ongoing 
intellectual debates about the relative worth of science over and 
against philosophy. Such things as sentiment, feelings or emotion 
were counterposed to science. At the same time they were 
frequently 
philosophy 
identified with philosophy. In this 
could be presented as unnecessarily fussy or 
context, 
rather 
too clever and seductive depending on what sort of feelings it 
was intended to evoke. Philosophy then could be presented as an 
old-fashioned irrelevancy or a dangerous siren song. In either 
case it was now a luxury or indulgence that a world beset with 
difficulties could no longer afford. 
This idea came to the fore when philosophical knowledge was 
compared with scientific knowledge. Against the austere contours 
of scientific thought, philosophy could be seen as too rich in 
meaning. When held up against the solidity of the discoveries 
made by science, the philosopher's "truths" could appear as 
dreams, phantasms and ornamental ideas. Where philosophy spun 
imaginative 
imagination. 
tapestries, science employed reason and not 
Differences of opinion concerning whether it was 
science or philosophy which could disclose the true nature of the 
universe had been in evidence since the late 19th century. Karl 
Pearson argued in 1892 in ~ Grammar ~ Science that 
metaphysical claims, because they could not be tested in 
accordance with scientific aethods of observation, could not be 
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seen as constituting knowledge. (Pearson 1937:18f) It was only 
science, he suggested, that could interpret the universe: 
There is no short cut to truth, no way to gain 
of the universe except through the gateway of 
method. The hard and stony path of classifying 
reasoning upon them is the only way to ascertain 
is the reason and not the imagination which must 
be appealed to. (Pearson 1937:20) 
a knowledge 
scientific 
facts and 
truth. It 
ulti1Rately 
Pearson's view of the respective values of science and 
metaphysics was upheld and further developed in the 20th century. 
Indeed. it was sometimes promoted by philosophers themselves keen 
to redirect philosophical inquiries towards more practical 
concerns. ( 1) While some intellectuals saw the foundations of 
knowledge and the world collapse as a result of the extraction of 
science from the universe of value. others valued the new role 
bestowed upon science. Rather than seeking to reinsert science 
within the philosophical domain, they thought the place of 
philosophy was now taken by science. J.E. Turner wrote in an 
article entitled •the Essential Distinction between Science and 
Philosophy• in Ib.e, Philosophical Reyiew that the clai•s of 
philosophy to •universality• were increasingly untenable. 
(Turner 1929:42) It was science and not philosophy which now 
approached an •ever fuller and ... more absolute certainty.• 
(Turner 1929:49) 
1. For example, the British pragmatist philosopher F.C.S. 
Schiller wrote of metaphysics: " ... it will be recognized that the 
scient~ has not as such any need for any metaphysics, which are 
all of the nature of ~in which the philosophers aay indulge, 
according to the measure of his personal idiosyncrasy, in order 
to round off and harmonize bis cosaic survey - after he has 
acquainted hiaself with the solid knowledge the sciences have 
garnered." (Schiller 1932b:247) 
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But as we have seen with Husserl, the decline in the status 
of philosophy cannot entirely be laid at the door of the positive 
sciences. The Australian philosopher John Passmore later wrote 
that the reason for the triumph of the scientific or 
"physicalist" outlook (which he described as the idea that 
anything that can be "intelligibly said can be said in the 
language of physics" [Passmore 1939:196]} was a division in the 
ranks of philosophers themselves. Be railed against those among 
the ranks of philosophy who had weakened and diminished its 
slatus because they had come to lack intellectual discipline, or 
had not been "militant against sophistry." (Passmore 1939:193} 
Due to this lack of discipline philosophy had splintered into an 
array of private languages. Many philosophers had rejected that 
one true mode of reasoning which their predecessors had 
originally discovered but which science now claimed as its own, 
albeit in a truncated form. (1) 
The attempt to render all knowledge in terms of physics can 
also be viewed as an attempt to change the whole vocabulary of 
intellectual discourse. It was viewed as an atte•pt to eliminate 
the suggestiveness and indefiniteness of metaphorical modes of 
description and replace them with scientific sentences that would 
be clear and sharp. 
This concern with the role of language and the desire to 
make the language of science as precise as possible had also been 
1. Passmore cited Max Black as saying that philosophy had become 
a "disgraceful muddle of mutually intolerant opinions." (Pasaore 
1939:196) 
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a preoccupation of advocates of the scientific method since the 
late 19th century. It was for the purposes of eliminating 
obscurity, and any suggestion of metaphysics, from the language 
of physics that Pearson wrote his Grammar. Pearson saw this 
move as urgent especially because the vocabulary of the physicist 
was being employed by biologists and sociologists. (Pearson 
1937:3) 
It is important to stress that Pearson, along with the 
German sciantist Ernst Mach, was an empiricist. (1) That is, he 
believed that science must begin with the study of immediate 
sensations or phenomena; these were the ultimate source of the 
facts of science. Whether these sense-impressions were produced 
by an external reality composed of things was something that the 
empiricists could not verify. (Pearson 1937:60-2) The empiricist 
position was countered by the new realists who, while also 
believing in the cultivation of scientific methods and their 
application to philosophical issues, argued in their 1912 
manifesto Ih@. ~ R,galjs1 that there was an objective realm of 
facts. Thus. one should not assume that there was absolute 
unanimity about what science meant. This was a debate which 
continued through-out the interwar years and in particular, was 
spurred on by the development of the theory of relativity as well 
as quantum theory. These are topics that I discuss in the next 
chapter. 
1. Pearson cited an article by Mach entitled "The Analysis of the 
Sensations - Anti-metaphysical', Ill.fl Monist, vol. i, p. 59. 
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For the moment, we should just note that both the 
empiricists and new realists agreed that scientists had to be 
careful in choosing words because they had a distracting 
"rhetorical effect owing to their associations" and so hindered 
the pursuit of real knowledge. (1) (Holt 1912:18) The constrast 
drawn between the language of philosophy became particularly 
sharp during the interwar years. As a certain scientist E.G. 
Biaggini later argued, science had a "special language"; one 
which had a "single term for each single thing and each single 
relation between thiugs which will fit perfectly what is being 
described." (Biaggini 1941:39) As we shall see, the desire to be 
scientific, outside of the immedjate domain of the physical 
sciences meant imitating this way of speaking and avoiding the 
semantic cloudiness of the speculative arts. 
3. The Social Sciences. 
It is among social scientsts that we can see a great 
enthusiasm for the idea of science and along with that a great 
deal of disdain for philosophy, especially in its metaphysical 
guises. Social scientists in partiuclar took to praising science 
for its objective nature and for the social uses to which it 
could be put. This could be contrasted with the relative 
uselessness of tradition philosophy in an age of •odern machinery 
and industry. Where specula:tive philosophers had offered either 
1. Words, the new realists had deter•ined, were only useful to 
the extent that they were "self-effacing." A good word, 
presumably as one expects of a good servant, should "retire after 
introducing an object" and not call attention to itself. (Holt 
1912:18) 
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aelodraaa of social struggle or unrealizable -ideals, social 
scientists could of fer theories designed to i .. ediately improve 
the human estate. Furthermore, as a result of the claias •ade by 
figures such as Pearson, it was beginning to be claimed that 
scientific method was universal in its scope whether the objects 
under investigation were "electrons or earthworms or ethics." 
(Portus 1927:30) 
We should remember that modern science was presented in 
quite a differe&t light to the science of previous centuries with 
its alleged emphasis, under the influence of .· philosophy. on 
deductive modes of reasoning. The idea of cartesian rigour was 
associated with an antique form of science; an a priorist science 
full of empty tautologies and remote from the real world. Modern 
science however, was described not as a body of deductive 
conclusions but as a body of factual knowledge. 
The opposition between science and philosophy was then also 
seen in terms of the opposition between the empirical and the a 
priori. For the social scientist in particular, the emphasis on 
fact and application, on the hardness. rather than the abstract 
nature of scientific knowledge, beca11e very important. We should 
stress here however, that the understandings that those who 
advocated the application of scientific methods to society 
exhibited little awareness of the complex epistemological debates 
that were taking place about the meaning of science. As I 
pointed out, the eapiricists were very careful to distinguish 
between clai•s about sense-impressions and claims about reality. 
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Nevertheless, such fine distinctions were often erased in the 
course of more general intellectual debates. Someti1tes, being 
scientific meant no more than, as a certain Willia• Anderson put 
it in an article called 11 Psycho-Biology and DeBtocracy 11 in the Di~ 
AustralasiaQ. Journal gt Philosophy ~ Psychology, •facing the 
facts 11 ; this he added, was the proper "attitude for aodern men. 
Everybody who is anybody is doing it ... (Anderson 1926:41) CH-
I would also argue that the odium which surrounded 
philosophy could have had something to do with its identification 
with metaphysics, and in turn the identification of that with the 
economic system of laissez-faire. The liberal economic system was 
said to be based on the 11metaphysics of providential guidance. 11 
(Greenwood 1933:80) The policy of laissez-faire was seen as 
resting on on sterile, intellectualist principles ~nd it was 
these which hampered progress in the area of social 
reconstruction. (Bland 193'•:68} The dismissal of metaphysics and 
abstraction was used in particular to attack arguments against 
the intervention of the state in the economic system. Planning 
and control of social development was testi11ony to the "power of 
1. In this context, see also an article by E. Govan eatit.led "A 
Scientific Approach to Social Service", Public Admjojstratio~ 
Journal Q.L Australiap Regional Groups. Vol. iv, No. 7, Sept., pp. 
311-23. Io this article, the author uses Pearson (a revised 
edition of bis Gra11ar having been issued in 1937) in order to 
argue the case for the application of scientific methods to the 
administration of social services. However, the author does not 
show any awareness of the episteaological implications of 
Pearson's argument although adaittedly, Pearson himself combines 
advocacy of strict empiricist procedures with ebulliant clai•s 
about the scope of scientific method. 
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man" and should replace blind faith in tired metaphysical 
principles. (Greenwood 1933:80) 
In conjunction with this we see a great change in the way 
academic economics was described. The modern scientific 
economists rejected the emptiness of "deductive narration", 
instead favouring the application of statistical methods to the 
fact-world. (Janes 1930:306) Econo•ists were called upon to 
acknowledge that their discipline was in truth an empirical 
science. Furthermore, one can also witness in the interwar years, 
especially during the 1930s, a growing tendency to promote the 
idea that the economic sciences could be successfully harnessed 
to serve large social goals. 
The marriage of positive science and economics was 
considered one of the most solid foundations of a new order. If 
the aim were to achieve the same kind of "proved facts" in the 
social sciences as in the natural sciences, it is not surprising 
that economists in particular, with their relatively unambiguous 
instrUB1ents of measurement and classification, were seen as 
advancing the task of providing a scientific framework for social 
reform. The econo•ic world's amenability to quantitative 
approaches meant that economists could provide exactly the sort 
of "bard", measurable data that was seen as one of th~ hallmarks 
of modern science. Economic science could provide graphic 
representations of current problems and chart -the course of 
alternative policies. Herbert Von Beckerath wrote · in ll.I, 
"measure11eot; classification; averaging 
and tabular and graphical presentation. that is, statistical 
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technique• were the hallmarks of the "positivistic attitude" in 
econo•ics. (Von Beckerath 1937:581) 
We should add again here that this positivistic attitude was 
expressed on behalf of all the social sciences. Writers spoke of 
the need for a positive science of ad•ioistration, a science of 
politics as well as economics, all of which would be independent 
of value judgements. Yet at the same time a strong social 
imperative lay behind this push towards an expanded role for the 
social sciences. Economists viewed their science as becoming 
both more rigorous - evident in their use of quantitative methods 
- and more humane as these methods were used to measure and 
promote welfare. (Janes 1930:306) Barbara Wootton wrote that the 
"scientific study of social institutions", using the technique of 
verification, was the "most potent instrument of human 
betterment." (Wootton 1933:153) 
These definitions suggested that science -was only 
instrumental and concerned with means rather than ends, and 
therefore that planners should be seen as scientists rather than 
socialists. (Parkinson 1934:96) The role of the scientist in 
this context was simply to tell us bow to achieve the good life. 
Yet one senses that this response was not entirely satisfactory. 
Scientific advocacy of certain means too easily became scientific 
advocacy of desired ends. Of course, this could be dressed up as 
the ambitious claim that science was able to tell society not 
just how to achieve the good life but what the good •ight be. 
That is, there was a sense in which the way to "the good life" 
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could only be revealed by the application of scientific method to 
the facts of life. 
We see these views of the potential scope of science 
continuing to be expressed in the early 1940s. Such claims must 
also seen against the background of the preceding years of 
economic depression and the development plans for post-war 
reconstruction. Hence, R.N Robertson wrote in I1w, Australian 
Journal Q.t. Scie~ that science could not just solve technical 
problems "such as the correct amount of vitamins to have in our 
bread", but it could also tell us what things are valuable and 
what things are not. (Robertson 1942:163) To that extent, it 
could be argued that any emphasis on the moral guarantees of 
science was superfluous. If one applied scientific method then 
good order would follow. (1) But such claims to social or moral 
neutrality when advocating certain ends were difficult to 
sustain. This was especially so where behind such claims that the 
social sciences must become more scientific and address the 
"elaborate problems of society• lay grave political concerns. 
(Robertson 1942:164) 
1. This attitude towards post-war planning was said to be very 
much in the •spirit of Fabian socialists". (Plillsoll 1941:104) 
The Fabian attitude to the application of scientific method to 
social refor• is reflected in the following statements of the 
Webbs. Collectivisa was described as a •business like way of 
transacting the business of society ... no reasonable person who 
knows the facts can fail to beco•e a Socialist.• (Durbin 1985:21} 
Meanwhile, Beatrice Webb had earlier spoken of a steadily 
increasing sphere of policy-aaking in which decision would be 
reached largely by •coaaon consent• based on the "cogency of 
accurately ascertained and authoritatively reported facts.• 
(Letwin 1965:373) 
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4. The Now Rationalism. 
We find a self-styled humane economics coming to the fore 
during the depression years and entering the mainstream of policy 
circles during the course of the Second World War. Plans for 
post-war reconstruction were laced with the language of positive 
economics. Yet we can trace this belief in the ability of 
scientific methods to address the problems of the real world back 
further than that. For the glow of optimism which surrounded 
economics in the Second World War years was but a particular 
expression of the more general belief in the positive social role 
that science could play, which had been around since the period 
of reconstruction after the Great War. The progressive movement 
associated with this belief was known as the "new rationalism" or 
the rationalization movement. Robert Brady, an American scholar 
(and author of a detailed study called Rationalization ~ yerman 
Industry [1933]) wrote in an article on the same topic in the 
Quarterly Journal gt Economics that the rationalization movement 
was "secular". "egalitarian". "cosmopolitan" and "naively 
optimistic." (Brady 1930:534) (1) 
-
1. Brady wrote in his survey of the rationalization literature 
that: "A German term had been fittingly used to characterize this 
process, Entzauberung ~ ii.lt, (•world disenchantement", 
"disillusionaent" 1 "secularization". "sobering"). In common with 
its cultural antecedent - the age of the Aufklarung - the 
"rationalization era" has been essentially rationalistic, 
egalitarian, secular, and naively optimistic. Its problems have 
found theoretical formulation at the hands of economists. 
engineers, and scientists who, though thoroughly steeped in the 
current scientific preconceptions appropriate to their respective 
disciplines, have been forced to grapple with its involved 
technical and organizational issues under the stress of the post-
war reconstruction period." (Brady 1930:534) 
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This so-called "new rationalism", while a species of 
rationalism in general insofar as it held that reason should have 
a commanding role in social life, was sharply distinguished from 
earlier foras of rationalism. Brady wrote that in contrast to 
the "old" seventeenth and nineteenth century rationalisms, which 
were concerned aainly with "matters of personal, social, and 
economic freedom and equality", the new rationalism was 
concerned with the "application of scientific method" to all 
problems associated with all aspects of production, consumption 
and distribution. (Brady 1930:533n} 
This new rationalism most often appeared in the form of the 
rationalization movement in industry, which involved integration 
in secondary industry and the introduction of scientific 
principles of management. While not always bound up with the idea 
of centralized state direction and control, it certainly did come 
to be associated with corporatist forllS of social organisation. 
The idea of rationalization gradually became linked to the idea 
that the state should direct the whole industrial sector so that 
it would serve the scientifically ascertained needs of the 
community. Brady thought this approach was characteristically 
German insofar as the Germans took science very seriously. 
Furthermore, he noted that laissez-faire capitalism had never had 
a strong foothold in Geraany; industrialists were thus more 
willing to accept governmental regulations. Nevertheless, Brady 
regarded the rationalization •ovement as an internationalist 
movement that would break down the barriers between states. Be 
suggested that the extreme nationalist sentiments expressed by 
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tho young supporters of Hitler was passing phase that would 
disappear when the rationalization movement gathered pace. (Brady 
1933:401-413) 
D.H. Macgregor also wrote of the German origins of the 
rationalization •ovement. He wrote in a review of Brady's book 
in the Economic Journal that the word rationalizaton was 
originally used to ref er to a period of "cleaning up" and 
"rationing" in Germany after the Great War, and later came to 
mean the "positive and futuristic reorganisation" of society. 
(Macgregor 1934:714) Of course, the exact direction which the 
rationalization movement took depended on the particular country 
and political traditions in which it developed. Thus in the 1920s 
it came to be associated with ideas of scientific management and 
integration in the tertiary sector in the United States, whilst 
becoming much more associated with state direction of the 
industrial sector in Germany. 
By the 1930s, Brady wrote, the meaning of the word was to 
be "found in its broader social implications." (Brady 1934:714) 
He pointed out that by then the scope of the rationalization 
movement had been broadened to include not just industry but all 
aspects of life, extending from "the reaches of philosophy to the 
of shoe-blacking." (Brady 1930:534) Rationalization subject 
was thus said to be "coterminous" with intellectualization of 
like both the natural and social realms. The new rationalisa, 
positive science, was contrasted with senti•ent, habit and 
custom. (Brady 1930:533) Rationalization was a victory of 
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"conscious effort. reason, and creative striving" over the "raw 
caprice of nature." (Brady 1930:532) That is, it implied the 
gradual elimination of all the mysteries and inexplicable things 
that confronted man in his encounters with the social and natural 
worlds. 
Social crisis was mysterious. It seemed to defy accurate 
description and understanding. But on the scientific view; the 
cause of social crisis was not something strange or obscure, it 
was quite simply ignorance. Aided by scientific methods one could 
pare away the cataclysmic and emotive resonances of crises and 
exposed their real character as maladjustments or dysfunctions in 
the social machine. This was a complete reversal of the position 
of Husserl, who had sought to render the crisis transparent by 
examining its philosophical causes. Here it was argued that it 
was positive science and not philosophy that could bring crises 
into the light. Crises were scientific problems requiring 
scientific solutions and were amenable to complete and rational 
explanation. To believe that crises were due to chance, accident 
or fate was nothing but superstition. 
The laissez-faire economic system was also depicted as 
possessing all the elements of the irrational, the capricious and 
the mysterious whith the rationalization movement opposed. It was 
argued that according to classical political economy. the 
calculated movement of isolated atoms would result in the 
enhanced welfare and order of the whole. As a self-governing 
system, and one in which perfect information was available, the 
market economy did not require "any administrative intervention 
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or direct guidance." (Von Beckerath 1937:574) But the 
information conveyed in the market-place through prices was 
imperfect and partial. The prices which served as "signals to 
producers" did not work very efficiently due to the operations of 
monopolies and other factors which disturbed the workings of the 
system. (Fisher 1932:94) Hence, the collectivity of atoms did 
not always move and come to rest in a state of timeless 
simultaneity. Indeed, in times of uncertainty irrationality 
permeated this system and as a result prices were set at danger-
level - the effect of this being economic contraction. 
Quite clearly the ideal equilibrium could not be guaranteed 
by the government of individual reason. Rather than being a 
picture of elegance or harmony, this economic system was rather 
more like the strange and dangerous realm of nature. The 
rationalist project was to bring more and more of those unruly 
elements that existed outside the bounds of the rationalized 
cosmos into its domain. Only tho steady hand of science could 
smooth out the contradictory, mysterious and paradoxical elements 
in social life; such elements were seen as involvini:; !1,:m,rnity in 
chaos. 
Thus, the coincidence of private interest and public 
virtues, which had been the lynch-pin of the system of laissez-
faire, was now said to be achievable only with external guidance 
and adjustment by the scientific-state. Perfect infor•ation and 
conditions of certainty could be delivered by the state under 
the stewardship of scientific experts. Only the rationalization 
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of society could establish an identity between the particular and 
the universal. This was to be achieved by a central intelligence 
rather than mutually self-adjusting forces. Thus. as an 
expression of the rationalization movement's drive to eliminate 
uncertainty, the planned economy also demonstrated the 
"superiority of conscious reason over blind instinct". which 
supposedly characterized the system of laissez-faire (Durbin 
1936:690) 
One of the key oppositions put forward in these 
recommendations for the rationalizaton of society was that 
between the sense of common discipline embodied in the state and 
the evidence of "competitive excesses" in the market-place. 
(Mauldon 1931:253) The disparate nature of the unregulated 
market could be presented as wasteful and excessive. as co•pared 
with the efficiency and discipline of a "socially controlled 
integration and coordination of industries". (Mauldon 1933:92-
100) It would be the state, rather than the market, which would 
beome the "executioner" of those redundant or excess units 
because of its commanding view of the whole of society. (Mauldon 
1931:254) When brought under the sway of a "voluntarily accepted 
discipline". whole industries would come to function •ost 
efficiently in the national interest. (Mauldon 1931:247-251) (1) 
We can see the impact of these ideas if we look at changes 
to the existing political vocabulary in the English-speaking 
1. The Australian student of administration F.A. Bland suggested 
that public ownership and control of industry might in some cases 
prove "more efficient and economic than private" control. (Bland 
1934:71) 
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world, where a new terminology had emerged. In the 20th century 
the focus of political discourse was said to have shifted from 
adventure to security, progress to order, freedom to discipline 
and competition to control. (Brigden 1935:236} Hore 
specifically, terms such as "'balanced production', ·orderly 
marketing', ·credit control', economic planning', and ·a five 
year plan'" had become central to administrative debates. These 
terms that would have been unheard of or "unintelligible" prior 
to the 20th cent~ry. (Mauldon 1933:92} 
But what did a society designed around new rationalist 
principles look like? State and society would function something 
like the stream-lined mass-production process of the 
scientifically managed firm. The state was conceived of as a 
"single great mechanism" comprised of smaller organisations and 
units, all 
1931:256} 
the excess 
of which dovetailed "into the whole." (Mauldon 
The unity of the state could be seen to stand against 
and disorder of unregulated economic life. Where 
crisis had implied a loss of grounding, government by scientific 
diktat through the command of the economic system would provide 
the new grounds, the new centre for social activity. The state 
would be the "unifying centre" which would "consciously shape the 
purposes of the economic systea." (Greenwood 1933:80) 
But what also emerges from this, is an ambiguous theory of 
the state. In contrast to the old rationalism, 
rationalism held that "Rational purposes• received 
the new 
"their 
highest expression in the activities of the state." (Greenwood 
1933:80} This state could, on the one hand, be depicted as a 
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purely functional centre devoid of autonomous will. On the other 
hand, it could be depicted as something which stands above the 
complex of social action, directing, guiding and co-ordinating 
it. The state could therefore be described as either a neutral 
mechanism or a supreme will securing the rationality of the 
social order. The problems associated with this dual depiction of 
the nature of the rationalist state will become evident in later 
discussions of the nature of the state under fascism. 
In summary then, the new rationalism oversaw the 
introduction of scientific research in the pure and applied 
sciences; the standardization and simplification of commercial 
processes and linguistic signs and symbols; the establishment of 
national planning commissions; the horizontal and vertical 
integration of social structures and, most importantly, the 
scientific management of men and materials for the purposes of 
the State. 
5. The Role of Politics 
As we have seen, far from standing for a frictionless method 
of social adjust•ent, the system of laissez-faire was seen as 
chaotic and vulnerable to capture by sectional interests. The 
unregulated economic system was seen as the apotheosis of greed 
and selfishness. To that extent it was seen not as a creature of 
economic science but of politics. 
More fundaaentally, laissez-faire could be seen as the 
effect of an uncontrolled, aetaphysical will. In opposition to 
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this, the growing strength of the physical sciences was seen as a 
denial or an attempt to suppress such metaphysical forces. The 
physical sciences embraced concrete realities and material 
forces. (Wallace 1924:282ff) This suppression of will by the 
physical sciences was also a suppression of politics insofar as 
the will to power lay behind all political conflicts. Thus, the 
laissez-faire economic system and the economic conflicts it gave 
rise to was but one example of the dangers of political will. 
Another example was war. The social disruptions caused by 
war were seen as the ill-effects of the free-play of political 
will. Of course, we should remember the historical context of 
these denunciations of politics and its identification with the 
evils of war. One cannot divorce the distaste for politics and 
the search for a new and disinterested way of administering 
domestic and international society from the bloodshed caused by 
the Great War. For the war was seen as an expression of that 
"spirit of egoism• which found its most effective vehicle in the 
form of the nation-state. The spirit of egoism was the sole cause 
of the waste and loss of war. (Knibbs 1923:171) (1) 
This weariness with and even contempt for politics also grew 
from an understanding of it as largely consisting of 
parliamentary debates over which policy or party would prevail. 
Such debates seemed rather petty in the light of the problems 
which were appearing in Europe from the 1920s onwards. This 
became a popular refrain. It was clearly a popular refrain to 
1. This is partly why, as we shall discuss in chapter five, 
there was a strong trend towards political pluralism after the 
war. 
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see in science the answer to social problems. A West•inster 
Gazette editorial in 1926 put it that the only way to prevent 
Government from hurting the public was by supplying it -with •an 
adequate scientific apparatus and placing it beyond the play of 
party politics." (Westminster Gazette 1926:1) 
As with war, politics was considered "wasteful". It was seen 
as an "expensive luxury" and a "parasite"; the methods which it 
employed being "reckless" and "haphazard." (Wallace 1924:277) 
Politics was the realm of "traditions, emotions and vested 
interests". (Portus 1927:31) Political judgements, because of 
their essential narrowness, were the direct cause of "industrial 
waste" and idle resources. (Greenwood 1933:82) Many were 
optimistic that politics, like war itself, was becoming extinct 
in an age of science. Already new techniques and methods for 
social organisation were emerging that would render politics 
superfluous and which would use science to establish "artificial 
or tellic control" over society. (Barnes 1925:117) For Wallace, 
the complexity of social life, and the increasing importance of 
scientific argument in the conduct of social affairs, showed that 
"political methods [had] risen to the top like a light and frothy 
scum, beneath which the new technique" was making itself ready. 
(Wallace 1924:277) 
The state did not have to become a vehicle for the political 
will. The new techniques which were emerging were centred around 
the idea of a bureaucracy which would be trained in scientific 
methods, and which would be "removed as far as possible from the 
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undue pressure of party politics." (Belshaw 1929:364) The 
Australian administrative theorist F. A. Bland wrote that the 
growing limitation on politics was not something to be regretted, 
for the greatest danger to modern society was the tinkerings of 
"political amateurs upon the body politic". (Bland 1934:76-7) In 
addition, it was not possible for the political executive to deal 
with the increasing complexity of social life, or to adainister 
all the services that the modern public service state was called 
upon to provide. (1) 
This identification of politics with irrational forces, and 
the belief that technical decision-making could overcome the 
political problem, was also taken up by Karl Mannheim. Mannheim 
wrote that politics was only possible to the extent that the 
"sphere of the irrational" persisted in social life. (Mannheim 
1936:170) But, with the development of the "exact" sciences, he 
was confident that the sphere of the "rationally controllable" 
was growing while the sphere of the irrational was in decline. 
(Mannheim 1936:170-1) In particular, for Mannheim, the eruption 
of conflicts was largely caused by economic inequalities. Hence, 
the way to reduce disturbances was the manipulation of, the trade-
cycle by a professional bureaucracy attuned to the real needs of 
society. As a result of this he wrote, in the future aany 
issues currently deemed as political would simply bec<>11e matters 
1. A sign of this transition from the personified nation-state to 
the state as a neutral mechanis• was the change in the 
description of i~ froa a "police state" to a "public service 
state". (McMahon Ball 1932:173) 
of science and technique rather than opinion. · At< this point·. 
politics would gradually disappear and adsinistration wo~ld take 
its place. (Mannhei• 1936:170) (1) 
Thus, it was not the state itself that was the problem in 
relation to conflicts of wills. It was the presence of politics 
at the centre of the state and not the institution of the state 
itself that was the problem. A scientific state. -unlike a 
politically driven state, would be a self-less state, according 
to those who were described as the new rationalists. (2) 
6. The Problem of Democracy. 
It was argued that the sceptre of sovereignty must be shared 
between politics and specialised agencies. (Bland 1934:76-7) This 
was obviously a problem ie relation to principles of democracy. 
Whatever the egalitarian thrust of the new rationalism in the 
economic sphere, it exhibited little interest in deaocratic modes 
of organisation. As we noted earlier, its interest was in the 
1. An Australian scholar P. H. Partridge wrote that when scholars 
stated that the •rational society of the future• would exclude 
politics they meant they would exclude the •exercise of force• 
and prejudice and replace it with the "conscientious study of 
society.• (Partridge 1941:252) ~. 
2. We can find many calls for society to be disciplined by 
scientific experts rather~than political amateurs through-out the 
1930s and 1940s. The modern state was said to need •tact-
gathering and fact interpreting bureaux•. (Ross 1934:242) ·Social 
planning was said to be based on social research of all the 
relevant facts and the substitution of the •properly equipped• 
for the •well-intentioned and devoted." (Xewley 1942:321) Refor• 
was said to require the erection of dykes to stop •the flood 
waters of partisan politics, froa engulfing the fields of 
ad•inistration• as Merriaa put it. (Renwick 1944:81) 
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rational ordering of society in the national interest, rather 
than in •atters of personal freedo•. This was what distinguished 
it from the old rationalism. A strong association. was •ade 
between the ideal of deaocracy and the ideal of economic 
freedom. The chaos of democracy could be seen to coapleaent the 
chaos of laissez-faire. 
Further•ore, when there was talk of the failure of politics 
it was the failure of democracy that was often being pointed to. 
For democracy, like politics itself, was also dee•ed to have 
failed as evident in the threats being posed to it all over 
Europe. Social scientists were rather sceptical of the wayward 
workings of democracy. As William Anderson had written, modern 
social scientists tended to "disparage democracy on the score of 
efficiency", and for this reason he believed that the democratic 
legislature was on its way to being superceded. (Anderson 
1926:48) For those planners who viewed themselves as akin to 
scientists, democracy could be seen as something which should be 
judged in terms of whether it could produce the greatest 
happiness rather than being seen as an end in itself. Dyas on 
wrote that economists: 
Hay fairly welcoae that decline of democratic faith which, 
though it reduces democracy from an inspiration to an 
instrument, nevertheless •akes society free to experiment 
and gives the economist liberty to pursue his inquiries. 
(Dyason 1932:172) 
To this extent, political de•ocracy becaae quite secondary 
to the pursuit of a rational social order, where political 
clashes between economic and social groups were eliminated by 
subjecting each group to •the dictates of a rational concept of 
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general national and social welfare." (Greenwood 1933:83) This 
idea was repeated time and again and was given full expression in 
the fashion for overhead planning of the economic real•, which 
Walter Lippmann described as the "dominant dogma of the age." 
(Bowen 1938:711) (1) 
As we noted in the last chapter, one could also link 
democracy with the rise of-irrational impulses. Hannhei• wrote 
that that de•ocracy also witnessed the "flash of e•otions and 
group valuations.• (Mannheim 1940:360) Mannheim said the paradox 
of modern society was that it facilitated the growth of 
bureaucratic organisation and increasing interdependence of state 
agencies (leading to a heightened degree of rationality in 
society) yet also threatened that rationality because it allowed 
rule by the mob. He wrote that "mass emotions" could nsweep away 
all traces of foresight and calculationn, and •mob emotionsn 
could have 6 disastrous 6 effects where they interfered with the 
work of government. (Mannheim 1940:359-60) While democracy 
required the input of the people, their input should only serve 
as an indication to the government as to what course to take and 
should not be accepted in its 6 crude state. 6 (Mannheim 1940:359-
60) 
There was also, it seemed, an intimate link between 
democracy and dictatorship which could only be severed by the 
expertise of the planners. Walter Shephard wrote in an article 
1. It was said that even the Americans were sacrificing "their 
individualistic godsn for the sake of Roosevelt's "national 
planning." (Wood 1933:45) 
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called "Democracy in Transition" in Ih& American Political 
Science Review that where democracy simply became an outlet for 
popular "sentiment, caprice and passion", it could be "reduced" 
by self-serving politicians to a set of "techniques by which the 
uninstructed masses may be swayed, controlled and used". 
(Shephard 1935:358} (1) Whereas in earlier times the important 
question was how to give effect to public opinion, now the 
question was how to control it. And to the extent that democracy 
embodied all unleashed popular passions which hindered scientific 
progress, it was said that scientists no longer believed that 
""the voice of the people is the voice of God.'" (Shephard 
1935:7} 
7. The Role of the Intellectual. 
These ideas about the failure of democracy and the 
importance of science to public administration obviously enhanced 
the role of social scientists in public life. As one writer put 
it, in a "period of expertocracy" where the "democratic movement" 
was seen to be exhausted, the scientist who knew how to manage 
things should take the place of the "untrained mass." (Jones 
1928:285} Not only did the wall between state and society come 
tumbling down under the doctrine of new rationalism, so did the 
1. Shephard wrote that H.G Wells was right in arguing that "we 
want the world ruled not by everybody but by a public-minded 
organization open, with proper safeguards, to everybody." Such an 
organization, however, had to be "immune to the pressure of 
propaganda and to the seduction of special interests." (Shephard 
1935:19} 
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wall between academic and non-academic life. There was no part of 
the social universe that could not be amenable to study and 
manipulation by experts. The concept of the scientific 
commonwealth seemed to deny the private sphere of activity any 
place, just as it denied any role to accident, chance or fate. 
For instance, laissez-faire in reproduction could be seen as 
being as regressive and irrational as laissez-faire economics. 
And just as laissez-faire was giving way to economic planning and 
control, so too in the course of education it was necessary to 
plan the individual personality and mould it to conform with 
social and moral principles. In a rationalized society, "mental 
hygiene", eugenics and "vital statistics" (that is, 
"improvement of the body politic 
intelligence") was an important goal. 
in health, vigor 
(Barnes 1925:117-8) 
the 
and 
The 
use of scientific methods in the reconstruction of the human 
personality and human behaviour would, like a planned economy, 
eliminate intellectual waste through such things as vocational 
training or even the planned reproduction of humanity. Psycho-
biology had as its end the elimination, as far as possible, of 
those elements of uncertainty and danger which the non-rational 
can bring. Some went as far to say that democracy should only 
apply to an "aristocracy of worth", so that the "stupid, or those 
unable to exercise the rights of citizenship, will not have a 
voice in control." (Tait 1928:29) 
If the disinterested scientist was the model for the social 
planner, then it seemed appropriate to characterize the social 
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arena as a laboratory for scientific experiment. Social 
scientists were now let loose in the greatest laboratory of all, 
claiming to be to the 20th century what Bacon was to the 18th. 
(Parkinson 1934:95) But again, as it was precisely the 
scientific detachment of the experts that entitled them to have a 
larger say in the running of society, it was important to 
maintain an air of scientific accuracy. Yet many of the 
disciplines emerging at that time were built on shaky empirical 
grounds. For this reason social planners tended to borrow their 
vocabulary from established fields of technical and scientific 
learning such as medicine, engineering and physics. 
Social scientists commonly depicted themselves as like 
medical scientists, working in the greatest laboratory of all. 
Their role in this regard was to eradicate the sicknesses 
engendered by self-interest and the misuse of resources in order 
to secure hygienic social conditions. The diseases spread by 
evils such as laissez-faire, war and politics could be contrasted 
with the predictability and security of the vast social 
laboratory of the future, which would be guided by clear-sighted 
experts. Parkinson wrote that gradually, the knowledge uncovered 
by use of scientific methods would be: 
... absorbed as established scientific truths into public 
utility, just as the germ theory of disease has been, and 
international trade relations will be controlled by a 
quietly functioning department, very like an international 
Board of Health. (Parkinson 1934:97) 
What was once decided according to opinion and interest 
would now be decided by technique. Mannheim also used a medical 
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analogy, stating that the social scientist's approach should be 
similar to that used in treating a "hygienic or sanitary 
problem", which was "usually solved by non-political means", 
based on the "best scientific methods available." (Mannheim 
1940:363) Where policy is based on such methods, he wrote, 
"political differences are inconceivable." (Mannheim 1940:363) 
The redescription of the economic activities of the state in 
terms of its activities in the procurement of health and hygiene 
had its origins in the Victorian period. In the late 19th 
century, state intervention had been justified in terms of the 
need to secure the health and hygiene of society and to prevent 
"social diseases". (Whitfield 1924:565) These were due to the 
existence of unsanitary conditions, particularly among the poor. 
The state was thus intervening to secure a higher good in line 
with the "change of social sentiment in the direction of public 
hygiene and social welfare". (McPhee 1924:541) This argument for 
state intervention in the 19th century was used to support the 
further extension of state control of the economic realm in the 
20th century. The provision of social security by the state 
could be seen as analogous to state provision of sanitary 
conditions. Just as the "preservation and improvement of public 
health" had once demanded a "union between science and 
administration", the preservation and improvement of the social 
order also demanded another sort of agency which would be charged 
with eliminating social illnesses. (Bland 1934: 71} 
These medical analogies also began to mesh with the 
description of society as being akin to a scientifically managed 
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firm. Individual citizens would need to be subject to 
psychological methods to indicate the specialized vocational 
function to which they were suited. This view of a well-ordered 
society as an arrangment of specialist functions overseen by 
expert managers was very much like the modern mass production 
process. Thus we find that modern mechanical, engineering and 
design techniques were frequently invoked in describing a state 
designed or engineered to serve large social purposes. The 
intellectualization of the world and a reduction in the realm of 
the unknown went hand in hand with the gradual elimination of the 
role of the accidental in the natural and social realms, its 
replacement being a world shaped by design. (1) 
That the social realm was actually conceived in terms of, 
and not merely likened to, a feat of engineering is evident in 
Sir Henry Barraclough's point, that when he spoke of engineering 
the modern state he said he was using the phrase strictly 
technically and not at all as a metaphor. (Barraclough 1939b:179) 
As suggested by our dicussion of the interest in eugenics and the 
planning of the human personality, it was not just institutions 
or the economic system that were to be designed. The new social 
engineers went further in making humanity the object of their 
1. Sir David Rivett cited H. G Wells as saying: "Every principle 
of the world machine must be designed. The property and money 
system must play in with the system of production, with the 
educational system, with the organisation for the extension of 
science, with the transport organization, with the biological 
controls. These must all be proportionate to one another, 
interacting with one another and modifiable in relation of each 
other. " (Rivett 1937:13) 
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investigation. The "vast mob " were to be "the chief material of 
the higher engineering." (Barraclough 1939a:187) 
At one level, the promotion of science as the model for all 
knowledge was political only in a metaphorical sense. That is, it 
was part of an attempt to control and change the intellectual 
priorities of the academy. But it was political in a more 
conventional sense as well, as social scientists armed with 
method could also claim to possess a superior wisdom in the 
running of worldly affairs. What followed from this was the idea 
that the "social scientist is better at politics" than either 
the politician or the public, and can perform the functions of. 
the political leader more "skilfully and responsibly." (Partridge 
1941:251} Hence, social scientists were not just claiming the 
superiority of science over philosophy, they were also claiming 
preeminance in the control and direction of political and civil 
affairs. 
8. The Linguistic Dimension. 
Elevating the importance of scientific ways of speaking in 
intellectual circles was also inextricably tied to the elevation 
of this way of speaking in the fields of public affairs and 
administration. Thus, it was the vocabulary of political and not 
just intellectual life that was being changed. As we have 
suggested, social scientists propounded a form of social 
description which elevated method above opinion, facts above 
speculative thought and literal above figurative meaning. 
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This is precisely why the adoption of the terms of 
scientific debate by social scientists became so important. For 
it was not as easy for social as for natural scientists to 
establish a special language. 
difficulties in locating an 
Social scientists encountered 
exclusive discourse. Social 
scientists could not so easily avoid indulging in common speech. 
L.M Fraser wrote in Economic Thought and Language that economists 
were aware of all the "inaccuracy of their linguistic equipment" 
when compared with the natural sciences. (Fraser 1937:vii) 
concern for an exclusively scientific language This 
reflected a desire to find a way of speaking about political 
life that would transcend all other ways. It also reflected a 
rationalist belief that if only the social problem is described 
or analyzed accurately, then all shall accept the same solution. 
It is not surprising then that one of the features of the 
rationalization movement was the standardization and 
simplification of linguistic signs and symbols. While one does 
not want to make too much of this, there was a certain sense that 
if people all spoke the same way or at least accepted certain 
fundamental rational principles of argumentation, then the 
political problem would fade away. 
That there was this concern with harmonizing beliefs or 
modes of speech has at least one perfectly understandable 
justification. The idea of one rational mode of discourse was 
seen as an answer to the images of Nazi Germany and Fascist 
Italy, where the popular passions were aroused by propaganda, 
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thus facilitating the rise of demagogues and dictators. The new 
sophists exploited the potent arts of propaganda, oratory and 
advertizing. 
Those trained in scientific method became contemptuous of 
the linguistic dimension of politics. The oratory of the Nazi 
leaders - the hammering of audiences with hard, uncompromising 
words - blurred the lines which separate language and violence. 
Nazi propaganda was also suggestive of all that could be seen to 
'be manipulative and sinister in politics and rhetoric for, as 
Kenn~th Burke noted at the time, Hitler claimed that 
should be sold like soap. (Burke 1984:77} So the 
politics 
model of 
scientific discourse and the ideal of a universal rational 
audience was seen as the linguistic antithesis of Nazi black 
magic. In the war of words, only scientific discourse would 
defeat the enemies of reason. But this was because of the 
fidelity of science and not because it possessed its own power of 
magic. Furthermore, a citizenry conscious of economy of meaning 
and trained in rational thought, rather than one chained to 
arbitrary and erratic will, would not be vulnerable to inflated, 
seductive or inflammatory oratory. 
The demand for a new model for political activity - for 
political discourse in particular - followed from 
characterization of contemporary thought as emotional 
the 
and 
confused. If the image of Babel, in the sense of everything that 
is opposed to reasoned discourse, was the dominant image of 
conceptual activity at that time, and if intellectual dissent 
posed a threat to the political order, then the intellectual 
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project to establish a commom perspective became crucial. (Fox 
1938:194) 
9. The Reconciliation of Democracy and Planning. 
As we have seen, democracy was seen to give way to such 
fevered outpourings. Where democ~ecy was defined in too radically 
individualist or pluralistic terms it was could be seen as 
involving society in chaos; either the chaos of uncoordinated 
individualism or the chaos of mob rule. The fracturing of wills 
which was the cause of social disorder was contrasted to the 
unified and rational will of the ordered state. Both idealist and 
new rationalist accounts of civil society designated the 
singular, public will as the real will of society. To this 
extent, it could be argued (albeit rather disingenuously} that 
the real enemy of rationality was a discordance amongst the 
popular will, rather than democracy itself. Social chaos was 
caused by the failure of individuals to recognize their true 
interests - the latter being coincident with the interest of the 
whole. Given this, it was easy to argue that the congregation of 
individual wills should be further controlled by the exercise of 
the public will. Without control, there would be a chaos of 
"competing popular wills." (Bland 1934:69} 
As we have seen, planning was said to be synonomous with 
scientific observation and social control of the populace by 
experts. Social stability necessitated surveillance of the 
population and the monitoring of its moods and emotions by means 
of mass-polling and mass observation. Thus, the "real problem" 
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facing modern democracy was precisely this need to reconcile its 
"fundamental basis with the growing necessity for expert 
control." (Gepp 1939:156) 
Some saw dictatorial implications in such arguments. (Eddy 
1939:284-6) However, it was countered that this did not have to 
mean a signifi~ant reduction in democracy. Indeed, observation 
and control were also necessary for the preservation of 
democracy. Far from facilitating authoritarian control, the 
monitoring of popular sentiment would allow scientists to be 
alert to potential clashes of will which could threaten democracy 
by creating crises open to exploitation by despotic leaders. 
(Metcalfe 1943:67) 
The potential contradictions within this notion of a 
scientifically steered democracy, or at least one in which social 
disagreement was limited, were also resolved by way of the 
proposal to extend the scientific estate downward into the minds 
of the populace. As we have seen with our discussion of the 
rationalization of political language, only the consonance of 
will between the scientist and the citizenry would bridge the gap 
between scientific truth and human understanding. Where the "non-
scientific public" was trained in the methods and language of 
science, tensions between the actual and real will, between 
expediency and scientific necessity, between representative 
democracy and expert control would be resolved. The popular 
corollary of the scientist-king was thus the citizen-scientist. 
The citizen-scientist was one who was able to think rather than 
feel, who was governed by reason rather than emotion and was able 
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to separate the substantial from the meretricious. (Bland 
1943:69) The citizenry, equipped with training to judge on facts 
would not be misled by bias; mass emotions could thus be 
harnessed for social progress rather than social disruption. 
Citizens should "demand facts ... and the use of experts." (Kewley 
1942:313) (1) 
Hence, a citizenry could be fully reconciled to the counsel 
of reason which was the state. Citizens who were versed in 
scientific argument, in a social context in which the interests 
had been eradicated, would not be prone to the waste of political 
disputation and indeed the physical and spiritual waste which 
came as a result of violent political clashes. If the "power of 
planned persuasion" were used to encourage "peaceful cooperation 
and understanding" rather than "stir" up strife, then "we would 
gladly consent to considerable interference at strategic points." 
(Shaw 1942:92) 
10. The Ambiguity of Planning. 
For those who conceived of society and knowledge as an 
organic unity animated by an ethical ideal, the intellectual 
movement of rationalization was spiritually soulless and amoral. 
For as suggested above, rationalization of the industrial process 
eventually led to, and indeed necessitated, a greater 
uniformity and common identity in social life. The spread of 
1. Note that Pearson had also written that: "Modern Science, as 
training the mind to an exact and impartial analysis of facts, is 
an education specially fitted to promote sound citizenship." 
(Pearson 1937:13) 
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mass-production thus oversaw the spread of a mass-culture and 
the gradual "organisation of all interests, including those of 
art and science, on economic lines." (Anderson 1931b:89) This 
trend was universal and transcended political differences. It was 
a trend which was Western, urban and cosaopolitian. John 
Anderson wrote that attempts to aodel society on an industrial 
system, based on the standardization and quantity production ~f 
"men and things", would in the end bring both Capitalisa and 
Bolshevism very close to each other in their final stages. 
(Anderson 1931b:90) 
Drucker's argument that the modern world had seen the 
destruction of economic man may well be correct, but it is not 
correct to say the dominance of economic values passed away as 
well, for rationalization meant quintessentially the udominance 
of economic values" and the test of material success. (Anderson 
1931b:89) The crucial difference between the new economic world 
and the old was that the distribution of economic rewards in the 
new order was based on what were deemed to be social rather ~ban 
sectional considerations. 
Rational social control It would not only 
stability and a higher standard of life it 
produce greater 
would also, in 
creating an organic community, create a moral one as well. 
Standardization and.· rationalization, "wisely practised and 
directed", were "a beneficient agency by which the co .. unity is 
organised to cooperate for the coamon good", soaething which 
was "an essential adjunct to our civilization.• (Hebblewhite 
1938:69) 
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Furthermore, despite the contrasts drawn between rationalism 
and ideal liberalism, we can detect similar ideas about social 
interdependence and social purpose. The main difference being 
that the rationalists preferred mechanical or industrial 
analogies to organic ones. The purposiveness of the earlier 
evolutionary idealism was reflected in the understanding of 
rationalization as marking the increasing self-consciousness and 
self-realizaton of the social machine. 
Further to this, we find that organic metaphors flowed into 
and informed the complex machine and systems metaphors taken from 
the scientific and technological realms. Thus, while on the hand, 
it was argued that the government machinery was being streamlined 
in order to form a more coherent structure, it was also said to 
be undergoing "a series of organic fusions." (Mauldon 1933:96) 
Brady wrote in Rationalizatj on~ German Industry that current 
scientific opinion suggested the universe was a "life-like 
machine", and this "functioning complex" was the model for the 
idea of a "functionally organized economy." (Brady 1933:9} Given 
this emphasis on the biological conception that the parts of an 
economy are functional to a "larger whole", it is not surprising 
that the idea of the rationalization movement, or at least the 
proposal for national planning, 
revival of organic theory. 
would later be seen as marking a 
(Wilson 1942:456,458} In this 
context, A.P. Elkin argued that society was entering a new period 
in which, instead of there being an emphasis on the individual, 
there was an emphasis on "social holism." (Elkin 1943:275} 
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But we should note that in stressing the functional 
interdependence of society, the advocates of planning did not 
necessarily mean to reduce human freedom. In attempting to refute 
the charge that social planning implied despotism there was a 
revival of those arguments put by the so-called new liberals of 
the late 19th century. F.A. Bland echoed T.H. Green when he wrote 
that the "new social order" had to develop a new understanding of 
"social obligations ... True liberty is possible only when 
everybody is passionately anxious to provide condtions in which 
every one has the opportunity of being its best self." (Bland 
1930:204) More specifically, the argument was developed that 
freedom - the free personality - could only develop where the 
state was allowed to eliminate the inequalities and injusticies 
of the market-place. Thus, it was argued that planning and 
freedom were claimed to be not "merely compatible but even 
complementary", for the old ideal of freedom - lost in the period 
of laissez-faire - could only be achieved by the technique of 
planning. (Partridge 1941: 236) 
The identity established between planning and freedom 
reinforced similar moves to unite the concepts of democracy and 
bureaucracy and the concepts of science and welfare. Where the 
authoritarian nature of the new order was questioned, one could 
argue with Mannheim that the application of social techniques to 
the running of society was "planning for freedom" not "planning 
for conformity." (Mannheim 1940:263-4) Freedom, it was said, 
would only be faciliC:tated by "compulsory education, by health 
regulations, possibly by political regulations, certainly by 
... 
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economic regulations." (Shaw 1942:86) However, where this 
identity was difficult to establish, one could stress the need to 
sacrifice certain values in order to serve some universal good. 
Such a view was comparable to the idealist notion of the 
"transferring of the ·actual' into the 'real' will." (Shaw 
1942:86) 
Despite these overlapping tendencies, the moral ambiguity of 
arguments for the use of scientific method in order to enhance 
social welfare was not entirely resolved. The status of value 
as something discovered by science or as something for which 
science was merely instrumental - was not clarified by those who 
were both believers in the neutrality and supremacy of method and 
at the same time concerned to promote a better world. Indeed, 
this ambiguity could not be resolved because the arguments in 
favour of planning were used in front of a variety of audiences. 
Attempts to resolve these tensions may well have invited 
criticism from one or other of these audiences. 
11. The image of fascism and the militarization of discourse. 
The need to establish a complentarity between planning and 
freedom also reflected a need to deflect charges that planning 
implied the same authoritarian state control which was evident in 
Communist Russia, Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy. Planning and 
rational social organization were asserted to be the antithesis 
of the vicious conflicts which characterized political upheaval 
of the kind that existed in those countries. (Greenwood 1933:83) 
Criticisms of these regimes appealed to both moral and scientific 
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values. Philip Parkinson wrote in I.he. Australian Ouaterly that 
planning, as a non-revolutionary approach to social change, 
promised not "ruthless destruction but the slow establishment of 
scientific truth in social relations." (Parkinson 1934:98) 
Yet despite the n~ed to distance planning from the 
authoritarian political systems of Nazism, Fascism and, to a 
lesser extent, Bolshevism, there was also an expressed 
fascination with the images of national discipline and order 
offered by those state directed societies. I have discussed the 
dualistic images of Nazism and fascism. They could appear as 
both arbitrary and fanatical as well as being the embodiment of 
efficiency and order. Thus, while at one level the intellectual 
appraisal of political affairs pitted scientific and democratic 
values against the rage of Nazism and fascism, a certain 
ambivalence towards these movements was shown (albeit well 
before the war) by those who wanted state direction of liberal-
democracies. It was still possible in the early 1930s to hold up 
the "great national plans of Germany, Italy and Russia" as 
models for those who saw the economic planning of the modern 
state as a means to go beyond political methods. (Wood 1933:45) 
Brady wrote that in Germany and Soviet Russia alone was there the 
"aniversal application of scientific methods and techniques and 
cooperative effort in all phases of investigation, production and 
distribution." (Brady 1933:6) Paul Einzig argued in I.he. Economic 
Foundations Qf. Fascjsm (1933) that while fascism began as a 
political idea, it had developed all the necessary preconditions 
of social cooperation for the introduction of scientific or 
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economic planning. (Einzig 1933: vii: 9ff) (1) 
The unregulated economic system containing warring atoms was 
in total contrast to a planned society. On this account, the 
concept of the totalitarian society was the ideal antithesis of 
laissez-faire's atomic model of society. Thus, while the anarchy 
of laissez-faire was presented as being inefficient it was 
claimed that a rigidly controlled society gave "swifter and 
smoother" articulation of the forces at work in society. The 
totalitarian society, like science which recommends it, is 
disciplined and rigorous. Unguided and unplanned democracy, 
however, could be characterised as soft and lazy, whereas in 
fascist Italy the "present pressing problems" were solidly 
grasped. (Lovell 1933:313) 
But it was the Bolsheviks' Five-Year Plan in particular 
which gave dramatic expression to the concept of a planned and 
vigorous society standing for "ambition", "vast promise and 
confidence." (Mauldon 1931:247) Russia was seen as the "ultimate 
rationalist economy" which showed the "growing unity of 
scientific method, which avoids the narrow practicalism of the 
American type." (Mauldon 1931:251) The "great energy and 
practical zeal" that was evident in Russia was contrasted with 
the "slackness" and "weakness" of democracies in times "crisis." 
(Abbot 1931:111) A.C. Pigou noted that Sidney and Beatrice Webb 
1. For a review of Einzig's book see D.A.S. Campbell 
Australian Quarterly, 1933:122 
in ~ 
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had written in ~ N.eli Civilisation that in the Soviet Union "no 
part of the material universe is left unprobed and untested." 
{Pigou 1936:94) 
Enthusiasm for the politics of Italy and Germany was diluted 
in the latter part of the 1930s. By then it had become 
increasingly difficult to praise Fascism and Nazism as model 
political orders, especially when calls for the defence of 
democracy and freedom were at the heart of war time propaganda. 
But the revelation that behind the order of Nazi Germany and 
Fascist Italy lay rapacious urges did not discredit the role of 
scientific planning. In fact, fascism was seen as demonstrating 
the need for rationalization. For it was argued that without 
economic planning the "despoiled lower middle class" would 
become ripe for "Fascist demagogery." (Lerner 1938:116) In 
addition to this, the Soviet Union was still be held up as a 
model of order and rationality, and a state where science was 
taken seriously. 
A contrast was drawn at least between the military 
discipline these new orders affected and the weakness of 
democracy when it came to defend its principles. (Brooks 1941:8) 
Democracy was thus said to be at some disadvantage with the 
Nazi's "'New European Order'" and the Japanese "'New Order for 
Eastern Asia'". The superiority of these new orders was due to 
their very simplicity, their blue-prints springing from "single 
source" 
1941:9} 
and proceeding "according to a simple formula". 
In order for democracy to survive it had 
{Brooks 
to be 
115 
disciplined. (Ogg 1942:13) Democracy could not afford an 
attitude of complacency in the face of political and economic 
ferment. In the new social order individuals were called on to be 
"registered and indexed, reserved, drafted, called-up, man-
powered, rationed ... Even a democratic society must be regimented 
as for battle." (Elkin 1943:275) 
Plans for control of the economic system were often 
described in military terms. Planning the peace as much as 
planning the war was an essential part of saving democracy. This 
was particularly evident amongst Australian writers during the 
war. Describing social policies in this way gave an added 
urgency to calls for social reform. The struggle against poverty 
at home could be seen as analogous to the struggle against the 
enemy without. As the most effective weapon of the state in the 
war against social insecurity, the concept of a controlled 
economy was readily translated into military and strategic terms. 
The problem of economic disorder could be seen as on a par with 
that of war. (Brigden 1935:234} 
For this reason, direction of the economy could be likened 
to the direction of a military force in the pursuit of some 
objective. Both demanded the administration of a resource in 
order to achieve the "maximum efficiency for the purpose 
contemplated". (Walker 1940:2) E. Ronald Walker was an 
Australian academic economist and public administrator and author 
of numerous articles in the Economic Record during the Second 
World War on the administration of the war economy. He later 
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wrote that the military mind, like the econoaic, was conscious of 
the need to avoid waste and decay, and of the "scarcity 
principle" and the need to allocate available resources "in order 
to maximise strength"; like the economist, the military leader 
must count the cost of "manpower and material" and develop a 
rational strategy for choosing between competing alternatives. 
(Walker 1947:16) In this way, military strategy was asserted to 
be a form of economy and "the economic organization of the 
coDlllunity for war" was "regarded as an extension of military 
planning into the civilian sector". (Walker 1947:16) (1} 
Planning the economy in the interests of the war-effort and 
describing this in terms of such military values as efficiency 
and discipline gave further credibility to the idea of a 
scientific public economy. For just as •military experts" were 
allowed to run a war without political interference, so too in a 
period of economic crisis should, the politicians let the experts 
get on with the job. (Shaw 1942:86} {1) Where Machiavelli or 
Clausewitz may be read as emphasising the political and temporal 
character of strategy, the planners appeared to view military 
strategy as a science - even an economic science. By governing 
through the economy, and enlisting the help of a strategic 
science, planners would be better equipped to eliminate the 
political - or rather the conflicts which gave rise to it. 
1. F.A. Bland wrote in Planning ti& H9derp ~that the analogy 
between the military general staff and an econo•ic general staff 
was drawn by the authors of the Liberal Industrial- Report in 
Britain. Bland noted that "many people are convinced that the 
principle [of a •ilitary Intelligence -Staff} has a wider 
applicaton." (Bland 1934:32-4} Bland added that the personnel of 
such a unit could be "drawn from •en scientifically trained ·in 
the work of research and investigation." (Bland 1934:34} 
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12. Planning a Better World 
This chapter has examined a response to uncertainty which 
contrased with the social pessimism considered in the first 
chapter. Scientific and related fields of technological learning 
provided a fund of models and metaphors with which to understand 
the world. These models were brought to bear upon the concepts 
of statecraft, sovereignty and political economy. In some cases 
it seemed to be suggested that, if only we could discover the 
laws of human behaviour, then "a rational society, in the 
political and economic sense, will come almost of its own 
accord." (Anderson 1940:66) On this and many other counts, the 
social planners certainly were naively optimistic. 
Nevertheless, there were good reasons why this belief that 
scientific planning could produce a better world developed. As I 
have pointed out, the promise of a better world was an important 
element in galvanizing support for the war effort in the years 
1939-45. (Partridge 1941:236) Social security, social justice 
and social policy were said to be "at the core" of the issues 
that the war would decide. (Schneider 1942:258) The new social 
order was originally intended to be a moral as well as a 
scientific order. (1) 
1. We can find any number of writers attesting to 
them economists. Burton wrote of the "strong 
better, more gracious way of life" after the 
1943:34) Giblin wrote of the hope for a "'better 
the war." {Giblin 1943:5) 
this - many of 
desire for a 
war. (Burton 
world' after 
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What clearly comes through is that social scientists in 
those years who claimed to have a special knowledge of society 
and the way it should be run had not theorised adequately the 
nature of their relation to the state and society, and the 
relation between the realm of science and the realm of value. Did 
their special knowledge qualify them to be the servant or masters 
of social progress? Furthermore, in this new order, what was to 
be the place of moral sentiments? As we noted earlier, it was not 
clear whether science was to be merely instrumental in achieving 
the good life or whether it actually could point us towards the 
good life itself. 
As we also noted in the last chapter, the coming of the 
Second World War did much to dilute the pose of neutrality 
adopted by social scientists. Indeed, it was the very 
"destructive purposes" to which science had been put that 
stimulated scientists to warn their colleagues that they could no 
longer pretend to be neutral and dissociate themselves from the 
social application of their work. {Vonwiller 1938a:30-33} 
Revealing an awareness of the criticisms of the potential of 
science to cause harm, much was being written on the "human 
aspect" of science. (Vonwiller 1938b:58} (1} 
1. H.G Wells was cited as calling upon scientists to create a 
better world by assisting in the: " ... the intellectualization of 
man's destructive urges in the interests of mankind by the 
practice of science in all its branches to abolish drudgery, to 
conquer disease and malformation, to control and augment good 
supplies, to breed new and better plants and animals, to rid the 
world of pain and disease, to build up a sound, happy well-
balanced attitude to life." (Ross 1942:85} 
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While traditional science and philosophy were seen as 
aristocratic, the new science could be seen as popular and 
democratic. For while social scientists claimed to be detached in 
their evaluations, they also claimed to be humane to the extent 
that their science was placed in the service of the commonweal. 
In this regard, it could be argued that modern science was the 
only intellectual movement which had the confidence to struggle 
successfully against the Nazis. (Robertson 1942:164) Indeed, it 
was where appeals were made to scientific principles in the 
course of the struggle against the Nazis that science's life-
giving qualities were brought to the fore. Science and 
rationality were especially associated with the pursuit of the 
good life where the war effort was cast in terms of the struggle 
between civilization and barbarism. 
These comments suggest that the contrast I have drawn 
between proposing science as a solution to crisis and proposing 
moral renovation was not very sharp. Clearly, many social 
planners who invoked the vocabularly of science did so partly in 
order to endow their arguments for social reform with 
intellectual authority. Nevertheless, there is also evidence of 
the naive belief that a society governed by the scientifically-
trained would be happier and more harmonious. Indeed, it appeared 
to be believed that if members of society were to adopt a 
scientific idiom then political differences could be greatly 
eliminated. It was in reaction to the use of this idiom in 
relation to social affairs that the word rationalism, which in 
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Brady's account had positive connotations, began to be used in a 
pe· jorative sense. That is, it began to be used as a means of 
attacking those who believed that society could be administered 
according to formula. It should also be stressed that the 
scientific idiom employed by social scientists was derived from 
highly simplistic understandings of the nature of modern physics 
and the methodological debates which were taking place in that 
area. Indeed, as we see in the next chapter, certain philosophers 
were putting forward radically different views of what scientific 
activity actually entailed. 
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Chapter 3: The Metaphysics of Process 
1. The Cult of Science 
In the previous chapter I drew attention to some of the ways 
in which people wrote about the intellectual and social order in 
the interwar period. I suggested that in certain intellectual 
circles it was common practice to try and emulate modes of 
scientific discourse. In fact, some advocates of scientific 
method claimed that only science could produce true sentences 
about the world. Due to this, as I also noted, the relations 
between advocates of scientific method and philosophers 
{particularly those working in the area of metaphysics) became 
rather strained. 
I should hasten to add that what was being promoted as the 
scientific approach was not just the result of scientists 
"eulogising" their own methods, as the American philosopher Ralph 
Barton Perry put it. (Perry 1918:45} The cult of science was also 
an invention of non-physical scientists. Social scientists were 
eager to establish for themselves an authoritative voice, and 
being scientific was seen as a means of achieving that. In 
addition to this, there were also philosophers, in particular the 
logical positivists, who sought to replace philosophy with what 
the Viennese philosopher Rudolph Carnap called the "logic of 
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science." (1) The logical positivists were more rigorous in 
their definition of what scientific method entailed than were 
those social scientists who merely sought to fillllll.d. scientific by 
using words such as fact, data, observation and experiment. Yet 
what we have in both cases are examples of scientism the 
belief that statements.about the world should be presented in the 
language of science. Where certain forms of knowledge cannot be 
or could only be imperfectly expressed in this way they were 
regarded as having less intellectual value. Scientism is the 
imitation and "cult of science", and it was this, rather than 
science itself, that so irritated a range of philosophers, 
social theorists and theologians in the 1920s and 1930s. (2) 
1. The philosopher John Passmore reported that the logical 
positivist movement emerged from discussions among members of a 
group formed in 1922 known as the "Vienna Circle". This group 
was led by Moritz Schlicht who was then Professor of Philosophy 
at Vienna. After 1928 it was known as the "Ernst Mach Society"; 
Mach being the German physicist and one who advocated that 
science should be strictly empirical in its approach. It should 
be noted that Schlicht was not sympathetic to Carnap's position 
that philosophy should be replaced by science. He wrote: "Some of 
my friends would prefer to pass as representatives of science 
rather than as philosophers; they attach the greatest importance 
to the scientific character of our thought and pretend that our 
doctrines derive entirely from the sciences and owe nothing to 
traditional philosophy. Often they mock at it and sometimes they 
go so far as to prohibit the use of the term 'philosophy' as a 
description of their own works ... This attitude appears to me to 
rest on a complete misunderstanding." Cited by John A. Passmore, 
"Logical Positivism (I)", ~Australasian Journal g1 Psychology 
~Philosophy, Vol. XX!, Nos 2 and 3, December, 1943, pp. 65-66. 
2. Perry described this cult of science as beginning with the 
"cultivation" of the scientific method, to be followed by "the 
praise and promotion of it, or a devoted loyalty to it." (Perry 
1918:47} Perry suggested that the key to understanding why 
science became an object of worship lies in the ambiguous nature 
of science itself. That is, it both "magnifies" and "belittles" 
man; in measuring him against the rest of nature science makes 
man look small and weak but because it also affords man greater 
power over his environment it enhances his strength. In reducing 
123 
Perry traced the cult of science back to the late 19th 
century when, he said, science replaced religion as man's guide 
in his struggle with nature. Science, he wrote, came to be seen 
as the measure of "progress, and as the central fact in a 
philosophy of history". (Perry 1918:47) Science, he added, was 
held to be on the side of mankind because it was based on reason, 
whereas religious knowledge was dismissed as superstitious and 
reactionary; science would push man forward where religion would 
hold him back. Perry suggested that it was the combination of 
this faith in scientific method with social idealism that 
encouraged an element of zealotry among scientists. And it was 
this, along with a dismissive attitude towards non-scientific 
values, that was partly responsible for the bitter conflicts 
between scientists and religious figures in the late 19th 
century. That is, Perry's argument was that the intolerance and 
arrogance of the scientific community encouraged intolerance on 
the part of the religious community. This helps explain, he 
claimed, the objections to Darwin's theory and new geological 
accounts of the earth's beginnings that were raised in the name 
of religion. (Perry 1918:47) 
But the ironic conclusion to this account is that what began 
as a declaration of independence on the part of scientists soon 
and enhancing man's stature at the same time, science resembles 
religion. Also like religion, it becomes a creed to be adhered to 
as well as a way of living. (Perry 1918:45) Perry made some 
similar observations about the promotion of scientific methods 
some twenty years later; however, in these later comments he 
expressed much more appreciation of their utility and 
distinctiveness. (Perry 1938:56) 
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saw science itself become an object of religious worship. 
Edouard Le Roy, who was to succeed Henri Bergson (an early 
opponent of scientism) to the Chair of Philosophy at the College 
de France in 1920, wrote in Ib& IW! Philosophy g,L Henri Bergson 
(1913) that in "the religion of science we see now nothing but 
idolatry." (Le Roy 1913:130) 
By the time Le Roy made this co-ent·it was the conflict 
between philosophers and scientists, rather than scientists and 
religious figures, that was obtaining prominence in academic 
literature. (Although many philosophers also argued against 
scientism from a religious perspective.) Here the battle was 
fought not so much over what particular scientific discoveries 
might mean in relation to Christian doctrine but more generally 
over the issue of methodology. We should note that scientists had 
also been asserting their autonomy in relation to philosophy 
since the late 19th century. 
The development of the positivist methodology was a 
manifestation of the scientists' desire to be free fro• 
metaphysics. This battle became even •ore pronounced in the 
early 20th ·century with the development of what was known as 
radical empiricism, something which was derived from Humean 
scepticism and which was associated with the names of Karl 
Pearson and Ernst Mach. The difference between positivism in 
this form and the positivism associated with the French 
philosopher Auguste Comte was, for our purposes, twofold. 
Firstly, as Marjorie Harris (of the Randolph Macon Women's 
College) noted in comparing Co•tian positivism with the radical 
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empiricism of William James, Comte had posited a world which 
existed beyond our perceptions and which was inter-related and 
ordered. Even if this reality was ultimately unavailable to us 
there was at least the possibility of achieving some unity 
amongst the sciences. Secondly, Comte subsequently put forward 
the principle of humanity as a means of unifying the subject 
matter of the sciences. This linking of scientific knowledge 
to human interests may resemble the instrumentalist theory of 
knowledge so often associated with the radical empiricists. Yet 
Comte's appeals to human purposes or values sounded more 
metaphysical that the stricter empiricist inistence that 
hypotheses be experimentally successful. (Harris 1925:156-9) (1) 
Because in its later development positivism did not claim 
to offer a new religion to humanity, one would expect that it 
would have been more tolerant of other intellectual pursuits. 
Yet, as we saw in reference to Carnap, this was far from the 
case. For the logical positivists it was not enough to assert 
the distinctiveness of scientific method a method which 
insists that scientists stick to an examination of the facts and 
attempt by means of induction to establish relations between 
these facts and the laws which govern them. One also had to 
announce the possible demise of philosophy. 
The reaction of philosophers to this was similar to that of 
religious leaders when told that their sort of wisdom had been 
1. The references to Comte that Harris made include the Systeme 
4g, politigue positiye, Paris, 1851-4, Vol. I p.27, Vol. III, p. 
95 and the Course ~ phjlosopbique posjtjve, Paris, 1830-42, 
Vol. III, pp. 279-283. 
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superceded. That is, in the face of claims that metaphysics was 
"ideological" (to the extent that it spoke of an "ultimate 
reality"), philosophers asserted the supreme value of their own 
discipline. (Loewenberg 1923:280-1) (1) Thus, the claims made 
by or on behalf of modern science invited indignation, hostility 
and even fear on the one hand and veneration on the other. That 
science could excite such responses is testimony to the 
influence of scientism at that time. (2) 
1. Note the comments by the Australian philosophy W.R. Boyce 
Gibson in comparing the nature of science and philosophy. 
"Finally, from the standpoint of motive, I should suggest that 
whilst both Science and Philosophy share a common respect for 
rationality and are stimulated in their quest by a common 
reverence for truth, the meaning put upon these terms 
differs ... To the philosopher the reality means ultimate reality, 
and rationality will to him have a corresponding wide scope of 
meaning, covering the rationality of fact as well as of theory, 
of imagination as well as of thought, of Art as well as of 
Science. And there will be similar extensions to the meaning 
given to Truth." (Gibson 1924:249) The "scientific" view was 
summed up by J. Loewenberg, in an article called the "Metaphysics 
of Modern Scepticism", Philosophical Review, Vol. 32, No.3, pp. 
278-288. He noted that it had been "declared" that science "has 
nothing to do with metaphysics. This declaration of independence, 
epitomized under the word 'positivism', assigns to science a 
narrow but definite and autonomous sphere. Science must cleave to 
particular facts and, eschewing speculation concerning their 
ultimate nature and destiny, must confine itself to a description 
of their definite relations and constant laws, capable of 
mathematical statement and experimental proof. The whole business 
is relative and its adequacy is to be tested with reference to 
its self-imposed limitations and by its own exact methods." 
p.280 
2. There were also examples of the scientific myth later being 
ridiculed especially by pragmatist philosophers who were equally 
as critical of metaphysics. For instance, the French thinker 
Jacques Barzun, in a book in praise of pragmatist philosophy, 
complained that: "All that people seem to have learned after a 
century of universal scientism is that science is the realm of 
'wonders' and of absolute certainty, a belief which has merely 
transferred religious faith from the black-coated to the white-
coated priests." (Barzun 1939:190) He also noted how the word 
science carried "all before it - at least with the populace." 
(Barzun 1939:178) 
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Asserting the supreme value of the truths revealed by 
philosophy was not the only argument used against scientism. For 
instance, the American economist Frank Knight argued that the 
aspects of life that his discipline dealt with were "so fluid" 
that they could not be rendered as suitable topics for 
"scientific discussion"; science, be wrote, demanded a "static-
subject matter." (Knight 1922:456) Indeed, Knight used an 
argument that was reminiscent of Giambattista Vico's argument 
that the knowledge which comes from a more intimate association 
with one's subject matter, as in the case in the study of 
history, while it cannot offer certainty in the way that science 
does, is nevertheless more powerful than the distant and 
impersonal knowledge 
Knight wrote that 
that science gathers. (Vi co 
those who thought of themselves 
1968:331) 
as "tough-
minded" in their attempts to emulate scientific modes of 
description were really weak-minded, because mere scientific 
description would not lead to true understanding. 
1923:616) 
(Knight 
Such arguments only worked in certain rhetorical contexts. 
From what we have said so far, it would seem that in most 
intellectual contexts, as well as in the public domain, 
scientific method was believed to be potentially universal in 
scope, to the extent that social phenomena were held to be of 
essentially the same nature as the natural phenomena which 
scientists studied. While the logical positivists may not 
themselves have been this ambitious, certain social scientists 
were, as we saw in chapter two. Furthermore, while using science 
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to improve society may not have been part of the logical 
positivists' programme, as we also saw in chapter two, this brand 
of scientism was quickly assimilated {albeit in a simplistic 
fashion) by those with ambitious plans for social reform. 
This leaves us with one point to raise in completing this 
section. That is, given its apparent potency, how much better it 
would have been if the scientistic myth could have been 
unravelled from within science itself. How much more effective 
criticisms of scientism would have been if science itself were to 
take a sceptical or pragmatic turn or perhaps even come to 
endorse the intuitions and reasonings of mystics and 
metaphysicians. For a number of philosophers writing in the 1920s 
and 1930s this is exactly what happened. 
2. Empiricism and the New Realism. 
When I say that there was a drive to become scientific we 
should recall that it was a particular version of science that 
was being put forward. As I pointed out in the last chapter, a 
distinction was drawn between the approaches of classical and 
modern scientists. While ever since the 17th century philosophers 
and economists had sought to imitate the physicist's 
decomposition of reality into discrete items of ever smaller 
dimensions, classical scientists seemed more interested in 
general laws which governed the arrangement of these units. 
Classical science was thus presented as being a series of 
deductions from a priori principles. To this extent, it was seen 
as still being beholden to the methods and metaphysics of the 
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philosophers. 
But modern science was seen as ultimately being secured 
along the axis of experience rather than by logic. Logic was 
needed in order to clarify or apply hypotheses, but deductions 
from these were regarded as being essentially tautological in 
character and therefore unable to express real knowledge. The 
content which actually filled out the logical structures of 
science could only be derived from experimental techniques, 
specifically, the processes of observation and verification. 
Einstein hailed this change in the direction of scientific 
activity away from first principles and towards the empirical as 
a "descent from the Olympus of the apriori". (Einstein 1967:2) 
The English physicist Christopher G. Darwin claimed in Th.a N.fili 
Conception Q..f Matter that the "whole beautiful structure" of the 
theory of relativity rested on an empiricist methodology. (Darwin 
1931:81) (1) 
1. The Australian philosopher Francis Anderson stated that 
Einstein had declared his affiliation with the empiricism of Hume 
and Mach. He cited him as stating in his earlier writings that 
the axioms of geometry "insofar as they refer to reality, are not 
certain, and insofar as they are certain, they have no reference 
to reality." (Anderson 1923a:60) Werner Heisenberg, however, 
later disputed that the work of Einstein and of science in 
general was empirical. He wrote that: "It is generally believed 
that our science is empirical, that we draw our concepts and our 
mathematical constructs from the empirical data. If this were the 
whole truth, we should, when entering into a new field, introduce 
only such quantities as can directly be observed, and formulate 
natural laws only by means of these quantities. When I was a 
young man, I believed that this was just the philosophy which 
Einstein had followed in his theory of relativity. Therefore I 
tried to take a corresponding step in quantllll theory by 
introducing the matrices. But when I later asked Einstein about 
it, be answered, 'This may have been my philosophy, but it is 
nonsense all the same. It is never possible to introduce only 
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As I have suggested, this emphasis on the experimental led 
to a physicalism which insisted that only those things given in 
our sensations which could be admitted as knowledge. (1) Hence 
also the physicalist dictum, as expressed by Moritz Schlicht, 
that only that which could be "measured is real". (2) Such a 
dictum obviously excluded the idea of a universe governed by 
invariable laws because such laws required postulates which were 
themselves unverifiable. (Reiser 1926:244,Wiener 1935:498) (3) 
observable quantities in a theory. It is the theory which decides 
what can be observed.' What he meant by this remark was that, 
when we go from immediate observation - a black line on a 
photographic plate, a discharge in a counter or such like - to 
the phenomena we are interested in, we must make use of theory 
and of theoretical concepts. We cannot separate the empirical 
process of observation from the mathematical construct and its 
concepts. The most conspicuous demonstration of this thesis of 
Einstein's was the later discovery of the relations of 
uncertainty." (Heisenberg 1983:10f) 
1. Examples of elemental things given in our 
include scraps of material, patches of colour, 
and tactile presentations all of which could be 
of observation statements. (Stace 1932:444) 
sensations might 
distinct sounds, 
expressed in form 
2. Schlicht, in the introduction to ~ and Iili iD. 
Contemnorary Physics, cited in Weber, 1927, p.521. 
3. This denunciation of the objective status of scientific laws 
was a strong feature of the logical positivist movement. See 
Bertrand Russell's essay "Science" in Whither Maq.kjg. 8 fdOOt'il'llP 
~Modern Civilization, Charles A. Beard (ed.), London, 1928. 
Russell noted that some of the "leading authorities on the 
structure of tho atom maintain explicitly that there are no 
causal laws in the physical world." {Beard 1928:65) He also 
noted that some philosophers held the same view and in this 
context he cited Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logjco-Philosophicus in 
which the philosopher wrote that "In no way can an inference be 
made from the existence of another entirely different from 
it ... Superstition is the belief in the causal nexus." (5.135, 
5.1362} This last quotation is taken from Passmore, 1943, p. 67. 
Note that there seems a degree of confusion as to what extent the 
technique of verification qualifies as an example of empiricism 
or rationalism. For example, it has been seen as rationalist in 
nature for it is a static test which rests on principles of 
consistency, coherence and non-contradiction which themselves are 
not verifiable. (Perry 1938:50, Hsaio 1927:196-7} John Grier 
Hibben had made similar remarks about verification as a form of 
instrumentalism. That is, instrumentalists demand not only that a 
truthful proposition "fit into the concrete situation of actual 
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The logic of positivism imposed even stricter limits upon 
what science could or could not say. For the radical empiricist 
argued that one could not even speak of things or substances. 
The English astronomer Sir Arthur Eddington agreed. In ~Nature 
Qf. the Physical Ril..r.1d (1928) he wrote that one had to think 
solely in terms of measures. But he also added that the question 
as to whether these measures represented anything real was one 
which was beyond scientific scrutiny. (Eddington 1935:7) Indeed, 
to insist on the "real" character of scientific facts or laws, 
to attempt to describe a reality beyond the immediate sensations 
or phenomena given in experience, was to involve oneself in 
metaphysics. In one stroke, the empiricist bad not only denied 
scientific laws any existence beyond a purely functional role as 
means of predicting the future, but also eliminated the 
metaphysical belief that subjects and objects existed 
independently of each other and endured beyond the moment of 
observation. All that remained were, as a New Zealand 
philosopher William Anderson wrote, transient "spatio-temporal 
relations of sensory elements". (Anderson 1924:241) 
facts in a way that can explain them satisfactorily" but they 
also demand that "it will fit into a thought situtation in a like 
satisfactory manner, so as to do no violence to the fundamental 
laws of our logical nature. Verification of this kind, however, 
concedes in its very statement the consideration of a higher 
standard to which the simple pragmatic test must conform. In 
other words, truth's instrumental value is conditioned and 
determined both in nature and range by the demands of our reason 
for coherence and consistency." (Hibben 1908:371) See also 
Passmore's comments, about the rationalistic character of the 
logical positivists method of verification insofar as it was an 
attempt to isolate "simple natures" and insofar as logical 
positivists held that there was only one method by which simple 
entitities could be verified. Passsmore, 1943, p.71. 
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But as Anderson asked, if this were the case how could 
appearances be saved? If not only laws but also scientific 
measures were really matters of conventions and agreement 
superimposed on the flux of our sensations, scientific knowledge 
could be seen as far less solidly based. (1) In fact, some argued 
that when it reached this point positivism became nothing more 
than a form of subjective idealism, for the idealist too spoke of 
immediacy or "pure sensations". (Greenwood 1922: 207) And thus, 
positivism was inclined to self-destruction as, in passing from 
its simpler goal of classifying the facts and reasoning upon them 
to a conventionalist theory of knowledge, it had become a 
solipsism. (2) 
Some realists or neo-realists reacted to the positivistic 
denial of the objective reality of science's truths. Realists 
such as Perry and Bertrand Russell, while at times appearing in 
sympathy with the logical positivists, argued for the concrete 
nature of reality and facts. While realists certainly wanted to 
instil the scientific attitude of disinterest among philosophers, 
1. Marjorie Harris wrote in an article called "Comte and James" 
in the Philosonhjcal Review that according to the positivist all 
one could speak of were "laws of similarity and succession of 
phenomena." (Harris 1925:156) Philip Paul Wiener made a similar 
observation some years later when he wrote in a review of Gaston 
Bachelard's L..a. Nouvel esprit scientifique, in the Philosophical 
Review that instead of the language of certainty previously 
applied to classical axioms and laws, the scientist had to 
substitute the language of postulates, consensual definitions, 
and statistical inferences. (Wiener 1935:498) See also Homer S 
Dubbs, "The Paradox of Certainty", Th.e. Philosophical Review, 
1935, p.254. 
2. For earlier comments on the solipsistic tendencies contained 
within emp1r1c1sm see Russell 1906a:606ff and Russell 
1906b:406ff. 
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they also held, unlike some of the positivists and empiricists, 
to the "independence of facts." (Perry 1918:365f) (1) For the 
realist, there was a reality beyond experience. (Wright 1924:611} 
And it was this reality which could objectively guarantee the 
propositions put forward by scientists. For this reason, as the 
Australian philosopher John Anderson wrote, realists rejected the 
idea that all knowledge is relative; the realist held that "there 
is. something absolute, namely facts." (Anderson 1930:128) I 
should stress that this critique was not anti-scientific. It did 
not challenge the veracity of science. For it expressed even 
greater confidence in the truths ascertained by science than did 
the radical empiricists. 
The popular apprehension that science was a sharply 
delineated field of activity in which progress was governed by 
1. See also Perry, Chapter XXV, "The New Realism", 1918. One 
should not confuse the new realists with the Critical Realists of 
whom Arthur Lovejoy was a representative. Loewenberg noted that 
the Critical Realist analyses the "cognitive situation in terms 
of "the epistemological triangle'" of "mind, data, and outer 
objects" and that this justified "the dictum of one of the 
critical realists that "we must appreciate subjectivism and yet 
be realists.'" He added that the position of the Critical 
Realist had "affinities with, and yet must at the same time be 
sharply differentiated from, the pansubjectivism of Berkeleyan 
idealism, on the one hand, and the panobjectivism of neo-realism 
on the other." (Loewenberg 1923:287} In relation to this last 
point note Charles Morris' contrast between the position of the 
realist who attempts to summon up the universe "from the 
standpoint of the generalized other;" "the standpoint of God"; 
the "point of view of eternity" with that of the positivist. The 
view of the latter is particularistic and puts the observer "at 
the focus of an ongoing act", viewing the world from his own 
"unique corner." While the realist sought "unquestioned meanings" 
which were "empirically sustained," the positivists, struggling 
against every principle of rational faith, adopted an 
instrumental epistemology expecting no more than workable 
descriptions of particular events. (Morris 1934:563) 
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adherence to a single theory of knowledge was obviously mistaken. 
In methodological discourse at least, there were different 
theoretical lines of departure. Categories such as positivism, 
realism, idealism, empiricism and instrumentalism dominated 
epistemological debate. Their presence points to the existence 
of a wide range of orientations and commitments. 
These philosophical categories were not clear-cut. They 
functioned as conceptual prisms able to project a range of 
philosophical or scientific ideas depending on the light in which 
they were examined. Some of these categories were so variable and 
multifaceted that they could be redefined to complement their 
notional opposites. Pragmatism (a philosophical approach which we 
will analyse in the next chapter) was frequently identifed with a 
positivistic anti-realism, and with the instrumentalist theory of 
knowledge which often goes with that position. Yet pragmatism was 
also described as a form of empirical realism; something which, 
as we shall see, involved the projection of the contents of 
experience onto the cosmos. Perhaps it was such conceptual 
ambiguities that necessitated the prefacing of the terms 
positivism, empiricism and realism with qualifiers such as the 
"strict", the "narrow", the "radical", the "critical", the 
"naive" and the "new". 
Thus, 
dialects 
what was called "scientism" was really a variety of 
rather than a universal and pure language. One could 
not expect it to be otherwise, especially where many of the terms 
used to refer to scientific methods had been used differently 
prior to their association with the natural sciences. 
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3. Bergson's Philosophical Challenge to Science 
There were points of comparison between the new realists and 
the positivists insofar as both adhered to empirical techniques. 
Frank Thilly (of the Sage School of Philosophy at Cornell 
University) wrote in an essay on current American philosophy 
that both new realists and positivists were accused of breaking 
the world of thought into small pieces, and philosophers were 
called upon to put it back together again. (Thilly 1926:538) 
As we have seen, the response of traditional philosophers 
and Christian thinkers to this was to attempt to resuscitate the 
quest for a universitas of knowledge. But one did not have to 
believe in the possibility of achieving a complete and final 
picture of reality in order to criticise the scientific 
decomposition of the world. Some philosophers thought the 
universe put forward by traditional idealist philosophy was as 
equally "dead and done for", to use William James' expression, 
as the closed and mechanical universe of the scientist. 
Putting the world back together again could mean, as against 
the picture of homogenous discontinuity put forward by classical 
science, stressing the continuity between things. But an emphasis 
on continunity did not necessitate the promotion of a static 
picture. For a continuous whole can be something that grows and 
mutates. 
Criticisms of science from this angle drew inspiration from 
the ideas of Henri Bergson. Bergson, as one of his most prolific 
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expositors the British philosopher J. Alexander Gunn wrote, was 
noted for his attempts in books such as Creative Eyolution to 
break down the mechanistic and materialistic beliefs of the 
previous century in stressing the "reality of change." (Gunn 
1927:283} Indeed, Gunn described him in his book Henri Bergson 
an.d. his Philosophy as above all a philosopher of change - a label 
of which Bergson apparently approved. (Gunn 1920:16:16n) 
Bergson's criticism was not confined to the classical 
conceptions of science. He mentioned positive science in 
Creative Evolution for he saw it as reflecting that same 
tendency evident in Newtonian science; that is, scientific 
activity, as A. Boyce Gibson (a philosopher at the University 
of Melbourne) put it, involved the "chopping and pruning" of the 
manifold. (Gibson 1946:86} We should note however, that 
Bergson's criticisms of science in Creative Evolution were being 
aired just when radical empiricist methodologies and the 
scientific developments associated with them were gathering pace. 
Bergson had a great deal more in common with modern science than 
he sometimes admitted. 
In this context, one of the most outstanding things about 
Bergson's critique of science was that it was seen as coming from 
within science itself. His critique appealed to the lessons of 
evolution and biology and to that extent he asserted that it was 
empirically based. This supposed empiricism was seen as the 
distinguishing feature of idealistic protest against science in 
the early years of the twentieth century. Bergson's philosophy 
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demonstrated exactly why positivism was seen as being prone to 
self-destruct. His philosophical exposition showed how it was 
possible to identify the intuition of immediacy with the 
processes of empirical observation. Indeed, both the positivists 
and Bergson appeared to agree on the point that phenomena do not 
need support - although what Bergson meant by this was that the 
changing does not need support from the unchanging while the 
positivist simply saw the idea of support for phenomena as 
metapny~.Lca.i.. \ i1 
What Bergson did was counterpose to the mechanical universe 
of the scientist the life process as he thought it really was; as 
a process which is fluid, plural, creative and dynamic. (2} In 
this context, what were called scientific truths were for 
Bergson, because they tended to freeze reality, only "temporary 
and partial" glimpes of the expanding, changing and living 
cosmos. (Bergson 1911:31} 
1. On this point of convergence between Bergson and the 
positivists see Gibson, 1946:84. 
2. The relevant texts for my discussion of Bergson are his 
Creative Evolution (originally published in 1907} and his 
Duration a.n.d. Simultaneity, Trans. Leon Jacobson, Bobbs-Merrill, 
Indianapolis. (Originally published 1922. Other texts of his 
which were regularly cited in English-speaking countries in the 
inter-war years include :r.i.ow. and~ ii1J,, Trans. F.L. Pogson, 
George Allen and Unwin, London, (Originally published 1889} and 
Matter ~ Memory, Trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott 
Palmer, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1978. (Originally 
published 1896}. For accounts of Bergson's philosophy see Le 
Roy, ~~Philosophy Q.f. Henri Bergson (1913}; H. Wildon Carr, 
~Bergson: ~ Philosophy Q.f. Change, People's Books, London, 
1911 and J. Alexander Gunn, Bergson~ his Philosophy, Methuen, 
London, 1920. For another example of this so-called process 
philosophy see A. N. Whitehead, Process ~ Realjty: ~ ~ i,D, 
cosmology, 1978, corrected edition, Free Press, New York. 
Originally published by Macmillan in 1929. 
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Bergson's philosophy has often been associated with the 
vitalist or neo-vitalist movement which developed in reaction to 
mechanistic conceptions in biology of the process of natural 
selection and of the relation between living creatures and their 
environment. This movement, which is most commonly associated 
with the writings of Hans Adolf Driesch, upheld the idea that 
each individual organism was a particular expression of, although 
not radically different to, the vital current - small amounts of 
which were contained within each cell of each living thing. 
(Simmat 1925:108) (1) Bergson agreed with the vitalists that 
nature is not a mechanism and like them he appealed to a 
metaphysical notion of the life-force in order to avoid 
mechanical explanations. However, he did suggest that there were 
some differences between himself and the vitalists. He suggested 
in his Creative Evolution that the vitalists accorded each living 
thing its own vital principle and its own specific teleology. 
However, for Bergson the vital impulse bound all living things 
together. There was only one original impulsion behind all life. 
(Bergson 1911:43) Furthermore, Bergson also rejected the notion 
(one which he called radical finalism) that things realized a 
"programme previously arranged." (Bergson 1911:39) The reasons 
why Bergson rejected finalism are the same as the reasons why he 
rejected the mechanism of the scientist, for if evolution 
followed a pre-ordained path it would not be creative. (2) 
Indeed, Bergson viewed the finalism of the philosopher as only an 
"inverted" mechanism because it substituted "the attraction of 
the future for the impulsion of the past." (Bergson 1911:39) The 
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reason why mechanism represented the impulsion of the past will 
become clear when I discuss Bergson's philosophy of time. 
A number of problems or ambiguities were detected in 
relation to Bergson's theory of creative evolution. Bergson 
suggested that reality was composed of two things - life and 
matter and that both of these were the creations of God or what 
he called the Superconsciousness. Although we should note that 
Bergson's God was defined as pure creativity. (3) Furthermore, he 
believed that reality proceeded in a double movement. That is, he 
argued that life moved upwards towards spirituality and matter 
moved downwards towards materiality or death. 
This mode of explanation was not always sustained. At other 
times Bergson suggested that matter only came into being after 
the creation of life. In this regard, he wrote that matter was 
the result of the obstruction of life in its forward movement. As 
suggested by Collingwood's telling image of Bergson's metaphysics 
of life, it was the result of the river of life being obstructed 
by rocks and mountains lying in its path - although we should 
1. Driesch's most important text in this regard is his ~ 
Scjence ~ Philosonhv Q.t.~ Organism, Black, London, 1988. 
2. Perry also noted Bergsons' rejection of the idea that life 
evolved in accordance with a "higher purpose." (Perry 1918:333) 
3. Bergson described God as a "creator [who] is free; who 
generates at once matter and life; and whose creative effort 
continues, on the side of life, through the evolution of species 
and the formation of human personalities. From all this 
consequently, there results the refutation of monism and of 
pantheism in general." This quotation was cited by A. 0. Lovejoy 
in "Bergson and Romantic Evolutionism," University o.f. California 
Chronicle. Vol. XV, No. 4, Oct. 1913, p. 482. For a discussion of 
similar conceptions of God see A. Eustace Haydon, "The 
Theological Trend of Pragmatism", ~ American Journal o.f. 
Theology, Vol. XXIII, No. 4, Oct. 1919, pp. 401-416. 
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note that Collingwood considered that it is the obstruction 
itself which logically must constitute the material world. 
{Collingwood 1944:140) Again here we have to ask what can it be 
but matter that interrupted the life process and if this were so 
from where did it originate.? To this extent the theory 
presupposed and indeed required the existence of that very thing 
whose coming into being it proposed to explain. {1} 
I raise these points concerning Bergson's theory in order to 
show how difficult it is to set out in an ordered manner. Similar 
ambiguities plague his conception of the evolutionary process. 
Evolution appears to proceed through the work of that vital 
1. On this point see also A. Aliotta Th.a Idealjstjc Reaction 
Against Science, translated by Agnes McCaskill, London, 1914. 
Aliotta said that the basic error or confusion in Bergson's 
philosophy was that it was never quite clear whether practical 
activity and its coordinate, matter, are primitive - as with 
intuition and its coordinate the vital impulse - or whether they 
were of later origin. If the latter were the case it is 
impossible to explain how practical activity can be borne of 
intuitive consciousness and how matter can be borne of flux. 
"With all his metaphors Bergson fails to convince us that 
continuous, creative activity can give birth to practical, 
discontinuous activity, and this activity in its turn to the 
objective world with all its determinations. The pure act of will 
is psychological in its nature, and is of itself powerless to 
leave the sphere of intimate consciousness; even it it be granted 
that it demands a discontinuity of terms, these terms will never 
appear external to the consciousness but will always keep the 
character of inner experience." {Aliotta 1914:135} See also R. G. 
Collingwood, The I.d.e.a o.f. Nature, where he also noted that 
Bergson's philosophy required that something inherent in life 
obstructed the life-force or that this obstruction was caused by 
something which existed outside of it. Collingwood argued that as 
the first possibility was ruled out by Bergson because the life-
force was defined as pure activity, we are forced to rely on the 
second. Collingwood wrote: "This is the vicious circle of 
Bergson's cosmology: ostensibly he regards matter as a by-product 
of life, but actually he cannot explain how that or any other 
special by-product can arise without presupposing, alongside of 
141 
current or life-force that is sometimes equated with (and at 
other times seen as pouring out of} God or the 
Superconsciousness. Whatever is the case, it would seem that the 
whole evolutionary process partakes of this one impulsion. It is 
this current or life-giving fluid that runs through every living 
thing and endows it with a forward urge to life. It is through 
the evolution of life that the original act of creation posited 
by Bergson was able to keep on creating. He wrote that it "goes 
on for ever in virtue of an initial movement." (Bergson 
1911: 110} 
Yet we must ask ourselves how the great variety of life-
forms which one could witness on the planet emerged out of the 
vital fluid. Bergson's answer was to appeal to yet another 
and indeed piror to life, matter itself." (Collingwood 1965:140} 
See also A. Boyce Gibson's discussion of Bergson's privileging of 
life over over matter. He wrote that Bergson was consistent in 
upholding the value of the dynamic, the formless, the unexpected 
and the spiritual against the invariant, the static, the 
determined and the spatial in order to discredit scientific 
materialism and the dualisms (between mind and matter, the real 
and the ideal etc.} attendant upon it. At the heart of his 
philosophy · was an animating force, be it called a vital urge or 
life impulse. For Bergson, the ~lan ~ was the current of life 
and where this "concentrated current of life" was "dissipated or 
frozen" as it was in science - there was a consequent "diminution 
of reality." (Gibson 1937:71} See also his article on Bergson, 
"Mystic or Pragmatist", in the Australasian Journal Q.b Pschology 
and Philosophy, 1946, p. 85 in which he discussed the problem of 
tne relation between life and matter in Bergson• s philosophy. He 
argued that Bergson's account of the creation of matter was 
really a revival of the Heraclitean hypothesis that matter is 
energy degraded. (Gibson 1946:85} Gunn too argued that matter, 
for Bergson, was a creation of spirit which had lessened in 
"tension". (Gunn 1925:285} Bergson himself wrote in Creative 
Evolution that the "Consciousness or superconsciousness" shoots 
into the sky like a "rocket, the extinguished remains of which 
fall into matter." Cited in Le Roy, 1913 p.109. See also Creative 
Evolution, p. 250 where Bergson described the spirit or psychic 
force which underlies reality and which creates matter. "For want 
of a better word we have called it Consciousness. But we do not 
mean the narrowed consciousness that functions in each of us." 
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analogy. He wrote that the history of evolution is like a "shell 
which has burst into fragments and these have burst into more 
fragments." (1} The cause of these explosions was either the 
interruption of life by matter, or alternatively, the volatility 
of the elements of life and matter contained within reality. 
Bergson wrote that it is the need to adapt to the external 
environment which explains the "sinuosities in the movement of 
Evolution"; although for Bergson, these encounters with the 
material world did not explain the actual cause of evolution's 
movement. (Bergson 1911:284} 
To sum up then, we can see that for Bergson evolution is 
whole to the extent that it is derived from and animated by one 
element which is the vital force. It is continuous or enduring 
as, whatever happens to its specific manifestations, the vital 
force itself presses on. (2} It is pluralistic because from the 
fluid of life there emerges a multiplicity of life-forms. In 
1. Bergson, Creative Evolution, cited in Le Roy, 1913 p. 111. 
2. Whitehead's philosophy of nature is also similar to that of 
Bergson insofar as he held that each "individual entity" was a 
particular mode in which the "general creativity" or "pure 
activity" was articulated and individualized. (Nankervis 
-----------1.934:269} ---These accounts also parallel the notion of evolution 
as put forward by the British physiologist Sir Charles 
Sherrington in~ o.n. ~Nature (1940). This book was based on 
the Gifford Lectures he gave in Edinburgh 1937-8. In a review of 
that text H.B. Adelman also described evolution as a heterogenous 
but continuous process of development; that is, while there is 
"unity" in the "life-principle" this unity also resolves itself 
into "millions of local principles" providing life with a 
constant stream of novelties. (Adelmann 1942:228) Also note the 
argument that according to evolutionary theory every "living 
thing, whether atom, molecule, colloidal complex, cell" or an 
animal compounded of cells was "surging forward" in "commerce 
with its surrounds." (Adelman 1942:228) 
143 
giving expression to the principles of novelty and 
differentiation in nature he wrote that: "Harmony is behind us 
rather than before: it is due to an identity of impulsion rather 
than a common aspiration." (Bergson 1911:54) Furthermore, it 
follows from his open-ended account that as well as great 
achievements in nature there can also be "terrible setbacks." 
(Gunn 1925:285) (1) Bergson suggests that one can neither 
predict what sort of forms shall emerge out of the evolutionary 
process nor, more generally, what particular course that 
evolution itself might follow. 
4. Creative Uncertainty and Time as Movement 
Of course, just because unexpected things happen it does not 
follow that nature is in itself chaotic or unpredictable. What 
Bergson in fact did was move from pointing to the existence of 
the novel and unexpected in nature to asserting that it has an 
inherently indeterministic character. (2) This move was 
important for Bergson. For as we shall see this element of 
uncertainty in nature is crucial in relation to Bergson's 
insistence on man's freedom of action. 
In order to approach this issue we should recall that for 
Bergson life is a forward movement and to the extent that it is 
1. On this point also see Gunn, 1936:248 where he described 
Bergson's view of nature as one which has it "full of 
unprogressive culs-de-sacs, blind alleys marking time, deviation 
and retrogression." (Gunn 1936:248) 
2. On Bergson's conflation of novelty with indeterminancy see 
W.T. Stace, "Novelty, Indeterminism and Emergence", ~ 
Philosophical Review, Vol. XLVIII, No. 3, May, p. 298, 1939. 
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expressed in individual entities they too partake in this forward 
push. Neverthelesss, individual creatures come against all sort 
of obstacles that block their path which results in the process 
of adaptation. In the case of plants and vegetables their 
development is significantly arrested; while members of the 
animal kingdom are forced to rely on their instincts and their 
bodily or sense-organs to help them on their way. Man, however, 
develops his intelligence. It is man above all who is best able 
to adapt and to break through those barriers which hold him at 
bay. With his intelligence he draws lines in nature - lines 
along which he can act. It is for this reason that Bergson 
claimed that intellect is originally an instrument of action. 
{Bergson 1911:182:299) 
We are then, said Bergson, essentially tool-making animals; 
our intelligence being the tool of tools. And with the aid 
of intelligence man is able to manufacture other tools out of 
his environment. Indeed, it is here in the course of this 
practical activity, Bergson said, that one finds the crude 
beginnings of mathematics, science and geometry, each being 
empirically founded, practical in origin and based on likeness 
and repetition. Bergson thought human beings were only 
"geometricians" or thinking animals because they are first 
"artisans" or tool-making animals. {Bergson 1911:44) 
It is because we must engage in practical activity that we 
lose consciousness of the vital force. It must be stressed that 
this was one of the major distinctions between Bergson and the 
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pragmatists who took up on Bergson's notion of man as ~ ~. 
For Bergson there is a better alternative to the practical 
knowledge that our intelligence gives us and that alternative is 
only to found by an act of intuition. (1) Thus, in Creatjye 
Evolution Bergson said that matter and the intellectual modes of 
understanding appropriate to it are opposed to instinctive and 
intuitive modes of understanding, which are seen as bringing one 
closer to life. Thus, Bergson also embraced a dualism but of a 
different kind. Nevertheless, there are times when Bergson 
appeared to overcome dualistic modes of thinking. To the extent 
that intelligence can be used to aid the forward urge of life and 
that matter is open to adaptation by life, Bergson appeared to 
overcome the dualisms between life and matter and between 
intelligence and instinct or intuition. 
a moment. 
I shall explain how in 
It would seem that in one sense Bergson did not see the 
oppositions between life and matter and intuition and 
intelligence as primordial or necessary. It is just that the 
course of human civilisation had increasingly seen them asserted 
and developed. The oppositions between mechanism and vitalism and 
science and poetry had grown out of the original opposition 
between life and matter. But it was clearly not the mere 
existence of these oppositions that he was objecting to. Quite 
obviously, he was also objecting to the valorization of one side 
in this chain of dualities I have just listed; that is, the side 
1. On this point see Gibson, 1946:92. 
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which is represented by matter, intelligence, mechanism and 
science. In a sense the elevation of these things has not so much 
come about because we are forced to engage in practical activity 
but because we have in fact forgotten the practical origins of 
intelligence and science. By practical origins 1 mean ~he notion 
that intelligence and science are originally instruments of life; 
and in this sense, they too are expressions of the vital force. 
However, instead of being seen in this light science - which 
dealt with the material world - had come to be understood as the 
truth about nature or life itself. Science, he wrote, had come 
to "pride itself" on the universal correctness of its spatial 
understandings. (Bergson 1911:198} 
Bergson's most extreme response to this was to assert that 
science could never touch the heart of reality. As we have seen, 
other philosophers responded to the scientific outlook by 
asserting the supremacy of the immutable values which philosophy 
dealt with. Bergson's response was instead to assert the reality 
of change although whether he considered this reality to be 
metaphysical and not just a matter of empirical observation was 
not always clear due to his ambivalent feelings about science. 
In Creative Evolution Bergson acknowledged the importance of 
spatial concepts because they are successful, useful and even 
necessary. While one could insist that spatiality was only an 
interruption of events in process, necessity demanded distortion; 
that is, that things be considered "one by one" instead of in 
their totality. (Bergson 1911:206} Nevertheless, Bergson 
suggested that intellect and science, in adopting an external and 
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spatial approach to phenomena (whether tracing linear relations 
or carving the world into discrete facts) provided inverted 
images of what he called the "true positivity" of flux, movement 
and becoming. (Bergson 1911:208) It is this flux which 
intellect hides and only intuition can apprehend. Bergson wrote 
that if we swept away intellect then the "material world" would 
"melt back into a simple flux, a continuity of flowing, a 
becoming." (Bergson 1911:369) 
Bergson's attitude towards language was also revealing in 
this regard. As Le Roy pointed out, for Bergson, the use of 
linguistic symbols is a means of spatially dispersing thoughts. 
{Le Roy 1913:71) But real continuity or becoming does not fit 
comfortably into the "molds of language" that the intellect 
imposes upon it. {Bergson 1911:302) (1) Bergson seemed to be 
objecting not to symbolic representation as such, but to 
particular modes of representation and particular metaphors. In 
this context, we should also note his claim that it is poetry 
rather than the more literally-minded discourse of science that 
provides the most accurate descriptions of life. Bergson seemed 
to think that poetic figures were better able to give clearer 
expression to the tone and quality of life; poetry could give 
1. In this context note Bergson's following comments. "The moment 
we reach the spiritual world, the iaage of it merely seeks to 
suggest, may give us the direct vision while the abstract ter•, 
which is spatial in origin and which claias to express, aost 
frequently leaves us in •etaphor: in these words poetry turns the 
tables on science with a vengeance and those who, by way of 
jeering, aaintain that 'aetaphysics is a species of poetry• are 
at once confiraed and confounded." {Gibson 1946:88) 
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literal description where science could only offer metaphor. 
(2) The reason for this was that he considered poetry to be 
concerned with largely with living things whereas scientific 
discourse only described the inert. Bergson complained that even 
where science described living things as it did in the area of 
biology, it treated them as if they were mechanical and 
lifeless. What Bergson was doing in many respects was calling 
for the elimination of spatial metaphors and their replace•ent by 
metaphors which were evocative of the flow of the vital current. 
Thus, Bergson stood what he saw as the standard dualisms of 
his time on their head. Firstly, he suggested that a true 
1. A. N. Whitehead makes a number of points in his Process w;ul 
Reality and other texts which have been viewed as akin to the 
ideas of Bergson that we have presented here. Whitehead wrote 
for example, that when philosophers removed "the necessary world 
of relations" there lay •the vague and indeterminant and 
contingent." In this context he spoke of scientists like Newton 
(just as Bergson spoke of scientists in general) as someone who 
sought to "regiment flux." (Whitehead 1978:208-10) Whitehead also 
made comments which are si•ilar to those of Bergson on the 
question of language and poetry. Whitehead coaplained of the 
misleading nature of the "language of substance." To explain this 
we should note Whitehead's argument that spatial concepts 
originated with men seizing upon and giving expression to the 
"permanences• in their midst, such as the "solid earth, the 
mountains, the stones,• in order to makes sense of and act upon 
their world. (Whitehead 1978:208) Nolfe Mays in a study of 
Whitehead's philosophy noted that the philosopher thought that 
language was designed to articulate exactly •such clear-cut 
concepts" which were then fitted into the subject-predicate mode 
of expression of observation state•ents. (Hays 1977:10-12) 
However, and despite the utilitarian origins of the language of 
substance and spatial concepts, he thought the degree of 
"linguistic trust" placed in these words and concepts allowed 
them to congeal into a physicalist and spatial conception of 
nature and knowledge. (Hays 1977:48) While Whitehead acknowledged 
that this provided the shortest route to a "clear-cut philosophy" 
because it explained concepts in a "familiar language,• it also 
effaced the "the fluency" of life. (Whitehead 1978:209-10) 
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realist or empiricist sees the world in terms of flux and not in 
terms of spatial arrangements. (1) Secondly, he regarded poetic 
discourse as true whereas science rests only on analogy. And 
thirdly, Bergson thought that it was by acts of intuition and not 
intellect that aan could understand reality. 
On this last point it should be stressed that the act of 
intuition of which Bergson spoke was rather hard to achieve. 
According to Bergson, it began with an act of will backed by such 
force that one suddenly was propelled out of the domain of 
intellect and into the domain of intuituion. Furthermore, in 
willing oneself to achieve a form of inuitive consciousness one 
was also able to discover a sense of one's connectedness with the 
rest of nature. At this point, Bergson argued, one achieved true 
spiritual understanding. (Bergson 1911:268) (2) According to 
Bergson, if aan were to rediscover his connectedness with nature 
he would obtain a vision of himself as creative force rather than 
a passive victim of his environment. Bergson thought man would 
then have "more power to act and to live." (Bergson 1911: 270)· 
We should note here that Bergson's philosophy, with its 
reassertion of the role of human creativity, gained great currency 
1. Le Roy said 
sense that it 
1913:136) 
Bergson's philosophy is really realisa 
aeans "giving ourselves to reality.• 
in 
(Le 
the 
Roy 
2. Bergson wrote of the act of intuition: "Let us try to see, no 
longer with the eyes of the intellect alone, which grasps only 
the already aade and which looks from the outside, but with the 
spirit. I aean with that faculty of seeing which is immanent in 
the faculty of acting and which springs up, somehow, by the 
twisting of the will on itself, when action is turned into 
knowledge, like beat, so to say, into light." (BeTgson 
1911:182:250) 
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both during and after the First World War in philosophical 
circles precisely because it provided a hopeful antidote to the 
belief that the war and the misery which accompanied it was the 
result of inexorable forces. The popularity of his philosophy is 
one indication of marked swing-away from "rigid deter•inisa to 
contingency" in philosophy and social theory. (Gibson 1923:231) 
Thus, Gunn wrote that Bergson's philosophy fitted in well with 
the atmosphere of post-war reconstruction; although I would argue 
that his recipe for optimism and faith was to a large degree 
overwhelmed by the pessimism that that conflict also engendered. 
Furthermore, and as a related point, I will later go on to show 
how Bergson's own philosophy was also seen as encouraging 
irrationalism and violence. (1) 
There is one last issue I want to raise in relation to 
Bergson and that is the question of time. We have seen that for 
Bergson the ideas of change, indeterminism and novelty were all 
important. These were ideas which he saw as identical with the 
process of evolution. But we should note that for Bergson the 
possibility of change was conditional upon the existence of time 
or rather duration; it was not evolutionary change which created 
time but the other way round. Evolution is thus a creature of 
time as much as it is a creation of the vital current. Indeed~ 
in Bergson's Creatiye Eyolution time and the vital current were 
often presented as one and the same thing. 
1. In relation to this point see Gunn's comaents on the revival 
of philosophy after the First World War. Gunn, 1920 p.vii 
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The word Bergson actually used to refer to time is the 
French~- But it did not, in his hands, mean the same thing 
as the English term duration insofar as that term merely denotes 
a length of time. For time above all for Bergson is not something 
which can be measured or spatially conceived, it is rather a 
particular sense or intuition of the flow of life. In this 
/ 
sense, the term ~ as used by Bergson pointed to a felt 
quality in experience. But Bergson also reif ied the concept of 
duration. It became lA ~ and it was referred to in both the 
passive and active tenses; as both something to be possessed 
psychologically and as something that moves forward - that does 
things. 
Thus, for Bergson, 1A. ~ ceased to be a mere 
psychological phenomenon; it merged into the vital force 
possessing its characteristics of continuity or indivisibility, 
plurality and creativity. Indeed, he seemed to view the personal 
experience of duration as only a result of the fact that the 
general duration is articulated in individual living things. In 
Creatiye Eyolution he appeared to objectify the conception of 
duration, making it something that both individuals and the 
physical universe possess or are a part of - that is, the one 
unfolding, universal history. To this extent his concept of time 
can be related to the metaphysical or realist understandings 
which appeared in Samuel Alexander's Space, Ii.Ii. AW1 ~ (1920) 
in the form of creative emergence (1) and in A.N. Whitehead's 11&1. 
1.. ~ ~~based QI!. 1lul Gifford Lectures ~ Alexander 
&A.Ia a,t Glasgow 1916-18 2 [Q..t further co111egts QD, 1etaphysisal 
understandings g,L ~ ~ SiwlD,., 1926b !Ii.Iii. ilL Hodetp 
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Concept g,L Nature in the form of the passage of nature. (1920). 
Nevertheless, in a later work Duratiop ~ Simultanaity 
(1922) Bergson appeared to return to his pre-Creatiya Evolutign 
understanding of duration as a subjective phenomenon. That · is, 
while he agreed that time is succession or passage and that it 
can only move in one direction, he held that duration understood. 
in this way is something which only consciousness can apprehend. 
Bergson ultimately rejected the idea of an objective ti•e ~- a 
concept of one world history of which everything was a part 
because it was a metaphysical construction which cannot be 
empirically ascertained. He also rejected Whitehead's broad 
notion of duration in favour of the particularism of the 
individual consciousness. Thus Bergson wrote that "real time" is 
time that is "perceived and lived ... Duration therefore implies 
consciousness; and we place consciousness at the heart of things 
for the very reason that we credit them with a time that 
endures." (Bergson 1965:49) (1) Furthermore, aside from its 
Metaphl'&ics I"; Gunn, 1927, "Time in Modern Metaphysics II", 
Gunn, 1929, Ihi, Problem g,L Iiasi. Gunn considered Bergson's 
failure to develop, as did both Alexander and Whitehead, anything 
beyond a psychological description of time as a weakness in ·his 
philosophy. It is interesting to note in this context that while 
Alexander's concept of duration (as with Whitehead's notion· of 
reality as process) was described by Gunn as a for• of realis• 
and was thus contrasted with Bergson's subjective idealis•, we 
also find another writer E.L. Hillllan describing Alexander's 
theory as an example of neo-idealisa. (Gunn 1929:324 Hinaan 
1926:480) 
1. Bergson asserted the centrality of the notion of duration in a 
letter to a Danish thinker Harald Hoffding: "Any account of ay 
views will distort them as a whole, and therefore lay thea open 
to a crowd of objections, if it does not first of all take its 
stand on, and if it does not continually return to, what I 
consider to be the very centre of the doctrine, the intuition of 
duration." cited in Gibson, 1946, p.82. Gibson also noted·how 
Bergson's concept of durfte was extended in Creatiye Eyolution to .. 
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metaphysical aspects, Bergson also implied that the minute one 
begins to objectify time, to develop on il\e basis of this 
immediate personal intuition of duration the concept of absolute 
time, one also begins to see time in terms of space. That is, 
where time is treated as universal history it comes to be 
represented by as a forward motion in space. Thus, while Bergson 
claimed to favour the idea of one physical time he warned that it 
is a notion based only on analogy. (Bergson 1965:46) (2} 
encompass the universe so that it becomes identical 
process of "continuous but heterogeneous development" 
creative evolution. Gibson, 1946. p.85. On 
introspective notion of time see Gunn, 1929:98:200. 
with that 
which is 
Bergson's 
2. Whitehead wrote in The Concept Q.f. Nature that his view of the 
creative advance of nature was similar to that of Bergson's idea 
of creative evolution. Whitehead wrote: "It is an exhibition of 
the process of nature that each duration happens and passes. The 
process of nature can also be termed the 'passage of nature'. I 
definitely refrain at this stage from using the word 'time', 
since the measurable time of science and of civilized life 
generally merely exhibits some aspects of the more fundamental 
fact of the passage of nature. I believe that in this doctrine I 
am in full accord with Bergson, though he uses 'time' for the 
fundamental fact which I call the passage of nature'". 
(Whitehead 1920:54) Cited in Bergson, 1965, p.62. Note that for 
Alexander there is a general duration which is an objective 
reality. For Alexander, the source of this is what he calls 
"space-time" - which is ceaselessly moving across the cosmos and, 
like Bergson's vital current, generating individual entities and 
things along the way. Thus, Alexander wrote that "the world of 
finites arises of out the mere restlessnes of Space-Time." (Gunn 
1929:253) For a further discussion of Alexander's ideas on time 
see Gunn, 1926, pp. 258-267 and Gunn 1927, pp. 10-12. For further 
comparisons between the ideas of Bergson and Whitehead see Milic 
Capek, IlMl Philosophjcal Tmpact !l..f. Contemporary Physics, 1961, 
p.220 where he stated that Bergson's notion of extensjye becoming 
"is more or less synonymous with Whitehead's creative advance of 
nature. Such extensive becoming, in contradistinction to 
mathametical purely linear time, has a certain transversal extent 
or width; it exists amidst the relations of co-presence 
(Whitehead} or simultanAity .Q.f fluxes (Bergson)." However, I 
think that an examination of Bergson's text shows that flows or 
fluxes only become simultaneous where they each enter into our 
consciousness, thus the comparison between Whitehead and Bergson 
may not be as appropriate as it may seem on the surface. Bergson 
wrote: "We therefore call two external flows that occupy 
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The concept of time was central to some of the criticisms of 
science made by philosophers. The concept of time and the 
metaphysical and psychological interpretations of it was also a 
crucial element in the responses of philsophers to the theory of 
relativity. Some as we shall see, saw the theory as supporting 
metaphysical views while others saw it as supporting subjectivist 
approaches. Bergson himself would criticise the theory for 
merely being a different way of rendering time as space. But 
before I go on to discuss this I should say something about 
Bergson's view of time in relation to the natural sciences. 
In this context, Bergson's charge was that scientists had 
eliminated the time element because they had conceived of it in 
mechanical terms. That is, what science had done was to resolve 
into groups all those elementary facts which repeated the same 
causes and the same effects. Indeed, each of these groups could 
be neatly fitted into a larger mechanism so that the universe 
could be seen as operating under one reversible time-line. 
Instead of the flow of time, the mechanical universe of the 
physicist was characterised by an eternal repetition of 
unalterable sequences. Insofar as each sequence moved in ~~hym 
with the whole the universe went like clock-work. But as I 
suggested, for Bergson a mere repetiti•~of sequences, the eternal 
turning of wheels upon wheels, was not real time. Where all was 
the same duration "simultaneous" because they both depend upon 
the duration of a like third, our own; this duration is ours only 
when our consciousness is concerned with us alone, but it becomes 
equally theirs when our attention embraces the three flows in a 
single indivisible act." (Bergson 1965:52) 
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predictable, there could be no real time, as for real time to 
exist the present had to be open-ended. But in the mechanical 
universe what were called past and future were really only 
"calculable functions" of the present. (Bergson 1911:37) (1) It 
was precisely because this particular physical concept of time 
was not open-ended that Bergson objected to it in a way in which 
he did not object to the partially physical understanding of time 
as the unfolding of world history. Alexander's idea of universal 
history moves in space but it is opened ended - it flows on 
forward - just like Bergson's psychological concept of time, as 
that intuition of flux or passage. Hence Alexander likened his 
conception of space-time to the human being; time is the mind 
which pushes it along while the space is the body which carries 
it forward. (Alexander 1920:38-45) 
Bergson himself described time in Creative Evolution in 
terms of movement. But the movement was not a mechanical one, by 
which he meant homogeneous but discontinuous units rearranged 
periodically in accordance with unalterable laws. Real time 
whether it was conceived as the onward movement of history or in 
terms of psychological · experiences flowed on without 
interruption. Real time, he wrote, was a "continuous progress of 
the past which gnaws into the future and swells as it advances." 
(Bergson 1911:11,S) (1) Or as C. 0. Weber put it in an article 
1. Dewey later made the same point in welcoming the principle of 
indeterminacy. He wrote that the principle defied the "Laplacian" 
picture of a mechanical universe governed by laws of motion in 
which "at any one time its whole future could be predicted - or 
deduced." (Dewey 1930:202) Note also that a Harvard scholar, 
Ralph W. Eaton cited, the American philosohper C.S. Peirce as 
saying that the laws of evolution, contained an "element of 
indeterminaccy and spontaneity" and were "not to be obeyed 
exactly." (Eaton 1921a:295} 
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called "The Reality of Time and the Autonomy of History", which 
appeared in the Monist, even if the clock were to "suddenly 
reverse its movements" real time would continue to "go forward." 
(Weber 1927:530} Bergson also later wrote in Duration .a.wi 
Simultaneity that real time considered introspectively was 
succession - a before and after - and this process was 
irreversible. (Bergson 1965:65) 
We should note that both mental time and metaphysical time 
were crucial to Bergson's argument in favour of human freedom. 
The subjective feeling of time is important in terms of our 
capacity to make choices and have anticipations. (Gunn 1929:328-
9) But this sense of time being open-ended must be more than a 
mere intuition if freedom is to be realized; there must be in it 
an element of real surprise and a suggestion that it is open to 
modification. In this context, we should note another signficant 
criticism of the timeless mechanical depictions of the universe. 
In such a universe nothing new could ever occur. An American 
scholar Oliver L. Reiser wrote in an article called "The Problem 
of Time 1n ~c1ence ana Pn11osopny• that all that happened in the 
mechanical universe was the periodic redistribution of mass 
particles in space. (Reiser 1926:238) Bergson argued that there 
could be no "unforeseeable form" in a science that was really 
nothing but a "new arrangement" of old or given elements. 
(Bergson 1911:30) Only a universe which does not obey exact laws 
can produce real surprises and can allow for human intervention 
in it. Thus, Bergson's notion of freedom implied that both the 
human personality and the vital force run parallel to each other; 
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both grow and develop but follow no predestined path. Both are 
creative and dynamic; and both, as Gunn put it, are a continuous 
stream because memory holds all our experiences together just as 
the life force unites all the living. {Gunn 1920:66,78) 
5. Science and Contingency 
Bergson's criticisms of the existing model of science, while 
ridiculed in some quarters, were complemented by developments 
within science itself. (1) At least, new ideas in science were 
often read as supporting Bergson's views. With the coming of 
20th century physics, science had apparently ceased to look like 
"itself". A certain Mattoon M. Curtis wrote in the 
Philosophical Review that a leading physicist of the day had 
declared that the sole concept of modern physics was energy, and 
as this had been discovered to be immaterial then science was now 
left without any material means of support. This discovery was 
seen as further evidence that the 20th century was a "century of 
bewilderment." {Curtis 1925:491) 
For many predisposed to see an objective science as the 
answer to the "crisis" in knowledge, this change would have been 
discomforting. In ceasing to look like itself science was in fact 
becoming part of the problem that was the collapse of Western 
thought. It was taken as representative of an irrationalist 
zeitgeist, something which was seen to envelop the realms of 
1. Bertrand Russell said intuition was the property of "bats, 
bees and Bergson." (Bergson 1911:xxxv) 
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art, literature and philosophy. Many of those who analysed 
crisis, such as Laski and Russell, mentioned of the "anarchic" 
character of modern science. (Laski 1933:18, Beard 1928:65) 
But the efforts of modern scientists were not just seen as 
part of a work of destruction. For some, whether pragmatists, 
metaphysicians or subjective idealists, new scientific 
developments meant opportunities to reconstruct knowledge; 
opportunities to reconcile, however tentatively, the realm of 
fact with the realm of value, quality with quantity and reason 
with intuition. They also provided opportunities for thinkers 
marginalised by the cult of science to reassert the authenticity 
of their own views of reality. Thus, we find that alongside 
demands in the 1920s and 1930s that intellectuals become more 
scientific, there were those who were actively dismantling the 
established image of science. 
What were these scientific developments which challenged the 
traditional basis of science? Henry Adams argued that physics 
had begun its descent into chaos in the late 19th century 
following such events as Roentgen's discovery of x-rays 1893 or 
the Curies' discovery of radium in 1898. (Adams 1918:457} Adams 
added however, alluding to the conventionalist theories of 
' knowledge that had been put forward by Henri Poincare and Karl 
Pearson in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, that: 
... in 1904, Arthur Balfour announced on the part of British 
science that the human race without exception had lived and 
died in a world of illusion until the last year of the 
century. The date was convenient, and convenience was truth. 
(A<la."'s 1918~457) 
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But more commonly used to symbolise the emergence of modern 
physics was the theory of relativity and quantum physics. It 
was the work of Albert Einstein along with the work of Max 
Planck, Louis de Broglie, Niels Bohr, Erwin Shrodinger and Werner 
Heisenberg that was seen as giving expression to what the French 
scientist Gaston Bachelard would call the new scientific spirit. 
What Bachelard appeared to mean by this description was that 
science was developing its own distinctive philosophy - one that 
made it autonomous from the traditional philosophical world. (1} 
However, as I suggested at the earlier, it was also argued that 
these developments also brought science and philosophy together -
although as we shall see, this reconciliation could take a number 
of different forms. 
By the 1920s, the theory of relativity was firmly entrenched 
in the popular and intellectal consciousness. I would argue that 
the word relativity itself helped gain the theory publicity in 
this regard. A word with both philosophical and popular nuances, 
it gave a mathematical theory, incomprehensible to most, a 
familiar and accessible air. As an American scholar Jesse S. 
Reeves noted of the theory, a "popular stereotype" which stated 
that "everything is relative" was not long in the making. (Reeves 
1929:7} One wonders whether it would have excited such an 
enthusiastic and controversial reception outside of science if it 
1. On the distinctive nature of the philosophy of science see 
Bachelard, 1984, Ch. 1, esp. p. 16. 
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had been called something which had far less resonance. Indeed, 
one of the major problems relating to misinterpretations of 
physical theories is the fact that their names and the terms 
employed to explain the theory are so highly suggestive. But it 
is not the popular (in the sense of non-academic) reception of 
the theory which I want to discuss. My focus is largely on the 
reception it received in philosophical circles. More 
specifically, part of the intention of this discussion (along 
with an account of the impact of quantum theory) is to reveal 
something about the web of metaphorical connotation that was 
suspended between science and philosophy at that time. 
Although the Special Theory Q..f Relativjty was first 
articulated by Einstein in 1905, to be followed by the General 
Theory in 1917, it only really began to make its presence felt in 
philosophical journals in the 1920s. (1) In those years there 
appeared a flurry of articles in English language journals such 
as Mind 
--· 
~ Monjst, Iha Philosophjcal Review and 
Australasian Journal Qf. Psychology a.n.d. Philosophy on the 
significance of the theory for philosophy. (There were also, it 
should be noted, many articles on the mathematical and physical 
importance of the theory.) A number of philosophical texts 
addressing the supposedly wider implications of the theory also 
appeared. 
The two most important aspects of the relativity theory that 
1. The English version of Einstein's work called Relatiyity: ~ 
Special ~ ~ General Theorv was translated by R.W. Lawson. It 
appeared in 1920, published by Methuen. 
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concerned philosohers were its apparent support for the notion 
that the world is wholly or in part a product of mind and its 
apparent support for idea that nature is essentially process. 
Gunn wrote in his 1920 study of Bergson's philosophy that the 
theory leant support to subjective idealism as well as to the 
philosophy of change - although he would renounce this view in 
later years. (Gunn 1920:x:21) 
Both of these notions were related to the theories 
relativising the concept of time. As I have argued, philosophers 
had complained that the Newtonian universe was a timeless one. 
As Gunn noted in his Problem .of. Time (a historical study of both 
philosophical and scientific understandings of time), scientific 
interest in time had grown since the 1880s following the 
Michelson-Morely experiments which tested for the speed of light. 
(Gunn 1929:186) Einstein's importance was that he showed, as 
Horace S. Fries wrote in the Monist, in analysing the concept of 
simuitaneity that " ... time enters in a very intimate manner into 
all observations." (Fries 1921:383) (1) But the word time did 
1. Fries makes clear that Einstein was talking about time as 
measured. His description of the relativity theory continued as 
follows: "We must try to grasp that all matter has extension in 
time as well as in space; that it is not sufficient to locate an 
object two squares ahead, three to the right, ten stories up, 
~ along three space axes, but we must also specify the point 
along our 'time-axis' when the observation is made, if we are to 
correlate the object in question with anything else in the world. 
In the 'absolute' world which we must picture to ourselves, 
'objects' must be replaced with 'events' because when my eye 
measures the length, width and breadth of an object these 
measurements consist of a series of events radiating from the 
object and experienced by my eye in a string of happenings lined 
up in time and, similarly, any and everything that happens to, in 
and around the object takes time, and is strung out in time, so 
that its 'real' place cannot be described without adding time as 
a 'fourth dimension.'" (Fries 1921:383) 
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not mean the same thing to the philosopher as it did to the 
physicist. As we shall see, this was also true of many of the 
other words used in order to describe physical theories. 
Yet we should note that Einstein did begin with a definition 
of simultaneity with which Bergson could agree, because it 
relates to a psychological apprehension of time. He wrote that 
simultaneity occurred when two events are "for a given 
observer ... perceived or seen at the same time by that observer 
while he is equidistant from both." (1) But for Einstein this 
was not the end of the matter. For it is the very fact that 
actual simultaneity is limited to such contexts that necessitates 
the development of ways of calculating its occurrence in relation 
to events which happen "at distance". (Gunn 1929:180) Thus, the 
"qualitative problem" of simultaneity comes to depend on the 
"quantitative problem of the measurement of time" and this in 
itself depends on the calculation of other things such as 
velocity and gravitation. (Gunn 1929:180) In this context, the 
importance of Einstein's work was to show that simultaneity or 
rather time as measured was relative. Gunn wrote that Einstein 
showed "that two events which for a given observer take place at 
the same time, do not take place at the same time for any other 
observer in a state of motion relatively to the first observer." 
(Gunn 1929: 197) Hence, if motion is relative so too must 
simultaneity relative or rather, it must be dislocated in time. 
(Gunn 1929: 205) 
1. Einstein, The Theory g,1 Relativity (English Trans.), sec viii 
and ix, pp. 21-7, cited in Gunn, 1929, p. 192. 
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But one should stress again that the words time, 
simultaneity and relativity as used in these contexts had very 
different meanings to the way in which they were by philosophers. 
We should note at the outset that relativity theory was couched 
in physical and mathematical terms and its focus upon time as 
measured. (Gunn 1927:186n) While it showed the concept of 
simultaneity to be subjective or relative, it should be 
remembered that the subjective or relative character of an 
observation statement referred not to a psychological state but 
only to "physical subjectivity" - that is, the position or 
relative motion of an observer. (Gunn 1927:186n) 
Nevertheless, a number of philosophers saw in the theory of 
relativity confirmation of their own intellectual beliefs. In 
relation to this last point two philosophers stand out. H. Wildon 
Carr and Viscount Haldane in particular. Their work prompted a 
considerable degree of interest. That Haldane's major work on 
the topic, The~ .Q.f. Relativity (1921), sold out in the first 
week of publication suggests a strong desire to grasp the wider 
implications of the theory. But the idea that the theory had 
implications beyond the field of physics was also something that 
was promoted by these philosophers themselves. 
Perhaps implications is too mild a word to be used in this 
context. This is because the theory was seen as marking a 
revolution in the world of thought as far-reaching in its effects 
as the work of Newton. With the appearance of the theory of 
relativity, it was suggested, the world would never be the same 
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again; it marked a point of no return. For instance, H. Wildon 
Carr claimed that the theory constituted a crisis in the history 
of ideas, one which falsified and rendered "useless" all the old 
ways of thinking about and arranging practical, scientific, 
social, political and religious affairs. (Carr 1926:65) This 
view was reflected in Haldane's text which traversed the fields 
of philosophy, science and politics. But as I have stressed, it 
was the bearing the theory had on the nature and role of 
philosophy that seemed to most concern Carr and Haldane. Carr 
wrote that it was the duty of philosophers was to help humanity 
in its struggle to "adapt its mind" to this new way of viewing 
the universe. (Carr 1926:65) 
Carr and Haldane also attempted to relate the theory to 
traditional and current philosophical tendencies such as neo-
idealism and process metaphysics. For example, Carr in his a 
Theory .o.i Monads: Outlines .o.i th.a Philosophy .o.i th.a Principle .o.i 
Relativity (1922} and his The. Scientific Approach t.n. Philosophy 
(1924) blended the work of Leibniz, Bergson and Einstein. (1) 
Both Carr and Haldane believed that the theory of relativity 
had rendered the distinction between science and philosophy 
superfluous. Indeed, they argued that the problems Einstein 
raised were ultimately philosophical problems as they were 
1. For a review of Carr's a Theory .o.i Monads see J.A. Leighton, 
Philosopbjcal Review, Vol. XXXII, No. 5, 1922, pp.544-548. 
Leighton described the book as a "reinterpretation of the 
Leibnizian Monadology in terms of the Bergsonian doctrine of 
reality and knowledge, and with an ingenious use of the 
Einsteinian theory of relativity." (Leighton 1922:544} 
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concerned with the role that mind played in creating the world 
around it. The theory of relativity, wrote Carr, was a triumph 
for philosophy. (Hinman 1926:479-801 Northrop 1925:3~ Carr 
1924:22f:182) 
As I suggested above, the theory of relativity was taken to 
be crucial in settling the dispute between realist and idealists; 
the theory of relativity, according to Carr, favoured the latter 
group. {Carr 1921:465) According to Carr, relativity theory had 
expelled things, substances and forms from reality and left in 
its wake nothing but events which were at least in part 
projections of what idealist philosophers referred to as 
"psychic activity" or "spirit itself". {Carr 1921:464f~ Smith 
1921:505) Creighton; 1922:289-290) It is not surprising then, 
that in a review of H. Wildon Carr's Ih.e. Scientific Approach !..Q. 
Pbjlosophy, E. L. Hinman wrote that Carr bad made relativity 
"talk Bergsonianism." (Hinman 1926:478) Indeed, it was argued 
that the theory's new approach towards nature was one that many 
philosophers, including Bergson, bad already adopted. {Creighton 
1922:288;Smart 1925:511) (1) 
It was believed that the theory of relativity implied the 
view that the world was in part a creation of mind. However, 
1. Gunn wrote that the "researches of Einstein, culminating in 
the formuation of his general Theory of Relativity and his 
~v~~idi !neory of Gravitation, which are arousing such interest 
at the present time, threaten very seriously the older static 
views of the universe and seem to frustrate any efforts to find 
and denote stablity therein. In the light of these discoveries, 
Bergson's views on the reality of Change seem less paradoxical 
than they might have formerly appeared." {Gunn 1920:21) 
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neither Carr nor Haldane believed that this entailed a strict 
positivist concern with pure immediacy. Both of these scholars 
described something called reality. It was just that the reality 
which they referred to was seen as essentially spiritual in 
nature. {Ainsough 1922:495) Indeed, Carr described the texture 
of this reality, although it was a texture quite unlike the hard 
surface commonly associated with neo-realism. For Carr thought 
that the world was fundamentally composed of mind-energy arranged 
in a monadic pattern. {Carr 1924: 95: 187) 
view attempted to overcome 
Thus, this particular 
the subject-object metaphysical 
dualisms of idealism and realism. Carr wrote in a review of 
Haldane's ~ Q..f_ Relativity that the only "concrete reality" 
was the immanent activity of the interpenetrating subject-object. 
{Carr 1921:466) 
Carr called this phenomenon duality in unity. {Carr 1922:3) 
We are not talking here of a synthesis of opposites. Haldane said 
that according to the philosophy of relativity it is not so much 
that idealism triumphed over realism {or that they simply 
dissolved into each other) but that the "difference" between 
idealism and realism "disappears" when it is absorbed into a 
"larger outlook that embraces the difference itself." {Haldane 
1921:141) Relativity theory therefore suggested more than a 
subjective idealism; it suggested, as J.E. Creighton put it, a 
philosophy in which the "conception and the conceived" embrace 
each other "within a greater and foundational 
{Creighton 1922:289) 
actuality." 
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We should note in this context that Carr's and Haldane's 
theories were also likened to the "actual idealism" of the 
Italian philosopher Giovanni Gentile in his 1922 work ~ Theory 
g,! ~as. £u.r.e. A.c..t.. (Turner 1922:339) (1) Gentile too sought to 
reconcile the mystics' embrace of an absolute identity with the 
practical necessity of recognising that identity has different 
and finite expressions. (Gentile 1922:266-7) 
There was a further reason for associating Bergson with 
these interpretations of the theory of relativity beyond 
asserting his identity with a form of subjective idealism. If 
these theories pushed beyond subjective idealism towards a 
description of reality, then Bergson too could be seen in that 
light. For he too, in some respects, sought to break down the 
oppositions between certain principles. In his case, as we saw, 
he sought to breakdown the opposition between life and matter by 
similarly founding these terms in some sort of superconsiousness 
or underlying energy. He too can be seen as treating finites as 
expressions of one single impulsion. Indeed, I think a natural 
conceptual progression was being followed here; one which began 
with subjective idealism and then proceeded to insist that the 
1. This text was translated from the Italian into English by H. 
Wildon Carr. For a review of this text, see Warner Fite who 
described it as a synthesis of Leibniz, Hegel, Bergson and 
Einstein see ~ Philosophjcal Review, Vol. XXXII, No. 5, 1923. 
pp. 544-548. In addition to Bergson and Gentile, E.. L. Hinman 
wrote in a review of Carr's DMt Scientific Approach !g 
Philosophy in ~ Philosophical Review that there were 
affinities between Carr and the neo-idealism of Croce and 
Alexander. (Hinman 1926:478} 
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world itself 1s mind-energy and that individual minds are 
articulations of this. 
This same logic can also be seen in the development of 
positivism. Indeed, the conceptual path that Carr, Haldane and 
others followed in their discussions of relativity theory further 
demonstrates my earlier point about the plasticity of 
epistemological categories such as positivism. This path 
illustrates how positivism could be construed in ways that saw it 
end up as the very thing that it set out to eliminate - that is 
metaphysics. Furthermore, metaphysically speaking, positivism 
could be shaped into two different forms. The epistemological 
reduction that leads us to concentrate on the immediate data of 
consciousness can be rendered as a form of subjective idealism. 
The given becomes immediacy and is apprehended by intuition, 
implying the subordination of reason, discourse and conceptual 
analysis to image, emotion and feeling. At the same time, I have 
also demonstrated that positivism can bloom into a metaphysics of 
process of which individual minds are the terminal expressions. 
It was argued that the very the fact that positivism has no 
hard ground to fasten onto meant that it wound up in relativism. 
(Loewenberg 1923:278) However, it is precisely this which also 
made positivism a hospitable base on which many different sorts 
of concepts could be placed. Perry wrote that the "metaphysical 
limbo" which positivism occupied was easily filled with all 
sorts of substances which can take the place of God, be they the 
concepts of energy, force or ether. (Perry 1918:57) The British 
scientists Sir Arthur Eddington in The. Nature of. .the. Physical 
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~ (1928) and Sir James Jeans saw the theory of relativity as 
lending support to a form of idealism - one in which mind played 
some sort of role in constructing a deeper spiritual realm which 
existed behind appearances. (Eddington 1935:324f~Jeans 1933:307) 
6. Time and Duration 
The other major focus of interest in relation to Einstein's 
theory was on the question of time. As indicated by our comments 
in relation to Bergson, some saw the theory of relativity as 
supporting the view that the world was immersed in duration. 
Here, the notion of relativity was translated into the 
Heraclitian notion that reality is flux. In this context, both 
Haldane and the American philosopher William Kay Wallace claimed 
that the principle of relativity had originated in ancient 
Greece as it reflected the view of life as a ceaseless becoming. 
(Haldane 1921:33~ Wallace 1924:290) To this extent it could be 
argued that what appeared to be a new scientific discovery was in 
fact as old as philosophy itself. (1} 
But while often seen in these terms the theory was also 
cr\ticised for failing to come to grips with the real meanings of 
time. In some cases it was assumed that the word relativity 
meant exactly the same thing for the philosopher as it did for 
the physicists - and indeed, that Einstein was really only 
1. Another philosopher George A. Wilson commented in an article 
entitled "Philosophy over against Science", {The Philosophical 
Review Vol. XXXI, No.3, May 1922, pp. 257-68) that "on a 
scientific basis" one could not "say even as much as Heraclitus, 
that the law of change abides." {Wilson 1922:259} 
170 
restating what philosophers had always known. Some scientists 
objected to this misinterpretation because it confused physical 
with psychological or metaphysical concepts. But philosophers 
like Gunn also rejected the conflation of relativity theory with 
such notions as duration or general creativity. Gunn was well 
aware that Einstein's interest in time as measured was 
qualitively different to Bergson's understanding of time as la.. 
~. which as I have noted is time as we live it and not time 
as measured. But it is interesting to note that even where the 
differences in approach were recognised the argument was that 
physicists should somehow be able to be reconciled with Bergson's 
idea of time; that is, it was believed that Einstein should have 
approached the the question of time in its deeper and more 
fundamental metaphysical reality. This is evident in a comment 
made by Francis Anderson that while Bergson had attacked the 
"ultimate problems" relating to the question of time in Creative 
Evolution, Einstein had not dealt with these "in a systematic 
way." (Anderson 1923a:1962) 
Bergson himself compared his own theory of time with that of 
Einstein's in Duratjon a.n.d. Simultaneity - a book written in order 
to demonstrate the limitations of the physicists' concept of 
time, compared to his own understanding of la.. duree as time that 
is lived and experienced. (1) He argued in this text that the 
1. Gunn noted: "He [Bergson] laid aside for a time in 1920, his 
preoccupation with Einstein's work in order to examine the 
relationship between the theory of Relativity and his own 
doctrines of Time which date from 1889. The fruit of these 
labours was a remarkable little volume, iss~ed in 1922 (and now 
in several subsequent revised editions} Duree g,t SjmultaneitQ i 
propos gg la.. th6orie ~". (Gunn 1925:280) See also 
Gunn's "Bergson and Einstein", 1926a, pp. 215-8 for further 
comparisons of the psychological and physical concepts of time. 
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plurality of times - which involve expansions in time-lengths 
and "broken-up simultaneities" - offered up by the special theory 
of relativity - do not constitute different "times" at all, 
because they are really "light-lines." (Bergson 1965:159) Thus, 
for Bergson Einstein had in some respects only rearranged the old 
mechanical universe so that instead of being under the governance 
of one reversible time-line it was now under the sway of multiple 
reversible time-lines. (1} The times of relativity theory still 
remained mathematical fictions based on a false analogy between 
time and space. Bergson wrote that the use of "space to measure 
and symbolize time" confused duration which is the "order of 
quality" with "pure quantity." (Bergson 1965:6,160} For 
Bergson, the relative times or simultaneities imputed or inferred 
by an observer-scientists were not things which anyone could 
experience or verify; the minute one entered one of these time-
frames its relativity was extinguished. (Bergson 1965:158-9) 
Bergson further argued that the multiple times of the 
special theory not only do not eliminate "the oneness of time" 
but are actually predicated upon it. (Bergson 1965:159} For there 
was one time contained within the theory which was time as lived. 
1. On this point see Gilles Deleuze in his study Bergsonism where 
he writes that instead of an "inseparably hyphenated" space-time, 
Einstein had merely treated time as a "a fourth dimension of 
space." Deleuze says that according to Bergson, Einstein had 
"merely invented a new way of spatializing time." (Deleuze 
1988:79:85} He had produced a non-Euclidean universe in which 
the multiple times had "different speeds of flow" but were "all 
real, each one peculiar to a system of reference." (Deleuze. 
1988:79} But in the Bergsonian universe, Deleuze argued, there 
"is only one time ... although there is an infinity of actual 
fluxes ... that necessarily participate in the same virtual whole." 
(Deleuze 1988:82} 
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This was the time which the physicist inhabited before and after 
he began his calculations - all of which are "auxiliary" to and 
dependent upon this lived time. For without a sense of the 
simultaneity of flows, Bergson argued, it was impossible to 
conceive of a simultaneity of instants. {Bergson 1965:159} {1} 
Some metaphysicians did attempt to reconcile the numerical 
and discontinuous space-times of relativity theory with their 
own ideas about general duration and universal history. For 
example, W. Shimer wrote in an article entitled "The Evolution of 
Relativity" appearing in the Monist that Einstein's concept of 
space-time did not falsify real time, since space-time was also a 
"constituent of the real." As such, it was subject to the 
evolutionary process; that is, the relativities of physical time 
themselves evolved, became and changed. {Shimer 1927:541} {1) 
In many respects Einstein and Bergson were in agreement with 
each other. Einstein accepted Bergson's intuitive understanding 
1. Bergson wrotes that: "Expanded and broken-up times are 
therefore auxiliary times, intercalated by the physicist's mirid 
between the start of his calculations, which is real time, and 
its finish, which is the same real time. In the latter we have 
made the measurements with which we operate; to the latter do 
the operation's results apply. The others are intermediary 
between the statement and the solution of the problem." {Bergson 
1965:159) Gunn appeared to agree with Bergson on this point. He 
wrote that the intuitive sense of simultaneity was crucial for 
without it clocks could not be read. That is "clocks are compared 
in order to ascertain the time at which events occur, and the 
relation of the event to the hands of the clock gives us that 
absolute simultaneity which is intuitive, experienced, sensed, 
lived. The physicists themselves (Einstein among them} are 
obliged to note this primary absolute sense of the term, for it 
is but that identity in time which enables them to note the time 
of any event at all. The setting of clocks, for instance, 
involves noting the time of the departure of the light-signal, 
then the time of fits arrival, and finally the time of its 
return." {Gunn 1929:190) 
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of simultaneity as the only absolute form of simultaneity without 
which it would be impossible to measure or take note of time. 
(Bergson 1965:xxxvi) Bergson also clearly accepted the veracity 
of Einstein's theory of relativity as a physical theory and was 
cautious when it came to the more metaphysical notions of time. 
Thus, we must ask why this debate, concerning the meaning of 
time, between Bergson and Einstein arose. We should note that it 
was a debate which many metaphysicians joined, weighing in on the 
side of Bergson to the extent that like him they rejected the 
notion that time could be reduced to measures. (It is a debate 
which Einstein is deemed to have won.) 
One sticking point appears to be the insistence of 
philosophers that their definitions of time denoted real time 
whether construed in psychological or metaphysical terms - as 
opposed to the "artificial" time of the physicist. (1) 
In this context, we should note that an interesting exchange 
took place between Bergson and Einstein (as recorded in 
~ ~ 
Bergson's Melanges) at a meeting of the Socjete de. Phjlosophie 
in Paris in 6 April 1922. At this meeting Einstein appeared to 
reject the notion that there was a special philosophical 
definition of time. There was he said no time for philosophers, 
there was only physical and psychological time. (Bergson 
1. For further comments critical of the physicist's concept of 
time see Hans Joas, 1985:169. Joas wrote of George Herbert 
Mead's objection to the theory of relativity. He wrote that for 
Mead "the concept of a four-dimensional space-time-world" 
implied that time was a "subjective phenomenon" and not an 
"inherent feature of the physical world itself." (Joas 1985:169) 
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1972:1345f) Einstein's response to the philosophers is worth 
quoting at length. For what it reveals to us is that this debate 
was essentially a debate about definitions; that is, about how 
~~was to be defined. Bergson's argument was that there is 
only one real time (la. dur~e), the time of minds not that of 
clocks. Whereas Einstein's argument appears to be that there is 
no r.e..al. time at all. (1) He stated: 
The question is posed thus: is time for a philosopher the 
same as it is for a physicist? I believe that ~ for a 
philosopher is both psychological and physical at the same 
time; well, physical time can be derived from conscious 
time. Primitively, individuals have the notion of 
simultaneous perception; they are able to understand each 
other and to agree on something they perceive; this was a 
first step towards objective reality. But there are 
objective events independent of individuals, and, from 
simultaneous perception, we can pass on to the events 
themselves. And, in fact, this simultaneity has not, for a 
long time, led to any contradiction because of the great 
speed of light. So the concept of simultaneity has been able 
to permit the perception of objects. From that we can deduce 
a temporal order in events ... But nothing in our 
consciousness permits us to conclude that there is a 
simultaneity of events, because these are nothing but mental 
constructions, logical beings. So there is not time for 
philosophers. There is only a psychological time which is 
different from a physicists time. (Bergson 1972:1345-6) 
7. The Response of the Scientists 
We should note that Einstein was forthright in his 
denunciations of the interpretations that were applied to 
relativity theory - especially the notion that it implied that 
1. This exchange was recorded in French in Bergson's Melanges. It 
is not clear from the text whether Einstein actually spoke at 
this meeting in French or German. For various intepretations of 
Einstein's position as regards this exchange see Capek, 1961, 
p.160. 
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all things are relative and that there are no absolutes in the 
world. (Although some argued that Einstein had simply failed to 
grasp the philosophical implications of his theory. [1]) 
Philosophers of a realist persuasion also objected to 
subjectivist or relativist interpretations of the theory. A 
certain Thomas Greenwood for instance, argued that the 
subjectivism the theory was seen to support was in fact an 
anathema to all those scientists who saw it as their job to 
eliminate the singular and the partial and to create the 
universal. (Greenwood 1922:207) Far from justifying idealism, 
Greenwood wrote, relativity theory supported the opposite 
conclusion as it reflected an: 
•.. absolute reality, independent of the mind and even of the 
motion or tne observers, absolute in its objectivity 
although relative in its expressions by various observers. 
'The laws of nature,' says the principle, 'remain unaltered 
whatever be the motion of the observers.' (Greenwood 1922:206) 
There were a number of other scholars making similar 
observations. For instance, J. E. Turner (whose views on the 
superiority of science over philosophy were cited in the last 
chapter) concluded in an article called "Relativity without 
Paradox" appearing in the Monist that to interpret the theory to 
1. This observation was noted by the Australian philosopher 
Francis Anderson. He thought it a wrong observation because of 
Einstein's own admission of his epistemological "filiation" with 
the radical empiricsm of Hume and Mach. He wrote that Einstein 
bad a much stronger grip on the philosohical implications of this 
work that his critics were willing to admit. Although we should 
note that Einstein's argument that there were absolute laws of 
nature is hardly consistent with the position of the radical 
empiricists. (Anderson 1923a:62) 
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mean that reality was mind-dependent was "fatal" to science. 
(Turner 1930:2} {1} 
As we have seen, the theory of relativity provided no 
justification for subjectivism, just as it provided no 
justification for the view that the world conceals a deeper 
spriritual force. Yet it seemed that such distortions of the 
theory continued to circulate. 
It was this fact that resulted in a very interesting book by 
Philipp Frank (a professor at the German University of Prague and 
adherent of the positivism of Carnap and Wittgenstein} called 
Interpretations an.d. Misinterpretations Q.f Modern Physics (1938). 
In this text, Frank began by noting that every new physical 
theory is immediately examined to see what use it has for 
settling philosophical disputes. (Frank 1938:3} Or, as he later 
noted, metaphysicians scan physical theories for evidence for 
what "man has always known without the benefit of science." 
(Frank 1938:83} A good example of this was the claim of the 
Australian philosopher Francis Anderson that Einstein's theory of 
relativity was not new to philosophers who had been long aware of 
"the relativity of things, not only to each other, but to the 
1. Note also, as evidence of the way the word relativism had 
begun to circulate outside of science, John Anderson's article, 
"Realism Versus Relativism in Ethics", The Australasian Journal 
Q.f Psychology an.d. Philosohpy, March, 1933, Vol., XI, No. 1., p. 1 
where he wrote: "It is a condition of progress in any science 
that relativist confusions should be removed ... " Anderson claimed 
that relativism is inevitable prior to the "development of theory 
in any particular field." 
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mind that perceives them". (Anderson 1931a:1) (1) I have cited 
other similar claims - such as the idea that science had arrived 
at a theory of nature that had already been elaborated by 
Bergson. 
Frank attributed the fact that science can be used and 
interpreted in this way to two things. Firstly, the presence of 
the verbal similarities between the language of science and the 
language of philosophy. This would certainly seem to be the 
case, as I have demonstrated how physical subjectivity became 
mental subjectivity and physical time was interpreted to mean 
flux or becoming. We should also note here how the notion of 
physical relativity was used to lend support to the idea of the 
relativity of knowledge and ideals. (Shimer 1927:551 Reid 
1933:85) Indeed, the loose interpretations of the meanings of 
this word led some to speak of relativity as some unseen 
historical force running through modern times and evident in the 
work of thinkers as diverse as Bergson and Einstein. 
The second thing that Frank attributed misinterpretations of 
physics to is what he called a lingering "anthropomorphism" among 
some philosophers who drew the false conclusion from modern 
physical theories that the universe is fundamentally spiritual in 
1. See also the comment by George A. ~organ in an article on 
Dilthey, in which he said the first and perhaps last "lesson of 
history" was that of "universal relativity ... All that the Greeks 
learned from the flux of external nature and the deceptions of 
the senses modern thinkers have discovered in the labyrinths of 
the human past." (Morgan 1933:373} 
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nature. (Frank 1938:3) He saw this as a move which scientists 
were equally guilty of making - and here Frank referred to 
Eddington and Jeans among others. (1) 
It is important to note that the motivation for Frank's 
attack on these interpretations of physics was not purely 
intellectual. For his argument both began and ended with a 
warning about the political dangers posed by metaphysical 
interpretations of modern physics. He specifically referred to 
what he called organismic or spiritual interpretations of 
physical theories. That is, those interpretations which held that 
physics now demonstrated that the world was essentially an 
1. He cited Jeans as asserting that the notion that electrons 
have both particle and wave aspects was equivalent to the 
"mystical" notion that reality was comprised of individual 
entities and the "stream of life" from which they sprang. He 
cited Jeans as stating: "'It is only a step from this to a 
solution of the problem which would have commended itself to many 
philosophers, from Plato to Berkeley ... ' Once more the tendency 
to find within physics arguments in favor of the ever-recurrent 
spiritualistic ideology is quite obvious. The physical sentences 
are intended to provide the solution of problems formulated since 
Plato but expressible only in metaphysical terms." He wrote that 
Eddington had also arrived at a spiritualistic position "by 
arguing that observations cannot be predicted on the basis of 
mathematical formulas, wherefore there exists something 
spontaneous and creative in nature." (Frank 1938:18) For a review 
of Frank's book see John Passmore, The. Austalasjan Journal of. 
Psychology and Philosophy, 1940, pp. 82-4. See also L.S. 
Stebbing's Philosophy and th.a physicists, London, Methuen & Co., 
1938. Another study of the idealistic interpretations of science 
by scientists was C.E.M. Joad's, Philosophical Aspects Q.!, Modern 
Science, George Allen and Unwin Limited, London, 1932. 
Eddington's is an interesting case for he too wrote that it was a 
"common mistake" to think that the theory of relativity means 
that everything is relative. He stated: "Actually its says: 
'There are absolute things in the world but you must look deeply 
for them. The things that first present themselves to your notice 
are for the most part relative.'" {Eddington 1935:34) The 
trouble, according to Frank, is that Eddington's absolutes appear 
to possess a spiritual content. 
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organism or a spiritual being of which human beings were 
particular instances. Frank argued that the dangers of these 
representations of nature was that they provided the "ideological 
foundation of the organismic conception of society" which was 
used by "definite power-groups" to facilitate their rise. (Frank 
1938:33) His aim in this context was to prevent popularized 
presentations from being used to assist "intellectual, and hence 
social, reaction. " (Frank 1938:58) It is interesting to compare 
this statement with that of the Australian scholar P.H Partridge 
who wrote soon after that " ... the deepening mysticism of certain 
branches of scientific theory [in the sense that it had lost 
any notion of general order and interconnectedness] ... has 
weakened the resistance of science to anti-scientific moralities 
and philosophies." (Partridge 1940:16} (1} 
Of course, Frank's argument would be that it was not science 
itself that was becoming mystical - rather, the mysticism arose 
from those who misinterpreted it. Furthermore, as a positivist, 
Frank would not see pervasive order and interconnectedness in 
science as a prerequisite for scientific rationality. 
Nevertheless, there is a sense in which it could be argued that 
that scientists had themselves rendered their discipline 
vulnerable to mystical ideas. For instance, it was argued that 
physics could be construed as lending support spiritual ideas 
precisely because of the radical empiricist's insistence .that 
phenomena do not need support. In the absence of such support, 
it could be argued that positivism was bound to either tend 
towards a form of subjective idealism or panpsychism. It could 
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become a form of personal idealism or it could give rise to a 
picture of the universe as a psychic melting-pot. To this extent, 
philosophers had only rushed through a door that had already been 
opened, if only a little, by scientists. 
There are a number of conclusions that one can draw from 
these debates about the meaning of relativity theory. Firstly, I 
think the examination of these interpretations of modern physics 
demonstrates that exchanges about the meaning of relativity and 
about the epistemology that it favoured were often overwhelmed by 
the desire to raise other intellectual or spiritual concerns. 
Secondly, and more importantly, the winding course of the 
epistemological arguments I have outlined suggests that both the 
language of philosophy and the language of scientific description 
were highly equivocal. We can see this in the confused 
interpretations of the intentions which lay behind the use of 
words such as simultaneity, relativity, subjectivity and time. 
Thirdly, the confusions over the meanings of these terms brings 
into question the actual coherence of what was called the 
modernist movement. As we have seen, somehow the intuitionism of 
Bergson and the relativity of Einstein were be seen as 
representative of a particular zeitgeist. This zeitgeist could be 
1. As we have seen organismic interpretations of physics were 
tied in with the work of Bergson and Whitehead. Other organismic 
theories current at that time included those of C. Lloyd Morgan 
in Emergent Evolution, 1927, Williams and Norgate, 1923. J.C. 
Smuts in Holism ~Evolution, Macmillan, London, 1936 {Third 
Edition}; ~.O Losskii in ~ ~ ~ QIL Organic ~. 
(Translated from the Russian by Natalie A. Duddington}, London, 
OUP, 1928. 
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seen in as an irrationalist one or it could be seen as a sign of 
the new liberation of spirit that was abroad. But if some of 
these ideas were not what they seemed and did not stand for what 
they were said to stand for, bow accurate was this idea of a 
relativist zeitgejst? 
8. Quantum Physics 
There were similar attempts to locate philosophical and 
social meanings in the area of quantum physics. Here again, 
suggestive terms were used to describe a theory - terms which are 
readily translated into both popular and philosophical idioms; 
terms that had a history prior to their use by physical 
scientists. Quantum theory is most popularly associated with 
what became known, after 1927, as Heisenberg's principle of 
uncertainty or indeterminancy. 
There are actually three inter-related features in the area 
of quantum theory that are relevant for this discussion. The 
first relates to the uncertainty consequent upon the conditions 
under which observation of an electron is possible. That is, in 
casting a beam of light on an electron in order to observe it, 
one makes the the electron "travel too fast for observation." 
(1) 
The second feature which is important for this discussion is 
that electrons were described in terms of both particles and 
waves. The third feature is the related assertion that quantum 
1. F.C.S. Schiller cited by Rube H. Quiney, 1931:272n. 
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theory demonstrated a discontinuity in spatio'-temporal and causal 
relations. All of these points were seized upon by philosophers 
in order to put forward arguments similar to those which were put 
in relation to the theory of relativity. I shall explain what 
these are in a moment, but first, I should atteapt to explain 
further some of the features of quantum theory that I have 
listed. 
The quantWB theory stated that there are limits to the 
accuracy with which we can observe sub-atomic phenomena. The 
reason for this, according to Bohr's formulation, is that no one 
set of experimental techniques can both spatially locate the 
position of a particle as well as predict its future course. That 
is, as Frank put it, there is "no experimental set-up concerning 
corpuscular radiation in the description of which the terms 
'position' and 'velocity' of an electron can both be 
significantly used." (Frank 1938:14} (1} We should also note how 
1. Note Bohr's co1111ent which appeared in his formulation of the 
theory in the Physical Reyiew in 1935: "When an experiment is 
made in which electrons are produced, then it depends on the 
experimental set-up whether or not a 'position' or 'velocity' of 
the generated particles can be defined at all. It is not 
permissible to say that in the experiement, particles (in the 
sense of corpuscular mechanics} are produced, whose state is 
'unknowable' or even 'undetermined'." (Frank 1938:12} D. Brown, 
a New Zealand physicist, cited Heisenberg as stating in 1927 that 
quantum theory iaplied that there was a "well defined limit to 
the accuracy with which observations" of electrons can be made 
thus aaking it iapossible to acquire "sufficient ,data to predict" 
their future aovements ... It is theoretically possible to 
determine with coaplete accuracy either the position · Ql:. the 
velocity of the particle, but if we select one· of these 
quantities for exact measureaent, the other bece>11es quite 
indeterminate. Or else we aay decide to accept a degree of error 
in both determinations, which will then be governed by the 
Quiney cited F.C. S. Schiller as describing the problem posed by 
183 
the terms position and velocity are correlated with the terms 
particle and wave. An experiment which locates the position of 
an electron may be depicted in terms of a "particle at that 
position", while in an experiment in which velocity (or impulse} 
is definable then a "wave length may be correlated to it." 
(Frank 1938:15) The third generalisation that flows from this 
theory, according to Frank, is that there is a discontinuity 
between spatio-temporal and causal relations. What this means is 
that there is no experiment which can be conducted which can give 
both a spatio-temporal description of the position of an 
electron as well as predict its future course; one can have a 
"spatio-temporal description" or a "causal description" but never 
both. (Frank 1938: 15} (2) 
Philosophers seized upon this theory in order to justify 
three related notions. These were firstly, the conception of 
reality as process; secondly, the view that mind interacts with 
the natural world and thirdly, the pragmatic theory of truth. 
The American pragmatist philosoher John Dewey reported the 
principle plainly enough when he wrote that it showed that the 
action of making an electron visible at the same time displaced 
the theory as one where a physicist wanting to observe the 
behaviour of an electron and having to "first throw a beam of 
light on it". The problem or the element of uncertainty arises 
because this act makes the electron "travel too fast for 
observation." (Quiney 1931:272n} See also Heisenberg, ~ 
Physical Princinles Q.[ th.a Quantum Theory, Dover, New York, 1949. 
2. Note Frank's point that the "complementarity between spatio-
temporal and causal description says exactly the same thing about 
the particle as the complementarity between position and 
velocity. In popular presentations, among which those of a number 
of physicists have to be counted, this fact is left obscure and 
it looks as if something more general bad been said." (Frank 
1938:16} 
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the observed object. (Dewey 1930:202-4) The most important thing 
for Dewey in this context was that the condition of uncertainty 
arose because the observer played a role in dictating what 
happened to the object. (Dewey 1930:202-4) The meaning given to 
the clause, the observer played a role, is pivotal here; for it 
would seem that it had a significance for philosophers that it 
did not have for scientists. For instance, a physicist might 
argue that that the failure to measure accurately was, following 
James Clerk Maxwell, due to the limitations of our faculties or 
the coarseness of our instruments of measurement. That is, the 
uncertainty effect was produced by optical and physical means 
rather than being a result of the intervention of psychological 
forces in nature or some degree of indeterminancy in 
itself. 
nature 
This view was disputed by a number of philosophers, 
including a certain H. Ruhe Quiney who said that the importance 
of the theory to philosophy could "hardly be over-estimated." 
(Quiney 1931:272). He argued that uncertainty was not due to 
"extraneous factors" such as mechanisms of measurement. (Quiney 
1931:223) The British pragmatist F.C.S Schiller argued that 
since the operation of knowjng an electron could change its place 
and velocity, then scientific inquiry now had to include in any 
conception of reality the "human operations by which that 
reality" comes to be known. (Schiller 1932b:247:1929:247) Dewey 
also articulated this view, stating that Heisenberg's theory of 
indeterminancy had completely disproved the spectator theory of 
knowledge in giving support to the notion of mind as a 
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participant within reality. (Dewey 1930:204-5) We can see here 
how "plays a role" in a physical sense could easily be conflated 
with "plays a role" in a psychological sense. (1) 
The next development of the quantum theory related to the 
assertion that nature itself is somehow irrational because it 
does not behave in a predictable manner. In quantum physics 
electrons behave both as waves with a definite velocity and as 
particles with a definite position, and they seemingly and 
unpredictably "leap" from one of these states to the other when 
they undergo observation. This led to the assertion that there 
was a discontinuity between spatio-temporal and causal relations. 
That is, where one could afix a position to an electron one could 
not predict its future movement; where one could assign it a 
certain velocity one could not pinpoint its position. Thus, 
insofar as the sub-atomic realm could be characterised by 
discrete and qualitatively different states in atomic behaviour, 
it was argued that uncertainty inhered in nature itself. Dewey 
1. While viewing the Principles as support for the 
instrumentalist theory of knowledge Dewey did draw attention to 
the distinction between interactions of a physical and mental 
sort. He wrote that: "The particle observed does not ~fixed 
position or velocity, for it is changing all the time because of 
interaction: specifically, in this case, interaction with the act 
of observing, or more strictly, wjth the. conditions under ~ 
an observation is. possjble ... [my emphasis]" (Dewey 1930:202} 
Eddington wrote that the relativity theory and the quantum theory 
were not just new discoveries but constituted a whole new way of 
thinking. Furthermore, he saw quantum theory as an 
epistemological principle that made physics a world contemplated 
from within. "We ourselves, our conventions, the kinds of thing 
that attracts our interest, are much more concerned than we 
realise in any account we give of how the objects of the physical 
world are behaving." We can study the external world now but 
without the halo of reality. (Eddington 1935:145,216,221,275} 
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wrote that uncertainty was not just a product of mind but was 
truly a "trait of natural events themselves." (Dewey 1930:249) 
The point of making the twin assertions that nature was in a 
sense irrational and that human activity could modify it was to 
argue the case for the instrumentalist theory of knowledge. 
Scientific concepts like that of velocity and position were seen 
only as tools which were used in order to deal with an 
"antecedent existence" rather than as "fixed properties of that 
existence." (Dewey 1930:203) (1) For Dewey the theory implied 
that all physical laws are of a statistical character and 
therefore are but "predictions of the nrobabi1ity of an 
observable event", not exact predictions as to the course that 
any particular electron may take. (Dewey 1930:248) 
This was not to say that banishing all uniformity, 
continuity and substance from nature meant that all scientific 
laws and theories would be banished as well. The quantum 
theorist accommodated inconsistency in the sub-atomic realm, by 
using whatever theories and applying whatever laws appeared to 
work in particular experimental contexts. (Sheldon 1930:250) 
While Heisenberg's theory appeared to deny the principle of 
causation, Schiller argued that it would be used wherever it 
worked; he wrote that "no behaviour of electrons can confute it." 
(Schiller 1929:247) (1) 
1. Marjorie Harris noted that Heisenberg himself had argued 
that "paradoxes" thrown up by quantum physics could only be 
resolved with the renunciation of such old and cherished notions 
as the "principle of causality" and the notion that "natural 
phenomena obey exact laws." {Harris 1933:511) 
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There are three conclusions then which were derived from 
quantum theory and its support for the instrumentalist theory of 
knowledge. The first related to intellectual life and the second 
to social action. Firstly, the significance of the theory should 
be seen in the context of the lower status that philosophy and 
social theory were accorded by many of those who were committed 
to the scientific ideal. Again, we see the same argument that was 
put in relation to the theory of relativity; in this case quantum 
theory was said to show that philosophers and social scientists 
should not be jealous of physical scientists. For what the theory 
demonstrated was that uncertainty was a condition of life which 
faced the ignorant and the scientifically informed alike. 
(Swenson 1928:437;Sheldon 1930:257) Dewey wrote that if man, by 
virtue of knowing, is a participant in the natural world and this 
is no bar to scientific understanding, then it must follow that 
his participation in the social world is no threat to his 
achieving understanding there. 
Further to this, the principle was taken to imply, like 
relativity theory, that what was called reality was in part an 
invention of mind. As with relativity theory, it was argued 
that where the subject-object relation was indivisible, reality 
had to include our modes of understanding. (1) Thus, Dewey 
claimed that "a certain method of directed participation" in both 
the social and natural realms was a prior condition of "genuine 
understanding." (Dewey 1930:212) 
1. Philip Weiner wrote that as with the Relatiyity Theory, the 
Uncertainty Principle was seen as challenging the bifurcation of 
the world into an objective realm of rationality and a "fixed 
residue" of subjective irrationality. (Wiener 1935:498) 
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The other conclusion, one which flows from this last point 
is the use of the theory in putting the case for the 
philosophical notion of free-will. Where traditional arguments in 
favour of free-will had been derived from confidence in the 
supposed uniformity of the physical world, modern physics 
suggested non-uniformity of action and so the case against 
determinism was reopened. Darwin wrote that the "new outlook" in 
science was welcomed, although Darwin himself did not approve of 
this, because it seemed to "remove the well-known philosophical 
conflict between the doctrines of free will and determinism", 
resolving the issue in favour of the former doctrine. (Darwin 
1931:101) 
Dewey argued that while he thought the choice between free-
will and determinism an artificial one, he still believed that 
the statistical character of Heisenberg's theory had an "obvious 
bearing on freedom in action." (Dewey 1930:249} Dewey argued that 
it demonstrated that there could be no mechanically exact 
science of an individual thing (whether electron or human being), 
as each had a history unique in character. (Dewey 1930:249) (1} 
1. Marjorie Harris noted that superficial comparisons between 
quantum theory and the discontinuity that it embraced and 
Bergson's ideas about freedom of action were also possible. 
(Harris 1933:513) However, she added that despite this one had 
to note the "different significances that discontinuity has for 
each. From discontinuity in atomic processes designated as - 'the 
very essence of the quantum theory' - quantum physicists inferred 
unpredictability. Whereas Bergson implied that the intellect can 
grasp discontinuity which exists in the realm of matter, and can 
predict there but cannot grasp the continuity of life and 
therefore cannot predict in the realm of life.- tliarris 
1933:513n) Note however, that it is noL co~tlnuity itself whlcb 
makes life undpredictable but the fact that the continuity we 
find in nature is temporal in the sense that it is the creativity 
from which life springs and which animates it that makes life 
indeterminant. 
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Both scientists and philosophers encouraged this view. 
Evidence that this interpretation gained currency can be seen in 
the very fact that Einstein, Darwin as well as other scientists 
and philosophers attempted to refute it. Einstein in particular, 
responded to the claims that free-will existed in nature with a 
miture of incredulity and contempt. (1) 
We now come to the last feature of the quantum theory that 
was used by philosophers. As suggested earlier, it was argued 
that science had lost its absolute objectivity and certainty not 
1. Jeans cited Einstein as saying on this matter: "I am entirely 
in agreement with our friend Planck in regard to the stand which 
he has taken on this principle. He admits the impossibility of 
applying the causal principle to the inner processes of atomic 
physics under the present state of affairs; but he has set 
himself definitely against the thesis that from this 
Unbrauchbarkeit or inapplicability we are to conclude that the 
process of causation does not exist in external reality. Planck 
has really not taken up any definite standpoint here. He has only 
contradicted the emphatic assertions of some quantum theorists 
and I agree fully with him. And when you mention people who speak 
of such a thing as free will in nature it is difficult for me to 
find a suitable reply. The idea is of course 
preposterous ... 'Honestly I cannot understand what people mean 
when they talk about freedom of the human will.' (Jeans 1933:284-
5) See also Stace who argued: "How any one can dare to found 
upon the present uncertainty in physics such doctrines as free 
will and the spiritual nature of inner reality passes my 
comprehension. Philosophers have often been accused of building 
idle speculation upon insufficient data. But some of our men of 
science completely outdo the philosophers in this." (Stace 
1932:384n) C.G Darwin also denied that the doctrine of free-will 
could be derived from modern physics. He wrote: " ... I cannot see 
that physical theory provides any new loophole. If we are to find 
room for free will within the realm governed by physical science, 
we have to suppose that the motions of our own bodies are in some 
way free not to obey the inexorable commands of the older 
mechanics. At first sight it might appear that the Uncertainty 
Principle provides the necessary latitude, but this is 
contradicted by closer consideration. We cannot say exactly what 
will happen to a single electron, but we can confidently estimate 
the probabilities." (Darwin 1931:101-102) 
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only because the principle of causality appeared to have broken 
down but also because matter was now seen as immaterial. E. L. 
Hinman wrote in relation to the theory of relativity that science 
had destroyed the very "positivity" on which its objective 
character had rested. (Hinman 1926:478} (1} Indeed, as we have 
seen, some were beginning to argue that the supposed discoveries 
of science such as energy and electricity were in part 
"psychical," "mental" or "spiritual" in character. {Turner 
1930: 13) (1) 
As we have seen, some scientists and philosophers were not 
comfortable with this claim. Yet in relation to the quantum 
theory, we can see how this conception was developed. First of 
all, many scientists themselves gave rise to the idea that all 
the basic concepts of science - such as matter, ether and 
electricity were being "remodelled". (Salmond 1929:2} The tile 
of Darwin's text if not the contents, Iha~ Conceptions Qf 
Matter, is evidence of this scientific bravado. Furthermore, to 
the degree that scientific concepts were being remodelled, we 
should note that this process involved a degree of metaphorical 
experimentation and a relaxation of rules and definitions. As a 
result concepts become much more permeable; more open to 
modification and interpretation. It is this that allowed 
1. Even Bertrand Russell appeared to defend this position. He 
wrote that matter had become "not a persistant thing with varying 
states, but a system of inter-related events. The old solidity is 
gone, and with it the characteristics that, to the materialism, 
made matter seem more real than fleeting thoughts." Russell in 
Q1.1rline Qf Philosophy, p. 311, cited in Jeans, p.295. 
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philosophical and even mystical ideas to flow into science. It 
is why Bergson's understanding of positivity in terms of movement 
could, however misguidedly, be merged with modern physics. 
It was on this very point that Frank criticised a number of 
scientists. One was Jeans, who wrote that while electrons and 
protons "behave as particles while they travel freely through 
space, and as waves when they encounter matter ... both are aspects 
of the same reality." (Jeans 1933:166) Similarly, Darwin called 
these aspects "half-worlds", which each give a "partial view of 
the whole world" except that they are "expressed in different 
languages." (Darwin 1931:82) And Eddington coined the 
portmaneau term "wavicle" to decribe these unusual 
structures. (Eddington 1935:199) The reason for 
energy 
Frank's 
objection to these depictions was the fact that what the theory 
demonstrated was that in certain experimental set-ups the term 
particle could be employed while in other set-ups the term wave 
could be employed, but never both. Indeed, we should recall that 
wave and particle pictures (pictures that Frank thought were 
possibly too suggestive in this context) are only another way of 
representing the ideas of velocity and position. (Frank 1938:15) 
While quantum theory asserted the complementarity between 
position and velocity and between particle and wave pictures, 
this did not mean that these terms referred to a larger 
"inscrutable" reality which contained both wave and particle 
features. (Frank 1938:11) Frank wrote that to speak of a: 
... two-fold nature or a bifurcation of physical reality 
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would be ... to slip into metaphysics. The reality is not in 
itself two-fold, but our traditional means of expression, 
designed for the description of the experiences of daily 
life, are always suitable only for a part of the more subtle 
experiences of atomic physics. The statement concerning 
complementarity speaks about the relation between the means 
of expression invented for the description of gross 
mechanical processes and the richer observational material 
of atomic physics. (Frank 1938: 18) 
Indeed, the complementarity principle simply implied that it 
is "impossible to describe living organisms by means of physical 
concepts so completely" that one can "formulate causal laws for 
them in terms of physical quantities alone." (Frank 1938:11} 
Thus, it was the complementary character of modern physics that 
necessitated the use of metaphors in the descriptions of modern 
physics. And it was this in turn, especially where apparently 
contradictory images were used in conjunction with each other, 
which caused some to be.lieve that the reality disclosed by 
physics was more complex, mysterious and paradoxical than it had 
been in the past. ( 1) 
This aside, we should note that there also emerged a 
tendency to privilege the wave picture - to convert this into 
some underlying metaphysic equivalent to the idea of becoming or 
process. Again, this tendency arose as a result of the allusive 
metaphors used by scientists. Darwin, for example, likened what 
1. Weiner also wrote that recent investigations of the internal 
structure of the atom had "revealed a complexity" that was 
"opaque" to Cartesian analysis. Instead of the "simple 
configurations" derived by that analysis, the atom was now seen 
to be all at once "radio-active, undulatory, and corpuscular" in 
character. (Wiener 1935:498) Whitehead wrote of the "mysterious 
quanta" emanating from the "recesses of protons and electrons." 
(Whitehead 1978:78) Andrews wrote that the atom now had a 
"paradoxical side" as bewildering as any other concept known to 
man. (Andrews 1935:11) 
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he called the language of the wave aspect (because it represented 
continuity) to the language of objective reality, and the 
language of the particle aspect (because it is particularistic) 
to the language of subjective perception. (Darwin 1931:82) 
Frank also regarded these analogies between particles and 
subjective perception and waves and an objective reality as 
mistaken and giving expression to the "pet" ideas of idealists. 
(Frank 1938:18) Furthermore, he wrote that the wave picture as 
it appears in quantum physics is not like the popular and so 
suggestive image of a wave. Frank wrote that the wave of quantum 
physics was a "monochromatic wave filling homogenously the whole 
space." (Frank 1938:15) 
The wave aspect of the electron was emphasised because it 
seemed to blend in with the more elusive notions of mind-energy 
or pure energy of some of the idealists and vitalist thinkers I 
have mentioned. This view of the electron was applied to matter 
in general. Thus, instead of matter being seen in terms of 
billiard balls, pellets or pills it was claimed that it was now 
wave-like in nature. (Salmond 1929:3 ;Quiney 1931:272> Gunn 
1936:251) C. F. Salmond wrote that physicists had found that the 
solid matter upon which they had built their science had now 
dissolved in their hands; he wrote that matter had resolved 
itself into a "vibratory ebb and flow of underlying energy." 
(Salmon 1929:3) Similarly, Dewey wrote that the philosophical 
counterpart to these physical theories was a conception of the 
universe in which each entity was in process. (Dewey 1937:171) It 
is not surprising, that here again, it has been argued, we have 
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only come back to the philosophy of Bergson. (1} 
We should note in regard to these metaphysical ideas of 
process that the new conceptions of matter also provided an 
opening for vitalist conceptions of nature. As I noted earlier, 
vitalist thinkers rejected the purely external approach of the 
scientist, viewing such things as chemical interactions of 
elements and compounds as having their ultimate cause not in 
mechanical laws, but in an original impulsion; that is, a non-
material life force which resulted in endless and unpredictable 
transmutations and concentrations of energy. It was this 
vitalist view of life as booming with energy, that was held in 
mind when it was suggested that the atom described by the new 
physics was transforming into an organism. (Agar 1932:483} 
I suggested at the beginning of this chapter that certain 
developments in modern physics were seen as a further 
manifestation of the crisis in knowledge. Overwhelmingly 
1. Pete A. Y. Gunter argued in his introduction to the 
University Press of America edition of Creative Evolution that 
Bergson had preceded Louis de Broglie, Erwin Schroedinger, Werner 
Heisenberg and Niels Bohr, in his proposal in Matter and Memorv 
that matter was nothing but "·modifications, perturbations, 
changes of tension or of energy, and nothing ~lse' (Matter and 
Memory 270)". Gunter wrote that in Bergson's analysis the 
"billiard-ball model of matter is rejected in favour of a 
pulsational, quantum-like ... model exhibiting both wave 
(continuous) and particle (discontinuous) features (Matter and 
Memory 277-278) and fundamental indeterminacy. (Hatter and Memory 
331)". (Bergson 1911:xlv) Gunter also noted that this 
resemblance between Bergson's picture of matter and that 
suggested by quantum theory was recognised by Louis de Broglie. 
(Bergson 1911:1) See also Adelman's co11J11ent that the "stable 
imperishable entities" of classical physics, themselves derived 
from religious thinking, had given way to an "energy-system of 
rushing units;" an •equilibria of torrents of movement" and 
"continuous flux and change" from (Adelmann 1942:228) 
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however, the evidence I have examined suggests that many 
philosophers welcomed these developments. Science appeared much 
more receptive to philosophical ideas following the appearance of 
the theory of relativity and developments in the area of quantllll 
theory. Hence, pragmatist philosophers such as Dewey and Schiller 
argued that these developments showed that science and philosophy 
were not as greatly dissimilar in their scope and capacity as had 
been thought. However, those philosophers called neo-idealists 
went further, arguing that modern physics demonstrated that 
philosophy was the fundamental source of knowledge. 
In this context, we should note that there were two •ain 
interpretations of physical theories. Firstly, it could be 
argued that science now denied the universality of any point of 
view. All that existed was a series of kaleidoscopic pictures. 
It followed from this that in such a non-Euclidean -world, one 
which was fundamentally pluralistic, there could be no single way 
of describing the universe. Where science now only offered a 
multiplicity of representations· of nature, there was no 
justification for denying the frames of reference of the poet and 
philosopher their equal place alongside those of the physicist. 
(1) 
But one could be more ambitious than this. One could make 
the aetaphysical point (one that contradicts the understanding 
1. Note that Jeans considered this possibility 
His opinion was that the book of nature is 
mathematics and for that reason is available to 
(Jeans 1933:302ff) 
but rejected it. 
inscribed with 
our intellect. 
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of a universe comprised of irreducible frames of reference), and 
argue for an objective reality that was essentially wave-like in 
character. It could be argued that nature was really an 
objective order of connections in process; an order which was 
only articulated in particular frames of reference, entities and 
occurrences. That is, we are offered a metaphysical view of 
reality which had it that mobility, or the wave aspect, was 
"anterior" and prior to immobility, or the particle aspect. 
(Wallace 1931:167) Could this not also be taken to suggest the 
priority of metaphysics over science? 
Thus, the interpretations of the significance of modern 
physics went in two directions. For some physics now implied a 
radically pluralistic view of things and a purely subjectivist 
account of knowledge. For others however, modern physics pointed 
towards an objective realm of existence. It was a realm 
characterised by continuity but it was also one that was ever on 
the move. But I should stress that philosophers were only able to 
find philosophical meanings in physics because words such as 
relativity, uncertainty, discontinuity, indeterminancy and so on 
were open to interpretation. 
But whether the meanings attached to modern physics ~ere 
misinterpretations or not is not ultimately my concern. What is 
important is that they did have an impact on intellectual life. 
The view of reality as process and of knowledge as purely 
instrumental were important to arguments, in the area of 
philosophy, and in the areas of political and economic thought as 
well. 
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Chapter 4: The Philosophy of Pragmatism 
1. Terminological Difficulties 
Pragmatist philosophy was widely embraced in the interwar 
years in the English-speaking world. It also excited interest in 
France and Italy. But it was in America that pragmatism gained 
its widest audience; indeed, it was often seen as a 
quintessentially American philosophy and in this regard it 
received both praise and criticism. 
One reason why pragmatism was criticised was because it was 
seen as being hostile to the philosophical quest for higher 
knowledge. This was true to the extent that pragmatists were 
antipathetic to philosophers who took flight from everyday 
reality and the realm of feelings in the pursuit of certainty. 
However, the avowed aim of pragmatists like William James and 
John Dewey was not to destroy philosophy but to save it by 
bringing it back down to earth. Indeed, Dewey believed that 
relating philosophy to the day to day world was a necessary 
component of all plans for social reconstruction. 
The pragmatists believed that their philosophy was best 
able to off er intellectual and social guidance 1n an age of 
uncertainty. According to its supporters, the advantage that 
pragmatism had over traditional philosophies lay in its method. 
Pragmatists did not waste time searching for the absolute. 
According to the pragmatist method, truth or falsehood should 
be decided on the basis of what "worked" or what was useful in 
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resolving a specific problem. As we saw in the last chapter, it 
was argued in the interwar years that scientists too believed 
that so-called laws scientific laws were things which were useful 
rather than true. Hence, the pragmatists saw their own method as 
in keeping with scientific notion of the instrumental theory of 
truth. Indeed, instrumentalism became one of the defining 
features of pragmatism and the source of much antagonism towards 
it. 
Once more I should stress that I am dealing with categories 
that are open to various interpretations. In particular, in 
examining these intellectual debates one is confronted by an 
array of isms. Such isms, whilst undoubtedly providing a 
convenient means of grouping together a number of philosophical 
ideas, could also be used to mask a multitude of intellectual 
sins of omission and commission. Furthermore, the particular isms 
that I am addressing were themselves defined in relation to 
other terms (including other isms}, which also lacked in precise 
definition. 
For example, positivism was defined as a form of empiricism 
- that is, the belief that knowledge begins with the apprehension 
of what is given in experience. But then, one still has to 
decide what nuances one should attribute to terms such as the 
empirical or the given. While, strictly speaking empirical could 
ref er to phenomena or sensations - things which did not need the 
support of reality - it could also be taken as pointing towards 
something external to experience. Indeed, we often find that 
199 
reality was identified with experience. As I have suggested 
before, the language of appearance is highly ambiguous. (1) 
One of the greatest difficulties in examining 
epistemological or metaphysical debates is that they are peppered 
with such terms. This explains why in the debates I am examining 
misperceptions and misinterpretations arose. We have certainly 
seen that this was the case in our discussion of the way in which 
some philosophers absorbed the supposed lessons of modern 
physics. 
There are two other points which we should note in relation 
to the use of general categories in philosophical debates. 
Firstly, to the extent that some of these categories proved vague 
or slippery they were hard to attack because they could be 
redefined in the course of argument. By the same token, the 
vagueness of these categories also made them more vulnerable to 
attack. That is, these categories could be defined in terms of 
the most absurd or pernicious implications that could be derived 
from them. Both of these argumentative tactics appeared in the 
intellectual debates of the period. 
This was particularly so in relation to certain categories 
such as positivism, pluralism, instrumentalism, monism and 
voluntarism. The processes of intellectual understanding were 
further complicated by the fact that some of these 
1. For a discussion of the difficulties surrounding the language 
of appearance see H. H. Price's analysis of Alfred J. Ayer's 
Foundations Qf. Emnirical Knowledge, Mind, Vol L, No.199, July 
1941, pp.280-293. 
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functioned in distinct ways, depending on whether they were 
being used in the context of philosophical or political debates. 
Realism and idealism, for example, could mean a different thing 
to the philosopher than they did to the political scientist. Yet 
we should also note how the meanings attached to a word such as 
realism in an epistemological context could be run into the 
meanings attached to the term realism when used in a political 
context. Hence, a political realism which saw life as a ceaseless 
struggle, and a realist belief in the objective existence of 
facts, could be presented as mutually reinforcing ideas. 
These points also underscore the difficulties with the 
philosophy of pragmatism, some of which I alluded to in the last 
chapter. Some of the conditions which I have just spelt out in 
relation to general philosophical debates apply with added force 
in the case of debates about pragmatist philosophy. For 
pragmatism was a many-sided philosophy and its vocabulary was 
renowned for being equivocal. Indeed, we should note that the 
pragmatist often prided himself on his semantic flexibility and 
on his tolerance and embrace of various forms of human 
understanding. William James, who along with John Dewey is most 
closely associated with the philosophy of pragmatism, made 
exactly such an assertion in his Pragmatism. {James 1907:81) 
Dewey also gave expression to this attitude some years later in 
Reconstruction in Philosophy (1920) when he wrote that the world 
was so "multiplex and far-reaching" that it could not be "summed 
up and grasped in any one formula." (Dewey 1957:61) It should 
also be stressed that both James and Dewey made explicit their 
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view that words are not verities but are man-made tools; as 
such, they should be regarded as tentative in their meaning, 
open to interpretation and flexible in their application. This 
view was crucial to their attempt to display the contingent and 
make-shift nature of what they saw as the philosophical dogmas of 
their time - specifically, mechanistic philosophies which had 
deterministic implications and most significantly the idealism of 
the neo-Hegelian movement. 
As my previous comments suggest, the flexibility of the 
pragmatist in regard to matters of doctrine and the meanings of 
words was what made criticism of pragmatism rather difficult from 
an analytical perspective. That is, a requirement of systematic 
definition was ruled out by the pragmatist a priori. Hence, to 
criticise pragmatist philosophy for not being systematic could be 
to invite the response that the demand for clear definitions is 
only an arbritrary requirement, and indeed goes against the 
nature of those things which philosophy is seeking to describe. 
As we saw with Dewey, the world that the pragmatist surveyed was 
multi-faceted or kaleidoscopic. This may be to say no more than 
that the pragmatist and the logician play by a different set of 
discursive rules; rules that can exclude them from talking to 
each other on equal terms. However, as we shall see, some would 
argue that whatever rules or non-rules the pragmatist played by, 
they were not proper to philosophical inquiry. 
2. The Development of Pragmatism 
James wrote that pragmatism was first inserted into 
202 
philosophical discussion by the American scientist and 
philosopher Charles Sanders Peirce in January 1878, in an article 
called "How to Make Our Ideas Clear" in the Popular Science 
Monthly. (James 1907:46) In this article Peirce recommended 
that philosohers adopt a method similar to that of the 
experimental scientist. The point of suggesting this was that 
it would help philosophers to clarify their ideas and define 
issues. (Schneider 1924:333) That is, what Peirce tried to do was 
·to relate the notion of truth to the consequences of a given 
test or experiment in the light of the effects that that test or 
experiment was intended to produce. James described Peirce's 
argument as follows: 
Mr. Perice, after pointing out that our beliefs are really 
rules for action, said that, to develop a thought's meaning, 
we need only determine what conduct it is fitted to produce: 
that conduct is for us its sole significance. And the 
tangible fact at the root of all our thought-distinctions, 
however subtle, is that there is no one of them so fine as 
to consist in anything but a possible difference of 
practice. To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an 
object, then, we need only consider what conceivable effects 
of a practical kind the object may involve - what sensations 
we are to expect from it, and what reactions we must 
prepare. Our conception of these effects, whether immediate 
or remote, is then for us the whole of our conception of the 
object, so far as that conception has positive significance 
at all. (James 1907:46-5) 
Thus, on James' interpretation Peirce's argument was that 
truth or meaning was what worked. If an idea resulted in the 
conduct that it was supposed to result in (in the particular 
context in which it was tested), then that was its meaning; the 
idea then became true. James went on to note, however, that 
after Peirce introduced the term it lay dormant for twenty years, 
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until James himself revived it in a paper he de11verea on tne 
topic of religion in 1898. He added that be tnou~nt tne times 
were right for pragmatism to gain wider acceptance; and ever 
since that time, he wrote, the term had cropped up regularly in 
articles in philosophical journals. (James 1907:47) Thus, the 
term pragmatism, to express it in a Jamesian fashion, had 
arrived. More importantly for our argument, we should point to 
his observation that the word could be applied "conveniently to a 
number of tendencies that hitherto have lacked a collective 
name." (James 1907:47) For this comment draws attention to the 
point that pragmatism is a variegated philosophy. 
We should note that Peirce imposed much stricter conditions 
on the application of his pragmatic theory of truth that did 
James. Hence, towards the end of his career Peirce actually 
changed the title of his method from pragmatism to pragmaticism 
in order to distinguish his position from that of James. (1) It 
was Dewey who was later seen to be closer in spirit to Peirce 
because he was a stronger advocate of scientific methods. Sidney 
Hook suggested in Ih.e. Metaphvsics Q.f Pragmatism that Dewey's 
1. Sidney Hook wrote of how Peirce, in one of his last few 
publications, listed the positive and negative things about 
pragmatism. On the positive side were there "(1) their general 
acceptance of the 'Pragmaticist principle' (2} their denial of 
'Necessitarianism' (3} their naturalistic explanation of 
consciousness (4} their acknowledgement of 'Real Habits' and (5) 
their specific insistence upon interpreting hyostatic 
abstractions in terms of what they IiQ.UJ..d or ~ come to in the 
'concrete.'" On the negative side Peirce listed "(1) their 
disbelief in the reality of infinity, (2) their belief in the 
mutability of truth (3} their confusion of ·active willing with 
willing not to exert the will (will to believe}'". See Peirce, 
the Hibbert Journal, Vol. 7 (1908} p. 112. Hook added that none 
of these criticisms applied to Dewey. (Hook 1927:10) 
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philosophy should also be called pragrnaticism, {or 
instrurnentalism or experimentalism) rather than pragmatism. 
(Hook 1927:9) Dewey himself conceded that there was a lack of 
logical rigour in the early pragmatism. 
This distinction between James and Dewey was evident almost 
from the outset. That is, this distinction applied insofar as 
Dewey attempted to move beyond the pragmatic emphasis on the 
particular moment and develop a method of transforming sensations 
into hypotheses. He wrote in Studies in. Loaical Theory (1903) 
that: 
... thought has a distinctive work to do, one which involves 
a qualitative transformation of (at least) the relationships 
of the presented matter; as fast as it accomplishes this 
work, the subject-matter becomes somehow thought's own. As 
we have just seen, the data are progressively organized to 
meet thought's idea of a complete whole, with its members 
interconnected according to a determining principle. (2) 
Yet we should also note that this statement could be seen to 
contain a voluntaristic element as well - and indeed, the charge 
that Dewey's definition of truth was voluntaristic was something 
that would persist despite his attempts to deny and refute it. 
I will return to this point later. For the moment, it should be 
noted that the emphasis in Dewey's work on the importance of 
1. John Dewey {ed.), Studies in. Logical Theory, University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, 1903, p. 65 cited by John Grier Hibben in 
"The Test of Pragmatism", The. Philosophical Review, 1908, p. 373. 
Note that doubt has been cast on the actual compatibility of 
Dewey's philosophy with that of James. W. Y. Elliot for instance, 
regarded it as significant that Dewey came to pragmatism via 
logic and argued that this helped to explain his differences with 
James. {Elliot 1928:27) 
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logical and conceptual analysis of empirical data would become 
more pronounced. 
It should be stressed that James himself invoked 
experimental and instrumental techniques of verification in his 
discussion of pragmatism. His insistance that knowlege should 
begin with the study of pure sensations is a case in point. James 
himself stressed the importance of Mach's empirical method {along 
with that of Pearson, Ostwald, Duhem and others) in Pragmatjsm. 
{James 1907:57) But as we have seen a stress on the phenomenal 
alone could lead to the charge that one's approach is mystical or 
nominalistic. 
In relation to this, we should point to the association 
between pragmatism, empiricism and the philosophy of Bergson. 
These were grouped together because they all shared an interest 
in experience or immediacy. I suggested in the previous chapter 
that Bergson favoured the method of intuition over those of 
observation and verification as a way of handling immediacy. 
However, I also suggested that the lines of division between 
Bergson and the empiricists and the pragmatists were not always 
that clear-cut. This was especially so given Bergson's 
description of knowledge as an instrument of action. The 
pragmatists too, with their concentration on phenomena and their 
advocacy of instrumental methods, were readily associated with 
empirical schools of thought. Indeed, Collingwood observed that 
there was an "implicit" agreement between the "schools of Mach, 
of Bergson, of James, and of Croce" - between empiricists, 
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pragmatists and neo-idealists - insofar as they all agreed that 
science was action rather than knowledge, and was useful rather 
than true. (Collingwood 1922:445) 
These points help explain the charge of nominalism. As to 
the charge of mysticism, it was suggested that James was 
sympathetic to the ideas of empiricists such as Mach. But it was 
what James actually did with the immediate contents of experience 
that made his philosophy seem mystical. We should also note 
here how the philosophy of Bergson, along with that of James and 
Dewey, was compared to the philosophy of Gentile - at least they 
were all seen as sharing common ground to the extent that all of 
these authors viewed thought as essentially activity. {1) 
I shall discuss this point extensively in chapter six. For 
the moment, we should just note that James also included in his 
a Pluraljstic Universe {1909), which was based on the Hibbert 
Lectures he gave at Manchester College in 1908, a chapter on 
Bergson, whose philosophy he felt was very close to his own. 
The other important point to stress in relation to the 
charges of mysticism and nominalism that were being laid against 
pragmatism, was that in James' hands (as well as in the hands of 
the British philosopher F.C.S Schiller and the Italian 
1. See Walter Fite's review of Gentile's Philosophy Qf ~ as. 
£.ur.e. A.c.1. in Iha Phjlosophjcal Review, Vol. XXXII, No. 5, 1923. 
pp. 548-549. 
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philosopher Giovanni Papini [1]), the pragmatic method of judging 
things in terms of whether they "work" or not did not only apply 
to what worked in an experimental sense but also to what worked 
in terms of human interests or even one's wishes or desires. 
(This also helped explain why Peirce changed the name of his own 
pragmatic method.) That is, while advocating certain procedures 
and principles associated with the empirical method of the 
scientists, James also wrote that: ""The true' ... is only the 
expedient in the way of our thinking, just as "the right' is only 
the expedient in the way of our behaving." (James 1907:222) 
Such a statement, as with many other sentences in James' 
Praomatism, could be interpreted to imply not just that inter-
subjective notion of truth as it is applied in experimental 
contexts, but also a subjective definition of truth. 
Dewey would later argue that this subjectivist 
interpretation of pragmatism was wrong; however, the fact that he 
attempted to redirect pragmatist thought away from its original 
emphasis on pure sensations and towards the development of 
experimental methods suggests that he felt that pragmatism was at 
least vulnerable to this interpretation. 
1. Herbert Schneider wrote that F.C.S. Schiller attempted to 
rock the philosophical establishment in England, just as James, 
did in America. However, he was less successful. Schneider wrote 
that this was "due partly to the differences in the general 
traditions and trends of thought in America and in England, 
partly to personal factors ... Schiller was more polemical and his 
humor had a sting ... Schiller was interested in fighting for 
humanism James in defending humaneness. (Merrian 1924:333) See 
chapter six for a discussion of Papini's philosophy. 
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Pragmatism caused a storm of controversy when it was 
introduced onto the philosophical scene. (Haydon 1919:401} 
Indeed, the very style and vocabularly which James and his 
sympathisers employed seemed designed to provoke a strong 
reaction. In objecting to all those philosophies which posited a 
supreme value or higher realm of being James argued, drawing upon 
the language of commercial life, that no ideas were true or 
perfect in themselves but rather they should have a "cash-value" 
or should pay. (James 1907:53) 
Indeed, some scholars responded to this suggestion in a most 
vehement manner. Albert Schinz (then associate-professor of 
French Literature in Bryn Mawr} opened his philippic 
Pragmatism (1909) by saying that pragmatism was only a new word 
with which to describe ""opportunism'" and "sophistry" in 
philosophy. (Schinz 1909:xv} 
It has been argued that part of the reason for the strong 
reaction against pragmatism was an aristocratic European disdain 
for what seemed to be such a defiantly American philosophy. (1) 
Of course, some did regard the emphasis within the American 
pragmatic movement on the cultural and political values of the 
new-world (such as an emphasis on know-how rather than on strict 
reasoning, on openness and toleration rather than rigidity and 
hierarchy} as refreshing. However, others saw this as one of its 
least pleasing aspects. Schinz for instance wrote that it was a 
1. On the European response to pragmatism 
Th.a American Democracy, 1948, p. 724. 
Europeans pragmatism was the "typical and 
civilization whose deepest concern is with 
see also Harold Laski, 
He argued that for the 
inferior product of a 
wealth." 
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philosophv designed to please the crowd. "Popular science, 
popular art, popular theology" he wrote "only one thing was 
lacking popular philosophy" and pragmatism was it. (Schinz 
1907:xv) Neverthless, we should also note that aspects of 
pragmatism were also presented as being in keeping with certain 
European ideas or traditions of thought - ones which were 
associated with the names of Machiavelli, Nietzsche, Sorel, 
Bergson and Duguit. This point will take on greater significance 
when I examine the political movements associated with 
pragmatism. Suffice to say, that where pragmatism was associated 
with these thinkers it was seen as a philosophy which threatened 
democracy while at the same time pandering to its worst elements. 
3. Pragmatism and the Empirical Tradition of Thought 
The previous passages have suggested that pragmatism was not 
always presented in systematic terms. Indeed, for that reason 
pragmatists themselves 
(albeit for different 
often denied that it was a 
reasons than those used 
philosophy 
by the 
philosophy's antagonists.) Instead, of a philosophy, it was often 
described as a point of view, an approach, an outlook or an 
attitude. (Papini 1907-8:353 Sabine 1930:365 Walker 1929:118) 
James himself subtitled Pragmatism - ~ ~ew Name EJu:. .5.o.me. Q1d ~ 
Qf Thinking. 
What were these old ways of thinking? James dedicated 
Pragmatism to the memory of the British philosopher John Stuart 
Mill and thus presumably declared an allegiance to the British 
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empirical and utilitarian traditions of thought. In the view of 
Dewey, and later George H. Sabine, the empiricism of Francis 
Bacon was also important. Dewey wrote that while he was not sure 
whether James had Bacon in mind when he penned the subtitle of 
his book Pragmatism, he felt that Bacon could be regarded as 
the "prophet of a pragmatic conception of knowledge." (Dewey 
1957:32} 
However, a few years later, Dewey would include Bacon among 
those philosophers who he viewed as participants in what be 
called the quest for certainty. It was a quest which he thought 
had fixated philosophers since the time of the ancients. While 
this quest had been expressed in different ways at different 
points of time, what all the participants in it (including 
Plato, Descartes, Bacon and Kant) shared was the desire to found 
knowledge on a basis which excluded "everything but intellect." 
(Dewey 1927:2) But according to Dewey this quest always ended in 
disappointment, for every attempt to found knowledge on an 
"exclusive intellectual basis" had in time faltered or bad been 
superceded. History, he wrote, was always revealing our ideas to 
be either false or in need of further supplementation. 
1927:2} 
(Dewey 
On this point we should note the influence on pragmatism of 
another noted natural scientist - namely, Charles Darwin. Again, 
it was the empirical method of the scientist to which importance 
was attached. Sabine wrote for instance that Darwin had followed 
Bacon in embracing a completely empirical approach "ordering a 
great mass of seemingly unrelated data without the clue of 
211 
mathematics." (Sabine 1930:866) The other very important thing 
which Darwin's hypothesis suggested to the pragmatists was that 
history should not be seen in terms of stable entities or rigid 
categories, but should be viewed as continuous process, movement 
and change. (Collingwood 1922:445 Sabine 1930:866) (As we have 
seen, Bergson had drawn similar conclusions from evolutionary 
theory although Bergson was more in favour of Lamarck than 
Darwin.) This points to the three main aspects to pragmatism, 
aspects that can both contradict and complement each other. These 
were, as both Collingwood and Sabine suggested, empiricism, the 
concept of history as ongoing evolution and instrumentalism. (1) 
In 1920 Dewey proposed the reconstruction of philosophy. A 
number of distinct yet also related intentions lay behind this 
proposal. First of all, Dewey was concerned that philosophy had 
become irrelevant to social life. This is one theme that 
persisted in his writings and in the writings of other scholars 
throughout the 1920s and into the 1930s. (It is a theme that I 
shall develop in the next chapter.) 
1. Sabine wrote that pragmatism stands " ... like a tripod upon the 
three supports of empiricism, evolution, and the instrumentalism 
of thought in human behavior. It accepts control as the end of 
knowledge and the test of its efficiency, and therefore makes 
purpose an ineradicable part of all thinking." {Sabine 1930:366) 
See also R.G. Collingwood, "Are History and Science Different 
Kinds of Knowledge,"~. 1922, Vol. XXXI, No. 124, October, pp. 
443-51. Collingwood discussed the importance of the idea of 
history as process and the instrumental theory of knowledge in 
relation to the pragmatists and to other schools of thought. 
{Collingwood 1922:445) 
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Dewey was also concerned about other developments which he 
saw as related to the aloofness of philosophy from the concerns 
of ordinary men. To explain this we should note tht for Dewey, 
(as for James) philosophers had artificially divided the world 
into a superior or transcendent reality on the one hand, and an 
"imperfect and perishing" reality on the other. (Dewey 1957:22) 
This superior reality was what was deemed worthy of contemplation 
by philosophers, while the imperfect everyday reality where men 
lived and worked was seen as the province of those lesser forms 
of knowledge associated with the positive sciences. (Dewey 
1957:22) Thus, the gap between philosophy and social life also 
entailed a gap between philosophy and science. Further, and this 
was central to the emotional appeal of his argument, this led to 
a gap appearing between morality on the one hand, and the 
empirical world and those sciences which took it as their object, 
on the other. That is, in turning away from the everyday world 
philosophers had left a spiritual vacuum behind them. Thus, the 
stewardship of social life was left in the hands of those who 
accepted the strictures of scientism. Furthermore, these types 
had sought to "revenge" themselves upon those who would view the 
study of the empirical world as a lower form of knowledge, by 
declaring that neutral observation and the collection of facts 
were the only paths to real or useful knowledge. (Dewey 
1957:282-283} Hence, Dewey wrote that: "While the saints are 
engaged in introspection, burly sinners run the world." (Dewey 
1957:196} 
But while Dewey was critical of scientism he was 
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nevertheless an admirer of the natural sciences. First of all, as 
we have seen, he suggested that the scientific approach was 
saluatory to the extent that it attended to everyday reality. 
But we should note that given his stress on ordinary or everyday 
reality Dewey was most concerned with the social sciences. (After 
all, it would be hard to conflate the study of sub-atomic 
phenomena with the study of everyday reality.} Indeed, Dewey 
appeared to be suggesting that philosophy should become a form of 
social science. That is, philosophy should centre itself around 
human behaviour and should assist in the application of 
scientific methods to social problems. Thus, Dewey wrote: 
While we have been reasonably successful in obtaining 
command of Nature by means of science, our science is not 
yet such that this command is systematically and pre-
eminantly applied to the relief of the human estate ... [This 
is] the specific problem of philosophical reconstruction at 
the present time. For it emphasises the larger social 
deficiencies that require intelligent diagnosis and 
projection of aims and methods. (Dewey 1957:43} 
This asserted need to apply science to the organisation and 
running of society suggested that one of the main reasons for 
reconstructing philosophy (that is, breaking down the 
philosophical distinction between higher and lower forms of being 
and knowledge), was to reconstruct society. This necessitated 
the introduction of a moral consciousness amongst scientists but 
it also, as I suggested, required that philosophers develop an 
interest in practical affairs and in scientific methods. Thus 
philosophers, Dewey wrote, should turn from their studies and 
adopt an "experimental intelligence" in order to "project a 
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better future." (Dewey 1957:96) 
We can see here how Peirce's original instrumental 
definition of truth was being placed in yet another context. 
If, as we shall see, some defined it in terms of the satisfaction 
of a desire, Dewey appeared to be defining it in terms of the 
fulfillment of social needs. That is, there was an intimation of 
that attempt to combine science with social planning that I 
discussed in chapter two. 
But the scientific study of society was still in its 
fledgling stage, as shown by the fact that social scientists were 
constantly asserting their scientific credentials. In this 
context, one can view pragmatist philosophy as a defence of the 
scientific status of the social sciences. This involved two 
things. Firstly, a reconceptualisation of what science meant and 
secondly, the development of a methodology appropriate to the 
scientific study of society. 
In the case of the first requirement, as I argued in the 
previous chapter, developments in the area of modern physics were 
crucial because they appeared to undermine the absolute 
objectivity and certainty that was previously attributed to the 
natural sciences. That is, modern science dealt with 
probabilities rather than with exact mechanical prediction; the 
statistical element was uppermost and from this it was concluded 
that reality must be non-deterministic. On the basis of this it 
was argued that nature was not stable but was process. Dewey 
wrote that modern science showed that life could not be pared 
215 
back to a series of logical steps or crystalline forms; change 
rather than fixity he wrote, was what the modern scientist used 
to measure reality. {Dewey 1957:61) And as we have seen, some 
also concluded from the indeterminism of modern physics that mind 
penetrates every part of reality. Indeed, the reviewer of P.W. 
Brl.dgman's T~~ Tnn~~ ~F M d Ph · ~ J.!..J._ o ernys1cs, W.E. Van De Walle, wrote 
that modern physics provided evidence in support of the 
pragmatist position. While conceding that the author might not 
agree, he thought this book justified a pragmatism " ... with the 
mind imposing certain characteristics - a pragmatism with a 
categorical element added." (Van De Walle 1928:286} Similarly, 
Thilly thought that in science one could only speak "as if" one 
reached data or "as if" there were laws. (Thilly 1926:523) 
Obviously, to the extent that these interpretations were 
believed, there was no need for the social scientist to be 
apologetic about his own failure to achieve certainty or arrive 
at accurate predictions. There was no need to defend the charge 
that the social sciences could not be scientific because the 
material they examined did not sit still or because in the area 
of the social sciences feelings and emotions intervened and thus 
prevented disinterested analysis. 
4. The Method of Instrumentalism 
The second feature of the reconstruction of philosophy that I 
pointed to was the perceived need for the development of a 
methodology. In the light of my previous comments concerning 
assertions about the nature of modern physics, this might appear 
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surprising. But the very developments that were seen by some as 
undermining the foundations of science had also enhanced its 
status. Furthermore, modern science was still seen as yielding 
sufficiently accurate results so as to make it worthy of 
imitation in this regard. This made it especially important for 
the pragmatists to dispense with those charges of subjectivism 
that had been levelled against them. It was not enough to say 
that science was no longer absolutely objective and that its 
methods were instrumental. Pragmatists also wanted to be seen to 
be in compliance with the rules of investigation which applied in 
the laboratory context. Note that Dewey wrote in Reconstruction 
in. Philosophy that: "Dreams, reveries, emotional idealisations" 
all served as a means of "escape" from "the stream of perplexity 
and conflict." (Dewey 1957:139} But he added that these were 
"short cut solutions ... [which] do not get rid of the conflict and 
problems but only get rid of the feeling of it." (Dewey 1957:146) 
Real thinking of the type that is needed in order to deal with 
social problems he wrote, is characterised by a close examination 
of the facts. Although we should note, Dewey insisted that the 
examination of the facts is not something that is prior to the 
actual work of thought. Thus, Dewey wrote that intelligent 
thinking involves: 
... facing the facts - inquiry, minute and excessive 
scrutinising, which is not something outside of and prior to 
thinking but the indispensable step of defining the problem, 
of taking the trouble, of forcing home a definite instead of 
a merely vague emotional sense ... of what the problem is and 
where ... [it is] clarifying the disturbed and confused 
situation so that a reasonable way of dealing with it may be 
suggested. (Dewey 1957:140-1} 
This method of experimentation which involves the 
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This method of experi.mentation is instr1111ental "insofar as it 
implied that in order to solve a problem one must understand the 
reason why the problem was seen as a problem in the first plac. 
That is, in order to successfully conclude an experiment one must 
know the purpose which gave rise to the experiment in the first 
place. Dewey was not talking here however of laboratory 
experiments or strict scientific problems. He was referring to 
social experiments and social problems. Therefore, the 
experimental method when applied to society could only work if 
one knew social purposes and needs - because these were the only 
criteria by which to judge what actually worked. Thus, he wrote 
in Essays iJl Experimental ~ (1903) that philosophy and the 
social sciences must have an appreciation of social experience: 
Unless we have a critical and assured view of the juncture 
in which, and with reference to which a given attitude or 
interest arises; unless we know the services it is thereby 
called upon perform, and hence the organs or methods by 
which it best functions in that service, our progress is 
impeded and irregular .... A general logic of experience alone 
can do for social qualities and aims what the natural 
sciences after centuries of struggle are doing for activity 
in the physical realm. (Dewey 1953, 99, 100) 
There are three points to stress here. Firstly, once again 
we see an attempt to amalgamate scientific observation with 
social planning. Secondly, we should note that when Dewey was 
speaking of an experimental logic being applied to the study of 
social life and the resolution of social problems he was only 
using the word logic in the metaphorical sense. That is, he did 
not mean logic in the sense of rules of valid inference; rather 
he meant a certain pattern of understanding and investigation. 
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Thirdly, and as a related point, Dewey appeared to be arguing 
that the social sciences can have their own distinctive method or 
logic but remain scientific nevertheless. We should stress that 
all of these points could be used to raise questions about the 
exact validity of the results that his type of social science 
could achieve. 
In addition to his emphasis on experimental logic, Dewey 
also sought to place his pragmatism on an objective footing. 
That is, there was an attempt to endow pragmatism with a realist 
metaphysic as well to emphasise the importance of experimental 
logic. In this way, pragmatism appeared as a cross between 
logical positivism and neo-realism. (1) 
Dewey wrote in his introduction to Hook's Metaohysics .o_f. 
Pragmatism that he rejected the suggestion that pragmatism had 
solipistic implications. Instead he argued that the novelty of 
the philosophy lay in its very objective understanding of 
instrumentalism: 
Instrumentalism was taken to signify that thought and 
knowledge exist only as means of accomplishing some private 
advantage, some external utility. The earlier stages of 
criticism show that instrumentalism was even defined as the 
doctrine that all knowing is subordinate to satisfying 
organic, animal needs. The idea of action was given a 
similarly isolated and private interpretation. What the 
criticisms really proved was the nature of the conceptions 
which were previously current as to instruments and action. 
When these conceptions were read into the new view, there 
was no difficulty in attributing to the latter a denial of 
all objective and "disinterested" thought. It took time to 
1. Gibson later referred to the "Carnap-Dewey synthesis of 
Chicago". (Gibson 1946:91) 
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make it clear that what was genuinely new in pragmatism was 
precisely a denial of these conceptions, and the 
substitution for them of an objective conception of tools, 
purpose and action. {Hook 1927:4) 
Dewey appeared to be arguing that the objectivity of his 
pragmatism was derived from the fact that he was not talking 
about personal desires or actions in advocating the instrumental 
theory of truth; rather, he was referring to objective social 
needs, purposes and action. The objective status of these things 
is due to the fact that they are part of a wider social and 
natural environment. Indeed, Dewey asserted that a continuity 
existed between the energies that drive man and the energies of 
nature. That is, natural energies are "expressed in the behavior 
and habits of a living organism." {Dewey 1927:4) It is for this 
reason that Dewey asserted that there is continuity between the 
study of nature and the study of society and hence the 
possibility of disinterested knowledge. Although we should note 
that this knowledge is not final or absolute but is rather the 
most complete vision or synthesis that one can achieve at a given 
time. 
Hook supported Dewey's claim concerning the objective basis 
on which pragmatism rested. Furthermore, as I suggested earlier, 
Hook drew a contrast between what he called Peirce's and Dewey's 
"social and scientific" pragmatism on the one hand, and what he 
called Schiller's "personal consolatory" and James' "mystical and 
nominalistic pragmatism" on the other. (Hook 1907:9) Hook 
described James' pragmatism as subjectivist because of bis "warm 
attachment to sensations". (Hook 1927:7) This was not wholly 
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accurate, as I will explain in chapter six, although for 
somewhat different reasons than those put forward by Dewey in 
defence of the objective character of his pragmatism. 
The sharp constrast drawn by Hook between the pragmatism of 
James and Dewey can be understood as a reaction against what_ he 
described as a "debasement" of the term pragmatism. (Hook 
1927:6) In addition to this, the philosophy was also under 
considerable fire from its critics. Thus, one can see Hook's text 
as a response to these critics and an attempt to distance 
pragmatism from the charge of scepticism. This is not to say 
that there was no validity in the distinction which he drew 
between James and Dewey. As we have seen, Dewey did make 
"scientific" claims on behalf of his pragmatism whereas James did 
not. (1) 
There were also epistemological reasons why Hook wanted 
pragmatism to reach beyond private sensations or phenomena. He 
perceived that in the absence of both a metaphysical base as 
well as a rigorous methodology, pragmatism would collapse. As we 
have seen this is an observation that was made on a number of 
occasions about positivism; that is, it would collapse into 
subjectivism or became mysticism. Hook wrote that if pragmatism 
were to avoid the fate of the positivism of Comte and the 
phenomenalism of Mach (both of which were anti-metaphysical) then 
1. In the context of Hook's development of a more 
and socialised version of pragmatisIB we should 
affinity with Marxism. 
materialistic 
note his own 
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it had to grasp hold of an external reality. (Hook 1927:9:6) 
(Although comments I cited in the previous chapter concerning the 
distinctions that were held to exist between Comte and the 
radical empiricists would perhaps partially undercut this point.) 
{j, The Instrumentalist Theory of Truth 
The pragmatist definition of truth proved equally elusive. 
Dewey himself wrote that the word truth was ambiguous precisely 
because it had "implications dependent on our standpoints." The 
"truthful" depiction of the natural world by the physicist, he 
wrote, can differ greatly from that of the poet. (Dewey 1930:29) 
But if that were the case, how was the pragmatist able to secure 
the instrumental theory of truth? 
This was obviously a problem considering the criticisms that 
pragmatism gave rise to scepticism or radical relativism. (Pepper 
1936:126) Morris had observed of positivism that where it became 
instrumentalist in its leanings it would "collapse" into 
subjectivity. (Morris 1934:550) Hence, both the positivist and 
the pragmatist attempted to place the instrumentalist theory of 
knowledge on a more secure footing. In particular, they 
advocated the method of verification by way of appeal to 
experience. There were problems with this to the extent that 
modern physics was said to bring sense observation and the 
existence of a material world into doubt. (Dubbs 1935:254) 
Nevertheless, Paul Schilpp wrote that while no "finality" could 
be asserted for the method of verification, it was the only way 
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of establishing a difference between the "coherence of scientific 
statements and fairytales"; it would avoid, he wrote, the 
"dangers of an irresponsible scepticism." (Schilpp 1935:481) 
In relation to this point it should be recalled that 
verificationist techniques were used by the laboratory scientist 
in much more restricted conditions than they were by the social 
scientist or planner. Nor, as I earlier suggested, does the 
social scientist deal with inert material. These are important 
distinctions between the natural and the social sciences that 
some pragmatists tended to gloss over. 
In addition to this, and this is the most important 
difference between the pragmatist understanding of social science 
and the natural sciences, the more limited definition of 
instrumental criteria that was used in the laboratory environment 
was broadened by pragmatists to include social utilities. Hence, 
the descriptions social positivism or the social theory of truth 
were applied to the pragmatist concept of instrumentalism. What 
this meant was that ideas or plans would be tested in accordance 
with whether they worked in relation to society's needs or 
purposes. 
In this context, we should note P.H. Partridge's argument 
that Dewey's social 
voluntaristic. Partridge 
characterisation, given 
theory of truth was essentially 
thought Dewey would accept this 
his arguments in favour of 
instrumentalism in Reconstruction in. Phjlosopby. Patridge did, 
however, contrast Dewey's position with that of Hook whom he 
thought, as a Marxist, would be inclined to reject voluntarism. 
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In fact, as we have seen, both Dewey and Hook had attempted to 
place their pragmatism on an objective footing by conceiving 
purposes, actions and instruments in naturalistic terms - as 
functions of an objective environment. But even if social needs 
are understood in these terms, how is the social scientist to 
obtain knowledge of them? 
As we have seen, the success of Dewey's approach to social 
problems depended on the fact that this knowledge was accessible 
to the social scientist. Yet as we saw in the last chapter, Dewey 
had also argued that the observer always played a role in 
determining the outcome of an experiment; if this were so, how 
could the social scientist know what real social needs were? 
Partridge wrote that verification of social truths was not 
possible: 
... unless there are truths which must be, independently of 
what the predictor does himself, unless truths are 
recognised, instead of being realjsed, no verification is 
possible at all, and it is actually an inconstistency upon 
the part of the instrumentalists to utilise verification in 
support of the pragmatic conception of truth. (Partidge 
1936:170} 
Given the impossibility of the social scientist discovering 
what objective needs were, the social theory of truth which Dewey 
and Hook embraced bad in the end to be voluntaristic. That is, 
the social theory of truth held that truths were made rather than 
revealed. (Partridge 1936:162} For the only way of arriving at 
such truths was social agreement through an act of community 
willing - a decision on the part of the community that such and 
such was the case. However, there is no guarentee that such a 
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decision would reflect those putatively objective purposes of 
which Dewey and Hook had earlier spoken. 
The other point that was made in relation to tle 
instrumental definition of truth was that, in calling on the 
principle of verification, the pragmatist was admitting the 
existence of non-instrumental criteria. That is, verification 
does not simply depend on the test of experience, it also assumes 
certain rational principles or rules such as coherence, non-
contradiction and consistency which are themselves not 
verifiable, being mental properties. (1) As John Grier Hibben 
observed many years earlier in an article in Iha Philosophical 
Review called the "Test of Pragmatism", the instrumentalists 
demanded not only that a truthful proposition "fit into the 
concrete situation of actual facts in a way that can explain them 
satisfactorily", they also demanded that: 
... it will fit into a thought sitµation in a like 
satisfactory manner, so as to do no violence to the 
fundamental laws of our logical nature. Verification of this 
kind, however, concedes in its very statement the 
consideration of a higher standard to which the simple 
pragmatic test must conform. In other words, truth's 
instrumental values is conditioned and determined both in 
nature and range by the demands of our reason for coherence 
and consistency." (Hibben 1908:371) 
1. Note that there seemed a degree of confusion as to what extent 
the technique of verification qualifies as an example of 
empiricism or rationalism. For example, it has been seen as 
rationalist in nature for it is a static test which rests on 
principles of consistency, coherence and non-contradiction which 
themselves are not verifiable. (Perry 1938:50 Hsaio 1927:196-7) 
See also Passmore's comments about the rationalistic character of 
the logical positivists' method of verification. He wrote that it 
was rationalist insofar as it was an attempt to isolate "simple 
natures", insofar as logical positivists held that there was only 
one method by which simple entitities could be verified. 
Passsmore, 1943, p.71. 
225 
These rational criteria obviously did not sit comfortably 
with a social theory of truth. Of course, many pragmatists did 
not pretend that the test of experience was objective. It was 
argued that, given that the process of verification was set in 
train by personal interest or desire and was directed towards 
such ends, and furthermore that the given had always to be 
interpreted, the idea of impartial knowledge was excluded. 
(Anderson 1940b:85, Wright 1924:608, Merrington 1939:102} As we 
have seen, it had been argued that these factors were also now 
accepted by modern science - as if testing whether a certain 
social policy was able to work was no less methodologically 
uncertain than testing a scientific hypothesis in the laboratory. 
Nevertheless, there remained a great deal of difference between 
inter-subjectivity amongst scientists and social agreement. In 
the case of the former there is already agreement about what sort 
of rules should determine what constitutes verification or truth; 
there is usually no such agreement about rules of inference in 
the social arena. 
Alternatively the pragmatic social scientist could claim 
that his methods were impartial and scientific in the more 
traditional sense of that term. And that therefore he could 
establish what the real needs of society were as a result of his 
experiments. But then, one would assume, pragmatists had ceased 
to be instrumentalists and had become rationalists. Indeed, as 
W.H Sheldon observed, while social agreement and "proved verity" 
are not the same things, there always remained the tendency for 
the "former to usurp the prerogatives ot the latter." 1~ne1aon 
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1930:243) This is precisely why the instrumentalists among the 
social theorist came to be called rationalists by the early 
1940s, as we shall see in chapters six and seven. 
The problems with the instrumental theory when defined in 
social terms become obvious if we examine some comments of 
Schiller's. Admittedly, Schiller's pragmatism was not of the same 
kind as Dewey's, in the sense that he did not seek to place his 
philosophy on an objective footing. This is evident his 
objection to Bertrand Russell's concern, which I mentioned in the 
last chapter, about the apparent anarchy in the realms of modern 
scientist. But Schiller wrote that the reason why Russell was 
so concerned was because he still had a commitment to what 
Schiller called the "old "contemplative' ideal"; that is, Russell 
still believed that general laws could be found which governed 
the totality of facts. (Schiller 1929:246) For Schiller, the fact 
that "enlightened physicists" no longer believed in matter and 
viewed "order, unity, and continuity" as "human inventions", was 
no "reproach to science" but was "its glory"; such views, he 
added, had no effect on the usefulness of science. (Schiller 
1929:246) For if the point of scientific knowledge were power, 
he wrote, and "science as the pursuit of power becomes 
increasingly triumphant", then to talk of the "collapse of 
science" was neither justified nor relevant. Indeed, Schiller 
added, it was only an "obsolete sense of "truth'" that prevented 
the metaphysically minded scientists and philosophers from 
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accepting the findings of modern science. (Schiller 1929:247) (1) 
Of course, Schiller went further than many positivists and 
pragmatists in redefining scientific knowledge in relation to the 
pursuit of social power. That is, he argued that insofar as 
modern science adopted an instrumentalist approach and was aimed 
at the increasing man's power over nature, there was no good 
reason for excluding "wishes and endeavours" from scientific 
activity. (Schiller 1929:246f} One would suspect that a more 
aesthetically reserved positivist would have baulked at this 
suggestion that scientific activity should be directed by such 
maxims. Because firstly, admitting such things as "wishes and 
endeavours" into the domain of empirical science potentially 
blurred the boundaries between it and philosophy, opening the 
way for the resurrection of the very metaphysics which Schiller 
decried as "meaningless" and "pseudo-science." (Schiller 
1929:247) Secondly, we can see how Schiller's views might have 
posed a problem for social scientsts who sought to avoid 
speaking the language of values. This was precisely because many 
social scientists (as we saw in chapter two) identified social 
progress with an expansion of the disinterested scientific 
attitude, in contrast with the social disintegration brought 
about by egoism and the selfish pursuit of power. 
1. Schiller made these remarks in reviewing a book called Whither 
Mankind, Charles Beard, (ed.), 1928 which included an essay by 
Russell on the direction which modern science was taking and in 
which he made remarks about the positivistic rejection of the 
belief in causality. 
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6. The Metaphysics of Nature 
As suggested earlier, Dewey wanted pragmatism to be immune 
from the charge of nominalism and subjectivism. These charges 
were made because pragmatist philosophy appeared to centre 
meaning around human desires. It was within this context, that 
Dewey attempted to give pragmatism an objective status by 
inserting these private urges within the context of nature. 
Dewey then gave a naturalistic account of human behaviour, much 
as the scientist might give of other aspects of nature. Dewey 
thought an account of human behaviour should not be mechanistic. 
According to his naturalistic interpretation of man there were 
certain conditions within this framework which allowed for the 
realization of human freedom. 
Both Dewey and Hook viewed man, following Bergson, as ffQmQ 
Faber. Hook wrote that the description of man as a tool-making 
animal included his "activities" as a "sign-making animal"; an 
"instrument-using animal" and a ""brainy' animal'". (Hook 
1927:7 Dewey 1930:71) It was this tool-making capacity which 
helped man free himself from the bondage of nature, and also 
provided the explanation for industrial civilisation. 
In relation to the issue of freedom, we should note here 
that this biological account of human development assumed that 
the external environment was relatively malleable so that it was 
open to human manipulation and control. (Dewey 1957:84) In this 
context, Reiser described nature as having a "semi-determinate 
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texture", something which suggested that while there were 
obviously limits as to what one could will into being, there was 
nevertheless room for human creativity and choice. (Reiser 
1926:252) (1) Hook accounted for this conjunction of human 
freedom alongside an objective reality by arguing that a 
"metaphysics of nature" implied that human beings "freely" 
manufactured tools in order to achieve their goals, but that 
these tools were dependent upon the "character" of the tool-maker 
and also on his "working material" and his "environment." (Hook 
1927:143) Thus, Hook endowed his instrumental theory of knowledge 
with both objective and voluntaristic elements. 
When pragmatism was construed in this way it was seen as 
breaking down the oppositions between idealism and realism; 
subjectivism and objectivism and determinism and indeterminism. 
(Wright 1924:608 Morris 1928:505) It did this, R.W. Sellars wrote 
(in an article entitled "Epistemological Dualism vs Metaphysical 
Dualism" in~ Philosophical Review), because it assumed that 
the "bearer of experience" was "in and of" the world rather than 
being "antithetical" to it. (Sellars 1921:483) Pragmatism 
demonstrated that mental activity was part of the objective 
environment to the extent that knowing is not merely a 
reproduction or translation of reality; it was a form of 
cognitive doing which transformed the external environment as it 
proceeded. It is for this reason, William Kelly Wright wrote in a 
1. See also Whitehead in Process a..n..d. Reality for similar 
observations. (Whitehead 1978:211) 
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review of Emmanuel Lerroux's 1£ Pragmatisme a1ericajn gt. anglais, 
that the pragmatic understanding of knowledge did not favour 
"determinism" but rather it demonstrated the "efficacy" of hW1an 
action. (Wright 1924:611:607) (1) 
But opinions varied as to whether and to what degree 
pragmatism in this phase of its intrumentalism fulfilled realist 
criteria. As Charles Morris suggested, while it could be argued 
that pragmatism expressed a clear anti-realism, it could also be 
argued that pragmatism affirmed the existence of an objective 
reality. (Morris 1934:551, Scbilpp 1930:311, Reiser 1926:237) (1) 
Similarly, opinions differed as to bow much pragmatism 
afforded human beings freedom to act. Rudolf Eucken wrote that 
while pragmatists claimed to free men from their subjection to 
past metaphysical and theological dogmas, they had in "orienting 
meaning around behavior" drawn the "net tighter around human 
scene"; this was because judging human conduct only in terms of 
biological utility and economic success was a denial of any 
higher purpose. {Eucken 1924:4) On the other hand, "Hook 
concluded his Metaphysics Q.t. Pragmatism by stating that the 
universe was "open ... spiced with chance and alive with 
possibilities, a life of human freedom is not only an organized 
enterprise, it is a spirited adventure as well." {Hook 1927:144) 
1. In this context, note the clai• of the Allerican philosopher 
(and former student of Dewey's), Charles Morris that James bad 
appealed to a third category called "pure experience", which 
allowed for the existence of "permanently existing objects" and 
which insisted that radical empiricism "can include 'any ele•ent 
of empirical reality' independent of any particular experi•ent." 
(Morris 1934:551n) 
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But as Eucken's comment suggested, pragmatist methods when 
applied to social planning could be seen as militating against 
any semblance of spirited adventure. 
Other confusions arose over whether and to what degree this 
later pragmatism understood reality in terms of stability or 
process. That is, even where it was accepted that pragmatism had 
metaphysical implications, it was not always clear what sort of 
metaphysics was being referred to. As we have seen, some 
pragmatists had embraced those scientific theories whether in the 
realms of biology or physics which were seen as asserting the 
importance of process. In this context, Walter S. Gamertsfelder 
wrote that pragmatism had "very definite metaphysical 
implications", having embraced a "conception of reality in terms 
of the current physical theory of events" (Gamertsfelder 
1933:111) 
But Charles Morris wrote in his introduction to George 
Herbert Mead's~~ an..d. Society that pragmatism had to move 
beyond the antithesis between being and becoming that had "proved 
fatal from Plato to Whitehead." (Mead 1934:xxviii) In terms that 
again echoed Hook, he wrote that modern empiricism would fail if 
it eschewed any type of formalism and spoke only of reality in 
terms of pure transition. Modern empiricism then, had to 
incorporate the factors of universality and structure as well as 
the factors of temporality and emergence. (Mead 1934:xxx) Morris 
suggested that the pragmatist was capable of doing this. He 
wrote that whereas the philosophies of both being and becoming 
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were fanatical and uncompromising, pragmatism, which viewed the 
"mutual principles of being and becoming" in terms of the "more 
or less" rather than the "all or none," was a "counsel of 
sanity." {Mead 1934:xxx) 
These reconciliations that the pragmatist was seen to enact 
between opposed categories may well underscore the claim that 
pragmatism was a philosophy of "compromise", of flexibility and 
toleration. But they also reinforce my earlier point that 
pragmatism as a philosophy was difficult to define. It seemed at 
times as if it could be all things to all men, something which 
accounted for both its widespread popularity and the notoriety 
that it achieved. Pragmatists were both radical empiricists and 
empirical realists; they both denied and embraced a metaphysics 
of nature; they were both voluntarists and determinists. Charles 
Horris, unwittingly perhaps, gave expression to this ambiguous 
character of pragmatism when he described it as an "enchanted 
half-way isle" between a metaphysical realism and a positivisic 
idealism; enchanted, because as an approach, it proved "to be 
neither one nor the other." (Morris 1934:564:556) (1) 
7. Problems with Pragmatist Ethics 
Despite the attempts to anchor the instrumentalist theory to 
such things as social agreement or verificatio~. the charges of 
subjectivism or voluntarism came back to haunt it. The problem 
1. Also note Carr's comment that Dewey was "poised between the 
materialism of an extended reality" and the "spiritualism of 
internal activity", and thus "haunted" by the "shadow of realism 
and the spectre of idealism." {Carr 1926:65) 
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with the instrumentalist theory of truth, according to its 
critics, was that far from eliminating the danger of scepticism 
it removed every epistemological objection to it. But 
pragmatism was criticised on moral as well as intellectual 
grounds. As pointed out earlier, it was seen as defining human 
wants solely in terms of a set of biological or economic 
impulses. In this sense it was seen as inimical to any notion of 
a spiritual or moral life. Furthermore this, in conjuncton with 
the pragmatists interest in control of the future, was seen as a 
recipe for a programme of social engineering. We should note that 
both of these objections would be developed in relation to the 
perceived political implications of pragmatism. 
In relation to these points pragmatism was lampooned in a 
number of different ways. Morris wrote that it was described as 
the "philosophy of the business man;'" and "'the reductio ad 
absurdum of empiricism'". With pragmatism, it was said, true 
philosphy had "vanished;" philosophy was now brought to the 
"brink of comedy, if not downright charlatanism." (Morris 
1928:495) John Anderson caricatured Dewey as someone "hailed by 
all the Women's clubs as a prophet of Fordism, vocationalism and 
bureaucracy." (Anderson 1930:494) 
Those philosophers sympathetic to pragmatism responded to 
these charges. Frank Thilly, William Kelly Wright and Paul 
Crissman all argued in defence of pragmatism. One of the central 
points that they made was that in pragmatist philosophy the words 
practical or utility included moral and spritual values. (Wright 
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1924:608 Gamertsfelder 1933:111) Furthermore, insofar as the 
pragmatist saw knowledge as a form of biological adaptation, 
this adaptation was both to the "social milieu, and to the 
realization of ideals." (Wright 1924:608) 
Defenders of Dewey argued first of all that his naturalism 
was tempered by his sincere social idealism, his religious 
attitude and his optimism. (Tbilly 1926:53~Criss•an 1928:616} 
Indeed, we should note that the idea of nature in Dewey's 
philosophy implied more than animals striving to fulfill their 
basic urges and doing battle with matter. Dewey bad written years 
earlier that the idea of nature was also continuous with man's 
moral and intellectual life. In a 1911 article entitled 
"Maeterlinck's Philosophy of Life" in the ~ Hibbgrt Journal, 
Dewey wrote that both Emerson and Maeterlinck had realized that 
the idea of nature implied the principles of democracy, equality 
and toleration. {Dewey 1911:778) For nature, as the natural 
sciences had shown, was "uniform and equable in all its 
diversities". (Dewey 1911:778) Dewey raised this point in order 
to object to Nietzsche's "traditional ethics" of force and 
domination. (Dewey 1911: 777) ·· 
Thus, there was no doubt an ethical impulse underlying 
pragmatist philosophy and its proposals for social 
reconstruction. There is also no doubt that Dewey saw in nature 
much more than an ethics of survival. However, as pragmatism 
developed and its experimentalist and instrumentalist aspects 
were emphasised, this moral component slipped into the 
background. 
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Indeed, it was argued that insofar as pragmatism meant 
experimentalism and instrumentalism, it was incompatible with the 
pursuit of ideals. It was argued that its methods and modes of 
evaluation would vitiate or even subvert attempts to achieve 
ideal ends. This was precisely because pragmatism as 
experimentalism and instrumentalism regarded ideals, ethical 
principles or moral laws as adaptable - as things with which were 
open to experimentation. Th~ pragmatist also regarded ethical 
norms as instruments or tools which were appropriate to 
particular situations. (Crissman 1928:597) Critics of 
pragmatism argued that experimentdl or instrumental ethics were 
not true ethics. This is because statements of moral principle 
are by nature complete rather than open-ended; they are general 
rather than particular. They are not things that can be judged 
on whether they succeed or fail in particular situations. 
(Anschutz 1924:182) Therefore, the pragmatic approach would 
undermine its own ethical principles to the extent that it led to 
the view that these could be adapted in accordance with the needs 
of the hour or regarded as useful rather than true. The argument 
was that the pragmatic method denies or subverts the pragmatist 
pursuit of ideal ends. We shall see, in chapter six, that this 
argument was put much more strongly in relation to the influence 
of pragmatist philosophy on politics. (1) 
1. For an analysis of the conflict between pragmatist ethics and 
pragmatist methods see R. Anschutz, "The Pragmatist Theory of 
Truth", in The Australasian Journal o.f Philosonhv ~ 
Pscychology, Vol. II, No. 3, Sept., 1924, pp. 174-182. 
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8. The Pragmatic Conception of Civilization 
I suggested earlier that the pragmatists and Bergson were at 
one in the sense that they agreed that the intellect was an 
instrument of action. However, there was an important difference. 
For Bergson, while certainly regarding the human intellect as an 
efficacious thing, did not always regard it as a means of 
achieving freedom. For him, the intuition of the life-force was 
the real means to achieve freedom. Indeed, Bergson regarded his 
civilization's preoccupation with science, industry and material 
goods as inimical to human creativity. Pragmatists on the other 
hand, were fascinated with industrial civilisation and with the 
power that man had been able to gain over nature. While they 
agreed that science and industry had been used to serve unjust 
causes, their hope was that the power of science and industry 
could be used for human ends. Thus, Hook wrote that: "Although 
instruments have often been the means of man's enslavement, 
construed as they appear in their social setting they breathe a 
promise that they will make him free." (Hook 1927:61) Hook's 
point applied to economic instrumentalities or institutions as 
much as it did to machines. 
We should recall at this point the groundswell of hostility 
to technology and science that had emerged after the First World 
War and which continued into the 1930s. (Irvine 1933:287} Hook, 
Dewey and Schiller were concerned to counter those who would 
dismiss science and technology as evil. Thus, one of the aims of 
the pragmatists was to restore the reputation of science and 
~ 
237 
technology. In order to do this they argued that scientific 
instruments and machinery (like words and moral laws) should be 
regarded as tools or instruments. If they were regarded in this 
light, then the problem of reconciling oneself to modern 
civilization would disappear. Indeed, Schiller argued that "a 
humanism which flees from science as an emeny denies [man] the 
means by which a liberal humanism might become a reality." 
(Schiller 1932a:132) 
Dewey put a similar case. It was a case which resembled 
Bergson's account of creative evolution as well as his argument 
that it was by pushing himself (by means of intuition) back 
inside the life-force that man obtained a greater power to act. 
Dewey also noted how it was necessity which compelled men to 
"invent art" and to "turn the powers of nature to account;" that 
is, he wrote of how man had built a "fortress out of the very 
conditions and forces" that threatened him. (Dewey 1930:3) It was 
from the safety of this fortress he was able to transform the 
wilderness by damming rivers, building bridges and erecting 
electricity lines. (Dewey 1930:85} But he added, such scenes of 
transformation became so familiar to men's eyes that they began 
to overlook "their meaning" and forget "that the inherent power 
of life is illustrated in them." (Dewey 1930:85) 
One of the ironies of human history for the pragmatists was 
that man who had dreamt of conquering nature, had come to adopt a 
submissive posture in front of the very intellectual and physical 
machinery he had devised with this end in mind. Dewey argued 
that once these machines are seen as works of the creative 
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imagination, then the disjunction between mechanism and life can 
be overcome. Thus, the pragmatists with their humanistic 
instrumentalism were attempting to resolve that dichotomy which 
Bergson had largely failed to resolve because of the emphasis be 
placed on intuition rather than on intellect and science. 
But Dewey, like Bergson, was calling for a shift in the way 
in which reality was conceptualised. That is, he argued that if 
nature were seen as "relatively malleable and plastic", then it 
would become available to be used for social or ideal ends. 
(Dewey 1957:70) This leads us back to a point that I made 
earlier. For Dewey, the question of how to bridge the gap 
between science and morality and between the ideal and the real 
was the "deepest problem of modern life." (Dewey 1930:255) 
Thus, in attempting to make philosophy more scientific Dewey was 
attempting to bridge all the other gaps which he saw as existing 
in civilisation. 
the continuing 
P.F. Irvine wrote that Dewey hoped that with 
revelation of the "interdependence of all 
knowledge" (that is, the unity of all the sciences), people would 
also begin to feel the "interdependence of all men." (Irvine 
1933:433) 
Whether Dewey was successful in his attempt to fill the 
breaches he thought existed in civilisation remained a matter of 
dispute. For while some found in pragmatist philosophy the 
weapons with which to tear down stale orthodoxies and to argue 
for a more practical attitude to be taken to the running of 
social affairs, others would continue to insist, as Scbinz bad, 
that 
The 
pragmatism 
1920s and 
meaning and 
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gave a philosophical blessing to opportunism. 
1930s witnessed continued debates about the 
significance of pragmatist philosophy. In 
particular, the issue and influence of pragmatism became a matter 
of controversy in relation to politics. It also excited interest 
in the areas of jurisprudence and economics. It is the impact of 
pragmatism on these areas of thought that I shall examine in the 
next three chapters. 
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Chapter 5: The Politics of Pluralism 
1. The Background to Pluralism 
In the last two chapters I examined the philosophical 
notions that were said to be implied or given justification by 
the new physics. In particular, I focussed on the cosmological 
and epistemological meanings that were attributed to the ideas of 
modern physicists. 
I showed that scientific and philosophical exchanges in the 
1920s were partly a deliberate process and partly a result of 
accident. There were ~ertainly considered attempts to transfer 
new scientific ideas to the philosophical realm, yet it is also 
evident that 
philosophical 
the linguistic identity of 
terms, like relativity, 
scientific 
uncertainty 
and 
and 
indeterminacy (as well as some of the conceptual resemblances 
between physical and philosophical theories}, gave credence to 
the assumption that physics and philosophy shared a core of 
metaphysical beliefs. 
A related point has been made by Arthur Goldhammer in a 
recent translation of Gaston Bachelard's ~ ~ Scientific 
Spirit. Goldhammer writes that . 1930s editions of the French 
philosophical journal LA, ~ ~ Metaphysique gt ~ Morale 
include a number of articles by well-known scientists and 
mathematicians suggesting a degree of interaction between these 
scholars and philosophers on metaphysical issues. He argues that 
this interaction is evidence that scholars believed that the 
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gulf between science and metaphysics was "not unbreachable." 
(Bachelard 1984:xviii) Goldhammer writes that "Husserl'sCrisis", 
which as I have mentioned involved a critique ofscienc&-and the 
civilisation which gave rise to it, "had not yet co•e to France." 
(Bachelard 1984:xviii) (1) 
Perhaps this was to some extent the case in France. As we 
have seen it was not the case in the English-speaking world after 
World War One. But even in France we find early glimmers of the 
more strident assault on science that was to come .... Several years 
before the war Bergson had engaged in criticism of the 
scientific world view. Part of the success of his criticism 
derived from the fact that he confronted scientists on their own 
terrain, i.e. biology. (Perry 1918:349f) Another French 
intellectual Georges Sorel, appealed to the authority of that 
philosopher in his own 1911 anti-enlightenment tract 
Illusjons Q.f. Progress. (Sorel 1969:135f) 
Neither Bergson's nor Sorel's critique of the idea of 
progress amounted to a declaration of a crisis in Western 
civilisation. Sorel later made such a claim in the concluding 
1. This point can also be 11ade in relation ···to French 
intellectual life during the Great War. A. Lalande; {of the 
Universite De Paris} in an article appearing in Ilut-"0Pbilosophiso1 
Review in 1916 and entitled "Philosophy in France in 1915" 9 makes 
particular mention of an address given by Emile Boutroux (a close 
friend of William Jues and author of QA. tb Contingency. Qi-~ 
~ Q.f. Nature published in- 1374 [Perry . 1935: 560]} ·to -the 
Congress of Mathematical Philosophy ·Of Paris some -months----before 
the war but only published in 1915 in LA ~ de. Metaphysigue ilt, 
~Morale. He noted: " It is sad and touching to reread . to-day·. 
the conclusions as to the value and the international duties.=,.of -
science - conclusions fir• and true despite the-.erisis-•-t:llrough 
which we are now passing.!L {Lalande 1916:-525}-··-·· - ~. ··- ·---··· ·"-
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chapter to the 1920 edition of Illusions. But Bergson's 
philosophy was seen, notably by the Christian philosopher 
Berdyaev, as similar to science in threatening the fate of 
humankind. Berdyaev thought the moral nihilism that went under 
the banner of modernism (Freudian theory, Marxism, existentialism 
and positivism} provided the real clue to what would become 
Husserl's Crisis. 
The question then becomes, how are we to reconcile the 
existence of these critiques of science with the -evidence-of 
intellectual exchange between philosophers and scientists? One 
answer would be that despite warnings of danger about the 
growing breach between science and philosophy, there was also a 
degree of optimism in the 1920s and 1930s about the possibility 
of reconciling the claims of philosophers, scientists and 
theologians. 
One can then say that the exchanges which began to take 
place between philosophers and scientists signalled a kind of 
rapprochement between these fields .. of - endeavour. - -These 
connections had begun to be established well before then in the 
work of Bergson and those who followed him [1]}. Science suddenly 
looked less cold and impenetrable to those whom I have referred 
to as pragmatists and metaphysicians of process. Quite clearly,,. 
this - new feeling --of empathy with the scientific estate was only 
1. For example, see- Sorel's 1919- work 12g.-l'uti1it'·-dll, 
Prag•atis1e, especially Chapter IV entitled "L' experience ·· dans · 
la physique aoderne" where he discussed among other things, 
indeterainisa in quant1lll physics p.287ff. This book also inc~uded 
a critique of vitalist philosophy and Bergson's -theory of 
---creative-evolution p.557ff. -·-
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to be found among certain philosophers. What Dewey, for example. 
found heartening about modern science (such as-- -its apparent 
embrace of contingency). was what others saw as .. a potential 
threat to the quest for knowledge. (1) 
The significance of this rapprochement was not purely 
intellectual. as references to great breaches or gulfs in 
cjyjljsatjon and not just academic knowledge attest. (Curtis 
1925:492, Merrian 1924:11) As I have shown, attempts to bridge 
the alleged gap between science and other realms of activity were 
partly spurred by the concern that this was one cause of social 
crisis. Implicit in this was the belief that intellectual 
activity does have a larger meaning and purpose. 
One consequence of this was the claim that the purpose of 
true knowledge is to calm our restive souls. Another 
consequence, one which does not contradict the previous 
injunction, was that knowledge should be channelled into socially 
constructive directions. It was here too that the lessons of 
modern physics proved promising. For just as it could provide 
1. Bertrand Russell, for instance, wrote in an essay which 
appeared in ~ Political Quarterly in 1935, how Hwnean 
scepticisa led to the view that science ..... should be relegated 
to the . limbo of delusive hopes and irrational- convictions .1• ..,. He 
add that while Hue's followers in the 18th:-.and 19th'" ~enturies 
had not accepted his scepticism, the issues tbat-Huae·toucbedon 
had been revived in " •.• recent discussions ~of ·the philosophy 
appropriate to quantwa physics .•. • (Robson 1971:143{.) -This wa~ a 
view that Russell bad expressed in a 1928 article in Whither 
nanlsind; A. Panorama Qi, Modern Cjyi U zation (a book designed · to 
combat social and intellectual pessiJlisa}, when he wrote that 
" .•. scepticism [as expressed-by-Eddingt<>n·and Wittgenstein} is·.a 
---eanker--·at th&-··heart of- seienee1 ·· affeeting 9=,·-as--yet1 ,,-only,a .few 
-- ·-·- .. leaders. . but·· capable, . in ti•e, ~· &f paralyzing the cactivities ·-of 
----~-he-whole -army ·-Ot--scientific-workers.~--.(Beard--1923-:i6i)...·-····· · 
a means of reconciling humanity with the rest of the cosaos, at a 
more practical level modern physics seemed to endorse the 
pragmatic or experimental attitude towards other aspects of life. 
To that extent, Dewey•s purpose in-texts such -as llm'···~-
,(QI. Certajnty and Reconstruction ill Philosonhy was not to attack 
scientific enterprise as such but only a particular image of-it. 
The same could be said of Bergson. (Carr 1919:vii} Indeed, one of 
Dewey's intentions was to shore up the reputation of science 
because it was so heavily under attack.- (l} Dewey was 
principally concerned to overthrow approaches to philosophy, 
economics and politics which, in aping what he described in a 
polemical piece in the Nati. Republic as a Victorian understanding 
of science, had become characterised by dogma and rigidity. 
(Dewey 1921:315ff} Far from decrying scientific enterprise, Dewey 
wanted to see philosophers and others adopt the modern 
scientist's pragmatic or instrumental approach. This he thought 
could help reconstruct philosophy and help rebuild civilization. 
This intertwining ·Of .. the destinies of philosophy·· and 
civilization is easily explained. Herbert W. Schneider wrote in 
his contribution to A History Q.L Political Theories: Recent 
~. a ·series of 1924 essays-hy·philosopbers and political 
1. This was something which Dewey pursued with renewed vigour in 
the 1957 edition of Reconstruction ill Philosophy because he felt 
that.since the first edition appeared the reputation of· science 
bad diminished even further, particularly amongst the younger 
generation. 
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scientists in tribute to the late William Dunning (1) that there 
was a great sense of disappointment in philosophy among both 
scientists and men of affairs, because it coul~ not provide 
answers to the questions asked by a deeply troubled world. 
(Merriam 1924:332) On the evidence presented so far, philosophers 
obviously felt under great pressure in the 1920s and 1930s to 
answer the charge of social irrelevance. 
This leads us to another point. We have noted that there was 
a certain awe surrounding words like •new" ·or--·"scientifie" at 
that time. (Follett 1919:13JMerriam 1924:13) Similarly, the word 
"social" gained prestige in academic circles and became attached 
to all sorts of theories. (Cohen 1919:678) (2) Morris Cohen, of 
the College of the City of New York, wrote how some philosophers 
saw it as absolutely necessary to substitute social philosophy 
for what they dismissed as "epistemologic chess." (Cohen 
1919:690) 
The pragmatic turn in the 1920s and 1930s and the interest 
in the new science on the part of philosophers -was thus a 
consquence of pressures flowing from both social and intellectual 
disarray - both real and perceived. In addition to this, it was 
a consequence of claims put forward by social scientists (and 
those speaking on behalf of natural sciences)· to be -the·· -sole 
1. Dunning was Lieber Professor of History and Political 
Philosophy in Col1111bia University and was the author- of a· three 
volume History g,t, Political Theories; the first. second and third 
volumes were published in 1902, ·· 1905 and 1920 respect.ively. 
(Dunning 1920:v) 
2. Cohen hiaself was critical of this retreat fro• intellectual 
iapartiality and aoves towards what he described as.c "journalisa• 
or ."propaganda"; be -suggested-·that--·iapar-t-iality-wa&-.. -tbe--bes~ ._,;o.. 
service the philosopher could offer-society. {Cohen -19-19:6730-- · 
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providers of relevant social understanding. It is . for these 
reasons that debates within philosophical circles were easily 
transmuted into debates about political or social philosophy and 
policy. More specifically. arguments about pragmatic approaches 
to philosophy and science expanded into argwnents about the 
pragmatic approach to politics; pragmatisa- was seen by some as 
the bridge between philosophy and life.-
The influence of pragmatism on political thought was a 
matter of debate by 1925. Professor Charles Merriam in the first 
essay in a History o.f. Politjcal Theories argued that while 
pragmatism, along with the philosophy of Bergson, had swept 
through the philosophical world its influence on politics had so 
far been very limited. (Merriam 1924:14) Earlier, the American 
scholar Rodney L. Mott, writing in the Political Science 
Quarterly on syndicalist political theory, had said that 
pragmatic methods, anti-monism and scepticism were slow in coming 
to political science. (Mott 1922:25) (1) However, reviewing ~ 
Historv Q.t. Political Theories Matoon K. ·· Curtis ·wrot&· that 
pragmatism bad gained widespread currency in •odern political 
theory. (Curtis 1925:492) 
1. Mott contrasted the late emergence of pluralis• and scepticism 
in political science with developments in ·biology, where 
criticism of monistic thought could be seen in the attacks-" oa 
natural selection by supporters..,of the mutation hypothesis;· in 
economics where be cited the attacks by the Austrian Subjective 
school on classical political economy as being •distinctly 
-pluralistic• and--finally,. ·i11:_religion, where he cited the rise in 
agnosticisa and the increasing interest of religious persons in 
social· and · econ<>11ic affairs.·· (Kott· 1922:25)-·:Se&'.~*also· 4arker·•A" 
1915, p.248 for siailar couents.;. ,,,., · • :, .. 
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I would argue that pragmatist philosophy. collplemented by 
the approaches and images generated by the new physics, played an 
increasingly significant role in debates about politics and 
society froa the mid-1920s until the late 1930s. Pragaatism was 
always potentially a political or social philosophy. Many have 
noted the democratic zeal and confidence in industrial progress 
which underpins this philosophy and to which it gives expression. 
(1) Pragmatism. in its humanism. provided a direct route from 
metaphysical or epistemological speculation to social policy. 
(Although some would say that in its more positivistic moments 
pragmatism gives way to a naturalistic anti-humanism.} But the 
impact of pragmatism on political thought was not only evident in 
the conscious adoption of pragmatist dialects by political 
thinkers and actors. It was also evident in the attacks made upon 
pragmatism's influence. 
On this last point, we should recall the concerns of some 
writers in relation to the sceptical character of many modern 
pn1.iosopfiies and to the materialistic nature of modern society. 
From what we have said previously about pragmatist philosophy, 
it should be be clear why pragmatism was also seen to- have---a 
philosophically and socially unsettling influence. This applies 
whether pragaatism was understood in te.r11.s of the. inst:ruaentalist 
theory of knowledge (something which eould be used for aanagement 
1. On this point, one which I discuss in the next chapter,. see 
Laski ~American Democracy, (1948:726ff}, Russell in. Beard, 
.. (1928:660-. . A. Eustace Haydon, "The Theological· Trend ·of 
Pragmatisa", in ~American Journal gt tbeoJorv, .Vol. XXIIIrlio. 
4, Oct. 1919. p.401 and cAlbert" Schinz, Anti-Pramtism&, 
(Paris: 1909}, cited in Ralph Barton .. Perry. c.-Tb§. present-·iop.Ujct . 
gt. Ideals,-1918, Longmans. New York 1 p.334. ·""-·-------~-
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of the social and physical environment), or in terms of a pure 
philosophy of the will. 
We must remember that the philosophy of pragmatism is marked 
by a high level of generality. Contributors to what Curtis called 
the "pragmatic drift" in philosophy since the 19th century had a 
mixed set of allegiances. (Curtis 1925:492) Bacon, Hume, 
Schopenhauer, James, Bergson, Dewey and Schiller have all been 
included in the pragmatic tradition of thought. Indeed, James' 
philosophy can itself be seen as the moderately tempered heir of 
British empiricism as well as the more wilful! child of romantic 
philosophical doctrines. 
This duality was reflected in what were seen as pragmatism's 
political manifestations. These ranged from notions of direct 
action to an emphasis on a positivist approach to social 
planning, which could take on a dictatorial air. This explains 
why pragmatism was seen as lending support to collectivist or 
corporatist forms of social organisation as well as to those who 
argued in favour of the autonomy of groups within society.--
However, while this particular simplification is useful for 
the moment, it will become clear in the next chapter that the 
alleged opposition between fascist or comaunist for.s _ o~ 
political organisation (these being examples of dictato.Tial 
political systems} and a radical pluralist politics-(as with the 
alleged conceptual opposition- between positivisa -· -and 
intuitionisa}, disguises what some saw as tbeir-c-0-.oD--c<>r•07...-;..;~" 
--I--wil-1- eoncentrate ·most of 11y examination of---·-tbe'.':"·alleged 
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internal relation between radical pluralism and authoritarian 
forms of government and their relation to pragmatism in the next 
chapter. This is because I think it is important to first 
examine the historical and intellectual climate in which 
pluralist politics (also referred to as anti-statism or as the 
anti-rationalist movement in politics} arose, before one can 
examine its relation with the philosophy of pragmatism. (1) 
The important thing to remember at this stage is that 
pragmatism, in its opposition to all monistic philosophical 
systems and in its promotion of a pluralistic cosmology, gave 
philosophical weight to arguments in favour of pluralistic 
political arrangements. In addition to this, the pragmatic 
instrumental theory of truth was embraced by Georges Sorel who 
was, at various times, closely associated with the syndicalist 
movement. This movement achieved great notority both before and 
after the First World War. Most importantly for this argument, it 
was frequently viewed as only a more extreme expression of 
political pluralism. 
1. Bernarcl~osanqU&t-,~a ·"•onistic" ·thinker·-sk&&gly- criecisM4Y'-"·~ 
pluralists and pragmatists, wrote in the introduction to the 
second- ,-edition of his Philosophical Theory g.1 tll§. ·· ~ -{19H)} 
how a great movement, that is. the one for social progress. had 
found itself (especially in Europe}, ···supported by those -who 
expressed "a distrust of the highly intellectual consciousness. 
We have had it from Schopenhauer, imported from the east, in John 
Henry Newman, and in Mr~ Kidd. no less than in Professor William 
James and K. Bergson~" (Bosanquet 1965:xl} 
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2. Philosophies of Group Life 
The pluralist political theory which took shape after the 
Great War was generated by a confluence of intellectual and 
social forces - not all of which originated at the same time. In 
addition to the influence of modern physics and pragmatist 
philosophy, pluralism's intellectual influences included the 
sociology of law movement; psychological theories which depicted 
the state as a representative of the herd instinct or "crowd" 
mind or which denied the rational basig of the social contract 
and most importantly, arguments in favour of the "real" 
personality of associations. (Follett 1919:9) (1) 
These intellectual influences coincided with, and were fed 
by, a series of social developments in the early part of this 
century. Developments such as the growth of voluntary 
associations (professional associations, the feminist or 
suffragette movement and ecclesiastical groups) and their spread 
across state borders; the related pursuit by economic -and 
industrial groups of legal recognition and protection as well as 
a share in political power; the breakdown of empires; and 
finally, the tremendous loss of life during the Great War· which 
did so much to inspire hostility towards goverrunents and·~the idea 
of the state and the metaphysical theories which supported '.'·it. 
(Follett 1918:9 Merriam 1924:4ff) L. T. Hobhourse wrote· in -his 
1.· · See~. also on this point.~J •'~~· Alexander Gunn,. Bergsop 114 .,, Bil,~·· 
Philosophy, Methuen, London, 1920. p.110 
251 
Metphysical Theory .of. !ha ~. which was an arguaent against 
the philosophies of the neo-Hegelian idealists that "when the 
state is set up as an entity superior and indifferent ·"to 
component individuals it becomes a false god, and its worship the 
abomination of desolation, as seen at Ypres or on the SolRJlle." 
{Hobhouse 1918:136f} 
On this last point, we should stress the tendency on the 
part of some critics of the idea of the state to conflate 
governments with the state, or rather their failure to 
distinguish governments from the state as sovereign will. (Ellis 
1920:401f) This is a point which will become clearer as the 
discussion develops in this and the next chapter. 
I have listed above some of the major features of the 
intellectual and social atmosphere which existed at the end of 
the First World War. They go some way to explaining the origins 
of anti-statist and anti-intellectual feeling. More generally, 
Baron S. A. Korff (of Georgetown University) wrote that pluralism 
was the outcome of a longer-term historical development; that 
being the expansion in the size and power of the state during the 
19th century. 
:k'or.U wrote that the ·st:a'f~i, .. ,.in response to the demands of 
industrial civilisation, had become in the 19th century a 
creative and not just a commanding power. (Korff 1923:406) 
Governments had expanded into a range of areas and ··had 
established a number of new instrumentalities and functions. Most 
notably, in the postal, 11ines, railways, telegraph and shipping 
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sectors. (Korff 1923:406} It was against this background that 
concerns began to be aired about the growing omni-competence or 
all-inclusive nature of the state. (Laing 1921:6 Korff 1923:409} 
Such concerns became manifest in the revival of the idea o·f 
community interests and of the distinction between state and 
society. (Laing 1921:5, Barnes 1921:509} 
Interest in the idea of community rights or interests was 
significantly aroused following the publication of Political 
Theories !lf the. Middle ~ (1900} which was the nam~ for Frederic 
William Maitland's translation of a section of Otto Gierke's 
Deutsches Genossenschaftsrecht (1868}. Gierke's text, George H. 
Sabine noted in his substantial introduction to Hugo Krabbe's The. 
Modern Idea !lf the. State, was an extensive study of the legal 
theory of corporations. (Krabbe 1930:xl} 
Gierke was described by Cohen as the "patron saint" of 
pluralist theory. (Cohen 1919:613} Gierke argued that from the 
ancient to the medieval period the idea of society as a real 
corporate entity bad persisted and was only lost with the break 
up of the medieval system. (Muirhead 1924:167} Post-medieval 
Europe witnessed the increasing fragmentation of the body politic 
into governor and governed-and into state and individual a 
development which received theoretical expression-in·t11~-theory 
of···· sovereignty and also in · individualistie-contractualistic 
beliefs. (1} (Gierke 1900:70f, Mcilwain 1910:370f, Ellis 
1920:395} 
- 1 ... Gierke in fact argued that -this division -of--the -personality-of·· 
the state was already evident in aedieval theory;.. He wrote: .•And 
above all, the Doctrine of the State which prevailed in Classical 
Antiquity identified the State, when considered as a Subje~t-of 
Rights and Duties, with its visible Sovereign, and this antique 
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The two most highlighted aspects of Gierke's account were 
firstly, his challenge· to the view that corporations were 
artificial persons and secondly ,-his denial of the related notion 
that corporations were creations of the sovereign power.- In 
reference to the first aspect, Maitland wrote that Gierke had 
shown that corporations were not personae fictae as Sinibald 
Fieschi (Pope Innocent IV} had claimed. (Gierke 1900:xix Coker 
1921:187} (2} Following Gierke, Maitland wrote that voluntary 
associations had real personalities - they were real or group 
persons in possession of real or group wills. {Gierke 1900:xx} 
But the argument did not rest there. For challenging the 
fiction theory also lead one to challenge what was known as the 
concession theory of corporations. (Gierke 1900:xxx} Maitland 
Doctrine was becoming the starting-point for theorists. And so it 
fell out that even in medieval theory we may already see that the 
single Personality of the State is torn asunder into - two 
'Subjects' corresponding respectively to the Ruler and the 
Assembly of the People. Between them there is a conflict as- to · 
which has the higher and completer right; but they are thought of 
as two distinct Subjects each with rights of a contractual .,.kind 
valid against the other and with duties of a contractual.. kind 
owed to the other; and in their connexion consists the Body 
Politic." (Gierke 1900:70f} 
2. K. C Hsiao however cited H. A. Smith in :D.lg, ~ g,t, 
Assocjatons. pp. 152-6, as arguing that Innocent IV did not hold 
the fiction theory. (Hsiao 1926:32n} See also John Aust-in, 
another target of pluralist theorists, who explained his view. of 
associations as fictional persons as follows. He wrote- in-·- his 
Lectures QD. Jurisprudence Vol. II, Leet. XII that legal persons 
are "persons by a figment, and for the sake of brevity in 
discourse. All rights reside in, and all duties are incumbent 
upon, physical or natural persons. But by ascribing thea to 
feigned persons, and to the physical persons who they in truth 
concern, we are frequently able to abride our descriptio~s of 
thea." (Austin 1861: 13f) Cohen wrote that the i-Oea of -the· .. -real 
personality of associations was an extension of- the .idea--·· --Of:c--a 
folkspirit (volksgeist) which gained prominence-after-~JM.-Freneh · 
Revolution and was part of a romantic reacti0&- -~against 
Enlightenment beliefs in the rights of man and law based upon 
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wrote that the concession theory, which like the fiction theory 
had been handed down by the canonists, held that the corporation 
"is, and must be the creature of the State. Into its nostrils the 
State must breathe the breath of a fictitious life, for otherwise 
it would be no animated body but individualistic dust." (Gierke 
1900:.xxx} That is, corporations existed solely at the discretion 
of the sovereign or legislature. {Gierke 190o:xxx} In short, as 
Laski put it in his important 1916 article in ll:lg Harvard LaJl 
Reyjew entitled "The Personality of Associations", corporations 
existed "nowhere save in legal contemplation" and were dependent 
upon acts of parliament. (Laski 1916:410) But what Gierke's 
historical studies had shown, was that although associations 
certainly could be and were destroyed by the sovereign power, 
they were not in fact created by it; he showed that associations 
had an existence both prior to and independent of the state. 
(Gierke 1900:xxx} In summary, it was argued that groups or 
bodies within the state had a "real personality". were 
"spontaneous" in their origin and therefore, possessed-"inherent 
rights". (Coker 1921:187 Barnes:1921:493) 
In addition to Maitland, Gierke's ideas were introduced to 
English-speaking - audiences by John - Neville Figgis.- -(Cohen-· 
1919:679} (1) In Churches iJl the Hodern ~ (1913} Figgis 
reason. He cited Friedrich Karl von Savigny who argued that the 
laws and the history of the community are a product of a national 
ghost. (Cohen 1919:679} 
1. Figgis explained the development of the fiction theory thus: 
"With the large nuaber of cathedral chapters and religious orders 
in the Church, it became very necessary to arrive at clear views 
. .on the aatter, and Innocent IV. starting from the doctrine -of ----the 
civil law as to the nature of sovereign power and the rights of 
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traced the attempts by churches and ecclesiastical groups to 
maintain their independence and their rights. He too argued that 
corporations were real and vital psychic personalities. something 
which he said was refelcted in current legal and judicial 
developments. {Ellis 1920:393f) Figgis wrote: 
The courts and sometimes even the laws are being driven to 
treat corporate societies as though they were real and-not 
fictitious persons, and to regard such personality as the 
natural consequence of permanent association not a mere mark 
to be imposed or witheld by the sovereign power. (Figgis 
1989:111} 
One example of the phenomenon to which Figgis alluded was 
the judgement delivered by the House of Lords in the Tull Vale 
.G.a..s..e. in 1901, which overturned what had been the accepted case 
since the enfranchisement of trade unions of 1870s. That is, the 
belief that unions could not be sued for any action taken by 
their members. Trade unions were protected from the law of 
conspiracy because a 1875 act denied them the status of 
corporations. (1) 
individuals, came quite definitely to the view that it was 
necessary to call such bodies persons; but that their personality 
was purely fictitious, nomen juris." (Figgis 1989:114} In 
acknowledging the importance of Gierke's study Figgis wrote: -"I 
cannot overestimate my debt to that great monument, both of 
erudition and profound thought, the Das. Deutsche 
Genossenschaftsrecht of Dr Otto Gierke ... " (Figgis 1989~111} 
1. There were are two acts in the 1870s which are of significance to 
the Taff Vale decision. Thompson writes that the Taff Vale 
decision caused a great deal of hostility among the-trade union· 
movement as it reversed what had been the comaon - ass111tption 
since the Trade Union Act of 1871 which provided protection ·for 
trade union funds and also enhanced. the legal position of unions. 
(Thompson 1950:197) Ernest Davies writes in Amerjcan Labour that 
the 1901 decision also went against the 1875 . Employers' -and 
Workmen's Act. This act he wrote" ... put the British trade unions 
in - a privileged positioa.-... Under--this -Act-. .. breach-.of-~coatHCt 
--through . strikes - became an· actionable wrong.· --but--not"--a ·· crille. 
unless it could be proved that strkes endangered, public~- health 
and safety ••. Hore important was the provision that nothing done 
in furtherance of a trade dispute could be- punishable --as -~a 
conspiracy unless if done by a single individual it would have 
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What the decision in the ~ Vale ~ stated was that 
while trade unions were not legal persons they did in fact act as 
such and therefore they should be treated as such in cases 
relating to damages incurred as a result of the actions of·their 
members. The fact that this decision in a sense weakened the 
power of trade unions (a point which bas concerned some 
historians [See Thompson 1950:197]), was not relevant to Figgis; 
what was important was that the decision bore "witness• to the 
fact that corporate personalities were real and that they were 
living and growing entities. (Figgis 1989:114} (1) 
It is important to note that while Figgis rejected the 
argument that the state and the individual were the only 
political or legal entities, he was aware of the practical 
dangers posed to society by too great a weakening of central 
authority. Because of this, Figgis' picture of society was one of 
an "ascending hierarchy" (a pattern which included families, 
schools, counties, unions and churches},-rather than a horizontal 
proliferation of groups. Ultimate loyalty, be wrote, had-to be 
given to that "great ·society of societies' which we call. -the 
been punishable.as a criae ••. The famous legal decision following 
the strike on the Taff Vale Railway in 1900 interpreted the 1875 
act most unfavourably to labour." (Davies 1943-: 350 ·- L · Harold 
Laski repeated Figgis' opinion on this case , when he ... wrote: 
"Nothing has brought into more striking prominence the 
significance for practical life of this controversy than the 
questions raised in the last decade and a half by trade-union 
activity ... The Taff Vale case decided, as it appears to us, quite 
simply and reasonably, that:·. a trade union aust be responsible for 
the wrongs it coaai.tsir- ... a point of view which so iapressed the 
. Royal Commission #,{the 1906 Report -0f the Royal- -Cotulission · on 
Trade Disputes] .that they did not recomtend the reversal of the 
judgement.• (Laski 1916:423) 
257 
state"; the state he said, must have the power to regulate the 
groups. (Coker 1921:188) 
To repeat, there was a recognition of certain social 
necessities involved in this formulation. Figgis, for instance, 
insisted on loyalty to the society of societies in order to 
restrain groups and individuals from inflicting hurt upon each 
other. (1) (Coker 1921:188) This theme was also put forward by 
Ernest Barker and Harold Laski in their discussions of guild 
socialism. 
But as Figgis' analysis implied, there is an ethical 
component to this as well. One which suggests that there- is some 
sort of substance which binds us together either as groups or 
individuals. Barker gave expression to this when he wrote that 
the state would remain more than the sum of the guilds because it 
was a communitas comm1mitatum. He wrote that the state "will not 
be a mere bracket or hyphen, but a real entity in itself." 
(Barker 1928:201) 
1. --Figgis wrote: "To prevent injustice between thea-·fthe: groups] 
and to secure their rights, a strong power above thea··is needed. 
It is largely to regulate such groups and to ensure·that~,::they4o 
not out step- the· bounds-o-f --justice· that the coeT-ciYe~·ferce;-of"""'the , 
state exists." (Figgis 1989:125) Barker, in discussing guild 
socialisa, - wrote in bis English Political ThourJit:· ··that~"Central 
authority was necessary to prevent quarrels eaerging both between 
the guilds and ·-between the guilds and the political -power. 
(Barker 1928:201) Laski made similar comments in~ Gra111tar -~ 
Politics where he said in reference to guild socialism that, 
·while occupational groupings .- should have ,. a · high degree ' -of 
-autonoayt-- the "safeguard aust always exist that-the producers·do 
-not.,. seek to exploit the co-unity.for their own interest.'"(Laski 
1948:444) In some respects,·"·this aarked a significant.departure -
froa Laski• s earlier pluralist theory. -
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Rather than a discontinuous array of groups, pluralists often 
counterposed society or community to the political power. To this 
extent they were still allowing ·for some ele111eut ·· -&f holisa · -
albeit one that need only be bound up with ·tb&4dea -of ~society 
rather than that of the state. It should be pointed out that 
neither Gierke nor Maitland denied the necessity of a unified 
state. 
We should also note that the words community and society may 
not, in many cases, have been able to capture the ideas which 
some pluralists liked to express. For instance, it was common at 
that time when discussing political and social tneory to point 
to the growing complexity and differentiation of industrial 
society. (Merriam 1924:2, Sabine 1923:42, Korff 1923:406) In this 
context, William M. Urban (of Trinity College) expressed concern 
that the idea of community bad become curiously "difficult" and 
"unsatisfactory"; society had dissolved into, among other things, 
labour unions, conventions and boards of conciliation. (1} (Urban 
1919:547) 
What was the significance of this linking of the phenomenon 
of pluralism with some of the effects of industrial society? One 
notable feature was a shift away from arguments for pluralism 
framed · in teras of inherent riclffs <>f· associaMo!ts·~~towards-"······ 
arguments framed in terms of the in appropriatenesso.f· 11tOoistic 
theory to societies which were fragmenting in all -sortS•·of ways. 
1. See also G.D.H Cole•s discussion of: the probleas .associated - . 
-·-·-. with. using the teru society .and-~outunity·in·-his~·Ih& §tdtl 
Thegry in. Iba P1nrali st Theory g.f. tb state; :c±h11Sted writings ·· "' 
G.D.R. --~,L.L,, Figds-u§.--LI.,..- w.tiJ~edi-tff-l>y'~anl·Q--..-Hirst • 
Routledge, London. 1989 p.52.ff. 
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George H. Sabine, a historically-minded analyst of contemporary 
political theory, argued that whereas political monism· could 
- adequately characterise- a period in which simplicity in the .. form 
of legislative control was both possible and indeed desirable, 
so great now were the demands placed upon government that a new 
political theory was required. Such a theory would have to 
. provide . for more flexibli ty · -and loose-endedness than older 
theories had because of this changed ·political and ·social 
landscape. (Sabine 1923:39, Ellis 1920:407) In this case, whether 
to choose between pluralism or monism rested on the issue of 
suitability rather than on the abstract question of rights. 
It was in becoming more explicitly empirical in its thrust 
that pluralist theory began to make contact with pragmatism. 
Once they came into contact with pragmatism or with empirical 
approaches closely related to it, the pluralists adopted a more 
particularistic stance. The pluralists moved beyond arguments 
hinging on what was historically necessary . or .appropriate.-·· to 
arguments hinging on the actual nature - pluralistic or .. aonistic 
- of reality. This move was not made by Sabine, but by· Harold 
Laski. 
Laski was described as the most outspoken advocate of 
pluralism. (Ellis 1920:393). Be did most ... to···forge- -the 
. association between pluralist theory and pragmatist philosophy •. 
Originally however, he caae to pluralisa as a result ... of ···--his 
intellectual training at the ... University of. Oxford--where -be 
reacted against the neo-Hegelian branch of Oxfordidealisa .{its 
theory of the Real Will being seen as providing. ,as.Sabine -put 
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it. "an ethical foundation for legal coercion." [Sabine 
1923:647]). At Oxford Laski came under the influence of Ernest 
Barker, A.D Lindsay and Professor Dicey. Above all though, he was 
described as a disciple of Maitland. (Beloff 1950:381} 
As Max Beloff noted, Laski was led to the issue of voluntary 
associations through his study of church history and this was 
what was behind his earliest book Studies in. ~ Problem cl 
Soverejgnty (1917). (I would add that in this text examples from 
church history are being used to to make what are essentially 
political points. [1]) However, in Authority in. the Modern S!..at.e. 
(1919) he signalled that his earlier interest in religious 
associations was already shifting towards the claims of secular 
groups - in particular economic groups. (Beloff 1950:381) (2) 
This transition was only natural. Laski wrote that it was no 
coincidence that Figgis (who as we have seen was concerned with 
the restoration of the church) was the first to recognise and 
pick up on the significance of the Taff Vale and Osborne cases -
the latter being the case in which the House of Lords decided 
that trade unions could not use their funds to support non-
industrial causes. (Laski 1919:573) It was this decision which 
threatened to jeopardise the development of the British Labour 
Party. (3) 
1. See especially Chapter One, "Sovereignty of the State", 
Appendix A, "A Note On Sovereignty and Federalism" and Appendix 
B, "Sovereignty and Centralisation" in Laski's Studies, (1917). 
2. Laski's interest in the politics of the labour movement and 
other secular groupings were also reflected in his political 
activities at Oxford where he was involved in both the Fabian 
society and the women's suffrage movement. See "Harold J. Laski" 
in Clifton Fadiman (ed.) l Belieye: The Personal Philosophies cl 
Certain Eminent Men and ~cl Our Ii!!!g, Simon and Schuster, 
New York, 1939, p. 164. 
3. It was the hostile reaction to the decision in the Taff Vale 
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Laski is interesting for us because what he did was attempt 
to tie together the strands of thought he gathered from the 
writings of Maitland and Figgis with the philosophically robust 
pluralism of William James. His article on The Personality of. 
Associations referred appreciatively to the ideas of Dicey, 
Maitland and Figgis as well as to James' philosophy. He noted in 
the concluding section of that article that James' work A 
P1uralistjc Uniyerse was of "vital significance for political 
theory". {Laski 1916:425n) · 
Yet combining James' radical empiricism (I do not say 
pragmatism for reasons which I will explain later) with pluralism 
made for a different sort of politics to the quite gentle protest 
raised against state power by Maitland and Figgis. Indeed, the 
mixture of these influences in the writings of Laski may help 
explain why it is not always clear whether his theory is 
normative or empirical in nature or whether it is federalistic 
or polyarchic in its political implications. These points are not 
unrelated to the question as to how accurate or detailed" was his 
Case, as with the 'Osborne judgement' of 1904 which denied trade 
unions the right to spend their funds on political activities» 
that saw parliamentary legislation . after. '·1906 ·establishing 
rights of association and giving unions ""'''Proteetion---,·froa 
judgements such as Taff Vale. Political rights were restored in 
1913. {Thompson 1950:197) But the unions were,· in terms of 
pluralist theory, attempting to have it both ways. Barker wrote 
that the same principle that allowed unions to be sued in the 
Taff Vale case was also one that enfranchised the• and disallowed 
judgements such of those of Lord Balsbury in the- Osborne case 
which held that unions could •only exist through a ·charter ··of 
incorporation or within . the liaits af a :statute.~., (Barker 
1915: 178} This was,-tbe saae point, that Laski aade·in 1916 -when 
he wrote that while Taff Vale was a --~vital advance .. tne, wuttrlN· · ..-. 
case was a •reactionary step.• (Laski 1916:422} ·'~~- · 
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reading of James, or indeed, the question of whether the 
importation of this philosophy into Laski's pluralist theory 
helped impel hia towards ambiguity in the area of political: 
theory. 
There is no doubt that Laski's political theories stemmed 
from deeply held convictions. The relation between freedom and 
authority in particular was of central import to him. {Hawkins 
1950:392) He saw the struggle between these principles manifested 
not just in local struggles in England, the country of his birth, 
but also in such events as the massacre at Amritsar (the- leaders 
of which were court-martialled by the British military 
authorities in India); the imprisonment of socialists in Germany 
by the German Imperial Chancellor Otto von Bismarck in the 1870s 
and the activities of lynch mobs in America. He was also aware of 
the fact that groups who were fighting for or had won their own 
liberty (the Irish group Sinn Fein was cited as an example) 
often denied their own consciences and overlooked- their -own 
excesses. (Laski 1930:6,252) 
Clearly for Laski the struggle between freedom and authority 
had not been resolved by democratic revolutions.--The power-----that--
kings had seized from popes and the people had seized froa-kings-
--
had resulted in a new sort of monism and new forms of oppression~ 
It appeared that the bourgeois---revolution of -- 1789 - -bad 
transformed what had been a theocratic and - then - an ·imperial----
monism into a democratic one. - (Bsiao-1927:4,--El-liot-4922:-639--}--0r-
as Laski put it, the divine right .of kings had-becOJM the divine--
263 
right of state. (Duguit 1919:xvi) (1) 
There were actually two argwnents which were put to express 
-- this --Objection tG a democratic form- of -lftonis1tr· · One argmtent was 
that the structure of government and the concentration of power 
in the hands of the political executive and its bureaucratic arm 
allowed elected representatives to escape the control -of the 
community. Even where subjective rights had been constitutionally 
enshrined (such as they were in France with the Declaration ~ 
~ Rights o.f. Ma.n. ~the. Cjtizen}, it was argued that these 
rights were soon subsumed or overcome by an "irresistible logic" 
of the political executive. {Elliot 1922:639) (2) 
Another argument used to express concern about democratic 
monism derived from John Stuart Mill's warning in Qn_ Liberty: 
Representatiye Government about tyranny on the part of the 
majority. Laski was a great admirer of Mill and de Toqueville. 
{Beloff 1950:380) It is this second argument against 
majoritarian democracy which explains why pluralists like Laski 
were not satisfied with a deconcentration of executive power but 
in fact sought to dismantle it. What Beloff called Laski' s 
"essential liberalism" was expressed in his belief that the 
voice of the people was not the voice of God·.- ·(Beloff 1950:380,, 
Wilde 1920: 358) 
1. Article II of the French Constitution of 1798 declares the 
that sovereignty is "one and indivisible. - inalienahle and 
iaper-ceptable." 
2. Elliot -- wrote that in England a similar developaent (the 
subjective - rights of. _individuals - in - the ---co!DRlunity -~being 
transformed into the subjective right of .the state) .. had.o.c.taken .. 
place after .. 1688. He wrote that tlBenthaaite .theory" "took ._ 
authoritative font in Aus.tin with soaething-·i>"f ·the 'Saae-~'."4oeiea1 __ ,..,. 
rigor, though British practice and British :theory have .ever been 
two different things altogether." {Elliot 1922:639}"'c!"': 
Mass-democracy was not a sufficient condition for freedom 
and indeed could militate against it. In order to achieve true 
freedom, Laski wrote, sovereignty had to be "co-ordinate" or 
"partitioned"; it had to be parallel rather than hierarchical. 
(Laski 1919:539) Here, Laski has clearly broken with the 
pluralism of Maitland and Figgis. 
The basis for other objections to democratic monism could be 
found in studies of social psychology. Works such as Wilfred 
Batten Lewis Trotter's Instincts Q.f. .th.a ~·in~ @4 War 
(1919) and Stoddard's Iha Revolt Against Civilization (1922) are 
good examples. Stoddard's text in particular expressed an 
objection to majoritarian democracy dressed in psychological 
clothes. Stoddard called his own objections to mass democracy 
neo-aristocratic. (Stoddard 1922: 221} (1} This is important for 
as I said earlier, hostility towards the state was in part due to 
the view of it as a representative of the crowd mind. (Follett 
1918:87) Indeed, the takeover of the state by the crowd was seen 
as having as its consequence the Great War- (and in some· cases 
both the French and the Bolshevik revolutions} something which-
-·1. What aakes Stoddard's neo-aristocratic ·1'.>bjectio1t-to cJeaoerac:Y"""'~ 
..-· ··· ·-·curious·" is··· that···whil•·he ·condeaned4111SB'·"'<leaocracy:.,,~.because Li!l~'~'i.'?:;;;e_~ 
brings -"'into · the politicalc sphere· those - who-····are •. - he ., thinks'i · ·· 
· genetically. incapable-of-rational ... judgeme11t-,---s<>11ething which ... be 
said was an "UBJ1itigated disaster~ (Stoddard 192.2.:5} ~'.su.ch as 
those who adhered to ·the syndicali~t ·aove11ent-~in France- ,or to 
Bolshevisa in ··Russia - he also noted -how ~--fundamentally 
aristorcratic · the ··leaders of those 110veaents" ·were;; · He . wrote · ·· 
that. while the masses· were- to be· harnessed for~·,..their muscle in · 
··the course--of revolutionary activity once the -t?oal--of revolution·~..-,. '''"''': 
was achieved, the leaders of these movements,.., had no wish .40.,..,. '''r.,;·~~ .. 
listen, to-· thea... Be cites the French ·syndicalist,, theoretician .. , .. ·~~ 
Hubert Lagardelle as saying: •'The aass. unwieldy and cl1111sy as ~;.. 
it is, must not here speak out its mind.'" (Stoddard 1922: 172f) .,..,. 
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added to the revulsion against the state and majority rule. (1) 
(Follett 1918:9) 
While psychology was used to warn of the dangers of the 
crowd mind, it was also used to provide positive support to 
pluralistic theory. McDougall's ~ t1iDJi {1920) seemed to 
support the idea that voluntary associations possessed real 
personalities and that therefore they deserved legal recognition. 
In this case, the group mind is something that belongs to sub-
sections of the community, rather than to the community as a 
whole. The crowd mind is thus a dangerous thing while the group 
mind is something less to be feared. McDougall's theory was 
ambiguous on this point. Some saw in his theory of the group mind 
justification for a form of social holism. However, McDougall 
himself cited Maitland and Barker and their support for the idea 
of group-persons as in sympathy with his own theory. (McDougall 
1921:19) Indeed, he was careful to point out that bis theory of 
the group mind should not be construed so as to lend support to 
the idealism of Georges Hegel or Bernard Bosanquet; it was this 
philosophy he said, which had proved so destructive in Germany in 
the period leading up to the war. (McDougall 1921:ix} 
1. For a further discussion of this issue see Sir Martin Conway's 
Ilut Crowd i.g, Peace AW1, ~. Longmans, London, 1915, Ch. XVI "War: 
Its Cause and Cure" and Ch. XVIII "The Crowd at War•. See also 
the discussion of the theories of group behaviour by Harry Elmer 
Barnes; Barnes noted that social psychologists "have de•onstrated 
beyond question the fact that without the proper socio-
psycbological background and support, political sovereignty could 
not have even the •ost nebulous existence or any power whatever 
to compel obediance.• {Barnes 1921:508) 
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Psychological theories were also used to deny the rational 
basis of the social contract. Again, a number of psychologi~al 
theories were appealed to whether rightly or wrongly. These 
included McDougall's notion of the will to life, Freud's idea 
of the sex impulse or Jung's idea of the libido. ·· We should note 
that students of politics were quick to adapt psychological 
theories. The most notable in this context was Graham Wallas in 
1lwll.wA Nature ill. Politics where he cited Jaaes' Principles g,,t 
Psychologv. (Wallas 1908:25:189} Psychological theories could be 
used to argue against the belief that social organisation rests 
on informed consent because we are as human beings complexes of 
impulses. ( 1} The radical view which flowed from bringing the 
idea of a discrete self into doubt (Jv~ 1?o a phenomenonalism 
which emphasises the fluxational character of sense 
perception}, might be that human beings are too variable or 
erratic in their behaviour to give effect to any lasting 
compact. 
There were a number of problems with this appeal to the play 
of instinct and impulses in order to provide justification for a 
pluralistic society. If human beings are so fickle in their 
preferences, it is doubtful whether even voluntary associations 
could manage to exist. Further•ore, one could argue that it was 
hardly consistent to condemn the state as a representative of the 
1~ Bernard Bosanquet wrote in 1910 that in these psychological 
analyses •a great deal of the actual content of social - still 
•ore of supersocial - life, simply disappears. We are left with a 
foundation [in this case, instincts} which has not 
superstructre.• Here, Bosanquet refers specifically to 
McDougall's Introduction ,tQ, Social Psychology. (Bosanquet 
1965:xliii} 
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crowd mind only to paint an image of society as a bubbling 
cauldron of unstable psychological impulses. (1) 
The more moderate argument was that a greater emphasis must 
be placed on the role of voluntary organisatons and that 
political arrangements must be made more flexible in order 
accomodate multiple and shifting allegiances; we •ust construct a 
federal society that can fit our federal souls. Laski wrote that 
like it or not we are "bundles of hypens" - although he added 
that when loyalties clash we are forced to choose between them. 
(Laski 1916:425} Dewey argued that voluntary associations were in 
some ways superior to rigid organisations like the state because 
of their voluntary nature; this made them more supple, more open 
to adaptation and the accomodation of changing wills. (Dewey 
1930:203} (2) 
3. Radical Pluralism and Some of its Critics 
In the 1920s protest against the state was largely couched 
in terms of the rights or reality of groups or associations 
rather than in liberal terms on behalf of the individual. 
Groups were described as the real units of social analysis and 
1. See the debate between Walter Lippmann and Harold Laski on the 
significance of psychology for pluralism in the fUm. Rep•tblic. Kay 
31, pp.148-150. 
2. Ernest Barker made a similar point-some years earlier in his 
essay ~ Discredited ~ (1914) in which he argued that the 
"State is the organ of freedom :· it is also a vehicle of force. 
Its sphere is auto•atis•: it does external· acts to produce 
external results. Other associations need consent the more as 
they use force the less; they must act more in the spiritual 
sphere, and seek to supply aotive ideas in order to produce 
spiritual reactions." (Barker 1957:168) Barker was not however, 
suggesting that the state could not become something other or 
more than an instrument of force. This essay is not the anti-
statist tract that its title would suggest. Indeed, Barker 
concludes that the "discredit of the State is a sign that it has 
done its work well ..• " (Barker 1957:170) 
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activity; it was the individual and the state, it became collJllon 
to hear, which were personae fictae. (Dewey 1957:204 Urban 
1919:549) 
Placing groups at the forefront of the resistance against 
overweening state power often involved a rejection of the liberal 
ideal of the utility maximising or contract-making self. One can 
certainly see traces of 19th romantic ideas about the individual 
in pluralist theory. (Elliot 1928:56} Here the word romantic is 
intended to imply an emphasis on the role of individual will and 
creativity. In the 20th century however. the group became the 
repository of this creative will. 
It was the supposed romantic or irrationalist side of 
pluralism that caused the most concern because it was see as 
giving rise to a voluntarist form of politics. These in 
particular, were among the qualities which were seen as linking 
it to pragmatism. To its earliest critics, it was mainly the 
association of pluralism with the bitter class war-fare of the 
syndicalists that saw it condemned. It is to some of these 
criticisms which I shall now briefly turn. 
Attention was drawn to the link between syndicalism and 
"romantic" philosophical doctrines by a nU11ber of scholars and 
public figures. J. H. Harley, in a saall volume published by The 
People's Books and entitled Syndicalism, associated the violence 
of the French syndicalists with the "intuitionist" philosophy of 
Bergson. (Harley 1912:56ff) Harley's view was repeated, aaong 
others, by J. Ramsay Macdonald, the British Labour aember of 
parliament and future Prime Minister, in his book also called 
Syndicalism (1912). (Macdonald 1912:18:22) In their remarks on 
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the relation between Bergson's thought and the syndicalist 
movement these texts appear to be greatly in sympathy with one 
another. 
While Bergson was not always or even necessarily associated 
with pragmatism we should note the enthusiasm with which both 
Bergson and James embraced each others' work and the resemblance 
they felt existed between them. (1) Thus, it is not surprising 
that when Bergson was invoked in syndicalist literature or in 
writings critical of syndicalism, James was often mentioned as 
well. After 1921, when Sorel (the most famous of the movement's 
theoreticians and interpreters) published a volume entitled l2i. 
1. · 1. , ut1 1t +e ~ Pragmatisme in which he spoke 
James' attack on "the servants of scientism", 
appreciatively of 
the link between 
1. For example, James wrote: "O my Bergson, you are a mag1c1an, 
and your book [I..:. Evolution creatrjce] is a marvel, a real wonder 
in the history of philosophy ... " (Perry 1935:618) See Ralph 
Barton Perry Ih,g, Thought ~Character g,L Wi11iam ~. Vol II, 
599f f and 618f f for a discussion of the relationship between 
Bergson and James as well as copies of letters exchanged between 
them. See also Lecture VI in James' A Plura1istic Uniyerse, 
(1909) "Bergson and His Critique of Intellectualism". (James 
1977:101ff) Richard Bernstein notes in his introduction to the 
1977 edition of a P1ura1istic Universe that while the 
"intellectual relationship between James and Bergson was intense 
and complex, both felt that what they discovered in each other 
was a confirmation of insights that each had reached 
ipdpendent1y." (James 1977:.xxiii) Bosanquet however, claimed 
that James in 6, Pluralistic Uniy@rsft, "practically adopts 
Bergson's phraseology and point of view." (Bosanquet 1965:xlin) 
Note also that it was as a result of his lectures in England, 
some of which form the basis of 6, Plurglistic Upiverse, that 
James ensured Bergson's popularity in England. (Gunn 1927:278) 
See also Gunn's comment that not too much should be made of the 
association between Bergson and James because of the mystical 
nature of the former's work as compared with James and his 
dislike for the notion of utility as a test of truth. Gunn also 
lists a nUJ1ber of texts which explore the relation between the 
two philosophers. (Gunn 1920:7:7n) 
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syndicalism and pragmatist philosophy was referred to explicitly. 
{Sorel 1928:1) {1} By then, syndicalism was already in decline as 
a social movement. Nevertheless, attacks on it and pragmatism 
persisted well into the 1920s and 1930s. There were good 
reasons for the persistence of this criticism. Mainly, it was 
because, even when the political phenomenon of syndicalism 
subsided, the pragmatic spirit was held to be manifest in the 
authoritarian regimes of the 1920s and 1930s, in Italy and to a 
lesser extent Germany. 
One of the severest critics of pragmatism and intuitionism 
was the Oxford educated and Harvard based scholar W.Y Elliot who 
wrote a substantial work on what he called ~ Pragmatic Approach 
tQ, Politics {1928). (Elliot must have been a near contemporary of 
Laski's at Oxford.) In this text be developed the criticisms of 
Bergson's philosophy and the syndicalists put forward by Harley 
and MacDonald into a wide-ranging critique of irrationalist 
philosophies and the politics that they generated. His 
particular focus was upon pragmatism. 
Elliot's book, dedicated to his tutor at Oxford, A.D Lindsay 
who was also a publicist for the pluralist cause, was an extended 
version of articles he had published in journals such as the 
A11erican Political Science Review, Economica and the Political 
Science Ouartsrly in the 1920s on the dangers of pragmatism and 
pluralism as applied to political life. 
1. W. Y. Elliot claimed that Sorel made reference to pragmatism 
in the 1910 edition of the IJlil Illusions g,L Progress treating it 
as as the final phase of bourgeois thought. (Elliot 1924:236n} 
However, I have not been able to locate this particular reference 
to pragmatism in the text. 
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Harold Laski, one of Elliot's targets, described Elliot's 
book in a later edition of his Gra11ar Qt. Politics as an 
"interesting attack" on pluralis• and a "fairly complete guide" 
to the literature on pluralism and politics. (Laski 1948:249n) 
Equally severe criticisms of pragmatism as an approach to 
politics were those made by the Chinese scholar K. C. his 
pluralistic thought. Hsiao, a student of Frank Thilly's at the 
Sage School of Philosophy at Cornell University. Hsiao's 
Political Pluralism (1927) was, a book of greater philosophical 
depth than Elliot's, but he concurred with the latter's beliefs 
that pragmatism and pluralism, especially when taken together, 
were inimical to an ordered and harmonious social life. (1) 
One exception to this tide of critical opinion, albeit 
written some years earlier than Hsiao's and Elliot's books, was a 
work by H.P. Follett entitled the Ihg ~ State; 
Organisation. ~Solution g.t, Popular Goyernment (1918). Follett 
warned of the dangers of some of the political approaches that 
went under the label of pluralism, but she also expressed support 
for an increased role for municipal organisations and 
neighbourhood groups. According to Horris Cohen, her book was 
well-received in philosophical circles as an example of the new 
trend towards social philosophy. (Cohen 1919:676) But this would 
be a limited description of the work. More importantly for us, 
Follett thought that the ideas of both Bergson and James ran 
counter to radical forms of pluralism. (This is a point that 
Hsiao also •ade in relation to James and it is one I discuss in 
1. Both Elliot and Hsiao referred to each others' work in their 
respective texts. (Elliot 1928:x Hsiao 1927:13n) 
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the next chapter.} Follett's book greatly enthused Bosanquet, who 
described it as the "most sane and brilliant of recent works in 
political theory." (Bosanquet 1965:liv} (1} 
As we have seen with Laski, it was the struggle of economic 
and industrial groups to obtain legal recognition that excited 
interest amongst some pluralists. But such recognition proved to 
be a double-edged sword. Barker hinted at the reasons for __ th;is in 
his paper ~ Discredited~ (1914}, where be made the 
observation that the legal recognition of groups as persons 
raised the whole problem of what it meant for associations to 
come out into the public eye. Maitland had written that the trust 
(a quintessentially English institution [Barker 1957:157, Laski 
1916:418]} helped preserve religous freedoms. Further to this, it 
also allowed trade unions to gather and keep funds and go about 
their business all behind the protective shield of their 
trustees. Barker asked whether group life would be so well 
sheltered and tolerated if it were to be given legal 
recognition. Again, this would mean that groups would have to 
operate out in the open - under the full glare of the public 
light. (Barker 1957:157} 
Thus, while freeing associations from arbitrary power, as 
Barker wisely observed and as Figgis and Laski noted in relation 
to the Taff Vale case, legal recognition also meant groups had 
to become responsible for their collective activities. (2} The 
1. William McDougall also considered Follett's text an important 
work in harmony with his own. (McDougall 1921:xii} 
2. Laski cited Maitland as saying that the trust "·has served ~o 
protect the unincorporated Genossensshaft against the attacks of 
the inadequate and individualistic theories. We should all agree 
that if an Anstalt or a Genossepsshaft is to live and thrive it 
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need for legal recognition could not be avoided. Industrial 
groups required protection given the nature of claims aade by 
them in relation to existing distributions of wealth and 
political power; they especially required protection given the 
sort of actions they would take in order to further those claias. 
Adam Kirkaldy, then Professor of Finance· at the University 
of Birmingham, in Economics AIMl. Sypdicalism (1914) wrote that it 
was the intensity of the struggle between the industrial groups 
and the groups of owners that saw parliamentary interference in 
trade disputes in Britain. (Kirkaldy 1914:107) It was this action 
by the legislature (an action which was repeated. although to 
varying degrees, in other countries) in industrial disputes 
that helped engender violent opposition to "stateism"; under 
these circumstances discussions about the basis of political 
obligation were transformed into discussions of the principles of 
revolution. (Tufts 1919:595, Merriam 1924:42f) (1) 
4. French Syndicalism: Sorel and Bergson 
Not all groups were as antagonistic to the state as economic 
or industrial groups. But it was because of their very militancy 
that these groups received the most attention from those who were 
both drawn to and repelled by pluralist theory. It was the 
association of pluralism (as well as voluntaristic philosophies) 
with revolutionary political activity that saw it come to be 
regarded with deep suspicion. For some, pluralistic politics 
must be efficiently protected by law against axternal eneaies.'" 
(Laski 1916:418) 
1. James H. Tufts, a colleague of Dewey's at the University of 
Chicago. likened the dispute between labour groups and the state 
in the early part of 20th century to the great struggles between 
church and state in the Middle Ages. (Tufts 1919:589) 
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meant nothing less than a society divided down the middle 
consumed by class struggle. 
While industrial unrest was characteristic of most Western 
countries prior to and after the First World War, Elliot claimed 
that anti-rationalist politics was at its most formidable in 
Europe. (Elliot 1928:viii) In particular, it was the activities 
of the syndicalists in France that caused the most antagonism. 
The French word syndicat meant trade union. But Kirkaldy wrote 
that it also came to denote the policy of the Confederation 
Generate WI. Trayail, (the body which co-ordinated the activities 
of all the local industrial groups), which sought to "destroy the 
existing organisation of industry, and transfer industrial 
capital from its present owners to ... the Revolutionary Trade 
Unions." (Kirkaldy 1914:101-2) 
The French syndicates were legalised by Waldeck-Rousseau in 
1884 and the Bourses sW, Trayail were formed soon after; a law on 
Associations was passed in 1901. (Dimnet 1913:19, Fairchild 
1919:345, Sorel 1950:198) Harley wrote that the men who founded 
the French trade unions were acutely aware of the time and 
trouble it took to gain these liberties frOll the ,political 
authorities. (Harley 1912:76,Dimnet 1913:19) Also important was 
the fact that state soldiers were used in France against workers' 
groups, notably in 1906 at Villeneuve-Saint-Georges, and this 
frequently resulted in bloody clashes. (Harley 1912:36) (1) 
1. The syndicalists antimilitarisa in fact predated these 
encounters. Barbara Mitchell argues that this posture was used to 
get the peasant's on side because the peasants had •abiding 
hatred of recruitment." She wrote that the syndicalists also 
hoped to encourage "workin2-class solidarity• within the tower 
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Harley and others believed these facts helped to explain why 
the unions developed a great deal of distrust in the law and the 
legislature as protectors of their "rights". (Harley 1912:7§ 
Dimnet 1913:23) 
But delays in achieving legal and political recognition were 
not peculiar to France. In America. for example. this was 
achieved much later. Peculiar to France were certain other 
conditions which saw syndicalism flourish there in a way it did 
not in places such as Britain and Australia. (Harley 1912:30, 
Mott 1922:26, Coker 1921:208) The Dreyfus affair was seen by 
Harley and Laski as focusing French attention on the dangers 
posed by a centralised state. (Harley 1912:76) Laski, in his 
introduction to his 1919 translation of Leon Duguit's ~ iA t.D& 
Modern~. (1913), (Duguit was Professor of Jurisprudence at 
the University of Bordeaux) wrote that the revolt against 
/ 
etatis1e coincided with the unfolding of the Dreyfus affair. 
(Duguit 1919:xi) (Dreyfus was a military officer accused of 
spying.) Ernest Dimnet wrote that it greatly weakened the 
patriotic sense of the French people. (Dimnet 1913:21} 
Also of crucial importance in fueling working class 
hostility towards the French state was the persistence of severe 
economic inequality. (Lorwin 1957:31) Val R. Lorwin in an essay 
comparing the origins and developaent of French and Aaerican 
industrial groups argues that econo•ic inequalities persisted in 
France due to its relative industrial backwardness. 
ranks of the military. See Marcel van der Linden 
Thorpe Reyolutionary Syndicalism, Scolar Press, 
1990:32-6. 
France had a 
and Wayne 
Aldershot, 
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stronger agricultural base than Allerica or England - something 
which was bailed in France as a force for social stability. 
(Fairchild 1919:348,Lorwin 1957:28) French entrepreneurs had also 
proved more timid than their counterparts elsewhere; competition 
from outside and inside France was curtailed due to governaent 
protection and the operation of cartels. (Fairchild 1919:348i 
Lorwin 1957:28) (1) 
It was because electoral politics had not brought benefits 
to the workers that democracy was dismissed as the "political 
expression of individualism"; on this view, democratic elections 
only secured the property interests of the bourgeoisie,·therefore 
creating a new set of masters for the proletariat. (Fairchild 
1919:348) This conclusion had been reached by Sorel who at that 
stage was, along with Hubert Lagardelle and Eduard Berth, 
publishing regularly in 1£ Mouvement Socialiste. (Dimnet 1913:24 
Coker 1921:208) Sorel's view was that if the Fourth Estate 
wanted control of their destinies then they had to seize it 
themselves, and certainly not by the futile parliamentary-route. 
(Harley 1912:72 Sorel 1950:88) Sorel rejected the gradualism and 
moralism of the orthodox socialist movement. (Sorel 1950:270-ln) 
Sorel described the Dreyfusist movement as a conspiracy of greed 
and ambition and socialism as a "belly philosophy". (Dimnet 
1913:26, Sorel 1950:20f,84,194f) 
1. Lorwin does however, add that French industry was more 
productive than most thought. He writes that: "The workers' 
leaders were echoing the self-denigration so articulate in the 
nation, and sometimes long after the criticism bad been aost 
deserved.• (Lorwin 1957:29) 
But there was another reason for Sorel's dismissal of a 
politics of compromise and gradualism. One which underscores the 
point that was often made about Sorel; that his fascination was 
with the act of revolution rather than its outcome. Sorel's view 
was that co-operation with parliament, or indeed parliamentary 
service itself, inevitably led to a corruption of the 
revolutionary spirit; war, he wrote, " ..• is not made under the 
direction of talking assemblies." (Sorel 1950:270) Furthermore, 
as he shrewdly recognised, physical comfort and fat purses 
usually lead to a reduction in the virile courage of a political 
movements' leadership. (Mott 1922:30 )Sorel 1950:88:269) 
Sorel's concerns about preserving the heroic spirit were not 
necessarily uppermost in the minds of the actual syndicalists in 
the workshops; for them, the withdrawal from the political 
process was a tactical rather than an aesthetic choice. Indeed, 
one of the major syndicalist tactics was the less than 
spectacular "grouping process"; the routine recruitment of new 
members was to contine until the industrial groups achieved 
numerical superiority. (Dimnet 1913:23) (1) Of more significance 
in terms of the syndicalist association with Sorel were its other 
policy instruments such as direct action, sabotage (in Britain it 
was called ca'canny) and guerilla warfare; some of these tactics 
were adopted during the French railway strike in 1910 and it was 
these which brought syndicalists much of their notoriety. (Sorel 
1950:221, Di•net 1913:24, Kirkaldy 1914:122, Mott 1922:34, 
Merriam 1924:220) 
1. Ernest Dim.net wrote that there was 
syndicalist phrase than: "Do the hWRble and 
work." (Dim~•t 1913:23) 
no more 
humdrum 
repeated 
sydnicate 
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Because they adopted these methods syndicalists were often 
described as being opposed to politics. (Harley 1912:75, 
MacDonald 1913:5-15) From the literature I have examined, it is 
clear that what was meant by this term was parliamentary politics 
and that force and violence were not being included within its 
ambit. Politics on this account became an essentially rational 
activity counterposed to an irrational policy of direct action. 
This can be contrasted with the literature I have examined in 
relation to the rationalization movement and social planning in 
the 1920s and 1930s which certainly did include force and 
violence and more generally irrational impulses within the 
definition of politics. Thus, while Sorel rejected politics in 
the above sense, he was certainly reasserting, as Hsiao's 
analysis suggests, the primacy of force in social life. In this 
context, Sorel wrote of Nietzsche's advice that one must seek 
mastery, especially through the energy of the act, over social 
forces. (Sorel 1950:230ff) (1) As a related point, we should note 
how a number of writers called attention to the hypocrisy of the 
anti-military stand of the syndicalists when they themselves were 
advocating essentially military or rather, violent solutions in 
the conflict between labour and capital. (2) This particular 
issue will gain added significance when we later address the 
professed internationalism of the pluralist movement. 
1. Perry noted that the relation between syndicalism and the 
ideas of Nietzsche was discussed by G. Guy-Grand, YI. Pbilosopbie 
Synd1ca1iste, esp. Ch. IV. (Perry 1918:341} 
2. See Bosanquet, 1965, p. liiin and Paul H. Douglas, 
"Proletarian Political Theory" in Merriam, 1924, p. 226-6 where 
he wrote: "The syndicalists have in reality fundamentally 
adopted the philosophy of militarism ... " 
Hsiao contrasted this syndicalist picture of society as a 
field of forces with the image painted by economic monists - be 
they market liberals or marxists. (Although syndicalists did 
accept Marx's analysis of the nature of capitialism). Both of 
these schools of thought held that society was at bottom an 
economic machine; one which could be arranged perfectly. In 
literally smashing machines and challenging the political and 
economic elites to show their muscle the syndicalists were 
attempting to expose the co-ercive basis of existing social and 
economic relations and of the state's claim to legal sovereignty. 
(Hsiao 1927:111ff) 
But there were other more important intellectual influences 
associated with the syndicalist movement than Nietzsche, to whom 
there were few references. For example, the 19th century French 
anarchist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon was described by 
Laski as the "guiding genius of French labour." (Beloff 1950:381) 
Proudhon was inspirational not only in terms of his disgust with 
parliamentary politics but also in terms of his vision of a 
future society run by local groups of producers. (In relation to 
this last point, the Russian anarchist Peter Kropotkin should 
also be mentioned.) (1) Laski claimed that Proudhon realised, as 
1. See for example, Proudhon's General ~ Q.L ~ Reyolution in, 
~~Century (1851) and Peter Kropotkin's Fields. Factories 
~Workshops Tomorrow,George Allen and Unwin, London, 1974. (In 
the introduction to the 1974 edition Colin Ward tells us that 
Kropotkin's text, which was -first published in 1888-90, was 
revised and enlarged for a new edition which appeared just before 
World War One. His ideas were very influential at that time, 
especially in England where he lived before his return to Russia 
after the revolution. [Kropotkin 1974:9-12]) Note however, that 
syndicalism was not really anarchist. Stoddard described it as 
mid-way between anarchism and state socialism as it proposed some 
form of federalistic arrangement. (Stoddard 1922:151) 
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Marx never did. that the cause of industrial strife was the 
desire on the part of worker to control their own destinies 
rather thdn in any strong sense of class exploitation. {Duguit 
1919:xiv} (1) Indeed, collectivist answers to the class problem 
were doomed to failure {here the influence of Vilfredo Pareto and 
Roberto Michels was also important) as they only resulted in a 
new bureaucratic and eventually corrupt elite. {Sorel 1920:16) 
So insofar as the syndicalists offered a vision of a better 
world it was the idea of a society dominated by small-holdings. 
But for Sorel. at least. this was not meant to convey the 
impression of a final or utopian state of affairs. In his 
opposition to rationalist utopias Sorel resisted providing any 
neat blue-prints for the future. (Harley 1912:63) This appears 
also to be true of Proudhon. Sorel thought Proudhon was sceptical 
about the idea of progress and cited him (in a 1920 appendix to 
the French edition of the Illusjons o.f Progress) predicting in 
1860 that the future would be a place of blood and slaughter. 
Sorel added that the situation in 1920 was even more serious; and 
that it could only be saved by what Proudhon had called a 
"'sweeping revolution' ... in men's minds and hearts." (Sorel 
1969:211} It is also important to point out that this resistance 
to theorising about the future once again reveals that 
tendency in syndicalist theory to focus on methods rather than 
final aims. (Fairchild 1919:348, Merriam 1924:219) To what 
1. La.ski wrote thdt Proudhon " ... gave no 
nationalisation which was the result of Marx's 
did be insist that only by the destruction of 
bureaucracy created by the Revolution could 
effective." (Duguit 1919:xiv) 
quarter to the 
teaching. Rather 
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degree this was more true of the theoreticians rather than the 
activists is a matter of debate. Bertrand Russell, for example, 
suggested that this view of the syndicalists was partly the 
result of some myth-making on the part of those intellectuals who 
followed their activities. He wrote that: 
Syndicalist aims are somewhat less definate that Syndicalist 
methods. The intellectuals who endeavour to interpret them -
not always very faithfully - represent them as a party of 
movement and change, following a Bergsonian ~ ~. 
without needing any very clear prevision of the goal to 
which it is to take them. (Russell 1919:81) 
However, it has been noted that syndicalist leaders such as 
Emile Pouget and Emile Pataud, contrary to Sorel's teachings, did 
talk (in their Comment ~ Ferons la. Revolution), of a 
"syndicalist millennium". (Harley 1912:209, Merriam 1924:218) But 
syndicalist activists, it has been argued, also differed from 
Sorel to the extent that they were much more pragmatic and 
flexible in their use of tactics than his writings would suggest. 
I have mentioned for instance the routine of the grouping 
process. We should also note that sabotage was introduced a 
means of attacking the wealth of capitialists without at the same 
time threatening life and limb. (van der Linden 1990:29) (Sorel 
himself did not approve of practises such as sabotage but only 
because he believed workers should strive for perfection and 
nobility and acts of sabotage worked against this because they 
both ruined the fruits of proletarian labour and were motivated 
by revenge. (Harley 1912:58, Sorel 1950:21, Gunn 1920:115) [1)} 
1. On the role of violence Sorel's position is difficult to 
define. He seemed to draw a distinction between a noble sort of 
violence and a barbaric sort - although in practise this 
distinction would be rather hard to maintain. In relation to 
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In seeking to interpret the syndicalists, Laski argued that 
people had been greatly misled by the "attractive glamour" of 
Sorel. If one really wanted to understand the syndicalist 
phenomenon he wrote, then one should look to the "workshops 
themselves and in the effort ... to develop a complete economic and 
social life for the worker outside the traditional categories of 
the state." {Duguit 1919:xiii) (2) Dimnet, on the other hand, 
contrasted the purity of Sorel's motivation with many others in 
the socialist movement Sorel. he wrote, had sought to 
sacrifice himself to the ideals of the socialist movement and had 
not sought personal power. {Dimnet 1913:25f) 
this distinction Sorel wrote that proletarian violence is 
"fine and heroic" as it awakens the proud sentiments in the 
workers such as those carried in the hearts of soldiers in 
ancient Greece. Indeed, he argued, proletarian violence which is 
swift and pure can save the world from the barbarism created by 
economic decadence and is therefore something which is in the 
service of civilisation. {Sorel 1950:21n:98) For a further 
defence of this idea of proletarian violence see Appendix 2 
"Apology for Violence" included in the third edition of 
Reflections Q.D. Vjolence. {Sorel 1950:275-6) It is also worth 
noting that in the fourth edition of 1919 a third appendix "In 
Defense of Lenin" was added, in which Sorel responded to attacks 
on his earlier paens to the role of violence, that he saw 
violence as a necessary instrument of change which was already in 
use by the ruling classes. This did not mean he supported 
ruthless tyranny. He wrote "I have ... very strongly criticised in 
my book the frequently bloody tyranny of the French Revolution." 
(Sorel 1950:277n) 
2. Barbara Mitchell has recently argued (in addition to pointing 
out that in 1920 the Third International outlawed independent 
socialist or syndicalist movements which had an obvious impact on 
their future [van der Linden 1990:37]) that the leaders of the 
movement had "always been too practical to put all their eggs 
into one tactical basket. Direct action had always been based on 
taking advantage of the opportunities inherent in any given 
circumstance." {van der Linden 1990:38) Ber analysis would seem 
to confirm Laski's point that too much attention was given to the 
philosophy of Sorel and not enough to the more practical aspects 
of the movement. Indeed, she concludes her study by saying that 
the syndicalist movement was not the great failure some have 
claimed it to be. (van der Linden 1990:40) 
The exact nature of the relation between Sorel and the 
syndicalists and the degree to which this movement has been 
incorrectly interpreted as •irrationalist• are not debates I want 
to enter into here. What is important for this study is the 
actual regard in which the syndicalists were held by scholars in 
the English-speaking world; the fact is, that in discussions of 
the syndicalist phenomenon there was a great deal of focus on its 
cataclysmic approach (the proclaimed intention of tearing down 
capitalism rather than reforming it [Fairchild 1919:348, Dimnet 
1913:23]} and on the influence of Sorel as well as Bergson. In 
many respects, this emphasis on tactics, particularly an 
explosive set of tactics, became one of the defining features of 
syndicalism. In Reflections .o.n. Violence Sorel directly drew upon 
military theory in his discussion of revolutionary strategy, 
likening the general strike to a Napoleonic (or Clausewitzian} 
war of annihilation. (Sorel 1950:119} It was due to this belief, 
that the construction of New Jerusalems is a pointless task and 
that all that matters is the battle itself - an idea which 
implies permanent warfare. (Stoddard 1922:157}. It was for this 
reason that Sorelian syndicalism was dismissed as irrational. (1) 
1. In the light of the preceding comments, we should note that 
some have argued that this aspect of syndicalism has been 
overstated. Shils writes that Sorel was not so much objecting to 
all imaginings about the future but only those that posited the 
ideal of a final and ideal world. (See Edward Shils introduction 
to the 1950 American edition of Reflections, p. 15.) Sorel 
himself wrote that while we cannot predict the future 
scientifically, and indeed attempts to do so by socialists lead 
to a political passivity that can only serve the interests of the 
ruling classes, one must be able to think about in some way if 
one is to act. Sorel preferred to call such musings about the 
future social myths - which are useful to the degree that they 
arouse people to act. (Sorel 1950:124-5} 
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Sorel's rejection of socialism and its visions .of utopia was. in 
line with his rejection of the scientific belief in progress 
which was so current in France in his student days.when be .was 
undergoing training to be an engineer. Bergson's rejection of 
Darwinian or rationalist conceptions of historical development, 
as I noted earlier, was also influential here. (Sorel 1969:136) 
(1) But it was Bergson's philosophy of intuition that was most 
associated with the political aspects of Sorel's programme. 
In fact, syndicalists were often called Bergsonians. (Dimnet 
1913:23, Mott 1922:26) Sorel drew from Bergson ideas about the 
desirability of voluntary action and constant motion, and a 
Heraclitan view of reality as ceaseless change and flux. (Mott 
1922:26) The political world too was a mixture of possibilities 
and potentialities ready to be seized by the brave adventurer. 
Politically, one had to immerse oneself in reality rather than 
sit back and wait for the fulfillment of divine edicts or latent 
pattern in history; the revolutionary should rupture history and 
break its steady course by swift and sudden action. (Dimnet 
1913:25) 
The association with Bergson only added to the charge of 
irrationalism; other words such as mystic, gestural and poetic 
have also been used to describe Bergson's influence upon 
1. It is also not surpr1s1ng that Sorel so appreciatively hit 
upon the pragmatism of James .for its puncturing of the scientific 
faith and denial of all absolutes, in addition to his 
instrumentalist appreciation of the role of myth and gesture, 
seemed to sit comfortably alongside the pragmatists rejection of 
intellectualistic approaches to politics and life and its own 
emphasis on methods rather than final aims, as one writer put it. 
(Fairchild 1919:349) 
syndicalism. As a certain Australian scholar, I.G. Sutherland 
noted in the early 1930s, the syndicalist resort to violence bad 
been blamed on their embrace of Bergson's ideas of change and 
becoming. Sutherland wrote that these notions were "most likely 
to produce dangerous revolutionary movements. 8 (Sutherland 
1932:222) 
How real was the influence of Bergson? Sorel it seemed had 
certainly listened to Bergson's talks and studied his philosophy. 
~ Illusions of. Progress 
,. 
and h l'utHite du. Pragmatjsme 
demonstrated his knowledge of Bergson's critique of science and 
his theory of creative evolution. (Dimnet 1913:24) In Illusions 
Sorel's even defended Bergson against the charge that in 
attacking rationalism in philosophy Bergson was also attacking 
democracy. (1) When Bergson wrote Sorel an amiable letter 
,. 
thanking Sorel for sending him a copy of Ile. l 'utilite du 
Pragmatjsme Sorel was overjoyed. (2} Furthermore, Sorel certainly 
asserted a connection between Bergson's philosophy and his own 
political theories. Harley cited Sorel as stating that the 
1. Sorel wrote in Ihg, Illusions Q,L Progress ~hat: "If soaeone 
considers making a protext against the illusion of rationalisa he 
is immediately accused of being an enemy of democracy. I have 
often heard people who pride themselves on working for progress 
deplore the teachings of Bergson and point to the• as the 
greatest danger confronting modern thought." (Sorel 1969:22) 
2. It is recorded in Bergson's Melanges that: "Bergson replied 
with a most amiable letter in reponse to the book having been 
sent and this was one of the last great pleasures for Sorel. In 
spite of all the bitterness of the war Bergson remained for him 
the master who he listened to with Peguy. His pleasure erupted in 
all the letters which be wrote to his correspond4nts::: (Bergson 
1972:1332-3) 
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General Strike was "the perfect knowledge of the Bergsonian 
philosophy.• (Harley 1912:57) (1) There were indeed, constant 
references to Bergson's philosophy and to its affinities with 
Sorel's own in Reflectjons. 1950:122ff) 
Whether this direct influence was profound is another 
question. Dimnet, for instance, argued that despite his long 
studies of Bergson, Sorel's use of that philosopher was confined 
to the use of his language. (Dimnet 1913:24) Reflections is laced 
with words such as intuition, flux and becoming. 
Interestingly, however, both Lovejoy and Perry have suggested it 
is precisely Bergson's language, his use of figures and "strange 
symbols" with obscure meanings which could only be sensed or 
intuited, that resulted in his utility and popularity. (2) 
1. This quotation was oft-cited; for various references to it see 
Gunn, 1920, p.lMn. The wnole qkote·u. A.S f-o1\di.too1S.''5'hi.Jr:~ nave 
engendered in the proletariat the most noble, the most profound, 
the most moving sentiments they possess. The General Strike goups 
these in a composite picutre, and by bringing together, gives to 
each its maximum intensity; appealing to the most acute memories 
of particular conflicts, it colours with an intense life all the 
details of the composition presented to the mind. We obtain thus 
an intuition of Socialism which language cannot clearly express 
and we obtain it in a symbol instantly perceived, such as is 
maintained in the Bergsonian philosophy." Sorel wrote in 
Reflections that in the general strike one obtains " ... that 
intuition of Socialism which language cannot give us with perfect 
clearness - and we obtain it as a whole, perceived 
instantaneously.• (Sorel 1950:128) He added that this is the 
"global knowledge of Bergson's philosophy.• (Sorel 1950:128n} 
Sorel also saw at the core of James' philosophy a celebration of 
a •mystic ~· and of the experience of the supernatural. Such 
experiences, Sorel wrote, ennobled human beingsand were the very 
things that bourgeois society was so befreft of. It was precisely 
this sort of sense of the sacred - this mystic tlm .,. - .that he 
wanted to see carried forward by the working classes. (Sorel 
1969:180f} 
2. See Lovejoy, "The Practical Tendencies of Bergsonism•, p.2 
cited in Perry 1918, p.295. 
A related -.point, -made by--Sclmei4er, .was -tbat-"-M~as--because 
Bergson, as was much remarked upon, did not develop or refine the 
moral and social implications of his theory that it was left open 
to exploitation by various authors including including Sorel and 
James- (Merriam 1924:325-7) Schneider argued that the political 
implications of Bergson's work were clear enough; that is, they 
were on the side of individualism and romanticism. (Merriam 
1924:325-7} Dimnet had earlier argued that Sorel's methods owed 
less to Bergsonian philosophy or language and more to the love -0f 
sensation and war-fever that were so characteristic of the yellow 
press. On this last point, Fairchild cited Sorel himself as 
saying that storming capitialism was like the quest for glory in 
war in because it awakened the soul. (Fairchild 1919:348-9} (1} 
That Bergson's philosophy was not intended to be an 
incitement to violent action must have been well known. A 
sympathetic rendering of his ideas published by the People's 
Press in 1911 entitled ~ Bergson: The Philosopher Q£ Change 
written by H. Wildon Carr and which was referred to by both 
Harley and Macdonald in their own books. (Harley 1912:56n 1 
Macdonald 1912:18} (2) Carr wrote that Bergson was conscious of 
the implications of his work, and had him .saying _that neither 
1. Sorel wrote that it was this sensation that saved the 
proletariat from the "quackery of ambitious leaders, hungry for 
the fleshpots.• (Fairchild 1919:348-9 Sorel 1950:l2.Jl -~~-~-·-·-· ,. 
2. Macdonald cited Carr's text in order to point out that ·Sorel 
had fallen •into errors ...against which Bergson himself warns .bis 
readers• because Bergson himself agreed that the intellect had 
value in the service of action. However, Macdonald did later 
add that at some points in Sorel's writings, •Bergson is Sorel's 
master - and with Bergson stands Nietzsche, with his superaan." 
{Macdonald 1912:18:22) 
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philosophy or philosophers could stand --apart -from the 
international strife - that is, the Great War. In this context, 
Carr referred (although not by name) to an address Bergson gave, 
entitled "Life and Matter at War•, in front of the French 
Academie ~ Sciences Morales g,t, Politigues on December 12~ 1914~ 
where he registered his support France's war effort. Carr claimed 
this was not just for patriotic reasons. It was also because 
Bergson saw the war against the Germany as ultimately a 
philsophical struggle between freedom and matter or between free-
will as embodied in the French people and that form of 
mechanistic determinism that the German people . had chosen 
(despite their past love of art, metaphysics and poetry) in 
pursuing Bismarck's path towards unification. ( 1) (Bergson 
1915:466, Carr 1919:ix-x) As regards syndicalism, Gunn in his 
Bergson ~ ~ Phjlosophy (1920) and in later articles defended 
Bergson saying that just because the philosopher believed in the 
reality of change did not mean that he regarded all changes as 
good. Furthermore, he argued that Bergson's philosophy 
politically implied a society in which people had the freedom and 
wherewithal to fully express themselves. (Gunn 
1920:116ff:1927:279) (1) 
1. This speech was well publicised both during and after the war 
years. The opening portion of this address was translated and 
published in I.Wt, Hibbert Jounral. 1915, pp. 465-75. Lalande 
also cited Bergson as saying in relation to the war: "The France 
of to-morrow wi1Lbe what we will :it to be; for the ·future ls -
dependent upon us, and is that which free human wills make of 
it.• In relation to this point Lalande wrote that whatever France 
did or willed would not be the result of "pure caprice ... Our will 
is the faculty that we possess as men, of decision by the 
consideration of ideal values.• (Lalande 1916:535) Lalande also 
noted the fact that the war had severely affected instruction in 
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But I want to leave aside this question as to the •oral or 
political implications of Bergson's work as it relates to a 
general issue I will return to later - that being the relation 
between philosophy and politics. Let us just note that Sorel's 
political theory, which was supposed to be inspired .by the 
syndicalists but which also owed much to certain philosophies of 
action, was not appropriate to the task of steadily improving the 
living standards of ordinary workers; indeed, in many ways it was 
not intended to do so. It is not surprising then, that his 
influence among the syndicalists (which some believed had been 
over-stated anyway) waned. (1) 
As for the syndicalist movement itself, despite early 
successes such as the postal strike of 1908, the movement 
declined, especially during the First World War when the 
patriotic spirit of the French people was reawakened. (1) The 
Confederation Generate du. Travail was revived after the Treaty of 
Versailles. Inspired by the Bolshevik example, it began 
philosophy in France; both students and teachers had enlisted in 
the war-effort. (Lalande 1916:526) Perry also cited this speech 
at length and noted that it was one of Bergson's few incursions 
into the realms of moral or political philosophising. (Perry 
1918:345) Gunn also drew attention to the fact that a number of 
articles had been written concerning Bergson's message to 
feminism. (Gunn 1920:119) 
1. In the years between 
1910-14 Sorel. disillusioned with the sydicalists, drifted into 
neo-royalist circles. He was also extensively cited -in their · 
pamphlets. (Dimt~t 1913:27, Oneal 1924:93) It was the Boshevik 
revolution which once more raised Sorel's hopes that society 
could be renewed by the workers. (Sorel 1950:23) 
2. Dimnet in fact claims that a new public spirit was appearing 
in France before the war. (Dimnet 1913:29) 
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launching strikes in May 1920 in order to create a revolutionary 
situation; but such efforts were wasted. Elliot noted Duguit's 
comment that that in the midst of this strike the French nation 
rose against the enemy within just as they bad rose against the 
Germans in 1914. (Elliot 1924:249) In ensuing years. the CGT 
succumbed to the same political fate that Jiad turned Sorel 
against the socialists; that is, it gradually accumulated wealth 
and political standing. and began to adopt a more reformist path. 
In Sorel's terms. it had lost its virility. 
5. Syndicalism Elsewhere 
Italian syndicalism followed a similar although in one sense 
less spectacular path than that of the French movement. Sorel was 
read and translated there from 1903 onwards and be himself saw 
Italy as providing a rich soil in which his ideas could take 
root. (Harley 1912:59,44, Elliot 1924:234n) Yet after brief 
period of violence in 1919-20, the syndicalist movement in Italy 
declined. This was partly due to the movement's lack of any 
coherent programme or set of policies. (Elliot 1924:249f ,249n) 
(1) In their attempts to reconcile Marx and Sorel (Marx's vision 
and Sorel's tactics) Italian syndicalists had failed to shape a 
coherent programme or philosophy. (van der Linden 1990:139-40) 
As a consequence syndicalism in Italy was very fractionalised 
with different sections of the movement adopting different ideas. 
and approaches. Perhaps more importantly, their emphasis on local 
autonomy meant there was a failure to develop a strong national 
1. Mussolini claimed that by 1919 "Socialism. as a doctrine was 
already dead ..• " (Mussolini 1935:16) 
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industrial organisation equivalent to the CGT in 
der Linden 1990:139-40, Lorwin 1957:36) 
The most significant legacy of syndicalism in 
from the effects of the industrial struggles 
France. {van 
Italy came 
of 1919-20, 
themselves a result of the economic strains imposed by the war. 
(van der Linden 1990:140) While the strikes of this period 
failed, their importance for us is twofold. First, the 
justification that industrial disarray gave to fascist violence, 
and second, the conversion of some syndicalists to the cause of 
fascism and indeed, the admiration in fascist circles for the 
writings of Sorel. (1) (Shils writes that in Weimar Germany the 
intelligentsia also became interested in Sorel following their 
disillusion with democracy. [Sorel 1950:24]} There is perhaps a 
little irony in the fact that Sorel died in 1922 shortly before 
Mussolini's march on Rome. (Sorel 1950:23) It was the peculiar 
relation between syndicalism and fascism that led Elliot to 
concur with G.D.H. Cole's view, expressed in The. World Q..f Labour 
(1913), that Sorel's influence was greater in Italy than in 
France. (Elliot 1924:234f, Cole 1915:166ff) Obviously, Cole could 
not have been referring to the relation between syndicalism and 
Fascism when he made this comment. Cole wrote that it was 
because socialism in Italy had •always been much devoted to the 
criticism and interpretation of Marxian doctrine, his [Sorel's] 
neo-Marxism has probably had even more effect on theory there 
than in France.• (Cole 1915:167) Cole also argued that the 
syndicalist movement, contrary to widespread belief, was not very 
strong in Italy. (Cole 1915:167-8} 
1. After 1922 the fascists attempted to force ~11 workers into 
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Weaker syndicalist movements also appeared in the English-
speaking world. These movements, in countries such as England and 
Australia, were seen as being more moderate and more tolerant of 
political participation than their European counterparts. Harley 
wrote that this was partly because they were more pessimistic 
about their own ability to change the systea through strike 
action. (Harley 1912:79]47) But it was also attributed to what 
were alleged to be peculiarly Latin intellectual tastes. Elliot 
wrote that the popularity of syndicalism in France and Italy was 
due to a "Latin love of the sublime" (the words sublime and 
sublimity are often mentioned in Reflections [Sorel 1950:210f]), 
in contrast with a more moderate political temperament which was 
alleged to prevail in the English-speaking world, at least before 
the 1926 General Strike in Britain. (Elliot 1925:499, Harley 
1912:45) 
Moderation was not always characteristic of the English-
speaking world. In some places it seems, there was at least a 
flirtation with sublimnity. Harley, for instance, noted that 
Sorel's theory of the General Strike "gave confidence to the 
desperadoes" of Australian industrial trade unionism. (Harley 
1912:59} However, it was in America that the major -expression of 
syndicalism in the English-speaking world occurred. 
Syndicalism in American was represented by the Industrial 
Workers of the World (also known as the Wobblies}. They were 
their own National Confederation of Syndicalist Corporations. 
(see van der Linden and Thorpe 1990:148-51) This was 
complemented by the Anti-Strike Law of April 3, 1926, No.563. A 
translation of this piece of legislation is included in Paul 
Einzig's ~Economic Foundations n..f. Fascism. (Einzig 1933:133ff} 
See Mussolini, Fascism, Ardita Publishers, Rome, 1935, pp.16-7. 
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formed in 1905, arising out of the ashes of an earlier secret 
organisation known as tne tfobJ.e Knlt.bts of laboc. Liil.e the £'tench 
syndicalists, the Wobblies rejected political negotiation in 
favour of direct action. For while much of the industrial 
movement was incorporated into the state after the war, when 
President Wilson introduced a number of industrial reforms, the 
members of the IWW stayed true to the syndicalist faith. (van der 
Linden 1990:215} (1} Melvyn Dubofsky has recently argued that it 
was their policy of direct action in the period 1917-18 which 
brought American syndicalists into open conflict with the 
government. (van der Linden 1990:215} Another major source of 
friction was that many American syndicalists, (like the French 
movement in the war's early years) had openly opposed their 
country's participation in the Great War. (Oneal 1924:93} (2} 
In America, the conflict between industrial groups and 
political and economic elites followed the same logic of 
escalation as had similar conficts in Europe. Many have argued 
that American industrial warfare, on the part of both employers 
and employees, was waged with a ferocity unknown in Europe. 
(Russell 1919:86, Davies 1943:28f, Lorwin 1957:37} 
One of the explanations for this offered -at the time was 
that violence was an endemic feature of American society and 
1. In this context. Davies mentions the Clayton Act of 19.14 which 
afforded labour •temporary-protection against injunctions ••• This 
was primarily an anti-trust act and the opportunity was taken of 
excluding labour from its operation.•_ (Davies 1943:35) 
2. On the collapse of socialism in America during the war and the 
part played by the syndicalists see James Oneal, "Changing 
Fortunes of American Socialism", Current History, April, 1924, 
pp. 92-97. 
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culture. It was part of America's greatness and had its source in 
the harshness and discipline Americans had had to learn in their 
pioneering days. Americans were in Sorel's sense an heroic race. 
He appeared to express admiration for the courage and daring 
which inspired the use of the lynch law in America - although at 
the same time he called it barbaric~ (Sorel 1950:98, Elliot 
1924:241n) 
An additional explanation offered by Bertrand Russell was 
that what the French syndicalists claimed about the state as an 
agent of capitalism was much more true of the American situation, 
where the trusts were more powerful than were the eorporations in 
Europe. (Russell 1919: 87f) Another consequence of the laissez-
faire attitude towards the industrialists (whom Davies has argued 
exhibited an implacable hatred for unionists not in evidence in 
Britain [Davies 1943:16]}, was that they were able to get away 
with deploying private armies, factory arsenals and industrial 
espionage services in their fight with the workers. (Davies 
1943:16 Lorwin 1957:37) One should note too that "citizens 
committees", or lynching parties were used against members of 
the IWW. (Elliot 1928:118, Elliot 1924:2417241n) 
With public opinion behind it, the government was able to 
pass the Criminal Syndicalism Act during the war years and 
generally use the courts to prosecute the movement's leaders. 
(Elliot 1924:255J256n} Another consequence of this mood of fear 
and hostility (the end of the war had seen a return to bitter and 
violent strike action [Davies 1943:42]) was the arrest in 1919, 
and later trial, of the two "anarchist fish pedlars" (as Laski 
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called them}, Nicola Sacco and Bartolomeo Vanzetti who were 
charged with robbery and murder. (The two were executed in 1927.} 
The whole case caused an uproar-in literary -and intellectual 
circles because of the perceived political motivation behind it. 
Laski claimed that they were arrested for their anarchism rather 
than for their alleged crimes. (Laski 1930:5f) (During the trial 
a gangster confessed to the murders and claimed the robbery was 
performed by the mob.} Laski had been teaching at Harvard up 
until 1920 and this incident helped fuel his hostility towards 
the excessive use of state power. [Laski 1930:5f] (Beloff wrote 
that Laski was so affected by their trial and execution that he 
was still writing indignantly about it twenty five years later in 
The. American pemocracv. [Beloff 1950:380]} {1} 
Indeed, Laski's whole experience in America was important, 
for there he graphically saw the struggle between capital and 
·labour; he also saw how the machinery of the state was used to 
crush the striking workers such as in the Boston police strike of 
1919. Laski argued that if American society were to survive 
class hostility and war-fare then it was necessary to make 
society more pluralistic and participatory. (Lask 1920:337} Such 
calls for compromise were made also against the backdrop of the 
Russian Revolution. Dewey referred to this event in 1920 in the 
~ Rgpublic when he, like Laski, argued the ~ase for worker 
participation schemes in order to stop the spread of sovietism 
1. Laski left England for America in 1914, first to McGill 
University and then to Harvard. Returning to England in 1920 be 
took up a post at the London School of Ecomomics where he stayed 
until bis death. (Fadiman 1939:165) For references-to ~he Sacco 
and Vanzetti case see Laski's ~ American Democracy, George 
Allen and Unwin, London, 1949, pp. 70, 140, 163, 579, 588, 626, 
665f. 
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and militant industrial unionism in the United States. {Dewey 
1920: 317) 
The syndicalist movement in Britain was the most moderate 
and weakest of all the syndicalist movements. G.D.H. Cole made it 
clear in his World Qi Labour that the syndicalist movement was 
only of limited significance in relation to British industrial 
affairs. The Industrial Syndicalist League was formed in 1920 
under the leadership of Tom Mann whose writings indicated a 
willingness to compromise with the political power. _ (Harley 
1912:44f) Harley claimed that this was partly a result of Mann's 
experiences in Australia where he had witnessed a Commonwealth 
Labor government refuse to assist the state government of 
Queensland in the suppression of strikers during the Brisbane 
tramway dispute of 1912. (Harley 1912:44,79) Nevertheless, the 
word syndicalism appears to have caused anxiety in some circles. 
Fairchild wrote that in England the hysteria was such in some 
quarters that one would think it as easy to raze the Bank of 
England as to remove the Russian Tsar. (Fairchild 1919:348) 
Not surprisingly, syndicalists were disliked not just by 
political conservatives but also by the mainstream labour 
movement, the Labour Party politicians and figures such as Sidney 
and Beatrice Webb. (van der Linden 1990:114) In the latter case 
the fear was that the disruptive practices of syndicialist-
inspired groups (such as the English coal miners' str41te --0f ~hi ch 
took place in the spring of 1920 [Elliot 1925:492]), could 
setback Labour's own parlimentary and industrial work on behalf 
of the labour movement. 
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Laski claimed in Studies ill thi. Problem gL Soyereignty that 
before the First World War the union ideal commanded wider 
allegiance than did the state. (Laski 1917:15} Yet it must be 
remembered that the labour movement was much more successfully 
incorporated into the mainstream of political life in England (as 
well as in Australia and New Zealand), than it was elsewhere. 
Hence, J. Ramsay McDonald's book on Syndicalism. which, while 
condemning it strongly, also conceded that its influence in 
England was hitherto limited. (Macdonald 1912:45) 
Barker too, at least before the war, seemed little concerned 
by the presence of syndicalist elements and the ability of the 
British state to cope with these. In fact, Barker argued that 
pluralist ideas were well in keeping with English political 
traditions. He wrote that anti-statism had a long and respected 
history in England in the form of non-conformism and liberalism. 
The English state, Barker wrote, was accustomed to being 
discredited - and it was too its credit that it was. (Barker 
1957:154f} 
The most developed form of syndicalism in England was the 
rather "bookish" guild socialism. The National Guild League was 
formed in 1915 and guild socialist ideas were embraced by leaders 
of the National Union of Railwaymen, .the Railway .Clerks 
Assocation and the National Union of Teachers. (Coker 1921:208} 
(1} 
1. Guild socialist ideas were being articulated before the .war -in 
Guild socialists broadly spoke of a pluralist society in which 
A.J. Penty's Ih£ Restoration g1 J;,hg Guilds System {1906} and in 
A.R. Orage's the Politics~ Craftsmen (1907} (Coker 1921:204n}; 
its most well-know advocates after the war were S.G. Hobson (e.g. 
~Principles iu. ~ iUl4 Peace, Bell and Sons Ltd., London, 
1917), G.D.H. Cole {e.g Self-Goyernment iD, Industry, Bell and 
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participation was extended into the administrative and production 
structures of society. They presented a reformist syndicalism; 
occupying a space somewhere between the radical pluralism of the 
syndicalists and the monism of the state-socialists seeking to 
reconcile producer and consumer interests. (Merriam 1924:227) 
While emphasising distributivist rather than collectivist values, 
most of the movements theoreticians seemed aware of the need to 
prevent the weakening of central authority through too great a 
dispersal of power. In line with the pluralist thought of Figgis, 
there would not be a complete absence of collective association. 
Barker wrote that a guild socialist society would be a co-
operative commonwealth. (Barker 1915:226f) In reference to this 
last point, we should note that guild socialists frequently based 
their notional political system on what they considered to be the 
organic industrial organization of the Middle Ages. 
Doubts about the historical accuracy of this medieval ideal 
were expressed. (1) More importantly for us this organic 
conception of society could shade into something far more 
technical-sounding. That is, insofar as guild socialists promoted 
the idea of functional representation, they obviously overlapped 
with those who placed an emphasis on bureaucratic expertise. The 
Sons Ltd •• London, 1918) and Bertrand Russell (e.g ·~ .t,a 
Freedom London, 1919). All of these writers published in the 
Guild Socialist journal Ih.e, ~ ~- (Coker 1921:204n) R.H. 
Tawney's Acguisitiye Society, Bell and Sons Ltd., London, 1920, 
is also sometimes mentioned in this context. 
1. See Austin P. Evans in the Political Quarterly where he 
discussed the lack of historical accuracy in the guild socialist 
picture of medieval society. (Evans 1921:603,614f) 
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American scholar Harry Elmer Barnes described the functionalist 
state as one where, instead of attempting to resolve all social 
and economic problems through one single political organization, 
legislation and administration would be turned over "to 
specialized groups which are most competent in the field of their 
own activities and interests." (Barnes 1925:144) (1) 
When expressed in this form, guild socialism came very close 
to the Fabian idea of Municipal Socialism, which while allowing 
for some local autonomy, also spoke of rational guidance by an 
impartial public service which would occupy the commanding 
heights of the economy. It is for this reason that Fabian 
socialism, unlike guild socialism, is usually identified with 
collectivist or consumer rather than producer or group interests. 
Guild socialism understood as functional representation was 
similar to administrative syndicalism - the idea of a civil or 
public service independent of political power, whose expertise 
was devoted to the efficient running of society. (2) 
Many discussions of pluralism liked to cite the development 
of independent civil or public services as evidence of the 
pluralistic trend. The growing system of ~uthorites charged with 
overseeing economic and industrial relations were seen as an 
1. Laski described the guild socialist society as one where 
parliament would govern alongside a "Congress of the supreme 
bodies representing each of the main functions in Society" (Laski 
1948:138) We should note that guild socialists such as Cole did 
not believe functional representation was the sole answer. (Cole 
1918:85-9) Also note Laski's suggestion that Cole was far too 
optimistic in believing the guilds could spontaneously govern 
themselves. (Laski 1920:383) 
2. Laski wrote that while guild socialism was in vogue in 1920 by 
the middle of that decade its influence had become negligible or 
had largely come to lie in its emphasis on industrial 
decentralisation. (Laski 1925:99) 
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example of this. (Sabine 1923:47) Francis .W. Coker (of Ohio 
State University) specifically referred to the emergence of 
boards of Compulsory Arbitration in New South Wales and New 
Zealand, the Whitley system of industrial tribunals in England 
(which involved establishing in various departJDents hoards-which 
were jointly representative of employees and ministerial heads) 
and the British government's moves to establish a national 
council of representation for the English police. 
1919:203:210n) 
{Coker 
France was also grappling with the issue of administrative 
decentralisation at this time. {Lippman 1919:148f) It was the 
controversy in the French Civil Service before 1914 over its 
claims to autonomy from the arbitrary acts of political 
authorities that fostered Duguit's writings on administrative 
pluralism. (Duguit 
Duguit regarded 
commissions in 
1919:xii, Coker 1921:198, Cohen 1919:201) 
the evolution of self-directing boards and 
the public service and in the state 
universities as crucial examples of administrative syndicalism. 
(Sabine 1920:312) {1) 
If we can still call this a variant of syndicalism, it is 
clearly far removed from the syndicalism of Sorel, which insisted 
on the centrality of power in political life and which seemed to 
care less for the detailed planning of social development. -As 
Coker noted, Duguit's primary interest was in government 
activity, not in the welfare of "nonpolitical social groups". In 
particular, Duguit sought to show that the creation of "statutory 
law (1J2ia) is not the exclusive prerogative of any one organ in 
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the state" and further, that governmental action is or should be 
subject to certain legal limits. {Coker 1921: 191) (1) I shall say 
more about this in the next chapter. For the moment, one should 
note that calls for the decentralisation and independence of the 
public service were far removed from the struggle of producers 
to seize control of the tools of their trade and the fruits of 
their labour. 
Both Sabine and Mott implied that to greet such developments 
as evidence for syndicalism or worker participation was somewhat 
premature. Surely, as they suggested, these developments 
constituted a delegation rather than a real decentralisation of 
power. {Mott 1922:39, 1920 Sabine:312} In fact, it was not just 
the ideal of worker participation that inspired these 
developments. The growth of syndicalism or worker participation 
in the public service was a byproduct of the growing need to 
enlarge the talent and initiative within the service. Delegating 
some power and thereby encouraging the ideals of service and 
dedication was a sensible means of achieving this goal. {Coker 
1921:202) Laski thought the issue of an independent civil service 
excited such controversy in France because the evils of a 
centralised bureaucracy were most strikingly apparent in France. 
(Duguit 1919:xiv) 
Thus, the word syndicalism was stretched to encompass a 
broad range of activities and movements; as we have seen, it was 
used to describe the gestural politics of Sorel as well as moves 
towards administrative decentralisation in France, America and 
1. Duguit was to prove influential in the development of Laski's 
thought. Harold and Frida Laski produced the English translation 
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England. Municipal or regional movements were -also ~dded to the 
syndicalist list. (1) It was even made to accommodate the role 
of the Soviets in post-revolutionary Russia. Mott wrote that the 
Soviet system was an example of pluralism practically applied 
because it included, in theory at least, local autonomy. Ofott 
1922:25) The inclusion of Bolshevik Russia within the syndicalist 
tradition may seem odd given the lack of democratic control by 
the workers under the new regime. (Laski 1920:383) However, there 
already was in syndicalism a tendency towards an elitist emphasis 
on leadership. The comparison between communism and syndicalism 
might also seem strange given its related stress (real or 
imagined) on scientific development and government by experts. As 
we saw in chapter two, the Soviet Union later came to be seen by 
some as the ultimate rationalist or scientific state. Of 
course, it was argued that claims that the Soviet Union was 
ultra-modern were false. Stoddard argued that the Russian 
experiment sprang from the same ancient barbaric impulses that 
drove the syndicalist movement. (Stoddard 1922:214) (2) But even 
where the claims that the Soviet Union was a scientific state 
were taken seriously, it could still be likened to syndicalism to 
the extent that this term implied functional representation or 
administrative syndicalism. As I have shown, placing a high 
premium on expert guidance was not entirely antithetical to the 
syndicalist tradition. 
of Duguit's 1913 work ~ iD. ,th,g, Modern ~- (1919) 
1. See Coker 1921:186-212 
2. On this point see also Elliot who claimed that Wallas also saw 
the Russian revolution as springing from raw instinct. ~Elliot 
1924:257) Note also that Charles Merriam likened Bolshevism to 
syndicalism because of its fondness for direct action. {Merriam 
1924:42) 
~- . 
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6. The Impact of the War 
I want to now turn to another aspect of the anti-statist 
movement. This aspect pertains to the fact that sovereignty or 
the state is Janus-faced. Sovereignty has both internal and 
external significance. (Korff 1923 :404 Laing 1921 :4) While we 
have just discussed the challenges to the internal dimensions of 
the sovereign state, I now want to discuss its international 
dimensions. Objections to the state in its external dealings 
were also voiced by those critical of its internal workings. 
{Although here again, there was a failure to distinguish the 
"state" from the government of the day - as I said, this is a 
problem that frequently appeared in pluralist theory.) This is 
not surprising as the internal, unitary theory of sovereignty 
which asserts there is no other higher power in the land 
logically implies an external theory of sovereignty which 
upholds the principles of a plurality of states and non-
interference. As figures from the Abbe de Saint Pierre to 
Heinrich von Treitschke have observed, the creation of the 
sovereign state simply displaces the struggle for survival onto 
the international arena. (1) 
The problem -0f particularism in international r~lations came 
into focus around the time of the Great War. Some saw this war 
as marking an end of .an era whichJ>egan_either in 1648 ..with. -the 
L Rousseau sUJ1JRarised Saint Pierre's argument.in Abstract gL.thg, 
~ ~Saint Pierre's Project~ Perpetual~ (1761). (See 
Savigear 1970:136ff) and the first lines in von Treitschke's JliA 
Freiheit were: •Treat the State as a person, and the necessary 
and rational multiplicity of States follows.• {Savigear 1970:326) 
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Treaty of Westphalia at the conclusion of the Thirty Years War, 
or with the victory of Napoleon over the Frederick II at Jena in 
1805. This was the triumph of the sovereign, or in the case -0f. 
the latter example, the sovereign bourgeois state. 
Perhaps-the latter-1iate is mor~ -appropriate~ --As-according ·to 
scholars of international law there were some means of restraint, 
some degree of sociability, present in the international system 
up until the 19th century. In the 17th and 18th century, 
publicists and diplomats such as the Dutch-born Hugo Grotius and 
the Swiss-born Emerich de Vattel had attempted to establish a 
legal framework, (based on a mixture of natural law principles, 
rules of expediency, Christian doctrine and consensual agreement) 
by which state behaviour could be regulated. (1) Sovereignty was 
accepted as a legal or jurisprudential fiction. However, as 
Pitman B. Potter (of the University of Wisconsin) wrote, in the 
19th century, internaiional thought had become more empirical and 
inductive - less interested in principles of right behaviour 
than in the actual behaviour of states. The consequence of this 
was that the doctrine of sovereignty had become utterly 
politicised and had become detached from notions of legal rights 
and obligations. (Potter 1923: 382) (2) 
In the 20th century the 19th century development of the 
doctrine that whatever the state wills is right became the crude 
basis of diplomacy. Laski wrote passionately against the conduct 
1. See Grotius' ll.e. J.u.r..e.. ~ Ac. Pacis Libri ~ (1625) and 
Vattel's ~ ~ g1 Nations (1758). (Savigear 1970:37ff:87ff) 
2. Potter writes that political philosophers and scientists bore a 
responsibility for the war of 1914..,. for having .. let this 
develoment take place. (Potter 1923:392) 
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of the modern state in the midst of the First World War. In 1916 
he stated that the state was a modern Baal -Whose conduct in war 
knew no restraints. Evidence for this lay in the fact that in 
the name of the state Belgium bad been invaded; passenger ships 
had been torpedoed; the Luisitania bad been sunk; and barbarous 
submarine warfare was conducted. (Laski 1916:302-3) He repeated 
these views no less strongly in 1930, writing that since 1870, 
particularly a result of Bismarck's efforts, the "doctrine of 
force and fraud" had become enshrined in international relations; 
since that date, he wrote, all nations had stood poised ready to 
fight as "gladiators." (Laski 1930:254:257} 
In particular, from the post-war perspective, 1914 and its 
aftermath had demonstrated the ruinous consequences of a purely 
political understanding of sovereignty as expressed in the form 
of the doctrine of self-limitation. (Korff 1923:410} As previous 
comments suggest, this highly political notion of sovereignty was 
seen to prevail especially in Germany. (Laski 1916:302-3) It is 
noteworthy that Treitschke's lectures in Berlin in the late 19th 
century on the power of the state were strongly condemned in 
England during the war years for -inciting the Germans to 
militarism. (Savigear 1970:325) But it was not just the more 
obvious figures such as Treitschke who were blamed. Intellectuals 
like Laski spoke of the acceptance of a certain "grill 
Hegelianism• as leading to ·war. (Laski 1919:302) Dewey 
published a book in 1915 called German Philosophy ~ Politjcs (a 
revised edition with added material on Hitler and his relation to 
German philosophy appeared in 1942) which examined the influence 
of Germany's classic philosophy on its politics. (Dewey 1942:5} 
Of course, ··much of this literature was written in. the midst of 
the "beat of war propaganda". Nevertheless, the question of what 
relation philosophy bore to politics (as we have seen in the case 
of Bergson and the syndicalists), was regarded as a worthy and 
important topic of discussion. (1) Indeed, the , interwar 
criticisms levelled at certain Western philosophical doctrines in 
the because of their alleged association with unsavoury political 
movements or all-powerful states must have been taken seriously 
up to a point. There was often more than a hint of defensiveness 
in some of the philosophical studies published in that period. 
But we should note that in the post-war years criticism 
shifted away from a specifically German conception of state-power 
and was also directed at range of monistic thinkers in other 
Western countries. Korff said it was true that Germans had 
glorified in the nation and the all-powerful state before the 
war, but he added this was not solely a German pre-occupation. 
(Korff 1923:404-5) Other scholars agreed. Charles A. Beard wrote 
in his introduction to Whither Mankjnd (1928) nationalism, or 
at least a sense of the moral superiority of one's own society, 
was expressed by opinion leaders in England, France and America 
before the war and not just by William II. (Beard 1928:6f) 
Merriam made the same points in the first chapter of ~ Hjstory Qi. 
Philosophy in Recent tjmes. (2) 
1. On this topic also see Perry, ~Present Copfljct g.b Ideals, 
1918, where he appeared to endorse Dewey's views. See especially, 
Cb. XII, Ch. XIX, Ch.XXVIII. This book also addressed the 
philosophical background to the syndicalist movement. 
2. On the role that nationalis• played both bef<>re and <luriog·-the--
. War see also Merriam, 1924, p.27-8. 
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But it is not the phenomenon of nation-worship that I wish 
to examine. This was seen as a popular rather than as an 
intellectual pastime. It is observations about the role of 
monistic theories of unitary sovereignty giving rise to 
gladiatorial states that I am most interested in. On this matter 
too, there were other culprits besides an outdated Teutonic 
metaphysics. Thus, when Laski was fulminating against the war it 
was not just the Germans who were the object of his attack 
despite his strong words. For Laski flatly argued that the 
sovereign state was the cause of war. In this context too, Korff 
(although perhaps for slightly different reasons} listed English 
thinkers such as Thomas Hobbes (whom Laski called "that prince of 
monistic thinkers" [Laski 1917:25]), John Austin and Sir William 
Blackstone, the Russian theorist Kortunov, France's Carre de 
Malberg and Allerica's John William Burgess as supporters of the 
all-powerful state - although he said that only Blackstone and 
Treitschke could be counted among the really hard-line advocates 
of state power. (Korff 1923:405) {1) 
Nor was the German state alone in demanding terrible 
sacrifices of its citizens. One could argue that there had been a 
general failure on the part of governments in their obligations 
to citizens, shown by the sometimes careless way in which human 
lives were used and disposed of during the First World War. 
(Cohen 1919:687) This wastage of human lives was also attributed 
to the development of the doctrine of the offensive (such as the 
from 16th 
Bentham 
(Laski 
1. Laski established a direct line of descent running 
century publicist Jean Dodin down through Hobbes and 
until its full flowering in the jurisprudence of Austin. 
1919:563) 
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plan) on the part of European military officials 
before the war. But what is interesting is that the doctrine of 
the offensive had itself been infor11ted by Nietzschean 
philosophies of the will and the Bergsonian idea of the vital 
force - at the same time as the ideas of these philosophers were 
being taken up by syndicalist theoreticians. (1) The vital force 
could thus work both for and against the state. 
Both "intellectualist" theories of the state, such as that 
of John Austin and "anti-intellectualist" philosophies (such as 
Nietzschean ideas about the will to power} were held to be 
responsible for the war. (2) But in the English-speaking world 
1. The great loss of human life has been attributed to among 
other things, ignorance of the effects of new instruments and 
methods of warfare and the development of the concept of total 
war. Most importantly for us, it as attributed to the prevailing 
military doctrine of the offensive - a doctrine which itself has 
been seen as one of the major contributing factors to the war 
because it encouraged pre-emptive action. (See Stephen Van Evera, 
"Why Cooperation failed in 1914", R!u:.1d Politics, Vol. 38, 1986, 
pp.81-117) It is also important to note how this military 
doctrine was seen to gain impetus from philosophical doctrines 
which placed an emphasis on the role of will. Again, this is seen 
as not solely a German phenomenon. The doctrine of the offensive, 
Michael Howard tells us in ~ Theory ~ Practice Qf. Ra.I:., which 
stresses the importance of of having a "'proud and violent army'" 
and which sees small losses in war as a sign of weakness and lack 
of patriotic fervour, had been pushed by the French, British and 
German military commands before the war. Again this could be 
sheeted home to the philosophical beliefs current in some of the 
countries taking part in the war. Howard adds that this doctrine 
was explicity associated with Bergson's well-attended lectures at 
the Sc:bonne where he expounded on Nietzschean concepts -of the 
Creative Will and his o~n l'Slan xiJAl. (Howard 1966:521) The 
fact that military theorists across Europe invoked the concept-of 
the vital force or some such similar notion (although not 
necessarily in a way that the originators ,,,of -these-ideas -would 
have intended or wanted} makes Bergson's claims about the true 
nature of the conflict (i.e. that it was a struggle between 
French free-will and German determinism) all the more intriguing. 
2. In the case of Nietzsche, Merriam wrote that the intimacy -of 
the relation between his "pessimism and materialism" and 
militaristic posturing ~ould-be -doubt~ given the -presence of 
imperialistic and nationalistic sentiments in many coutries. He 
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pluralists tended to focus their criticism on idealist rather 
than "anti-intellectual" philosophies. (Given that syndicalism 
and pluralism in general were often deemed to be inspired by 
anti-intellectual philosophies themselves, this is hardly 
surprising.} Sometimes one or both of the English philosophers 
Bernard :Sosanquet (and his Aspects g( -~ §eneral W1;;. Social 
Problems dilil. the reality Qf. .th.e. 1Ull (1895]} and F.H. Bradley 
(and his essay "My Station and its Duties" in his Ethical Studies 
[1876]) figured prominently in pluralist assaults. The pluralist 
strategy was one of collapsing idealist notions of the general 
will or public spirit, as well as John Austin•s juristic theory 
of sovereignty, into the more tough-minded theories of 
Treitschke. (1) (Merriam 1924:88, Coker 1923:195) This move, 
which required the assumption that certain political theories, 
however inoffensive they may appear, will by some inexorable 
logic transform themselves into something much more 
unattractive. It is a move which would be used against the 
pluralists themselves. 
One cannot underestimate the significance of the war in 
relation to these debates. the English philosopher J. H. Muirhead 
wrote that it was the assocation of idealist theories of the will 
attributed the belief in this associaton to war propaganda. 
(Merriam 1924: 14) ;,, 
1. See Bradley Ethical Studies pp. 176ff. We should also note 
that the reputation accorded Treitschke both before and during 
the First World War in England was to some degree challenged by 
H. W. C. .Davis in ID.@. Politi cal Thought Qf. Heinris;h _ u,n 
Treitschke (1914). Forsythe tells us that in that text: Davis 
examined the development of Treitscke•s early thought-as~-.German 
nineteenth-century liberal. (Savigear 1970:325) 
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with the image of the all-powerful German state that had led to 
severe questioning of the theories of the neo-Hegelian idealists 
in England. He was unhappy about this and pleaded with critics to 
get away from the "disturbing atmosphere --0f the ·War"· and to 
engage in dispassionate analysis. (Muirhead 1924:166) Indeed, it 
was when the memory of war began to fade that ~ idealist 
philosophers regained their self-confidence and the most bitter 
attacks on pluralism and those philosophies associated with it 
(whether pragmatist or Bergsonian or Nietzschean philosophies) 
began to be launched. It was in that context that the causes of 
war were linked with "irrationalist" philosophies of will rather 
than with monistic theories of the state. 
7. Imperial fragmentation. 
The fragmentation of empires and a move in the international 
arena from what James called imperial "bigness" to particularism 
was also seen as evidence of the pluralistic spirit at work. 
Certainly, in the case of William James there was a continuity 
between his liberal bias in favour of the individual or small 
group and his preference for small Bations over large imperial 
systems. (Perry 1935:315} Both before and after the war, 
examples cited of particularism were the mandate system under the 
League of Nations; the push for home-rule or subsidiary 
parliaments in Ireland. Wales, Scotland (although again, as-with 
the regionalist push in France or America, this was seen as an 
example of deconcentraton rather than decentralization of power 
[Mott 1922:39]); the independence movements in India and Latin 
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America and the growing autonomy of dominions within the British 
empire. (Merriam 1924:27f , Sabine 1923:46f Korff 1923:411 Elliot 
1925:481f Barker 1928:181f) 
But it is at this point that pluralist theory begins to most 
clearly reveal some of its ambiguities and contradictions. Jiany 
of those who called themselves pluralists and who wanted to limit 
the domestic jurisdiction of the state were also 
internationalists who saw a rational world order evolving through 
the mechanisms of international law, international organizations 
and trans-national associations. (Laski 1916:303 Krabbe 1930:269 
Russell 1919:158f) 
This is because they believed that this same state, in 
competition with other states, was the source of international 
conflict. Thus, and I do not think this is spelled out in the 
literature, while it is monism that is being attacked on the 
inside it is essentially pluralism or fragmentation that is being 
attacked on the outside. (1) Responses of pluralists were thus 
inconistent. Firstly, it was contradictory to argue that the 
pluralistic nature of the international system is the source of 
conflict and then to welcome the further disintegration of that 
system whether that process affects empires, nation-states or 
composite states. We should note that the fragmentation of 
states in the name of self-determination was also seen as a 
manifestation of the nationalist mania. (Merriam 1924:14f) 
1. Follett remarked that while a number of English commentators 
were •raging against Hegelianism, at the same time the English 
are pouring out in unstinted measure themselves and their 
substance to establish on earth Hegel's absolute in the actual 
form of an International League.• (Follett 1918:267) 
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Secondly, and I will deal with this further in the next chapter, 
it was equally contradictory to condemn particularism in the 
international sphere and then recommend it as a way of ordering 
the domestic arena. 
In some cases it would seem that critics of the sovereign 
state did not adequately theorise the relation between the 
internal and external dimensions of sovereignty. Where they did 
they tended to argue in favour of pluralistic arrangements inside 
the state and more co-operative or unitary arrangements on the 
outside. That is, what they did was reverse the traditional 
order of our conceptions of intra and inter-state relations. 
Most of us are familiar with the calls for world government 
that prevailed after the Great War and which drew inspiration 
from the creation of the League of Nations. (1} What is most 
interesting about this denial of the validity of the state as a 
social unit (because the only real social units are groups or 
assocations}, is how quickly it ascends to the idea of new monism 
in the form of a universal legal order. (This was likened by a 
couple of writers to Dante's concept of a universal or world 
empire [Merriam 1924:99, Hsiao 1927:52]} Hugo Krabbe, for 
1. Hsiao wrote that on the question of international law. the 
pluralists advanced their arguments in two directions: 
•First. they •re ·· concerned- -to- -show ·that the --notion ·of st&te .,. 
sovereignty is incompatible with true international law. and, 
secondly. that with the growth -of . ·•odern social life -in 
complexity and organisation, states should no longer be regarded 
as the sole subjects of int&nationa1 law, or as the sole units 
of international relations.• (Hsiao 1927:50) For further sources 
for these views in addition to Russell and Krabbe see G. D.B. 
Cole,•The State and its External Relations•, Proceedings Qi~ 
Aristotelian .Society, -16, p. ll7ff, cited-in Hsiao, 192.7 .p.Sln 
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instance. spoke of a gradual shift from what he call~d Dational 
"legal communities" to an international "legal community". the 
rules of which states would be subject to. Indeed, he wrote that 
the term international law was misleading because what he was 
talking about was not treaties enacted between states but a 
"supernational law." (Krabbe 1930:233ff, 245) Where this leaves 
pluralism is another question indeed - although as Follett noted, 
some syndicalists were not adverse to appealing to the existence 
of objective rights or laws (albeit based on social function) in 
stating their case. (Follett 1919:22) 
Dewey however, did see a contradiction in this position of 
attacking monism inside the state and the supporting it in the 
international sphere. He was rather more sceptical about the 
enthusiastic support for world government among some of his 
peers, recognising the potential for tyranny in such a body and 
seeing this aspiration as another residue of the old scientific 
world-view (like state-socialism or collectivism in general). He 
wrote: 
One may sympathize with a longing for some state which shall 
reduce international anarchy to order .. ;But even · here it 
makes a mighty difference whether the super-state is 
something into which the multitude -0f -nations is to 
·dissolve,' or whether it is a descriptive formulation under 
which the multitude of local states, provinces,- t-0wns, 
villages, and other human groups may follow more securely 
their own careers. and voluntarily engage ~in undisturbed ·an<I 
fruitful conversar1on w1rn eacn otner. - For the only 
conversation in which participants ·dissolve' is the one--in 
which some tyrant bore monopolizes discourse, while voices 
melt into monotony. {Dewey 1921:316) 
Thus, rather than speaking of world government some 
pluralists (and this group included at times Russ.ell and.Krabbe), 
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preferred to speak in terms of -~orld federalism. (Merria• 
1924:98f) (1) 
But the important point here is the conjuction of pluralist 
and internationalist thought. The breakdown of the soverei-gnty-1tf 
the state was seen as occurring at two levels; firstly, in 
relation to the development of transnational interests, -and 
secondly, in relation to the emergence of sub-state or sub-
national groupings. Dewey wrote that both of these "cut across" 
and threw "out of gear the traditional doctrine of exclusive 
national sovereignty." (Dewey 1957:204 Curtis 1925:493) These 
developments also gained expression in the peace settlement in 
the aftermath of the Great War. The "rational Wilsonian" 
principles which were supposed to herald a new era of co-
operation in both the domestic and international spheres (Elliot 
1928:viii) encompassed both the push for greater global co-
operation and the rule of international law and the push for 
national self-determination. We should recall here that this 
coupling of economic, political and cultural integration with an 
emphasis on diversity and autonomy was also a feature of the 
rationalisation movement - ~xcept in that-c-ase this- arrangement 
was seen as being scientifically justified.) 
The -other thing to note here in r-e-lation to both -veluntary 
associations and the internationalist aspects of pluralism _ is 
1. Barker made similar comments to those of Dewey. He wrote that: 
"A true internationalism ... must recognize the existence of the 
State in all its fulness, and it must seek to comprehend states 
in its fold without any derogation from the fulness of their 
being." {Barker 1928:246) 
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that these associations were often trans-national in their scope. 
(Hsiao 1927:41:54) Religious organisations provided ·obvious 
examples. But this was also true of art leagues, professional 
associations. the suffragettes and industrial or socialist 
groupings - the latter gathering together under the banner of the 
Second International. (Harley wrote that Internationalism was 
also a leading sentiment among the syndicalists [Harley 1912:86]) 
It was hoped by some that with more and more -0f-· --toose groups 
emerging and extending themselves into new territories and lands, 
the distinction between the international and the doR1estic realms 
would eventually dissolve and the whole world would become both 
one and many - freed from the "artificial" restrictions ~f the 
state. (1) 
8. Syndicalism. Pluralism and Pragmatism 
This chapter has been a discussion of some of the 
intellectual and political developments which gave rise to the 
theory and practice of pluralist politics. In discussing the 
ideas of Maitland and Figgis, I was seeking to show that the 
relationship between pragmatism and pluralism, which-is -what ·I 
will concentrate on in the next chapter, was much more arbitary 
- than the critics of pragmatism -and pluralism -seeme<l · willing ---to 
allow. Further, I chose to focus much of this chapter upon what 
1. The point seeaed to have been overlooked, as Korff points out, 
that .as .international law is the result of treaties .signed ., .... by 
states, abolishing the sovereign state would in fact destroy 
int~rnational law as -it-stands. {Korff -1923:-413) Altb-Ough.-- --what 
these interationalists were arguing was that international law is 
in ---fa.ct .. .d~rivoo from -certain ~t-ernal prineiples of -- Tight 
behaviour. (Hsiao 1927:51) Hsiao thought that it was in this 
internationalist phase.. as a programme for world peace, that 
pluralisa was at its most constructive. (Hsiao 1927:55) 
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was seen as a particular and most extreme variant of pluralism. 
that is, syndicalism. I did this firstly, because it was this 
sort of pluralism which especially generated hostility towards 
pluralist theory as a whole. Secondly, because it was this 
variant of pluralism that did most to establish in the minds of _ 
critics the dangers of posed by the philosophies of Bergson and 
James. Thirdly, because it was syndicalist-style politics, in 
conjunction with the philosophy of pragmatism, that were held 
responsible for the development of fascism. 
In this chapter I also demonstrated the flexibility of the 
term syndicalism. On the one hand, I showed that one of its 
defining features, in contrast with earlier pluralist theories, 
was its focus on means rather than ends. This distinction is of 
course, unstable. In a sense, we can say that for the 
syndicalists the political means {the destruction of capitalism 
and the state) became the end. But on the other hand, I also 
showed that far from being seen as a gospel of direct action, 
syndicalism was also talked about in the context of reforming the 
civil service. In this case, syndicalism simply implied the 
independence of the public service from the political power and 
greater participation of public servants in the running of 
administrative departments. Hence the descriptions administrative 
syndicalism or administrative pluralism. 
The -flexibility of the ter11 syndicalism in this regard is 
also true of pluralism - although some might argue that this is 
simply a reflection of the equal flexibility -0f the pragmatist 
philosophy which underpins them. This I think would be both 
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simplistic and inaccurate for there were too many other social 
and intellectual forces .contributing to the .development ---.Of 
syndicalism and pluralism to simply attribute their dualistic 
character to the philosophy of pragmatism. Indeed, .one could go 
futher and point out that what was called the modernist movement. 
of which prag11atisa is -but a -part. was· seen·-to "'be 111ani·fest in 
philosophies that placed human will or intuition at the centre of 
action as well in the social scientific belief~~hat by studying 
human behaviour and discovering its laws society could be planned 
down to the last detail. 
Nevertheless, what makes pragmatism so intriguing is that 
it seemed to be the only single philosophy within the modernist 
movement to manifest these qualities at the same time. That is. 
one could call oneself a pragmatist while focussing upon 
instrumental techniques and experimental methods; one could also 
call oneself a pragmatist while stressing the ability of human 
beings to remake their world at will and use intuitive modes of 
understanding. We shall find this very same duality in fascism .as 
well - and again. according to some, it was the influence of 
pragmatism that explains why this was so. 
Finally, this chapter examined pluralist observations about 
international. -..affairs. --4n partictiar·the · complaint that -the 
balance of power sys tea was the cause of the Great War .. , I did 
this .partly to bring to light .some of the----eontr.adictions · in 
pluralist arguments as regards domestic political arrangements. 
For as I will show in the next chapter ... it was their views OD .the 
nature of sovereignty (derived in part from sociological studies 
of law; from analogies drawn from the physical-sciences - and-mos-~_c_ ____ _ 
importantly from pragmatist philosophy) that were seen as ~utting 
exactly such a balance of power system in place of the monistic 
state. 
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Chapter ~: ~he Legacy of Pragmatism 
In order to understand the sorts of conceptual relations 
that existed or .were held to -exist between p-rag11atist philosophy 
and pluralist political thought, as well as some of the other 
political ideas that were current in the inter-war years, we need 
to draw a clear distinction between the pragmatic methods and 
what was known as radical empiricism. As we have seen, Dewey was 
mainly interested in the former while James was mainly interested 
in the latter. 
This chapter begins then with an analysis of the respective 
roles played by empiricism and instrumentalism arguments in 
James' thought and the significance of this in relation to 
pluralist political arguments. Following this, I go on to examine 
the use of analogies drawn from modern physics in relation to 
political arguments. I then go on to examine the importance of 
James' philosophy to the political thought of Harold Laski and 
the impact that pragmatist ideas in general had upon theories of 
sovereignty and jurisprudence. This is followed by an examination 
of the arguments pertaining to the alleged contribution -0f the 
thought of Bergson, James, Dewey and Duguit to the emergence of 
tyrannical gover•ents in Europe in -the 1920s-and .. 1930s. ~ I --then 
go on to look at the attempts to rebut the claims that there was 
a relation between Bergson's philosophy and the philosophy of 
pragmatism and the political movements known as syndicalism and 
fascism. In looking at these rebuttals, we a.re also driven to 
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study those presentations of pragmatist thought which associated 
it with the ideas of the general will, of liberalism and 
democracy. 
This chapter also discusses the drift away from pluralist 
and pragmatist thought in the late 1930s. In this context, I look 
at the return of collectivist arguments and the development of 
what was labelled rationalism in politics; I examine the 
relation between these developments and pragmatist thought. I 
also briefly examine the turn away from arguments in favour of 
the internationalist ideal which accompanied the decline of 
pluralist thought. This chapter concludes with some thoughts 
about the attacks on pragmatist thought and, more generally, 
addresses the issue of the relation between political theory and 
political practice. This is an issue that arose up repeatedly, 
although usually only implicitly, in the political arguments of 
the period. The material included in this chapter is substantial 
but it is also necessary in order to illustrate the evolution of 
certain political arguments. 
1. Pragmatism and Empiricism 
I pointed out in the last chapter that pluralism and 
pragmatism developed indepen-Oently of ~ne another. Yet ~s we saw 
in the case of the syndicalists and in the case <>f: those 
empirically •inded ·pluralists there ·were · SOiie points '"' of 
connection. For Hsiao, these connections were largely conceptual. 
He ··conceded that there was no logical connection between 
pragmatism and pluralism; nevertheless, he did remark that they 
•run down -the-same grooves• .. Hsiao-made the-point that while 
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Laski was the only political pluralist (if we .Go not coWlt"SoTel 
and Follett who both used James but in diverse ways) claiming to 
be a disciple of James, there was a "genuine sympathy in spirit" 
between the ideas of James and pluralist theory well before Laski 
appeared on the scene. {Hsiao·1927:176} That is, the politicsof 
pluralism and the philosophy of pragmatism coalesce at certain 
points and resemble each other. 
The resemblances between pragmatism and pluralism are both 
methodological and metaphysical. In this regard, Hsiao drew 
attention to three possible links between them. Firstly, and 
most obviously, pragmatists and pluralists could be likened to 
each other to the extent that both appealed to experimental 
methods - that is, the pragmatic working test. Secondly, the 
pluralist emphasis on actual will could sound very much like the 
pragmatist emphasis on immediate consciousness; thirdly, the 
argument against unitary sovereignty closely resembled the 
pragmatist protest against the all-inclusive~lock universe on 
behalf of the discontinuous aspects of experience. 
1927:206} 
(Hsiao 
We should note that these last two points of contiguity 
between pluralism and pragmatism actually sprang from the same 
sourc~ - that is, frot1 the association between pragaatisa and 
radical -empiricism.·· Bat -·-we --have to-be careful·· here ·because 
pragmatism, strictly speaking, need not imply radical empiricism 
(this is a point I alluded to earlier}. That is, if we identify, 
as James does, pragaatisa with an instruaental approach to 
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metaphysical issues (to ask the question what difference would it 
make if I believed x rather than y), it may stand quite apart 
from the empiricist or pluralist perspective. 
This distinction between radical empiricism and pragmatism 
was noted by James himself in the preface to Pragmatism where he 
noted that there is "no logical connexion between pragmatism, as 
I understand it, and a doctrine which I have recently set forth 
as 'radical empiricism.'" (James 1907:ix) Thus, the question as 
to whether experience is in fact one or many (the one and the 
many being a central motif in pluralist thought) may be of no 
interest to the pragmatist. Although the pragmatic method may be 
a way of approaching or cancelling out that question. 
I draw attention to these points in order to make it clear 
that it was radical empiricism, rather than the pragmatic method 
which provided the metaphysical foundation for political 
pluralism. I shall explain how in due course. Suffice to say 
that even if we define pragmatism solely in terms of experimental 
or instrumental methods we have not removed all ambiguities. For 
I would also want to stress that the instrumental method of 
pragmatism is open to interpretation. It can be used as a way 
of addressing practical or political and not just metaphysical 
issues. But even then, it may be put to different uses - ones 
which aay lead us down quite different political paths. 
For instance, if we take instrumentalisa to aean, as some 
did, the satisfaction of some desire or impulse then we can see 
how it might lead towards completely self-regarding political 
behaviour. It aight also lead us, as it did in Sorel's case, to 
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argue that there are no soeial truths but only myths which are -
useful to the extent that they encourage political action on the 
part of groups. But we should note that neither of these 
attitudes rules out the possibility that the state itself can be 
seen as a useful tool for whatever ambitions that I or my group 
not be might have. The point is, that instrumentalism need 
accompanied by a belief in pluralistic political arrangements. 
It may not lead us to believe that the state should be dismantled 
or weakened - quite the reverse in fact. In addition to this, 
we should note that where the term instrumentalism is closely 
associated with notions of scientific prediction and control, 
it may have yet another meaning for political life; one which 
suggests that social institutions should be manipulated in order 
to achieve maximum social satisfaction and efficiency. 
Experimental or instrumental methods might coincide with 
pluralism where one argued, as I illustrated in the last chapter, 
that the actual configuration of society suggests that 
pluralistic arrangements might· work -better ---·at pr'Odueing 
happiness. This was the sort of empirically attuned argument that 
Laski and Sabine, although to different degrees, were inclined t-0 
put. It helps explain why pragmatic methods and political 
pluralism were somehow seen as being conceptually related. 
There is however, another reason why pluralism and 
pragmatism could be run together. The reason is- philosophical 
and is related to the pairing of radical empiricisa with the 
.. .conventionalist theory:-~cf-knowledge. ---The --C{>RV'6BtioaaU-st--theory 
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of knowledge, which we discussed in relation to changes in the 
philosophy of science, does not greatly differ from the pragmatic 
method. It is in some ways only a stricter version of it because 
it imposes greater limits on the criteria which we can use in 
order to judge what works. In other ways, it is a more radical 
version of it to the extent that it emphasises the purely 
conventional character of scientific knowledge. But what links 
together radical empiricism and conventionalist theories of 
knowledge is that in order to adopt the latter one must to accept 
some of the premises of the underlying the former. That is, 
conventionalist theories of knowledge presuppose that what we 
observe is somehow or to some degree formless or fluid; this view 
of sense-experience is one that is frequently associated with the 
radical empiricists as we shall see. What we should also note is 
that this founding of knowledge on immediate sense data drives us 
to focus on the particular instant or moment. 
Thus we can see that the conventionalist theory -0f knowledge 
may implicate, even if it does not logically entail, an emphasis 
on the particular, the empirical and a view of immediacy .as ~lux­
To the degree that pragmatic methods can be identified with 
conventionalism we can say that pragmatism is driven -~owards a 
radical empiricism as well. Indeed, a particularistic orientation 
towards _the world as well as an emphasis on -the given -has long 
been associated with pragmatism. {Hibben 1908:373) 
It is above all in the work of James that attention to the 
immediate and the particular was combined with pragmatic methods. 
--·Thus -we -ean alS-O perhaps -as~rt --1! ~-ertain comple11entarity--between 
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prag.lllatism ·and radical ~mpiricis1t - d~spite Ja1tes•··claims·to :the 
contrary. Dewey, on the other hand as we saw in the chapter 
four, was associated with pragmatism's more rationalist -or 
instrumentalist side, insofar as he had a greater belief in the 
veracity of the results of scientific experiment and placed more 
emphasis on arranging various data in order to present a wider 
picture of experience. 
As we also saw in chapter four, Dewey was not in favour of a 
radical form of empiricism and tended to place a -greater -e111phasis 
on the objective character of his pragmatism. It is interesting 
to note here again how the very strictness of the radical 
empiricist or positivist definition of the given is precisely 
what may allow it to shrink into solipsism or a subjective form 
of idealism; whereas a "metaphysical" commitment to the reality 
of facts may induce greater rationality, insofar as one might try 
to arrange the facts so as to form a coherent whole. 
These fine distinctions and subtle ambiguities within 
pragmatism are important because, as I suggested earlier, they 
are related to the different tendencies that existed within what 
-was called the pragmatic approach to politics. Indeed, 
pragmatism was an equivocal philosophy which gave birth ··to- an 
equivocal politics. 
2. Modern Physics and Politics 
Before I explore the various manifestations of pragmatism in 
politics, I want to discuss the illpact of modern..:physics on. _the 
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political theory of pluralism - something which I alluded to in 
the last chapter and which ties in with the generally empirical 
thrust of much pluralist theory. That there was such an impact 
is not surprising. Physics and politics have a long association. 
Classical physical theories had been used to give. support- to 
earlier political and economic creeds. 
it was natural that any changes 
Against this 
in physical 
background, 
theories, 
changes 
only 
that as we have seen were given a great prominence in 
intellectual debates, would invite political interest and 
speculation as to their significance. 
The connection between pragmatism in science and philosophy 
and political thought was often nebulous and indirect. As I have 
mentioned previously, there was a tendency to invoke something 
called the "spirit of the times" when arguing on behalf of or 
against "anti-intellectual" positions in various areas of life 
and study; so it was for politics as well. Thus, we find Laski 
arguing that the questioning of traditional social notions was 
merely in keeping with the general spirit of anti-dogmatism or 
anti-intellectualism in art, science and religion. (Laski 
1920:335 Elliot 1928:3ffJ15f} Laski himself made no use.of the 
vocabulary of physics in his discussions of pluralism - although 
he often did mix empirical arguments with moral and metaphysical 
ones. 
A little more closely related with the field of physics were 
appeals to political scientists to adopt the "relativistic" 
viewpoint in studying social institutions. This meant exalllining 
institutions in temporal rather than purely spatial terms. To put 
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this more clearly, political scientists should examine the actual 
workings of institutions and not simply the axioms on which they 
were based. (Barnes 1925:117-119} The American political 
scientist Professor William Bennet Munro wrote that, like modern 
physicists and biologists, political scientists should free 
themselves (as scientists bad freed themselves from the a priori 
idiom of Galileo} from static categories and structures 
including axioms pertaining to the sovereignty of the state, the 
natural rights of man and the principles of laissez-faire. (Munro 
1928:10} 
But these were no more than methodological injunctions and 
did not differ much from appeals to an empirically-minded, anti-
dogmatic spirit. Nevertheless, more explicit references to 
physical analogies appeared in political arguments, stating that 
that the the empirical 
macroscopic 
approach of modern physics 
and microscopic worlds which 
fluid and pluralistic. 
revealed 
are to a degree 
Thus, we find ·Dewey appealing to Einstein's relativity 
theory in arguing against what he called social absolutism. As we 
noted in the last chapter, Dewey argued that social absolutism 
(in particular, he was referring to its latest manifestation in 
Soviet Russia} was a product of an out-dated view of· science !: . .-
both in terms of its methods and in terms of the- picture"' of 
things that it offered. As I have pointed out, Dewey argued that 
Einstein's theory ·gave· support to the 
experimental approach.- . 
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But what sort of political beliefs did he see modern physics 
supporting? In this context, Dewey wrote that the collectivist 
views of writers such as H. G. Wells were based on a 
misunderstanding of the picture of things that modern s~ience 
offered. Collectivism, like the policy of laissez-,faire, was 
based on a view of science handed down from Isaac Newton to 
Herbert Spencer - one which depicted a well-ordered mechanical 
world. But, Dewey wrote, this understanding of science 
popularised by Wells among others, was no longer warranted in the 
wake of Einstein's theory. Einstein's theory had replaced the 
well-ordered world of classical science by a world full of 
"puckers and skews." (Dewey 1921:315ff) 
Quantum physics was also used in a most adventurous manner 
in this context. Munro argued that it was very Hdifficult to 
believe" that quantum theory had no metaphysical implications. 
Political scientists, he wrote, must be ready to "borrow by 
analogy" from the new physics and explore the "sub-atomic 
possibilities" that it offered. (Munro 1928:2:8:5) (1) Thus, 
just as the absolutist state was a microcosm of a monistic cosmos 
for idealist political theorists (as Elliot described it),- the 
pluralistic state became a type of macrocosmos of the sub-atomic 
quantum world for the pluralists. (Elliot 1928:88) 
1. Munro seemed conscious of the deliberate character.of -this 
metaphorical transposition. Be defended it by ar.guing that· in 
intellectual life: "New truths cannot be quarantined. No branch 
of knowledge advances by itself. In its progress it draws others 
along." (Munro 1928:3) Similarly, George Sabine {who as we noted 
earlier believed that ideas 8 naturallyn •igrated from one field 
to another) wrote that that while such borrowings by analogy 
could prove to be a 8 shaky form of inference,• nothing could be 
more --~-01R11on -"than for one science to be stimulated and enriched 
-by the exaaple of others.-• (Sabine 1930:880) · 
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Turning to the new physics implied more than a 
methodological shift for political science, for it could lead 
one towards a political metaphysics of sorts. Again, what was 
called for was a change in the central metaphor upon which 
political theory is built - that is a turn from static mechanical 
metaphors of atomic theory to biological or quantum metaphors of 
evolution and process. Munro wrote that just as the language of 
biology allowed public institutions to be seen as "living 
organisms" 
"protoplasmic 
allowed one 
caught up in a process of evolution like the 
cell", so too the language of quantum 
to view political "electro-dynamics" in 
physics 
terms of 
dynamic group forces (subject to process and change) , rather than 
in terms of static mechanical models. (Munro 1928:3-4) 
Dewey wrote that society is not just a complex of "many 
associations" but is also a flux of associations as "social 
molecules" recombine to form "new associations." (Dewey 1957:203) 
This is because the associations which exist in society are 
prone both to swell and break down. (Laski made the same point 
only using a different vocabulary. He wrote that: "Right ... is not 
a static thing, but made and remade in the crucible of 
experience." [Laski 1948:263]) Thus, we are not describing 
arguments in favour of a static pluralism; instead of this, . we 
are describing a picture of a society characterised by groups 
which are constantly flowering, fading and shi1ting. 
The political conclusions drawn from such analogies were not 
very controversial. Physics seemed to imply something in.between 
a society premised on the ultimacy of both the individual and an 
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a priori general will. As both Dewey and Harry Elmer Barnes 
wrote, neither anarchism nor absolutism were justified by modern 
science. (Dewey 1957:202ff,Barnes 1925:142) This brings us back 
to pluralism but even here the pluralism is not of a radical 
kind as there is no attempt to deny the role of the state. Dewey, 
Barnes and Munro all saw the future role of the modern state in 
encouraging and co-ordinating the activities of voluntary 
associations. (Dewey 1957:204) It was this particula~ conception 
of pluralism which prevailed in post-war America. 
How far did this sort of scientifically derived pluralism 
go? Not too far. This has been much remarked upon in relation to 
Dewey. A number of writers, including Perry and Charles Morris 
(the latter being a student of Dewey's at the University of 
Chicago}, note that Dewey was much more communalistic in his 
leanings than was James. (Morris 1970:96) One explanation for 
this relates to a point made earlier. Whatever his early leanings 
towards the notion of immediacy and conventionalist theories of 
knowledge, Dewey also developed a strong belief in the · efficacy 
of scientific methods of observation, prediction and control. 
(Although he did not believe that the procedures of the natural 
sciences had to be adopted in their entirety in order for the 
social sciences to become scientific.} That is, Dewey bad a much 
greater faith in the unity of the scientific_ method and its 
applicability to moral and social affairs - his was not the 
radical empiricism of James. (Elliot 1928:7) Indeed, it was for 
this reason that Dewey's critics charged him with -•·scientism'" 
(Morris 1970:89} 
Further to this, Dewey's interest in science was very much 
tied to the instrumental uses to which it could be put; in 
particular, he wanted to socialise the fruits of its methods. The 
explanation for this may also lie in Dewey's earlier cultural or 
ethical idealism. (Morris wrote that Dewey began bis 
intellectual life as an "avowed Hegelian" and only later moved 
from being a "cultural idealist" to being a "cultural 
naturalist". [Morris 1970:177]} Morris makes the important point 
that out of all the pragmatists Dewey was the most interested in 
questions of value. (Morris 1970:37:81) Dewey defined values 
not in terms of any passion or desire but as ---"~njo.yments- which 
are the consequences of intelligent action." (Dewey 1930:85) As 
we have seen, Dewey regarded values or purposes as a means by 
which to assess the efficacy of a particular course of action. 
But in addition to this, he also thought that the pragmatic 
method could help us to resolve disputes over values insofar as 
it could assist in the discovery of what would be required to 
revolve such disputes in the particular situation in which they 
arise. (Dewey 1939:47) (Although, this also led to the charge 
that he was not scientific enough. [Morris 1970:89]} We should 
keep these points in 11ind, ~as they are relevant -to the '-charge 
levelled against Dewey by Elliot that in his attempt make a 
science of ethics -he was creating 11 philosophy - fit only - for 
fascism. In the view of critics such as Elliot, Dewey had denied 
-- morality an -independent status and reduced it to to a -- for• of 
behaviour to be assessed in the context of a given environment 
-and in terms of its success or failure--in -£-elation to a given 
purpose or problem. (1} 
3. Pluralism and Pragmatist Metaphysics 
In Studjes iJl ru Problem g1 Soyereignty Laski declared 
himself to be a pragmatist and he related his political pluralism 
-on a number of occasions to James' philosopbieal-1>1uralism. ·This 
asserted philosophical influence might to some extent explain why 
his pluralism was more particularistic than that 1>f many -of his 
mentors or peers. On the other band, James' philosophy may have 
served only to provide philosophical justification or 
reinforcement for the radical pluralistic stand that he had 
already developed. But before I address that issue I should 
briefly examine the development of James' work and some of its 
possible implications. It is an examination which will further 
help demonstrate the relation between empiricism and pluralism. 
James' pluralist philosophy was a development of his 
empirical study of psychology. James described the reality 
disclosed to him in his psychological studies as a "sensible 
reality, the flux of our sensations and emotions as they pass." 
(James 1907:191} As Perry writes, when James was passing through 
1. Elliot wrote that in Dewey's • ... hands pragmatism changed 
character radically from the individualistic and romanticist 'way 
of looking at things' that it had meant to James. Later -0n ·it 
may become clear that for pragmatism to walk the same road with 
what Dewey has called Instrumentalism is a case of the lady and 
the tiger all over again. James, the enemy of scientific 
determinism applied to human conduct, would have cast off the 
alliance had he been able to forsee Instrumentalism as it appears 
in Experience ID.d, Nature,• (Elliot 1928:27) Elliot coap1ained 
that Dewey's argument in Exnerience ~Nature was essentially 
that he sought to make a. science of human conduct ~(a science ·~ 
moeurs). Be wrote that this was possible because Dewey believed 
that the forces that animated man were much the same as those 
which animated nature; Elliot wrote insofar as there w~re values 
in his analysis they were only the pragmatic ones of survival. 
(Elliot 1928:24} 
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his "phenomenalistic phase" (when he was influenced by the work 
of Mach, Ostwald and Poincare}, it was this "pure experience• 
which he put forward "as the aboriginal form of being .•. • (Perry 
1938:100) (1} 
But James went further than Mach and the other radical 
empricists. Because he used this phenomenonalism as a basis on 
which to construct a metaphysics or cosmology. Perry notes bow 
in A Pluralistic Universe James, encouraged by his association 
with Bergson, elevated this pure experience or immediacy "to the 
rank of ultimate reality." {Perry 1938:100) Thus, we have arrived 
at James' "buzzing" cosmos. 
As I said in chapter four, positivism as a form of personal 
idealism could bloom into a metaphysics of process. That is, the 
contents of private experience could be projected onto an 
objective reality; the contents of mind could become the contents 
of experience and matter in general. This is exactly what 
happened with James - his radical empiricism expanded into the 
metaphysics of pluralism. But the injection of his empirical 
psychology into the cosmos happened by design not by accident. 
In Pragmatism he embraced profusion, rather than Mach's rule of 
economy, as the key to reality. (James 1907:190)The qualities 
associated with the phenomenalistic understandings of experience, 
that is, discontinuity and flux also became the qualities 
inhering in a larger, concrete reality. In this way the universe 
was rendered as a multiverse and unity became-multiplicity. 
But James' crucial statement in relation to his pluralistic 
metaphysics, at least as far as political thinkers were 
concerned, was the one he macte in A Plpralistic Uniyerse and 
which is as follows: 
Pragmatically interpreted. pluralism or the doctrine that it 
[the universe] is many means only that the sundry .... parts ... of. 
reality ~ h.e. externally related. Everything you can think 
of, however vast or inclusive, has on the pluralistic.view a 
genuinely 'external' environment of some sort or amount. 
Things are 'with' one another in many ways,·-· -but .. nothing 
includes everything, or dominates over everything. The word 
'and' trails along after every sentence_ Something always 
escapes ... something else is self-governed and absent .. and 
unreduced to unity. (James 1977:145) 
It is this statement in the concluding chapter of James' 
book which Laski drew upon in Iha Personality gt Assocjatjons 
{1916},- Studies ill· the. Problem cl Sovereignty (1917} ind again 
a few years later in A Grammar a.f Politics (1925). (Laski 
1916:425 Laski 1917:10 Laski 1925:261) Laski appeared to have 
accepted much of James's understanding of reality as flux. He 
accepted James' view that things can only ever be partially 
unified; that variety or difference is essential and that· life 
can never be reduced to unity. He too writes of a multiverse 
rather than a universe. (Laski 1948:261) 
But let us see what happens when we move downwards from 
James' projected cosmos to social or political configurations. 
In applying James' pluralistic metaphysics to the individual and 
his ·relations with - --the -rest-- of society Laski· ~onclud~d · -that 
"never as human beings [are we] wholly included in any relation"; 
we are surrounded by an environment which "separates us from 
others. or. at the best. makes our union with them but a partial 
one." ...... (Laski 1948..:260}.---CU As social beings we experience 
1. Laski wrote in Liberty in. the. Modern ~that the-real self 
- is· the "self that isolated from bis,'.fellows ··" It is- "·all- that I 
am and do. It is the total--impression produced by the bewildering 
variety of may acts. good and bad and indifferent." (Laski 
1930:29) 
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ourselves as enfolded in but also separate fro• the rest of 
society and the associations into which we enter. According to 
~ 
Laski, men are never fully merged into groups and groups are 
never fully merged into the rest of society or the state. We 
should note that this argument would seem to contradict Laski's 
position of 1916 when he spoke of groups having real 
personalities. 
Laski did not always make it clear whether his pluralis• 
proceeds from the psychological or metaphysical bases which 
James provided. Indeed, Laski seemed to shift between these two 
levels of explanation; although, not surprisingly, this is 
somewhat true of James as well who, as we have seen, shifted 
upwards from sensory perception to grand metaphysics. 
Indeed, from the quotations I have cited from Laski, it can 
be argued that the psychological elements in James' pluralism 
were also in evidence in Laski's work with its strong emphasis on 
the isolation of the self - something which well suited Laski's 
own early liberalisa. Further to this, we can also see a 
relation with James' psychology in Laski's occasional focus on 
the complexity of each individual self. The self and the universe 
become then mirror-images as we find that division or difference 
goes to the core of each; just as we have a plural universe we 
also find within us a plurality of selves. Laski wrote, for 
example, that we • ... experience ourselves not in unity but in 
division" (Laski 1948:260} 
It is not bard to see what political consequences might flow 
from these interpretations of James' pscyhology and metaphysics. 
Psychological complexity translates into the political fact that 
in any given society an individual may have mtiltiple allegiances 
and that these should be accommodated. But what form of political 
organisation can accommodate such bundles of hyphens? At this 
point, Hsiao presumed that Laski's plural state was intended to 
be an exact replia of James' plural universe. (Hsiao 1927:126) 
- That is, Laski's state, like James' universe, was ultimately a 
pluralistic arrangement of grouped forces. Indeed, Laski admitted 
in his article "The Personality of Associations" that the 
implications of this theory were polyarchic. (Laski 1916:425) In 
the Grammar however, he argued that the implications were federal 
- whether this means a centralising or decentralising federalism 
is not clear. Indeed, Laski apparently refused to answer this 
question on the grounds that one can only respond to shifting 
desires, allegiances and needs. To this extent, we can say his 
pluralism is pragmatic or experimental rather than static. 
Drawing political conclusions from James'- metaphysics is not 
as strange as it may seem. In a sense, James himself had 
prepared the ground for this in using political metaphors in 
order-to explain his own conception of the universe. For example, 
he wrote that his conception of reality was closer to "a federal 
republic than an empire or a kingdom.• (James 1977:145) His book 
Pragmatism also made use of political analogies. Hsiao even 
suggested that James' metaphysics, which he slaued as the "most 
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audacious piece of anthropomorphism" in the history of Western 
philosophy •. was implicitly political - in the sense that it had a 
strong liberal bias. James had created his "cosmic republicanism" 
by extending the "libertarian idea of 'self-government' from the 
realm of p<>litical organisation to metaphysics.!! (Hsiao 1927:113}c 
(1) However. the real basis for the metaphysics lies in ·his . 
empirical psychology - although no doubt James• own liberal 
predisposition (2) is present in his metaphysical projections of 
his psychology. Thus, James travelled from a psychological theory 
of the self as a stream of experiences to argue for the 
pluralistic nature of the universe. From this pluralism there 
emerged a political theory which depicts society as a series of 
partially related autonomies - be they groups or individuals. 
Nevertheless, and contrary to Hsiao who saw pragmatism as 
the underlying philosophy of pluralism, I would argue that James' 
metaphysics fed and confirmed pluralist political positions Laski 
had already arrived at. As I mentioned earlier it is not clear 
1. In his Pragmatism James pointed to the fact that the authority ~ .. 
of States and Empires was crumbling, but that this anti-monistic 
political sentiment had yet to infiltrate the philosophy class-
rooms. (James 1907:261) Laski wrote in IWl American Democracy 
that James' philosophy was an "affirmation of faith in the 
individual, an insistence upon his freedom, a call upon him to 
act, and a promise that his ·action will not be in vain~·'" - (Laski 
1949: 448) -
2. Hsiao derided James' philosophy as a •eosaic Reign of Terror"<7 -
and was equally· scathing abou~:: Laski \s·;poliriesr·~ deciaring·~ha~"~: 
James bas played Rousseau to· Laski' s Dan~on.-- In coatiouing . his· 
French revolutionary analogy he wrote: ·~·-11The · absolut'ist Bastille'·· 
is shattered! · the all-absorbing aona.rchical .God.. dethroned, 
liberty .. for .. all; Year- one of the Universe-Rebublie is-declared.'!.. · 
(Hsiao 1927: 193} · ··· ... · ··· · · 
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whether Laski proceeded from James' psychology or his 
metaphysics; and nowhere do we find a sustained analysis of 
James' philosophy among Laski's works - although he was obviously 
familiar with some of James' ideas. What James' philosophy did 
was firstly, provide pluralists like Laski with a means of 
launching a metaphysical, and not just political, assault on the 
Austinian or neo-Hegelian theories of the state. Secondly and 
more simply, James' philosophy, as with empiricism in general, 
also provided a new vocabulary with which to challenge ~olitical 
"block-universes." Thus, it could be argued that rigid notions 
such as the territorial state did not take account of the flux 
and complexity of social structures. 
4. Pluralist Theory of Sovereignty and Law 
In relation to this last point, we find that empiricism and 
pragmatism also had an impact upon theories of jurisprudence. 
(Jurisprudence, Laski said, is the "eye of the law" because it 
relates law to the social environment and to the spirit of the 
times. [Laski 1948:577]} The influence of pragmatic or 
sociological thought in the area of law was evident in both 
America and on the continent. In the case of France, the 
jurisprudential theories of Demogue, Francois Geny (professor of 
civil law at the University of Nancy} and Duguit are the most 
cited while the Dutch-born Krabbe was also important. (1} America 
1. See Geny's four volume work Sciftnca g,t Tachnigue iD. ~ 
~ Positif, Paris, 1913. Note that in volume one, chapter 
three, Geny discusses the intellectual atmosphere of the times. 
He mentions for example the philosophy of Bergson (and its 
association with syndicalism as well as the radical empiricism of 
Poincare. (Geny 1913:75ff) 
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was represented in this regard by Dean Roscoe Pound and Justice 
Holmes. (Oliver Wendall Holmes Jr.} 
These were the names that were variously cited in 
discussions of the sociology of law movement. the members .of 
which called upon jurists to reject the idea of law · as -solely 
derived from either first principles or from contract. (Follett 
1918:122) It was argued that one should study all the sources of 
law; in particular, the concrete circumstances in which law 
arises and is observed. It is not surprising that with this 
call to turn away from abstract principles we see the words 
relativity creep into discussions about legal theory. This was in 
order to stress the tentative and negotiated character of law. 
Sabine for instance wrote of the "relativity of legal truth" 
adding that for that reason the jurist's attitude must always be 
one of "compromise" and "adjustment" - seeking the "pragmatic 
adaption of means to ends". (Sabine 1930:879 Merriam 1924:16) (1) 
Vital metaphors were also used to remodel traditional 
thinking about the law. Follett, Laski and Sabine all argued that 
not only in a process of becoming but was also an expression ·of 
life - law was an articulation of the community's .vital-····.flu.id. 
(Follett 1919:131, Laski 1948:577, Sabine 1930:878} (1} 
There were actually three distinct but overlapping arguments 
in relation-to legal theory being offered in discussions ·about 
the sociology of law. And all- three o.f. .. these . ·Views-·..of,-, ... 1~ 
1. There are numerous examples of the pragmatic spirit.-.in . ..the 
area of law. Hsiao cited Hugo Krabbe as saying·that the sta&i-li-ty 
of law is a contradiction in terms and Dean P.ound as saying that 
while law must be stable i L can . never stand ··· still .• -· (Hsiao 
1927: 169-70} 
· ·· theorr related in some way to the various tendencies within 
pragmat-iSJR. •.. -· Firstly, there was a pragmatic .conception of law as 
that which works. That is, law is simply those rules of conduct 
which, pragmatically speaking, can get "themselves obeyed" (Urban 
1919: 649;- Elliot 1926: 147) ·Secondly, there was the notion of. law 
.and sovereignty, as put forward by Follett, which has·them as the 
products of active willing on the part of the community - an 
understanding which she derived from James. Thirdly, there is 
the conception of law as a set of biological or psychological 
imperatives; a view of law which is seen as being close to, 
rightly or wrongly, the scientific pragmatism of Dewey. 
I shall deal with Follet's conception first. In Follett• s 
analysis we move beyond a view of law as something which is 
pragmatically negotiated; something which expresses nothing more 
than whatever individuals or the authorities can get away with. 
Law, she wrote (echoing Bergson), is the "entelechy of freedom"; 
that is, law like other institutions should allow us to be free 
to become. our true selves or to express our true personalities. 
(Follett 1919:578!} 
Thus, Follett did not simply seek to expose the political 
nature of the law, she also attempted to put something more 
ethically satisfying in place of the older and arguably 
discredited theories. Her emphasis (and here she cited the German 
jurists Ihering and Jellinek as well as Dean Pound), was on the 
1. Follett cited Mr. Felix Frankfurter's address to the American 
Bar Assocation in August 1915 in which he proclaimed that ··taw 
must follow life.'" (Follett 1919:130) 
fact that law is produced by the community or grows out of 
community needs and desires and therefore it should reflect these 
things. Krabbe is also relevant here, for implicit in his idea of. 
the state as a legal community, and also in his idea of an 
international legal community, was the notion that law grows out 
of interests which are then evaluated in accordance with man's 
sense of right. 
Krabbe wrote that it is mankind itself which is the source 
of "legal values" and it is for this reason that law is by its 
"nature sovereign." (Krabbe 1930:151ffJ232} However, while 
Krabbe's emphasis was on the creation of legal values or 
standards, Follett was more interested in the idea of the law as 
a reflection of the community will. (It should be obvious here 
why the notion of law as based on contract was rejected. Contract 
law rests on the idea that our wills are divided rather than 
fused; it leaves us "'free' to fight" out our differences 
[Follett 1919:124f]) The basis in Gierke should be apparent; how 
this grows into a theory of sovereignty resembling Bosanquet's I 
will explain in due course. (Follett 1919:122f} 
Looking to all the sources of law and prescribing that the 
state and its legal institutions should reflect the people's will 
could also be developed in another way. That is, one could begin 
to argue that law should relate to social purposes or needs. 
-{.t.ct.a~k~ ... ·~:577, Urban· 1919:549}· There are· some similairl::tes·,:;,,-.,,. 
between this view and Follett' s argument. However, the conception-' 
of law-·as something which should reflect social purposes could ·be 
made to sound more objective than Follett' s idea of law-- as a 
reflection of an active ccmmuaity willing - either by attachi~~"' ,,. 
this .. notion to a set of ~oral .. abstractions or-by ascribing -it. to 
certain laws of human behaviour. 
Given the varying tendencies available to those who 
approached law from a sociological perspective. it is -not 
surprising that there was often a lack of clarity in some of the 
arguments. Laski is a good example as he appeared to approach 
jurisprudence from a number of different and potentially 
contradictory perspectives. At times he attempted to ruthlessly 
expose the political realities which lie behind the law while at 
other times he made the prescriptive claim that law should serve 
social purposes. Even here ambiguity remained for these social 
purposes were sometimes treated as if they are moral commands and 
at other times as if they are mere functional necessities. 
These same shifts are also evident in Laski's discussion of 
the theory of sovereignty. At times. he followed the 
nominalistic path laid down by Duguit, denying that there are 
any essences behind our abstractions. (Wilde 1920:352} Thus he 
could argue that the apparent reality of the state as a juristic 
person, along with the will that it was supposed to represent, 
was nothing but an effect of language.- (Elliot 1925:485 Elliot· 
1928:88:41) As Barker recognised, this could equally lead--toan 
attack on the idea of group personality. Certainly. this was an 
idea that Laski seetted--t-0 gradually move away froa in the··· 1920s: 
although he still seemed to treat groups as if they were somehow 
more authentic than larger collectivities such as the stat-& .. --..We 
should also note that this nominalistic approach, which---aight 
leave us with nothing but individuals and their.:: interests. 11as 
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also very compatible with Laski's liberalism and with bis 
interest in James' empirical psychology. (1) 
According to the nominalistic picture, what lay behind the 
fiction of the juristic person was not a single sovereign power 
but an array of particular social forces or interests. {Laski 
1948:55f Elliot 1928:88}, Similarly, the state could not be seen 
to give expression to a single or united will. What the state 
wills is really the result of constant negotiation and compromise 
with and between conflicting interest groups. {Elliot 1928:89) It 
followed from this that sovereignty was, like the law, a relative 
notion; and that obediance was always a "matter of degree.a 
(Elliot 1928:89) 
We should note at this point how the instrumental method 
interposes in a most interesting way. Pluralists {from Gierke 
onwards) did not simply aim at providing a more empirically or 
metaphysically correct account of the source and workings of 
institutions; at least when they did there was a larger political 
point to this. This was especially true of Laski. Thus we find 
1. While Laski early on accepted the notion of the real 
personality of associations, he later seems to have rejected 
this. Firstly, this would entail the acceptance of undesirable 
groupings. But also, this would undermine his emphasis on 
individuals and their particular experiences. Further to this, 
to dismiss as aetaphysics the idea of a social aind would seem 
to necessitate a siailar dismissal of the idea of the group mind. 
Barker also wrote that pluralists had to decide whether it was 
the case that the members of a group shared the same identity and 
that therefore the group was a real person or whether it was the 
case that we are as individuals ultimately isolated and that 
therefore the idea of the real personality of groups is a 
nominalist fiction. (Barker 1957:160ff) 
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him shifting between observations on the relative nature of 
sovereignty to arguing in terms of the instrumental purposes of 
the state - just as he did in his discussion of jurisprudence. 
(Ellis 1921:401, Zerby 1945:138, 142) He wrote that we must judge 
the state not "from what it announces itself to be, but from what 
it does to the daily substance of men's lives." (Laski 1948:249) 
Thus, we turn from an empirical argument (which in itself is not 
conclusive) to a normative one, insisting that the limitation on 
the sovereignty of the state and its claim to obediance flows 
from the fact that the existence of any government solely rests 
on its ability to fulfill and maintain rights; rights which are 
held to be prior to the state. (Elliot 1924:259} 
In this vein Laski wrote that government rests on a 
"contingent moral obligation. Its actions are right to the degree 
that they maintain rights." {Laski 1948:57} As evidence of the 
infinite flexibility of pragmatic arguments, we should also note 
how Laski broadened out pragmatic criteria to include moral 
considerations. For he wrote that what the state does is right, 
not by virtue of the fact that it has willed something, but 
because whatever it does "works" in relation to the betterment of 
men's lives. (Laski 1948:283) 
With this appeal to abstract moral categories such as rights 
which impose limitations on state power we are moving beyond 
realistic appraisals of the operation of the law or of 
·sovereignty~· we are als<> moving out of the area of pluralisa. 
c· Indeed, we saw "this·0 ·earlier in relation to the seeaingly 
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paradoxical situation which had pluralists proclaiming their 
internationalism. 
This point deserves further explanation. Here we should 
note that one of the significant features of pluralist theory was 
its revival of the medieval distinction between positive and 
natural law. But the most important thing about-this distinction 
for the pluralists was that traditionally, natural law (itself a 
manifestation of "eternal law"} was held to be superior to the 
laws of man. (Hsiao 1927:10f} (1} Whatever the practical 
reasons for this distinction and the concomitant elevation of 
natural law, the point of drawing upon it in the 20th century 
was (as with the "realistic" analyses of sovereignty}, to upset 
juristic theories of the state; in particular, those theories 
which were associated with the names of Jean Bodin and John 
Austin. Drawing upon this antique distinction allowed pluralists 
to assert that there was an objective law beyond the state and 
that this was a righteous law. 
Quite obviously,· this was where Krabbe' s argument concerning 
a universal legal community was going. Rut-the influence of 
Duguit was also important to the pluralists-~-in this···· regard. 
1. See also Evans, "The Problem of Control in Medieval Industry", 
Political Science Ouarterlv, 1916. pp.606ff. Hsiao noted that 
this distinction proved useful in a period when the institutivu 
of the . state was gaining increased strength·- and -- "self-
consciousness" .•. Eor it became. "necessary to....reconcile political 
·· -su1>remaey"with 1egal supreaacy. The traditi~nttl·sharp ·distinction ·~ 
between natural law and positive law provided a ready· solution, 
and it was, as a matter of fact, utilized with great advantatge. 
Positive law, it was held, whether·it be declared by will of the 
prince, or promulgated by the sovereignty of the people, is 
plainly a creation of the political power of the state,--and 1-· as 
such must be regarded as below the state. It is natural law alone 
which is independent of, that is above, the action.of -the-state.• 
(Hsiao 1927:10ff) 
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(Korff 1923:406} Indeed, Duguit was best known for reviving the 
notion that there were laws that existed beyond the state; that 
the state was conditioned by a higher social purpose. It was he 
above all among the pluralists who spoke of the requirement of 
.the state to obey a certain "rule of right" or "law of nature" 
{Hsiao 1927:16); that is, the state should obey what Duguit 
called "objective law" (droit obiectjf). {Duguit 1919:50} 
But from what or where is this objective law derived? Duguit 
thought his approach thoroughly scientific in this regard. 
Objective law is derived from those things that are necessary to 
ensure the survival of the social organism and are also a 
consequence of that part of our psychological make-up that 
dictates that we must seek the realization of social purposes. 
(Duguit 1919:43f} These comprise what Duguit calls the facts of 
social interdependence or solidarity [solidaritie sociale]}; it 
is these which oblige the state and institutions to act in the 
public interest. (Duguit 1919:39-44 Elliot 1922:641-2) {1} 
For Duguit the state is not sovereign and self-limiting; it 
is disciplined by this objective law and the rules of conduct 
which flow from it. {Wilde 1920:357} {2} We should note that 
just as the government has a certain function to perform so too 
does objective law co1B1Rit the-·citizen to certain obligations. 
1. On this topic also see William KacMahon Ball, "The Basis -0f 
Political Obediance", in the Australasian Journal g,1 Psychology 
AD.4 PbUosophy, .. Vol. X, No.3, Sept. 1932, pp.173-87. (See 
especially pages 176-8.} 
2. -In-- fact, it is the objective character of the rules which 
distinguishes them from positive or statute law (~) - the 
latter being tainted by the subjective will .. of the state •. o. (Coker 
1921: 188ff) ....... -- -- . -·-· ·---· --···· -----
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These laws discipline the behaviour of members of the community -
each member must uphold these laws so as not to threaten social 
security and to preserve and promote those benefits which one 
gains in becoming a member of a community. Duguit wrote: 
The basis of 
organization. 
right or the 
of a social 
1919:49-50} 
public law is therefore no longer command but 
Public law is no longer based on individual 
autonomy of a private will, but upon the idea 
function imposed on every person. (Duguit 
Thus, Duguit's conception of an objective law or rule of 
right differed markedly from that promoted by natural law or 
natural rights advocates and from the idea of a universal legal 
community as proposed by Krabbe. Duguit insisted that government 
cannot "infringe" objective law; laws that the government 
issues (laws by statute - lois}, will only be obeyed to the 
extent that they give expression to these objective laws and the 
social purposes on which they are based. (MacMahon Ball 1932:177} 
Further to this, he argued that citizens or groups will not do 
anything to jeopardize social solidarity. But what, we may ask, 
is the exact thrust of the "cannot" or "will not".. l.n this 
context? 
That is, it is possible to call the objectivity of Duguit's 
law into question. Indeed, the word Wit itself is essentially 
... ambiguous. · In· French Wit connotes both -right and law yet is 
not quite the same as either of. these terms as they.are used·- in 
English. (1) While Duguit himself appeared to be using the term 
.. 1~ .. Lalande wrote that the word ~. one which French philosophy 
has.attached great importance too,"is a very comprehensive term; 
.iLis .at the same time right-r justice, a right-tul -claiwt, -law (and 
to mean law rather than right, this ambiguity still allows what 
-may- be merely an injunction or command to present itself as 
indubitable fact. 
Again, when Duguit said that the state must or will conform 
with the principle of social necessity, we have to enquire into 
the nature of these terms. As I said earlier, his objectivist 
view of law relied on appeals to the compelling power of 
biological and psychological facts. Thus he wrote: "Statute is 
[or should be] the expression of a rule which social needs are 
elaborating in individual consciences." {Duguit 1919:73} Thus, 
it is clear that if we accept Duguit's premises then the "must" 
of which Duguit spoke is tautological, because we cannot disobey 
what our psychology compels us to do, and prescriptive, because 
he was saying that it is a practical necessity that we pay 
attention to biological laws of survival. Thus, his drojt 
obiectjf exists as both fact and exhortation. (1) 
especially natural law), and positive legislation." (Lalande 
1916:531:531n} John Austin also noted that it was common for 
German writers on the philosophy or rationale of law to ··confuse 
the terms "law" and "right". (Austin 1861:258) In relation ... to 
the confused use of the term objective law Follet wrote ·that - by 
lg, droit objectif Duguit means "merely law." She added that 
because he also speaks of "power as resting on function in 
contradistinction to the classical theory of the abstract 
'rights' of man, rights apart from law and only declared by law, 
political writers someti11es speak of Duguitts 'objectiv&' --·theory 
-of-law,; as opposed to a 'subjective' theory of law, [that-is, the 
notion-·ttf ·subjective rightsl-·whea·-~jurists would ~el:l··us--,,·dtat·.•law·-- --
~objective, and that subjective right is always merely A right, 
my right." {Foll et 1918: 273n} 
1.· Elliot likened Duguit's idea of social interdependence to 
Rousseau's notion of the general will. (Elliot 1922:646) If he is 
correct in this analogy, the argument for compulsion is 
·essentially tautological. That is, we can not logically disobey 
because, by definition, we found ourselves and participate in the 
general--will. Interestingly, Laski himself, makes this. point 
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Duguit's concept of objective law thus has normative 
elements; nor can he maintain his claia that it- is non-
metaphysical simply because in a nominalistic fashion he rejected 
the idea of a community will. As many observers (including 
Laski) have suggested, rather than being posit1vi~Li~ uu~ 
realistic as he had claimed, Duguit's objective law was actually 
a metaphysical abstraction and to assert otherwise revealed a 
weakness in his argument. (Geny 1913b:l93, Duguit 1919:69f, Wilde 
1920:364} (1} 
Duguit did assert that his objective law was evolving 
because the requirements of social solidarity themselves changed. 
Law, he wrote, " ... like every social phenomenon, is subject to 
perpetual change." (Duguit 1919:xxxv) Nevertheless, it is 
difficult to see his theory as other than one which substitutes a 
legal for a political monism; a legal monism which had the state 
and individual or groups as its instrument. (2) This is a point 
which would seem to damage the credibility of both his pragmatist 
about Rousseau's volonte genera le -in Liberty ill~ Modern ~- · 
Similarly, Wilde notes that Hegel and Bosanquet 8 admit the 
existence of bad states, though they refuse to recognize them as 
strictly real or Wirkljch. 'A bad state', says Hegel, 'is one 
that merely exists.' And Bosanquet, both in his earlier and. his 
latest writings, claims for the state, not moral absoluteness, 
but only asboluteness as having 'the distinctive function .. of 
dictating the final. adjustement in matters -of··externa1""'-action 1 ' 
and even as to this, he asserts a duty of rebellion under certain 
conditions. 8 (Wilde 1920:368) 
1. Laski noted that it was pointed out by Geny in bis Science ~ 
Techniaue ~ Droit Prive--that one of the errors in Duguit's 
writings is the 8 absence of an explicit avowal .. of its implied 
metaphysic. 8 (Duguit 1919:69n) What is being referred to here 
when Laski and Geny speak.of a metaphysic would seem to be a 
.moral core. ---·-·· 
2. On this point, see Wilde, 1920, p.363 and Korff, 1923, p. 406. 
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and pluralist credentials. Follet wrote that Duguit's pragmatism 
had not as "yet rid itself of absolute standards." (Follet 
1918:276) Further to this, his conception of objective social 
necessity suggests an underlying harmony in society which sits 
oddly alongside the emphasis on conflict that some of the 
pluralists (especially the syndicalists) held to be pivotal. 
So, we have a number of different directions in which 
pluralist theory on the sovereign state and on jurisprudence 
could go. We have on the one hand, a political theory in which 
there is a harmonious conception based on the idea of objective 
needs, and on the other hand, we have a "realistic" account 
which depicts social life as a ceaseless struggle between two or 
more discontinuous groupings. In between these, we have a 
conception of law as the creation of the will of the community. 
As Sabine suggested, many of the critics of existing 
theories of sovereignty simply missed the point. For while it 
might be true that conflicting loyalties exist and that the 
unitary state had not been handed down from on high, these 
facts in themselves do not explain away the value of the 
doctrine. For Sabine, the debate between pluralists and monists 
was above all of a practical rather than logical or metaphysical 
nature. (Sabine 1923:41) Indeed, casting the debate in stark 
metaphysical terms could serve to escalate conflicts of opinion 
and introduce division of where none were warranted. 
Sabine also made the important point that in attacking the 
depiction of the state as a juristic person, pluralists were in 
some ways attacking a straw-man. This depiction he wrote, was not 
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intended to be interpreted literally; it was really a shorthand 
way of expressing the necessary unity of law. Sabine wrote that 
the seeming strangeness of the doctrine was due to the fact that 
a younger generation of political thinkers and actors were unused 
to this particular theoretical language. (Sabine 1920:306} 
Furthermore, the fact that there was a distinction between 
legal sovereignty and actual empirical sovereignty was hardly a 
discovery of pluralist thinkers. Figures such as Joha_Austin and 
Lord Bryce were well aware of this. (1) But for these theorists, 
whatever the empirical limitations upon the exercise of unitary 
sovereignty, it remained a very practical thing. Pluralists 
however, saw it differently. For them, a continued insistence on 
the necessary unity of law and sovereign power would not only 
prove highly impractical; it was also a recipe for tyranny. 
I will now go on to examine in detail the criticisms of 
pragmatism in relation to pluralist theory - both in its 
voluntaristic or functionalist form. In particular, I will 
examine its alleged association with fascist doctrine and 
administrative techniques. - I will then go on to discuss -the 
concept of sovereignty as something which can only be willed into 
being by the community. This is an idea that was also held to-be 
1. For example, Lord Bryce pointed out in his 1901- Studies.';:,, in. 
History !md, Jµrisprudence that,.•lega1 sovereignty had no:•reTtO 
do with actual political power than a demonstration in; geometry 
had to do with irregular figures drawn on · paper.• (Bryce 
1901:458) Even earlier than then,. Austin had alluded~ in his 
Lectures gg, Jurisprudence, to moral and other liaits to 
sovereignty when be wrote: •Like the sovereign body of- which it 
is a member, it [the state} is obliged or restrained 11orally: by 
opinions or sentiments current in the givenco-Wlity.~-----(Austin 
1861:238} _,_ 
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implicit in James and was put forward as part of an attempt to 
wrest James' philosophy from the hands of the pluralists. 
5. Pluralism and Tyranny 
Many of those of who were critical of Austinian notions of 
sovereignty or Bosanquet's theory of the general will (because 
they were seen as paving the way towards dictatorship} were 
themselves accused of letting loose tyrannical forces. I 
commented in the last chapter that the pluralist enthusiasm for 
crumbling empires seemed somewhat odd given their view that the 
sovereign state - or the anarchic balance of power system that 
it resulted in - was the cause of war. Similarly, I said it was 
odd that the very thing that was believed to have caused the war 
should be recommended as a way of ordering the domestic arena. 
That is, as Elliot described it, a polyarchic system in which 
groups were ttsovereign in themselves". (Elliot 1928:291} As Cohen 
wisely observed, the "evils of the absolute state are not cured 
by multiplication of absolutes." (Cohen 1919:689} Further to 
this, one can also ask how such a system differs from the 
anarchic system of laissez-faire which pluralists als°,/~~ 
Had they not just created a new set of sovereign atoms? 
One can also raise doubts about the claims of pluralists to 
provide an empirically superior account. of society.· As Muirhead 
wrote, it was not so much a question of overcoming metaphysics 
but of which metaphysics would be chosen; that is, pluraiism or 
monism. (Muirhead 1924: 174) (1) Cohen argued that what many 
·--!,. . Sabine regretted that essentially a practical · or·· political 
·-issue had been reduced to a ~tark 11etahpysical choice; ·· Sabine ·-
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pluralists had done was simply to reify groups rather than the 
state. Furthermore, it was argued that this metaphorical 
description of the group as an autonomous person was dangerous. 
(Cohen 1919:68Jff} Granting groups the same-status as persons 
might permit the entry into public life of all sorts of strange 
and sinister associations. As Barker had recognised, to hold that 
all groups are in possession of rights might entail the 
acceptance of evil groups such as the Mafia or Camorra. (Barker 
1957:163) 
But less colourful examples co~ld also be provided. Trade 
unions, for example, could be seen as equally or more oppressive 
than larger social organisations. As earlier pluralists 
recognised, it is because of the potential for group oppression 
that the state, with the ability to command, becomes necessary. 
In relation to this point, one could also argue that pluralists 
had been too selective in their choice of historical examples. 
For example, Cohen wrote that cities were freer than villages and 
that the kings' court was superior to the local court. (C6hen 
1919:687:677, Laing 1921:12) Again, as Laing noted, the reaso~ 
for accepting the "kings peaceN was that it was a practical 
·thing. It provided greater autonomy for religious groups reacting 
against ·the-established church and the physical · · - - -· 
pointed out that neither pluralism nor monism were theories as 
--- --- --such -but at best marked certain philos-0phical dispositions or 
attitudes. Indeed, Sabine regretted the introduction of these two 
- ---·---terms into political argument at the time because of the heavy 
--- ---- --- and-- possibly ·•is-leading philosophical baggage that -they carried~ 
-----(Sabine- 1923:44-5-)---·"' ·-
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security necessary for the conduct of trade and commerce. {Laing 
1921:12) 
Thus pluralism was considered to be poor metaphysics and 
poor politics. Indeed·, Hsiao wrote that the political dangers 
posed by pluralism only became more obvious when they were 
projected onto a metaphysical canvass. (Hsiao 1927:192-3) 
Let us now begin to explore these dangers in more depth. 
Elliot, who as I said was one of pluralism's most vociferous 
critics, wrote that where one detracted from the legal authority 
of the state, society would decline into a "period of feudalistic 
strife among the interests". (Elliot 1924:259) Here, he was 
clearly referring to the syndicalists. But this was only the 
first danger - one which did however, prepare the ground for the 
next. For in the midst of social division, it was possible for 
demagogues or disciplined and tightly-knit groups to seize power. 
The critics of pluralism in drawing attention to this issue 
were intent on attacking syndicalism. But they had another target 
in sight as well. For even though syndicalism as a political 
movement was largely dead by the 1920s {although this is not- to 
say that industrial unrest did not occur) it was seen as being 
replaced by an even uglier political phenomenon, namely. fascis•-
Indeed, according to the critics, it was the-class war-fare 
conducted by · the syndicalists that helped form the pretext for 
the --establishment of fascism- in Italy. Elli-0t wrote . •feudalism 
-begot -nationalisa -· so- --lawlessness begets--- Fascismo. "-·-·-----{Elliot 
---1-924:257}-- Or- - as J..- Raasay--KeDona1d-wrote- in aa--ar-t-k1&--in---the 
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S · 1· t R · • J 1923 th t ".The replu [answer} to op a isenew in une a : J 
syndicalism is Fascismo.'" (Elliot 1924:235, Stewart 1928:856} 
The relation established between syndicalism and fascism 
that I· have so far elaborated upon was purely -0ne -0f cause and 
effect. There were, however, suggestions of a more profound 
connection; a connection which related to the doctrine of 
voluntarism, and by that path to the philosophy of pragmatism. 
What Elliot did was in fact to identify voluntarism with 
pragmatism. For Elliot, it was what he regarded as the pragmatic 
doctrine of voluntarism which was the "thread of unity" which 
drew together fascism and syndicalism. (Sabine 1931:212) It was 
pragmatism, Elliot wrote, which gave both syndicalism and fascism 
their "ideology and their values." (Elliot 1928;viii} (Elliot 
also added functionalist and guild socialist political theories 
to his list as well - but I will explain the reasons for their 
presence later. [Elliot 1928:viii]) Both fascism and 
syndicalism, Elliot argued, embraced the centrality of will in 
political life and this is what placed theB5quarely within ·the 
pragmatist tradition of thought. Although we should note that 
while voluntarism could follow a meliorative path, it could also 
ascend to the absolute and divine. (1) 
What makes- this point interesting is that not long after 
this argument was being put, Laski was arguing in Dangers g1 
Obedjance that the tyrannies which existed in Europe (in Spain, 
1. This was a point made by H. G. Townsend, 19371c· 0 ··"0n the 
possibility of a better world•, Philosophica1 Review, Vol. XLVI~ 
No,2, March, pp.132-46. 
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Italy and Russia) were expressions of the monistic theory of 
sovereignty taken to their logical conclusion. (Laski 1930:27} 
What Laski took as providing support for his pluralism, bis 
critics saw as evidence of its danger. Futber to this, Laski was 
often arguing that both Lenin and Mussolini were cut from the 
same "Machiavellian" cloth - insofar as both saw the ends as 
justifying the means. (Laski 1930:251) Yet this was exactly the 
complaint that Hsiao and Elliot were making in relation to 
pragmatism (a pragmatism to which Laski had earlier declared his 
allegiance). As we shall see, the critics of pragmatism 
argued that it tended to view individuals as instruments and this 
could be regarded as immoral. 
But these are points I shall return to later. At this 
stage, we need to examine the relations between syndicalism, 
fascism and pragmatism; or perhaps I should say, the relations 
between James, Sorel, Bergson and Mussolini. It was in a famous 
interview which appeared in the Sunday Times on April 11 1926 
that Mussolini declared that be owed most to Sorel; h9 said that 
his "rough theories of revolutionary tactics has contributed most 
to form the discipline, energy and power of the fascist cohorts." 
(Sorel 1950:24 Perry 1935:575n} (1) 
Another point of intellectual connection, which ties in with 
their common interest in tactics, is that Sorel and Mussolini 
both shared an appreciation of the philosophy of pragaatisa. As 
L See also Mussolini in Fasds11 (1935) where he mentions Sorel, 
Peguy and Lagardelle of th.e Mouvemgpt Socialiste as well .as . the 
of Italian syndicalists .. as-- having- an input·· inte>- Fascisa. 
(Mussolini 1935: 16} -·· 
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I noted in the last chapter, Sorel admired American society and 
culture for what he saw as its dynamism, energy and unremitting 
realism. ( 1) 
Elliot wrote that Mussolini had admired and sought to 
imitate "these ·american' traits.• (Elliot 1928:118n} Mussolini 
seized upon pragmatism, which some have seen as the authentic 
expression of American culture. William Kilborne Stewart (of 
Dartmouth College) wrote an article appearing in the American 
Political Science Review called the "Mentors of Mussolini•. In 
it he mentioned Machiavelli, Nietzsche, James and Sorel, all of 
whom had been cited by Mussolini, and added to this list Pareto 
and Oriani. (Stewart 1928:845) Stewart said that Mussolini had 
embraced this "'American Philosophy'", insisting as 
"pertinaciously as James on the ·cash-value' of an idea." 
(Stewart 1928: 862) (2} 
But it was not just James' pragmatic instrumentalism which 
was absorbed into Mussolini's philosophical frame-work. 
Fittingly, especially in the light of Sorel's presence, we also 
bear the rushing sound of Bergson's metaphysics of life. Thus we 
again find the key descriptions; the world is an endless flux -
1. Elliot noted that it was in the context of this admiration 
that he quoted James approvingly as saying that the "Yankees not 
only ·consent to live on possibilities' ... but ,they even seek out 
the hazardous in their enterprises." (Elliot 1928: 119 • Sorel 
1928:20n} The connection between the philosophy of pragmatism 
and the realism of the American people since their pioneering 
days was also addressed by Waldo Frank in Qui: America. (Elliot 
1924:241n Frank 1919:26-29} 
2. It was because of the emphasis in Machiavelli's Prince on acts 
of indomitable will in the face of both fortune and necessity, 
that Machiavelli, above all, was seen by Mussolini as the 
•·prophet of the pragmatist era in politics.'" (Stewart 1928:845) 
In reference to the pragmatic element in fascist thinking 
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a ceaseless becoming. We find that Mussolini too had become 
infused with the relativistic spirit in throwing overboard all 
"fixed principles and preestablished categories." (Stewart 
1928:863) 
Relativity, flux becoming - Mussolini could not have sounded 
more Bergsonian or pragmatic. But it is at precisely this point 
that the pragmatic method is brought to bear. Indeed, we can 
begin to see why a pragmatic instrumentalism and a metaphysics of 
process are so politically compatible. Because if one is to 
exercise one's political will successfully, then it is a 
necessary precondition that the world is in some way or to some 
degree plastic. Indeed, this is the reason for Hsiao's insistence 
that the pluralist's assertion that social life was plastic 
increased the chance of "majority-tyranny or the domination of 
contingent force." (Hsiao 1927:192f) 
That is, as we saw with Sorel, once you view the world as 
infinite flux, as a universe "with the lid off" as James put it, 
then it can be seen as ripe, for good or ill, for exploitation. 
Insofar as Mussolini held this view, Stewart wrote, he could be 
regarded as a pragmatist. (Stewart 1928:863~--
Mussolini [or someone writing on behalf of Mussolini] wrote: "All 
doctrines aim at directing the activities which in~· thei~ turn 
react on the doctrine, modifiying and adjusting it to new needs, 
or outstripping it. A doctrine must therefore be a vital act and 
not a verbal display. Hence the prag1Ratic strain in Fascism, its 
will to power, it will to live, its attitude toward violence, and 
its value." (Muss9lini 1935:26} See also pages 6-7 where 
Mussolini spoke of fascism as a philosophy of action and also 
p.59 where he dismises economic understandings of society whether 
capitalist or socialist. Stewart cited Mussolini as saying that 
the opinions be expressed should "'not be considered as dogmas, 
but as expressions of the needs of today, which may toaorrow 
become relative ••.. Every program should be carried only ··t<> the 
right point.•• (Stewart 1928:863} 
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We asked earlier bow real was the relation between Sorel and 
Bergson; now we must investigate this alleged association between 
Mussolini and James. As Stewart noted, pragmatism was 
popularised in Italy by Papini. {Stewart 1928:8&2) Papini was 
part of a small philosophical discussion group which existed-- in 
Florence between 1903 and 1907 known as "The Pragmatic Club". 
(Perry 1935:570} Eleanor Hammond Broadus wrote in her 1934 
English translation of Papini's work~~. (a book which 
was awarded the Premio Mussolini in 1933} that in those years 
Papini became the "leader of the younger generation in Italy, 
voicing their doubts, their social discontent, their programme of 
reform." (Papini 1934:v) She also added that he was a friend of 
Bergson and James and along with Benedetto Croce, became one of 
the principle figures in Italian philosophy in the first few 
decades of this century. {Papini 1934:vi:v) Perry remarked that 
the friendship with James began when the American made the 
acquaintance of the group in the spring of 1905 on a visit to 
Rome to attend the Fifth International Congress of Psychology and 
was impressed by their enthusiasm, "frolicsomeness," and 
"literary swagger" - particularly that of Papini. (Perry 
1935:571) (1) As a result of this association Papini in turn 
became known to American academic audiences with an article he 
wrote called "What Pragmatism is Like" being · translated - and 
published in I.b,g, Popular Science Monthly, in 1907-8 in which be 
described the pragmatist as one who forced "things to exist" 
1. There are a number of approving references to - Papini "the 
young Italian pragmatist" as James called him -in -~ James' 
Pragmatism. (See pages 54,79,159,257) Papini himself.-· in letters 
to James referred to him as Master. (Perry Sorel 1928:3n) 
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rather than one who merely asserted that they do exist. He 
emphasised the particularistic and pluralistic character of 
pragmatist thought whilst also stressing the difficulties of 
defining it. (Papini 1907-8:351:354) 
But how does this relate to Mussolini? Stewart claimed that 
Mussolini probably began to read James before 1910. (Stewart 
1928:862} Perry concurred with this view, however he also noted 
that a number of unusual rumours were circulating in the 1920s 
and 1930s about the origins of Mussolini's interest in the ideas 
of Bergson, Sorel and James. For example, Perry said that 
Mussolini had actually Cldim~u Lu uav~ rn~L Jdmes - although Perry 
regarded this as unlikely. (Perry 1935: 577} What 
he thought most likely was that the future Italian leader had 
been acquainted with Papini, the Florentine "Pragmatic Club" and 
its publication Leonardo. He noted that when Leonardo ceased 
publication in 1907 Mussolini became a contributer to its 
successor publication La fuc.a. Hammond Broadus, however, thought 
that the association between Papini and Mussolini came about at 
the end of 1914 on the Popolo d'Italja where both were involved 
in a campaign to get Italy involved in the war. (Papini 1934:vi} 
By then the mercurial Papini bad already switched from 
pragmatism - to -futurism· and fro11t futurism to Catholicism.: 
(Hammond Broadus 1934:v Perry 1935:571} (1) 
Papini is interesting for us in relation to the links 
between pragmatist philosophy and fascism. He too was aware of 
the distinctive strands within pragmatisn; . priaaril~-- -the 
distinction between its "puritanic" utilitarian and 
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instrumentalist strand which reflects a desire to control the 
environment in order to achieve social goals and its 
particularistic strand which sees life in time and chance. For 
Papini, Perry writes, the distinction was between-a social-and a 
magical pragmatism and it was at this end of the pragmatist 
spectrum that he saw himself standing with James. (Perry 
1935:573f} (1} Pragmatism Papini wrote seemed made to "stimulate 
the poets and dreamers of the world of thought." {Papini 1907-
8:358} The fascist state however, as we shall see, was said to 
have adopted both aspects of pragmatism; taking the first from 
James and the second from Duguit. 
Mussolini (or those who worked with him) certainly sought to 
demonstrate a familiarity with certain pragmatist philosophers 
and ideas. In the same Sunday Tjmes interview I mentioned, 
Mussolini claimed to have embraced the philosophies of Nietzsche 
and James. (Indeed, Papini asserted that the pragmatists had 
taken from Nietzsche and developed the idea that theories 
originated in "biological needs" and in the "deepest sentiments" 
of the human race or "exceptional persons". (Papini 1907-8:357]) 
The former had "re-inforced" his anti-democratic feelings while 
the latter had. led-him to believe in ~he "will t~ live and 
fight-"-- and --that such- actions "shoulti-l>e judged~--·~.c:&rding- --to 
1. This turning away from pragmatism to Christian piety may 
explain why Papini's volume on pragaatisa. which he had announced 
never appeared. ·James-wt'&te- o.f· the bE>Oks--·coaing in. tbe . prefa~e 
to Pragmatism, (James 1907:viii} Sorel wrote rather dismissively -
·of--Papini·soae years later· in·lla l/utilite· sbl, Pxaqatjsme·· (Sorel 
1928: Jn) Geny described Papini -and the pragmatists of --¥.lorence 
as "pseudo-pragmatists". (Geny 1913a:75n) · 
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their results rather than on any "doctrinary basis." (Perry 
1935:575} 
Perry was aware that when he was writing in the mid-1930s 
questions·-had been raised about the relation between pragmatis• 
and fascism .. He referred for instance, in the Thought ~ 
Character Q.f William J.a.m.es.. to Elliot's Iha Pragmatic Revolt in. 
Poli tics. (1) (In bis 1938 text, Th.a Spirit Q.f William J.a.m.es.. he 
defended James against the charge made by a writer called·· Van 
Wyck Brooks that James had failed to create values. [Perry 
1938:129]) On this point, he wrote that it was not necessary 
to doubt that Mussolini had read or was acquainted with the 
ideas of these thinkers. He also conceded that fascism and 
pragmatism (as well as Bolshevism and pragmatism) held something 
in common insofar as they exalted the role of will, emphasised 
the importance of action and also supported the working test. 
(Perry 1935:576f,577n} 
To this extent, Perry wrote, Mussolini was correct to cite 
James "even if it be an afterthought." {Perry 1935:578} 
However, he added that one still had to be careful of taking 
Mussolini at his word; other advocates of free will or practical 
reasoning could have served Mussolini just as well as James or 
even Sorel. {Perry 1935: 5 7 5, Sorel 1950: 24} To-· the extent that one 
could use the term philosophy in relation to fascism it was quite 
obviously very "eclectic" - although Stewart thought this· 
1. Perry also referred to Herbert Schneider• s Making ~ Fascist -
State, 1928, VII, pp. 121, 232, 244. 
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provided yet another basis on which to compare it with 
pragmatism. (Stewart 1928:863) --Mussolini himself described 
fascism as a "great river". (Mussolini 1935:26) In this context, 
Perry argued that Mussolini had simply picked out a few f Fagments 
from James' philosophy and tossed it in amongst all the other 
currents flowing through his doctrine. These points aside, Perry 
argued that the fascists' anti-individualism, their hostility 
towards democracy and their doctrine of force were entirely 
antithetical to James' liberal and tolerant outlook.- · (Perry 
1935: 5 78) ( 1) Indeed, he argued that fascism in its later 
stages owed more to Giovanni Gentile's philosophical idealism, in 
the Hegelian sense, than to the pluralistic theory of pragmatism. 
(Perry 1935:578-9) (Gentile was for a time minister of education 
in the Fascist government. [Stewart 1928:845]) Although we should 
recall, as I pointed out in chapter four, that Gentile's 
philosophy expressed in Theory .Q.f Mind as. E.u.r..e. A.c.t. was also 
likened to the philosophy of Bergson, James and Dewey as an anti-
intellectual philosophy to the extent that he described mind in 
terms of activity rather than knowing. (Fite 1923:549} (2) Thus, 
Gentile was described (along with the philosopher Croce) as a 
"pragmatic Hegelian", although the author of this description 
conceded that Gentile himself had strongly rejected the label 
1. Perry - also thought it noteworthy that one member of ~ 
Pragmatic ~. Giovanni- Amendola became-a political opponent of 
- Fascism and was alleged to have been killed by its henchman ·in 
1926 for his outspoken opposition to Fascism. (Perry 1935:571) 
See Giovanni Gentile, "The Philosophic Basis of FasciSll"• 
Forejgp Affairs, VI, 1928, p.290. Cited in Perry, 1935, p. 578n. 
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pragmatist. {Fite 1923:549) Gentile rejected voluntarism, so 
often associated with the pragmatists, insofar as he rejected a 
conception of mind as pure will, as much as he rejected the 
characterization of mind as pure intellect. (Fite 1923:549 
Gentile 1922:271ff) More importantly, he objected to the failure 
of the pragmatists to unite the particular with the universal. 
(Gentile 1922:81f) 
Thus, Perry argued that pragmatism was too particularistic 
and empirical in its conception of mental activity to sit 
comfortably with Gentile's idea of a universal mind. It was this 
idea which was associated fascist thought and which, Perry 
argued, provided the basis for the conception of the state as an 
"organic solidarity." (Perry 1935:578) But this point was 
countered to the extent that it was argued that each particular 
will or non-intellectual mind activity that erupted would 
eventually absorb all other wills or minds around it because it 
could not but see itself as the one and only true will or mind. 
(1) This argument could be used to explain the development of 
fascism. Roberto Michels wrote that the fascists had snatched 
"power from weak hands" and had called "in the name of the 
country" upon " ... active and energetic men" who could give 
"expression -to an authentic and autonomous popular will." 
{Michels 1927:770} 
1. Perry himself later made the point that despite their 
pretensions to individualism (and one could say this equally of 
pluralists) romantics find themselves irresistibly pulled towards 
a form of unity infused with their concept of higher being. 
Romanticism is therefore, si11ply a paus~ ~in- the .. road - to 
absolutism and this explains why romanticists-can.pursue either a 
"ruthless subjectivism" or immerse themselves in nationalist 
movements. (Perry 1938: 143-6) ~~,_ 
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On this account, the particular will must become an absolute 
will and therefore James must become Gentile. The American 
scholar William Kay Wallace expressed similar opinions about 
·the pre-war Ger•an philosophy and polities in 1924. He did not 
explicity refer to Italian fascism but the connection is clear 
enough. The argument was that any philosophy which encourages 
the idea that success depends, not on right reasoningr but on 
swift and sudden action, and that all acts are not-the -result-of 
reasoning but a strong action, will lead to chaos and then 
tyranny. The will to believe is thus transformed into the will 
to power - "James and Nietzsche join hands with Spinoza and 
Hobbes". Opposition is crushed within and the nation-state then 
seeks to "impose upon the world what the Germans called the 
'national idea'." (Wallace 1924: 271} (1} 
In fact, Perry did concede that there was a certain logic in 
the development of fascism from being a pragmatist political 
movement to being an idealist one. The logic was;· however, a 
political rather than a philosohical one -- imposed -by -the 
requirements of rulership, something which every revolutionary 
group must face after it has gained power. Perry wrote:-
-Pragmatisa -0f the type represented by the-youthful Papini . 
... encourages .the indi:vidua1 or. casual group..to beco~heroes:;· 
and martyrs on behalf of ~ cause. Its tendencyis·' 
disruptive and anarchical. But when a revolutionary movement 
has seized upon the agencies of the state - it . becomes 
automatically the champion of thestate. For the subjective 
principle of freedom it is now necessary to substitute the 
objective principle of collJDon action •. {Perry 1935:379) 
L. On this point about the absolutis• inherent in pragmatisa and 
-pluralism Hsiao wrote that - : · • •• -.James -resolves-his theory ·· of 
Related .. points wera .. -~aised about ~--the.-.re.lati~-he.twe ...ea...--~-c-----
pragmatism and the advent of Nazism, .but .. tb.e criticis11s--0f-this 
relation were rather auted. Firstly, because the evidence was 
scant. Perry wrote in 1935 that :there was ,little . evidence of. 
pragmatism being embraced in Germany~-· He noted that wh.ile Hach 
was ffcanonisedff in Germany by the Vienna Circle it was Mach the 
positivist not Mach the pragmatist. (Perry 1935:580) (Although 
some might say that positivism and pragmatism ultimately amounted 
to the same thing - that is, unreason.) Secondly, as we shall 
see, pragmatists were well able to contrast their tolerant and 
flexible philosophy with the intolerance and inflexibility of 
Nazi doctrine. 
Nevertheless, the doctrines of intuition and voluntarism, 
which were often associated with (and sometimes even conflated 
with) pragmatism were viewed as important elements in Nazi 
doctrine. In the case of voluntarism, H. G Townsend complained 
in the Philosophical Review that in its contemporary humanistic 
and empirical form it tended to treat all values as a function of 
desire. (Townsend 1937:139) This danger was apparent .. in a 
statement by someone he described as "the official spokesman of 
the Hitler -stateff, which went: "Any philosophy is exactly as 
strong as the-will of its representatives todefend -itff. This, 
truth iato::::.:ct11e. · rationalis:t::·lltlnc.iple of ~"!ieoherence;c·. ·a~_~his 1"'· 
pluralistic universe .. itself suffers a · transformation in:t:O'· a 
panpsychic systea. The pluralists, similarly, conclud&·'their · 
political theory by re-establishing. a comprehensive. sovereignty 
which exceeds4he-powe:r &f---any sovereignty conceived by the legal 
··-----monist:s-.-!!.-{~---19-277-207) This absolutism is also- interesting 
. - ~--· insof.ar-.as-paga&tis•r---.as a '!voluntaristic pathos ff,. is seen as a 
... reaction. .. ~•to.:.:.:4l::•-~•onistic..- .and &ternalistic ,pathos. {Randall · 
1936:215l--:)::T-$;;;;t,the extent that thi·s' is the case we ean say ~that , 
--···-·----· prapatis•"' -~"::..expanding ·itowards aonisa has only :gone .... a··'full~ .'!' 
circle •. ~':;:;~i".:''••·J ··· :• 
,.,•,,,:.'~-~ 
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Townsend said, reduced voluntarism to a patent Madness. (Townsend 
1937:138) 
As mentioned earlier, Dewey revised his 1915 book on Germon 
Philosophy wi.d, Politics and reissued it in 1942. Dewey, of 
course, did not implicate pragmatism in his search for the 
philosophical causes of Nazism but he did ref er to philosophies 
of desire and intuition, although in a somewhat curious way. 
Dewey saw the origins of Hitlerism as lying in the same classical 
German tradition of thought, in particular Hegel, that he had 
argued in 1915 had contributed to German bellicosity before the 
First World War. The main point of connection which Dewey 
claimed existed between Hegel and Hitler (and this may seem 
curious because of the depictions of Hegelianism by so many 
pluralists in the 1920s as inteliectualistic) was a common 
emphasis on impulse and desire. Dewey wrote that Hegel's reason 
operated largely in the realms of "impulse, passion, desire, 
ambition, of personal or 'subjective' wills, who unconsciously 
execute the will of absolute spirit, or Hegel's 'God'." 
1942:44) 
(Dewey 
In fact, what Dewey was describing is what Frederick L. 
Schuman of the University of Chicago described as a "qualified" 
Begelianism; qualified, because it was a Hegelianism which held 
that ideas were the product of impulse rather than reason. 
(Although Schuman added that in accordance with Nazi philosophy, 
these impulses were not to be seen in Freudian terms; rather, 
they sprang from things such as the nation, race, individual 
genius or "the esoteric depths of the German soul." [Schuman 
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1934:210f}} In addition to this, both of these commentators 
wrote of the essentially "hazy" or " mystic, cloudy" character of 
Nazi doctrine - with Dewey also emphasizing its use of the method 
of intuition as a means o-f -Oisco-vering ultimate truths. (Dewey 
1942:21 Schuman 1934:211} Indeed, Schuman wrote that it was for 
this reason that what he called German Fascism, even more so than 
Italian fascism, was "less a doctrine than a faith ... " (Schuman 
1934:211) We should also recall that the cloudiness of Bergson's 
own methods and vocabulary had earlier been seen as a 
contributing factor to syndicalist irrationalism. 
What is interesting here is that Dewey was condemning the 
very same things (such as the emphasis on intuition [Dewey 
1942:21}), that others condemned in relation to Hitler's 
philosophy. He traced them back to a classical German tradition 
thought, which he wrote had found a home in Britain and America 
as well. (Dewey 1942:29). Whereas others, as I shall further 
demonstrate, traced these features back to the philosophy of 
James and Bergson. (1} 
In this regard, it is interesting to contrast Dewey's 
observations on this topic with those of Bertrand Russell in- an 
1. Of all the thinkers who were seen to be most closely 
associated with German politics, Hegel was seen as the major 
influence. Dewey even appeared unsure as to what extent- Hegel 
should be associated with Hitlerism. Dewey wrote that: "I do not 
think he [Hitler} can be called a disciple,-in any literal sense, 
of Nietzsche, Houston Chamberlain,- Treitschke or Spengler- any 
more than of Kant. or Hegel."- Dewey seemed to regard Hitler as 
totally opportunistic in the use of other people's ideas - albeit 
an opportunisa "combined ••. with fanatical- inflexibility --- of 
-- purpose." (Dewey 1942:15} - -
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earlier essay. For while Dewey mentioned some of the same 
figures that Russell had, his focus is overwhelmingly on Hegel. 
Russell did not mention Hegel at all. What Russell did in his 
· essay- ·The Revolt Against Reason was to explicity tie 
philosophies of will to what he called Nazidom. {1) {Russell did 
not claim that this revolt against reason was entirely a German 
phenomenon but the Nazi regime was used as the major example of 
it political effects.) For Russell, Nazism was the culmination of 
the philosophy begun by Fichte in 1807 and developed further by 
Carlyle, Mazzini, Nietzsche, Bergson, Treitschke and Rudyard 
Kipling. {Russell 1971:142, 146) As with so many others, what 
Russell was pointing to were philosophies which emphasised the 
role of will and intuition. 
Unlike Dewey, Russell included James and his definition of 
truth based solely on the criterion of success amongst his 
catalogue of influences. (Russell 1971:152) Russell was not 
suggesting that James had intentionally contributed to such 
strife. "Poor William James", he wrote, would be "horrified" at 
the use that had been made of his pragmatic theory of truth. 
(Russell 1971:146,lSSf) Nevertheless, Russell did add that 
1. It is also worth noting that there are striking continuities 
between this essay and material that appeared on the same topic 
after First World War which emphasised the role played by 
"irrationalist" philosophies in the lead up to World War One. 
For example, the phrase, "the revolt against reason", was also 
used by Perry as the title of one of the chapters in his The. 
Present Conflict g,L Ideals, a study, which as I have noted, was 
aimed at examining the philosophical causes which lay behind the 
Great War. In addition to this, many of the philosophers who• 
Perry examines in relation to both the war and to the syndicalist 
movement are those . whom .Russell referred--to seventeen years later 
in relation to NaziSll-- . 
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where all notions of objective truth are abandoned the big 
battalions move in. (Russell 1971:156} 
6. Fascism and Functionalism 
We have seen how fascism was viewed as highly energetic and 
wilful in its early stages, but that later the will that inspired 
it was sanctified - it became divine. But we should also note 
that fascism was, as Mussolini put it, a regime as well as a 
doctrine. (1) Here we should recall that fascism had another 
image; an image closer to an instrumental pragmatism aimed at 
social and environmental control in order to provide benefits to 
the collectivity - a socialised pragmatism would be one way of 
describing it. (Perry 1935:574} Here the emphasis was not on 
the will that seeks to destroy but on social purposes, 
administration and organisation. So interest passes from battle 
tactics to techniques of social management. We have noted the 
fashion for scientific planning that developed in Western 
countries after World War One and which really came to the fore 
in the 1930s. This trend was also apparent in Italy under the 
fascists. Indeed, we should recall my comment in chapter two 
that during the depression and war years the fascist state (along 
with the Soviet state) was held up as the embodiment of order and 
=======================-========================================== 2. Perhaps we should qualify this by drawing attention to 
Schuman's point that Italian Fascists largely fabricated their 
doctrine after seizing power. In this context, he contrasts the• 
with German Nazis who bad fourteen years to refine their doctrine 
before coming to power. (Schuman 1934:211) 
371 
discipline, especially when contrasted with the depressed 
economies of America, Britain and Australia. 
We can find examples of this trend in fascist Italy in Paul 
Einzig's book called Fascist Economics, published in London in 
1933, which presented a view of mature fascism as a rational and 
scientific form of social organisation. He wrote that fascism 
embraced the fashionable term "planning" as its political aspects 
- which were necessary to attain power - were overshadowed by 
its essentially economic aspects. It became a technique of 
efficient social organisation which sought to overcome social 
tensions and antagonisms and enhance the welfare of all. (Einzig 
1933:4-6:62} Indeed, it is interesting to note bow "scientific" 
fascism in Italy was contrasted by Einzig with the very 
unscientific barbarism of the Nazis. Yet Brady's text on 
Rationalization in. German Industry does presented an image of 
Germany as a scientific and functionally organised state. (Brady 
1933: 6. 7) 
We should also recall that scientific planning was supposed 
to eliminate competition between the interests and the lust for 
domination, and replace these aspects of political life with the 
disinterested administrative state. For this reason, the fusion 
of fascism (witn its 1JUt1a1 entnus1asa for social chaos and its 
celebration of the will) with more scientific programmes of 
social reform may seem puzzling. Some would argue that the 
fascist ethos and the idea of scientific administration were in 
stark opposition to each other. Clearly Einzig did not see it 
- that way .. But- then, bis work can also be seen as a def enc~ of 
that -- regime.-·- Wha·t---is-more ·important is that critics· of the 
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regime also drew attention to the functionalist or administrative 
aspects of fascism. Why they did this will become clearer as we 
proceed. 
As I have already suggested, even when fascism moved into 
its positivistic phase signs of the influence of pragmatist 
thought were still being detected. But it is not James' 
voluntarism that we are concerned with here; what we are 
concerned with is the input into fascism of pragamatism's more 
""scientific' values." (Elliot 1928:x} 
Dewey and Duguit were particularly singled out as harbingers 
of fascism in its mature form. Elliot said Duguit and Dewey bad 
between them "prepared a philosophy whose logical criteria are 
fit for Fascism's deeds." (Elliot 1928:57} Even more strongly, 
he wrote, in their hands, pragmatism had become "the philosophy 
of Fascism." (Elliot 1928:306} 
In what way did Elliot associate Duguit and Dewey with 
fascism? In relation to Dewey, you might recall his conclusion 
was that the future role of the state was to adjust and regulate 
the relations between voluntary associations. For Elliot, this 
suggested that Dewey (as with Duguit), bad embraced an organic 
conception of the state " ... which leads from pluralism to 
Fascism, because it leaves no place for the political rights of 
responsible personality but bases its social ethics upon fear and 
force." (Elliot 1928:304} 
---------The---point that- Elliot was making was that Dewey, in handing 
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over to the state the final power to control the groups whilst at 
the same time denying the possibility, on psychological grounds, 
of a social mind (social solidarity being a product of organised 
habit and custom rather than a fusion of wills}, ... was t:o-lay the 
groundwork for fascism. Elliot, in contrast to the radical 
pluralists, certainly believed that the state should be an 
umpire; but for him, its umpiring role could only ultimately be 
derived from a collective will. It was this which provided· the 
ethical basis for the state. Without this, the state would be 
cut off from any restraining moral sentiments; fear and force 
would thus become its sole currency and survival its sole end. 
But we must turn to Elliot's criticisms of Duguit to 
understand fully how this argument was applied. As we have seen 
Duguit denied the existence of subjective rights and argued for 
the existence of objective laws based on the fact of organic 
social interdependence - it was these laws which obliged 
government to provide public services and individuals not to do 
anything to undermine the social order. (Duguit 1919:50 Elliot 
1922:642) 
The danger of Duguit's theory, so Elliot's argument went 
(and this refers back to a point 11ade in the previous chapter} 
was that inevitably the state will come to define these objective 
social needs and functions. In ~his context, the principle of 
---- - - social·~s<>lidarity. and the need to protect-- it from disruptive 
.influences becomes a rhetorical device invoked by the authorities 
when they wish to crush all politic al . opposition or " extract 
services from the community. Indeed, Elliot noted how Duguit's 
~ objectif (or something similar) had been . app1ied 
successfully by Mussolini in his fascist corporate state. (Elliot 
1928:307) In fact, Elli-Ot cla-imed that--this··idea had become a 
useful tool of reaction through-out the Western world in the 
1920s, wherever the public services were threatened by strike 
action. 
But what Elliot was condemning mostly in the writings of 
Duguit (and Dewey) was the use of certain biological or organic 
analogies in order to describe society and the state. He argued 
that the functionalist programme, whatever scientific .. or 
positivistic pretensions it may have had, was really only a 
variation on that analogy. Similarly, the Australian philospher 
A. Boyce Gibson wrote that the functionalist aspects of fascism 
were a consequence of its "quasi-metaphysical" conception of the 
state as an organism. (Gibson 1934:122ff} Like Elliot, he 
believed that this analogy corrupted political thought because it 
denied the individual any intrinsic moral worth; individuals 
become passing phases in the enduring life of the state. In this 
context, Gibson cited the programme of the National Fascist Party 
of 1921 which stated: "The nation ... is an organism embracing an 
indefinite series of generations in which each individual is but 
a transient element." (Gibson 1934:132) {1) 
1. In relation to the relative unimportance .of the individual · 
Mussolini wrote that: "The key-stone of the Fascist doctrine is 
its conception of the State, of its essence, its functions, and 
its aims. For Fascism the State is absolute, individuals and 
groups relative. Individuals and groups are admissable in so far 
as they come within the State." (Mussolini 1935:37) 
For Elliot. even Cole's guild socialism could not be 
prevented fro• succumbing to this logic··of development. He 
argued that this was precisely because guild socialists conceived 
of society as an organic whole comprised of a ~ange of functions. 
Guild socialism therefore, could not avoid the gradual transition 
from pluralism to "solidaris11" and from thence to -fascism. 
(Elliot 1928:213) (1) Since individuals were absorbed into 
groups and groups were absorbed into the state Elliot wrote that 
all the pluralist had done was substitute the "functional state" 
for the juristic 1>r "representative state-person." (Elliot 
1928:431) 
This journey from syndicalism to fascism was seen as 
describing exactly the process which took place in Italy. Elliot 
claimed that while in the early days of fascism the autonomy of 
the syndicates was preserved, as fascism matured it began to 
stress the principles of "organic solidarity and organisation." 
(Elliot 1928:307) We can see this if we examine the wordings of 
the Charter of Labour and the Anti-Strike legislation that was 
passed in 1926. The Charter of Labour stressed the importance of 
serving the social organism indeed, it explicity stated that 
Italian society· is·a social organism; while the Anti-Strike 
1. Mussolini wrote that the wor<I ·guild · {corporozi9ne) expressed 
"one of the basic legislative and social .. creations . of. the .. 
- -~~iae;" {Muss1>1ini ·1935; 11l The crisis-..f.n ·capi~il1ism ;· .. he wrote, ·· 
would force a return to the guild system. But he said, a guild or 
syndicalist-· -systet11 would· liave ti> ··-be integrated into 1l 
"totalitarian State" - harness all the hopes. energies and 
aspirations .-0f. the people-· run -Oy-a singleparty·whkb -would 
ensure economic discipline. (Mussolini 1935:17:60) He called his 
syndicalism "national syndicalism." ~Mussolini 1935:17) 
·Legislation, which endowed legally recognised associations with a 
juridicial personality and dictated the organisational structure 
that they should adopt, stressed the obligations -0f the guilds to 
the rest of the corporate body. (Einzig 1933:125ff,133ff} 
It is also interesting to not~ Stewart's c<>11parison -of the 
fascist incorporation of functional groupings into the state 
organisation - described as a vertically integrated set of 
functions and vocations - with the way in which the Soviets were 
organised by the Communist Party in Russia. (Stewart 1928:857} 
(1} It is these pictures which help us to understand the 
distinction between functional representation or the 
administrative syndicalism of Duguit, which held that each 
function must be inserted into and disciplined by a hierarchy, 
and the much looser and polyarchic conceptions of society that 
appeared in Sorel and Laski. 
But as we have seen it was the internal relation between 
these two approaches to pluralism which the 
critics were interested in. For what occurred in Italy, as I 
said, was seen to be a natural ·evolution froa a romantic 
pluralism which utilised violence towards a positivistic 
functionalism that relied on the legitimate exercise of force in 
1. Gibson also ·-Oraws comparisons between -functional forms . of 
social organisation · in Italy · and · Geraany , with·~ , sia:ilar ;'"%' ,,., 
arrangeaents· in the Soviet Union. ·{Gibson ·1~31t!l33ff) On '"'this 
point also see Brady in which he associates functional forms .. .of 
economic organisation with -the rationalization ·•ov.eJleDt---in 
Germany. It is a form of organisation 'which he sees as being a 
reflection of the "functional interdependence" in "-the higher 
reaches of science. (Brady 1933:9} 
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order to ensure social solidarity. (Elliot 1928:117n) 
This is not to suggest the role of will bad been eliainated. 
As was suggested earlier, the will which inspired the early 
activities of the fascists was still manifest - except that it 
had become sanctified. This explains why fascisa in its 
developed form was seen as dualistic in character. It had both 
idealist and positivistic overtones and could shift between them. 
For the image of the corporatist state as a series of functions 
could also be converted 4nto an image of an individualistic will 
competing, in pseudo-Darwinian terms, for survival. (Gibson 
1934:130) The state was thus both super-man and machine. That 
is, the very ambiguity of fascism lay in the fact that the 
corporate state or person could be seen as an impersonal 
administrative body or it could be viewed in terms of this idea 
of divine will. (1) 
The arguments that I have just examined suggested that the 
particularistic will 'of the syndicalist may become the absolute 
will of the state. They also suggested that as a fascist this 
regime established by means of a revolution or coup matures it 
may adopt a more scientific caste. But whether or not such 
1. Dewey also noted-this paradoxical character in relation to 
Hitler's Germany. He wrote in the 1942 edition of German 
Philosophy ~ Politics" "There is nothing in the career of 
National Socialisa which requires any change in the sentence of 
the next chapter, written over twenty-five years ago: 'The chief 
mark of distinctively German civilization is its combination of 
self-conscious idealism with unsurpassed technical efficiency and 
organization.• Only the locus of the 'idealism• and the agents of 
its organization have altered." (Dewey 1942:37) 
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a regime presents an idealist or a functionalist face to the 
world, it will in the end collapse into fanaticism. That is, it 
will return to its esoteric source - be it a romantic pantheism, 
the will to power or some other deep-seated impulse. 
This last point explains why it could be argued that fascist 
and Nazi states were not really scientific states - these were 
regimes which, despite appearances, were not true to the 
scientific {or philosophical) ideal of the impartial pursuit of 
truth. The relation between fascism and science is purely 
instrumental. We should also be remember the argument that the 
vicious exploitation of science was possible only where a 
positivistic science denied the concepts of truth or value any 
utility. Similarly, as we have seen, critics of positivism argued 
that positivism collapsed into subjectivism or into an 
irresponsible anarchism. As we saw, this was the point which 
Russell was making in relation to Nazism and James' pragmatic 
theory of truth. 
Dewey also expressed concerns about the consequences of 
positivism. But his criticism focussed not so much on its 
alleged tendency to collapse into subjectivism, but on its strict 
separation from the field of values. He wrote that the fact that 
science had been compartmentalised in Germany - cut off from 
social and other values and influences made it so easy for Hitler 
to treat "all forms of science, physical. psychological .--and 
social ... [as] ... sheer tools of Nazi policy." {Dewey 1942:46} 
For Dewey, there was a lesson for democracy in this, 
particularly for America where Dewey thought science was also on 
its way 
Indeed, 
fascist 
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to be being partitoned off from the rest of society. 
it must be stressed that the criticisms expressed of the 
or Nazi governments also functioned as criticisms-· of 
liberal democratic societies as well. What many of the critics 
were in effect doing was warning their own compatriots that their 
society would be endangered if society went too far down the 
positivist or functionalist path. Fascism, in particular, served 
as a grim reminder of what might happen if liberal democracies 
went too far in either of these parallel directions. 
Hence, what Dewey wanted to tell members of his society was 
that they should not worship science as in Germany. However, nor 
should they fear it. Science, he wrote, must become a normal 
part of social intercourse - if this were so, the processes of 
communication would become "geuinely intelligent", avoiding the 
twin dangers of "mere opinion" and final authority. {Dewey 
1942:46-7) It is interesting that Dewey's criticisms of the 
social dangers posed by a narrow positivist understanding of 
science were reminiscent of the criticisms Elliot made fourteen 
years earlier of Dewey's own instrumentalism. 
7. Pragmatism and the Common Will 
How do we respond to these various criticisms of pragmatism 
and pluralism? First of all, it was-suggested ~hat the world of 
the pluralist and empiricist is one that falls into discontinuous 
bits and pieces, destroying any sense of social cohesion and thus 
preparing the ground for fascism. The other complaint, one which 
specifically referred to pragmatism, concerned the consequences 
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of applying instrumental or economic criteria to political life. 
In particular. it was argued that politics as instrumentalism 
easily becomes, in the hands of an authoritarian state, a means 
of imposing a personal tyranny. 
Can pluralist or pragmatist theory be saved from these twin 
fates? Most critics were agreed that many pluralists went too far 
in seeking to undermine the state and that to implement their 
programme would be to invite social strife. Indeed, it was 
argued that those pluralists who called upon pragmatism to 
support their political beliefs were not really being true to 
that philosophy; that they were not being pragmatic enough. 
(Follett 1918:263ff) Many pluralists, it was argued, had not 
paid close enough attention to the development of pragmatism 
beyond its earlier phenomenalistic phase; or where they had (as 
in the case of Laski), they had accepted only a partial account 
of its metaphysics and had ignored its tilt towards panpsychism. 
(1) 
As I pointed out, James had moved beyond his earlier 
particularism and had embraced profusion rather than economy as 
1. Hsiao explained the shift in James' position from his earlier 
radical emp1r1c1sm to something more tolerant of the absolute by 
reference to James' "conversion to Fechnerian panpsychisa ••• not 
only does he-finally admit the possibility of the hypothesis - of 
an ··abso1ute-wt-=be--reeonuaends-~he-confiuence of· finite selves- -in-
a vast conscious streaa as a most acceptable metaphysical 
assumption." (Hsiao 1927:200} Hsiao cites James as saying- in a A 
Pluralistic Universe that "·every bit of us at every moment is 
part and parcel -0f a wider self~'" (Hsiao 1927:201} See Chaper 
IV-"Concerning Fechner" in A. Pluralistic Universe, (1977) pp. 63-. 
- ·-· . 82-~ 
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the key to reality. But it would seem that in making a 
macrocosmos out of immediacy he did not exclude any degree of 
oneness from the realms of the many. In fact, James also saw 
rationality or coherence as being contained within immediacy. 
James said in a 4l Pluralistic Universe: "May not-the flux of 
sensible experience itself contain a rationality that has been 
overlooked." [James 1977:38}) Furthermore, for James, all the 
connections that we observe in experience are real and concrete 
and are not simply inventions of one mind or many - although the 
element of plasticity in things ensures that mind can 
"reorganise and reconstruct" reality. (Aliotta 1914:179} 
Empiricism then becomes not just the study of private 
experiences or pure immediacy but the totality of things and 
their relations - all of which are evolving. In summary, we can 
say that this reconstruction of James' universe tells us that 
each piece of experience throws out tentacles which attaches it 
to other pieces; furthermore, these points of connection between 
the various pieces of experience are real and not just the 
product of mind. 
James borrowed a word from Peirce in order to describe his 
sort of pluralism; the word was "synechistic" and it was used 
order to stress the.continuous aspects of experience. (James 
1977:147} In James''" universe there could be, as Barker once put 
it, a "oneness" without there being a "transcendent one." (Barker 
1957:161) (1) Thus, James wrote: 
Our ·multiverse' still makes a ·universe'; for every part, 
tho it may not be in actual or immediate connexion-, · is 
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nevertheless in ~bme possible or mediated connexion, with 
every other part however remote, through the fact that each 
part hangs together with its very next neighbours in 
inextricable interfusion. The type of union. it is true is 
is different from the monistic type of a11ejnhejt ... It is 
what I call the strung-along type. the type of continuity, 
contiguity, or concatenation. If you prefer greek words, you 
may call it the synechistic type. {James 1977:147) 
We can see here why pragmatism was given the title "philosophy of 
reconciliation"; it enacts or attempts reconciliations . between 
discontinuity and continuity, the many and the one and pluralism 
and monism. {Hsiao 1927:205, Follett 1918:272} 
It is, of course, a matter of emphasis as to how much unity 
and how much multiplicity is contained within James' universe. 
Some have stressed the partial character of its unity - arguing 
that difference is at the essence of his system. James himself, 
in Lecture IV "The One And The Many" of his Pragmatism pointed 
to both the lines of continuity and discontinuity in the 
universe. {James 1907: 127ff} Perry, and later Morris, both 
seemed to think it is the imperfect character of that unity which 
is important for James. 
Hsiao argued similarly to Perry. However, unlike him, he 
regarded James' failure to achieve a comprehension of the whole 
as revealing a fundamental weakness in his philosophy. He argued 
L··· ·Perry - noted that synechism was a term used by Charles Peirce 
... fol'· a -theory which affirms continuity." {Perry 1938: 109n} James 
also ascribed synechism to Bergson. (Perry 1938:108} Morris 
wrote that of all the pragmatists James was closest to the 
--British empiricists-. · However 0· he differed fro11 that tradition 
insofar· as he recognised a "much wider range of the contents of 
experience ·--as -including-relations as well as the particulars 
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that James was reaching for some sense of oneness, and while 
offering his readers occasional glimpses it, failed to wholly 
realize it. (Hsiao 1927:208} Indeed, Hsiao argued that as a 
philosophy of reconciliation pragmatism failed often by revealing 
an "empiricist partisan spirit". Hsiao also said pragmatism did 
not give enough credit to its monistic or rationalist opponents. 
In fact, Hsiao raised doubts about whether the reconciliations 
which James attempted to give effect to were at all possible. 
(Hsiao 1927:205} 
In contrast to this, Follett saw James as moving towards 
something akin to the idea of a general will. Indeed, Follett 
claimed that James was much closer to Hegel than many pluralists 
realised; they had failed to realise this because they had 
misunderstood both Hegel and James, mistakenly attributing 
absolutism to the former and radical pluralism to the latter. 
(Pollet 1918:266} 
In order to rescue James from the pluralists, what Follett 
did was to seize James' "trailing and" argument (which appears, 
as we have seen in, A Pluralistic Universe as well as in his 
Pta2!1!§1:ti sm) back from the pluralists, who had used it to argue 
that one can never have a unified state because all our 
differences could never be included in one unified whole; hence, 
James.' claim that the conjunction '"and" trails or strings along 
which are related, and continuities as well as discontinuities." 
Further to this, James did not see experience as a purely mental 
thing. "The cosmos as a whole became simply the totality of 'pure 
experience'''- (Morris 170: 112-3} --
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after every sentence. (Follet 1918:302) This is James' "strung-
along" universe where the connections between things are weak 
because they are external. In this case. things are indeed "with" 
one another but that is all - they in no way at ilfill. with each 
--t>tber, something that would involve a deeper form of union. 
~ut in Follett's text. James' "trailing and" rather than 
being seen as the last word on the matter, was·seen as providing 
both the incentive and basis on which to form more profound 
unions between things. That is, she argued that it is precisely 
because of the constant addition of the conjunction "and" or the 
never-ending appearance of differences that we m..us..t. seek to 
unify; otherwise the differences might overwhelm us and our world 
would fall apart. Furthermore, she argued that the "trailing and" 
not only makes unity a necessity. it also provides the very pre-
condition of the unifying process. That is. it is because of the 
presence of differences that we are able to enter into multiple 
new and intimate relations with each other. (Follett 1919:302) 
On this account then, multiplicity becomes the .very 
condition of the unifying process; difference itself becomes the 
means by which "infinite unrelation" can be transfonned into an 
infinite variety of relations. (Pollet 1918:302) (Although I 
think this argument is logically weak to the extent that it 
proposes difference as the solution to the problem which - is 
difference itself.} Follett' s solution to the problem -of the one 
and the many in social life was to pose a situation in which all 
our differences are swept up into a single whole, a whole that 
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encompasses and is enriched by the inclusion of these 
differences. (Follett 1918:40) Follet's idea of a general will or 
community spirit was thus modified to the extent that it was not 
complete oneness that she sought; rather, she posited a Jamesian 
conception of multiplicity in unity although I think sha went 
further down the track towards oneness than did James. 
It is not surprising that Bergson figured prominently in 
this modification of James' pluralistic empiricism. {Follett 
1919:583) (The conception of life that I have just outlined 
sounds very much like Bergson's understanding of life as a great 
evolutionary army containing all sorts of novelties and diverse 
forms.} Indeed, Follett explicitly adopted Bergson's vocabulary 
in order to stress both the continuous and open-ended aspects of 
life. She argued that the world must remain open; "' that the elan 
vital must have "free-play." (Follett 1918:99} But she also 
writes 
, 
that each d.uI..aa does not come to an end but rolls on into 
/ 
"the new duree endlessly." {Follett 1919: 582} (1) 
In Bergsonian terms community then is process; but it is 
also a unifying process. (Follett 1919:581) Row is-· this 
continuing expansion towards unity to be achieved? We should 
recall here Bergson's argument that it is by an act of will, and 
not by the application of reason, that we can reconnect ourselves 
with 0 the vital force and rediscover ·our vital ,powers.~ ·Similarly .... 
for Follett, personal freedom can only be enhanced by .. active 
willing; in this case, willing oneself into a wider community 
by blending or interweaving our consciences. (Follett 1918:266) 
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Pragmatism in her hands thus provided the basis for a 
politics of reconciliation. In her eyes, it was a· "means of 
reconciling all political or social differences - differences 
between public and private or collective and distributive 
interests; between the interests of capital and labour and more 
grandly, differenes between nations. We can, she wrote, will a 
family of nations. Indeed, Follett wrote that this was the 
impulse behind the creation of a federal League of Nations and it 
is this that will see an end to international conflict. We are 
all truly then part of the one and the same world history. 
(Follett 1919:577,583) When conceived in this way, James and 
Bergson certainly do sup with Green and Bradley rather than 
Sorel. (1) (Of course, Follett was writing before Mussolini 
came to power and a few years before the criticisms of Elliot and 
others began to appear. However, she was writing concurrently 
with those who saw Bergson as giving inspiration to syndicalism.} 
But pluralistic or Bergsonian touches remained. She did not 
posit any final end in her telelogical account of history. She 
1. Follett·'·s-··use of Bergson in this way was an·. isolated·- case. 
McDougall too also spoke of a willing process in·relation to 
overcoming difficulties in the international sphere and in this 
context he appealed in the same breath to Bergson, Hobhouse and 
Bradley. (McDougall 1920:300-1} We should note however, that he 
specifically excluded Hegel and Bosanquet from this group. 
Muirhead however, found McDougall's embrace of Bradley rather 
strange given that much of his text was in fact devoted to an 
attack on that other .OXford idealist Bernard Bosanquet •. (Huirhead 
1924: 174f) Like Bosanquet, Muirhead wrote that ·criticism <>f 
idealist theory flowed from a misunderstanding of Hegel and his 
expositors. The point of Hegel's theory he wrote was not to seek 
the imposition of a common will but to have all come to will the 
common and good will. Muirhead argued that pluralist critics 
failed to acknowledge the distinction between the authority of 
the sovereign state and the authority of ideals which the state 
wrote, for example, that the one and the many are in "ceaseless 
interplay". (Follett 1919:582) It is this activity that generates 
new discontinuities and differences but it ensures the 
possibility of new connections and continuities. Thus the act of 
willing for Follett ensured not only unity but also growth that 
is rich and vibrant. (Follett 1919:583ff) 
While this language might be unusual compared to the 
language used by most scholars at that time when writing on 
political theory, it was really nothing more than a recasting of 
the organic analogy to support federalistie political 
arrangements. Federalism was implied because it allows the 
unifying process to take place; but at the same time, it could 
accommodate all our differences. 
There was was a notable feature of Follett's text which might 
explain why Morris Cohen referred to it as a work of social 
philosophy. Despite her use of the sometimes magical or lyrical 
language of Bergson and James, Follett asserted at the beginning 
that the unifying process was a psychological and not a-mystical 
is supposed to embody. He cited as evidence for this point--the 
arguments of Bradley in the chapter entitled "My Station and its 
Duties". Bradley wrote that the "external is already is part af a 
reflection of the will of God." (Bradley 1876:187) And "Leaving 
out of sight the question of a wider society we may say the state 
is the home for that synthesis of choices in which in themain -a 
man's state and its duties fall" and which "partly by--i.ts- laws 
----and-institutions,. but still more by -its spirit,··· gi-ves-biar -rhe 
life he does live and. ought _to> live .. -" (Bradley 1876:174):: .. ,:-Jlr:adley-
of course, was not the main or even necessary target of pluralist 
criticism. One would have to show that these sentiments-equally 
-- -applied to Hegel and Bosanquet in order to reconcile them with 
.Sergson and Hobhouse as Bradley already appears to have done.- As 
suggested earlier, Bosanquet's introduction to the second edition 
of ~ Pbilosobjcal Theory g,L the. ~ seems to have gone some 
_way towards that. 
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·· process. Here she appealed to Freud as well as James in arguing 
that· we are self-unifying centres - we constantly integrate·· our 
impulses, experiences; desires and wishes. (Follett 1918:76} 
This provides the basis for what she called the law of inter-
penetration and it was a law that applies to us in our relations 
with both groups and the wider community. And it is only this law 
which makes federalism possible. (Follett 1918:344,20} (In 
Laski's case, psychology seemed, to the contrary, to provide for 
a law of disintegration.) 
Nevertheless, one should not take this pretension to social 
psychology too seriously. Bosanquet, who otherwise applauded the 
text, certainly did not. He wrote that Follett's arguments 
sounded very much like those of T.H Green and saw her idea of 
active willing as being close to his own conception of the 
general will. (Bosanquet 196S:lv} (He asked whether perhaps it 
was inspired in part by his own writings. Although we should 
note that this was in the second edition of his Philosophical 
Theory Q..f the. s.t.a.t.e. in 1919 - where he is attempting to defend 
his own philsophical theory against charges of absolutjsa. 
[Bosanquet 1965:.xvii]) Pollet .herself spoke of Bosanquet as a 
true interpreter of Hegel. (Follet 1918:267} Above all the 
importance of Follett's text for Bosanquet was that it revealed 
the sharp distinction between an Austinian theory of sovereignty 
based on force and one emanating from the will of all -a theory 
he ascribed to himself and Bradley. (1) (Bosanquet 1965:livff) 
1. Bosanquet claimed that Follett understood Hegel's intention 
much better than did James. (Bosanquet 1965:lviii} He also made 
the point that Follett goes overboard in distancing herself from 
mysticism and claimed that her analysis of the willing process is 
purely a pscybo-logical . .one.~·. (Bosanquet 1965zlxii}-Se& Follett 
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ceases to be something to be feared but becomes the very process 
to which we owe our loyalty. (Follett 1919:576:582 Follett 
1918:49} (1} 
Wilbur Urban made a similar point in this regard. He wrote 
that denying the reality of the state as an ideal does not mean 
one has to deny the common will or the idea of community. In 
fact, he wrote, in situations where political leaders have grown 
away from the community, denying the state becomes a means of 
reasserting these values. It is for this reason that revolutions 
are followed by republics or rather the creation of states 
which can represent the real will of the community. (Urban 
1919:556} (2} 
8. Pragmatism and Democracy 
Follett's use of James to develop the idea of a community 
spirit may seem surprising because James was seen as tending to 
p.272, where she insists the question of the One and the Many 
should be worked out on a metaphysical not a scientific basis. 
(Follett 1919:272} 
1. Follet also noted that Laski was actually approaching the same 
conception. (Follet 1918:315) In the Gram1ar Q.f. Politics 
(although written a few years after Follett's book), Laski writes 
that while there is no a priori unity - "no plane on which the 
differences can somehow be coerced into unity" we can still share 
experiences and discover "kindred purpose" with each other. We 
can find "sameness in difference" and via these social harmony 
can be forged. (Laski 1948:261} Indeed, we should also draw 
attention in this context to Elliot's own co-organic system. Co-
organicism was the notion that social unity would arise from the 
community's coming to possess a co1111on aind. Sabine wrote in a 
review of Elliot's book that the author saw in his co-organ1c1sm 
the true "iiQ. medja between pragmatism and an idealist theory." 
(Sabine 1931:213} 
2. Urban wrote that it is for this reason that revolutions are 
seldom followed by the establishment of an autarkic systea. This 
is because unitary sovereignty was not just a means of 
enslavement but may also be a condition of freedoa. (Urban 
1919:556} 
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favour the individual over the collective good. In relation to 
this we should note Perry's argument that James' individualism 
was not a selfish one; Perry said it was "inclusive" rather than 
exclusive because it respected the rights of others. (Perry 
1938:133) Nevertheless, it was Dewey rather than James who was 
seen as being more sympathetic towards the communal ideal. As I 
said earlier, it is this sense of social holism which fed into 
his faith in the use of science for social betterment and 
welfare. As I also noted, it was because of this faith in 
science that he was charged with scientism. Nevertheless, and 
contrary to what Elliot claimed, Dewey did not simply see science 
as providing an instrument or set of techniques for the 
management of men and things; nor did he conceive of society in 
purely functional terms. For example, in Reconstruction in 
Philosophy Dewey also elaborated his moral conception of 
democracy. He wrote of the purpose and meaning of social 
institutions in a way that was similar to the British philosopher 
Thomas Hill Green, whom he bad studied closely. He wrote that 
the purpose of social institutions is to: 
... set free and to develop the capacity of human individuals 
without respect to race, sex, class or economic status. And 
this is all one with saying that the test of their value is 
the extent to which they educate every individual into the 
full stature of his possibility. Democracy. has many 
meanings 1 but . if it has a moral meaning •. it J.s . .found .... in 
resolving that the supreme test of all _ political 
institutions and industrial arrangements shall---be -~the 
contribution they make to the all-round growth ,.<>f every 
member of society. (Dewey-1957:186} . --~-----···· ............ ---
It is this moral conception of democracy which to some 
extent defies Elliot's description of Dewey as a functionalist 
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and champion of organic solidarity. I would argue that Elliot 
I 
overlooked the flexibility of the organic analogy in reference to 
this. As can be seen with Follett it can be used for many 
different purposes. In fact, Elliot calls his own ethical state 
co-organic. 
Perhaps the reason why the ethical element in Dewey's social 
theory does not always seem very striking is because of the 
emphasis he placed on the use of experimental methods - in 
achieving moral ends. Indeed, democracy in itself was often 
described by Dewey, as with other social institutions, in 
instrumental terms - albeit as an instrument for achieving the 
good life for all. 
Further to this, we should note that Dewey often defined the 
good solely in terms of growth. It is this which marks Dewey off 
from the ethical idealists insofor as he did not point to any 
final ends to which growth should proceed or any absolute 
criteria against which it should be measured. The role of social 
institutions {and social scientists) is then to assist the 
growth of each individual and to help remove blockages to growth 
wherever they appear. It was precisely because of this emphasis 
on growth as the only end of society that Dewey's political 
philosophy was •new, radical. democratic." (Merriam 1924:350) At 
the same time, this focus on growth is also what allowed Dewey to 
his account of social development sound so scientific. This 
emphasis on the idea of growth allowed Dewey to approach the 
study of society from the point of view of the experimental 
392 
scientist. That is, studying society is very much like studying 
nature. (Schneider 1924:350) 
Hence we see with Dewey a number of strands being pulled 
together - strands taken from both ethical idealism and from the 
experimental sciences. It is not surprising then that he was 
charged with scientism and a lack of scientific rigour at the 
same time. Although it would seem that in his 1942 work German 
Philosophy .and. Politics his naturalistic tendencies were less in 
evidence. 
This discussion of Dewey's political thought serves to 
further underline the strong conceptual association that was seen 
to exist between democracy and pragmatism. (1) Both democracy 
and pragmatism were seen to stand for openness and growth. James 
himself had described pragmatist philosophy as being of a 
democratic temper. As we have seen, he was fond of using 
political metaphors in order to elaborate on his philosophical 
beliefs. Of pragmatism he wrote: 
But you can see already how democratic she is. Her manners 
are as various and flexible, her resources as rich and 
endless, and her conclusions as friendly as those of mother 
nature. (James 1907:81) 
In the 1930s, this relation was reasserted. Jacques Barzun, 
for example, claimed that pragmatism was the authentic philosophy 
of democracy and James its native philosopher~· (Barzun 1939:42'1 
In Barzun's text, ~Hum.an Freedom, the link between pragmatisa 
1. J. E. Creighton wrote in 1916, in reviewing Dewey's Democracy 
~ Education (1916} that he was sceptical of pragmatism's 
"exclusive claim to be a philosophy of democracy.• (Creighton 
1916:739) For further assertions of the relation between 
pragmatism and democracy see also co1111ents by Morrow 1920, p. 109 
and Wiltse 1936, p.328. 
:;-,,; 
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and democracy is their common emphasis on experiment, tol.erance 
and flexibility, all the things that James held to be central to 
his philosophy of pragmatism. 
Wee- should -·also place Barzun's depiction of the relation 
between pragmatism and democracy against the back-drop of the 
Second World War. It is interesting to see that whereas some were 
viewing pragmatism in the 1920s and to a lesser extent in the 
1930s as contributing to political instability and even tyranny, 
others were contrasting the pragmatic attitude, and its much 
vaunted tolerance and adaptability with the doctrinaire and/or 
barbaric character of totalitarian states. This is precisely what 
Barzun did in Q£ fu.un.an. Freedom. Barzun contrasted pragmatism and 
democracy, both of which embraced the richness and diversity of 
life, with the "dogmatic rigidity of Rationalism", which he 
argued produced highly uniform, centralized and hierarchical 
political forms such as existed in Nazi Germany. {Barzun 1939:36) 
In relation to this, I find it interesting that that Perry, 
writing in bis 1938 book In. thg Spirit Qf William ~. only 
mentioned indirectly those concerns he expressed a few years 
earlier about the association that was asserted to exist between 
James and Mussolini. Indeed, he argued in his 1938 text that 
James had in fact predicted the crisis that the world was now 
facing in relation to German Nazism and Italian Fascism, because 
he had previously sensed that democracy, being sceptical and 
flexible like pragmatism itself, could prove weak in the face of 
more passionate and compelling- -political doctrines.---Hence~ 
James' search for what be called a moral equivalent to war. In 
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this regard, Perry added that while James had predicted the 
present crisis, he had also provided a way out of it by showing 
that it was possible to march with the same sense of "solidarity" 
and feel the same "elan of combat" in defence of liberalism- and 
democracy. (Perry 1938:154-5} 
James thus gave inspiration to what Perry described as 
"militant liberalism" - and it was this quality that the 
democratic countries so desperately needed as the war with the 
totalitarian governments {Germany, Italy and Japan) loomed. (1} 
It was precisely this militancy, evident in such texts as ~ 
Moral Egujvalent t..Q. Ra.I. and The Will t..Q. Believe, that Stewart had 
ten years earlier described as giving inspiration to Mussolini. 
(Stewart 1928:862) 
Thus, a pragmatic conception of democracy, to the extent 
that it implied a willingness to compromise, a toleration of 
difference and a commitment to the worth of the individual, could 
be contrasted favourably with some of the other· political 
systems operating in Europe and in Asia. Dewey wrote in German 
Philosophy ~ Politics of the American "working philosophy'!. .. of 
democracy as something which involved "back-and-forth give-and-
1. Perry noted that the problem that faced ·liberal social 
movements is that they did not possess this sue will to believe -
as contrasted with adherents of communism or fascism. Those who 
organise these movements "seek to inspire their adherents with a 
faith in their cause, even when that cause is, other things 
considered, most precarious." (Perry 1938:194} See Chap. IV in 
Perry, In,~ Spirit Q,t William ~. 1938. For criticisms of 
this idea of a militant liberalism see Passmore, J.A. 1940 Review 
of Ralph Barton Perry, In the Spirit of William James, ~. vol. 
xviii, no. 1, June, pp 85-8 •.. 
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take discussion until the final decision represented a workable 
consensus of the idea of all who took part." (Dewey 1942:45} This 
he thought a far superior method of achieving social unity than 
the brutal discipline . that was imposed by the Nazis. 
Demonstrating this fact was the task he set himself in that book. 
(Dewey 1942:6) But we should also note that when pragmatism was 
discussed in this regard, its relativistic or voluntaristic 
strains were de-emphasised. Indeed, pragmatism was presented as a 
political third-way; something which bridged the gap between 
absolutism and relativism or between political monism on the one 
hand, and radical pluralism on the other. As we have seen, 
sometimes fascism and Nazism were treated as examples of 
voluntarism, rather than a dogmatic rationalism and in these 
cases pragmatism could be said to be mid-way between their will 
to power and the rationalism of the communists. 
9. The Collectivist Tide 
But if pragmatism, in its association with the democratic 
cause, began to be seen as a philosophy which encouraged the 
construction of social unity - where did this leave its 
pluralistic or particularistic string? In political terms, by the 
1930s the collectivist tide had overwhelmed the pluralism that 
had ····been- so · current in the 1920s. Explaining ·this ·cis ,-not 
difficult. As I have noted, Laski had once written that we are 
bundles of hyphens in terms of our allegiances - yet he had 
added that when two or more of these come into conflict we must 
choose. - Or as Urban· put it in an earlier critique of . pluralist . 
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politics, monistic theory is born in crisis and whenever there 
are crises as a result of internal or external threats, it is 
natural that the community as a whole will come to be upheld as a 
higher value. {Urban 1919:554} Indeed, it was precisely this 
sense of social crisis in the 1930s and 1940s ·.that ·saw, as 
Partridge observed, "the spread of the ideology of social 
planning. Along with the growing popularity of the notion of a 
scientific control of social development." {Partridge 1945:90} 
(1) 
This transition from pluralism to collectivism can be 
witnessed in the career of Laski. (2) As we have seen, Laski 
began by admitting to an interest in polyarchic or federalistic 
political arrangements - his concern in this context seemed 
to rest primarily with the question of freedom. But Laski was 
also concerned with the issue of economic equality. At first, he 
seemed to be suspicious of the state as an organ of equality, as 
in his dismissal of the "special status" which Elliot accorded 
the state in his own co-organic theory. He wrote that Elliot's 
view of the "modern State as essentially an umpire in the social 
conflict was inadequate because it ~ssumed the impartiality of 
l. In an earlier article Partridge made a similar point. He wrote ··':lf 
that: "Ever since the war began there has been considerable talk 
of planning the peace, of. post-war reconstruction, of the 
deliberate creation, when once we have disposed of the apostles 
of violence, of a secure, free and genuinely rational society." 
{Patridge 1941:236} 
2. ~ Pluralism tQ. Collectivism is the title of an excellent 
study of the development of Laski's political thought by Bernard 
Zylstra, Van Gorcwn, Assen, 1968. 
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its agents." tLasJU 1948:282n) He made similar comments about 
John Maynard Keynes' views on economic policy. suggesting that 
Keynes like the Fabians tended to overlook the class bias -0f the 
state. 
Despite this. Laski did come to accept that the state had a 
role to play in the reduction of class inequality. Beloff wrote 
that already in the late 1920s he was moving towards a position 
of compromise with the state. In that context. Laski began to 
argue that labour could admit the complete sovereignty of the 
state if the state were on the side of labour. (Beloff 1950:381) 
In relation to this. we should remember that pluralist 
politics was in many respects a disguised way of talking about 
the politics of class and in fact had little to do with dreams of 
a pluralistic society. The aspirations of some of the 
syndicalists for example. especially those inspired by the 
Bolsheviks, were closer to communism than to pluralism. It is 
also telling, in this regard, that Laski wrote in his Grammar 
that the goal of pluralists "must be the classless society." 
(Laski 1948:xii) And as we have seen, the reason for the 
hostility towards pluralist theory was partly because it was 
often used as a surrogate for the advocacy of violent class 
struggle. 
Given this interest in the importance of economic equality it 
is not surprising that by the 1930s Laski had become a strong 
supporter of the idea of the collectivist state. (1) For an 
1. Indeed, there are intimations of this shift in his 1930 work 
Ljbgrty in ~Modern ~. (1930) He wrote: "A compulsory 
-t~ai11ing .,..of the aind is still compulsion, it- is a sacrifice-·~ of 
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explanation of this gradual transition we can cite a number of 
factors. As we have noted, Laski was critical of the Bolsheviks 
for their rejection of democracy as well as for their 
-·opportunism. (Hawkins 1945:383)- Yet, Beloff writes, at the same 
time he, like many of his generation, was affected by the image 
of the Russian Revolution; also like many others of his 
generation, he was after that event propelled towards the study 
of Marx. (2) 
Other factors also intervened which explain his transition 
from pluralist to collectivist; from someone with an over-riding 
interest in liberty (which Beloff argued never really left him) 
to someone mainly interested in the issue of equality. Firstly, 
there was the great economic insecurity of the 1930s and 
. secondly there was the rise of fascism and Nazism. Both of these 
developments appear to have enhanced the status of collectivist 
and social democratic ideals. (Hawkins 1945~378) Thus, Ramsay 
MacDonald's point in the early 1920s that fascism was the 
some liberty to a greater freedom when the compulsion··· ceases;" 
(Laski 1937:56) Not only does this sound very much -like--tbe 
arguments that Mannheim was to put forward in his Planning ~ 
Freedom some years later but also, as one writer remarked, it 
went "perilously" near those idealist views. of· liberty --he 
otherwise repudiated. (Shaw 1942:88} It is interesting to note 
that some have argued that Laslti's individualism was ultimately 
derived from an ethi~a.1- presumptien--in .favour--o-f -~e--··individua1'"'' 
conscience. James'· radical empiricism only-really augmented this 
early bias. It is this ethical individual· that-links Laski-,-up, 
many respects, with idealist notions of the self. Indeed, Lewis 
Zerby has argued that Laski's idea that governmental policy 
should be geared "towards the integration of personality, the 
self-realization and happiness of all those to be affected by it" 
had a "Tory flavour." (Zerby 1945: 1430 ·'~ 
2. Laski published a book on CollJllunism in 1927 in which he spoka 
of it as essentially a spiritual rather "than econoaic- creed·." .... ~.~ 
399 
reply to syndicalism had seemed persuasive. For Laski argued in 
1933 in Democracy ~ Crisis that socialism was the reply to 
fascism. Indeed, Laski was to be found defending the Soviet 
Union in the 1940s during a period in which it was heavily under 
Nazi attack. (1) 
Laski went further than many of bis peers in believing that 
collectivism was the answer to social problems. Nevertheless, as 
I demonstrated in chapter two, the 1930s and 1940s saw an 
increasing interest in the idea of the scientific planning of 
social development. Pragmatism fitted into this mould, and we 
should note that advocates of social planning often appealed t~ ~ 
the pragmatic criteria. It was this pragmatism that was evocative 
of the instrumental methods of science - and perhaps also tinged 
with a sense of social holism - which, as I have noted, was often 
implicit in arguments in favour of social planning. 
But pragmatism, as a term describing a living philosophy, 
slowly disappeared from academic discussions in the late 1930s 
and early 1940s. Morris writes that in American intellectual 
life pragmatism was overtaken in the late 1930s by other 
intellectual trends emanating from Europe - logi~al empiricism, 
1. See Laski in Faith. Beason AW1, Ciyilisation, Victor Gollancz, 
London, 1944. pp. 158-9. One should note in analysing the 
writings of Laski and his transition from pluralist to 
collectivist the point made by Hawkins: after 1931, when he 
began to move closer towards the Marxist position, Laski bad 
become a pamphleteer as well as a scholar. It was as a result of 
his views on Marxist-Leninism that he was frequently branded an 
agent of bloody revolution and totalitariansim. (tlawkins 
1945:391) Beloff, however, denies this charge noting the Laski 
supported Labour's war-time coalition in 1940 against the pure 
Marxists. (Beloff 1950:379) 
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(Morris 1970:144} However, Morris suggested that while these 
intellectual movements developed independently of pragmatism, 
they also had much in common with certain tendencies within the 
pragmatist tradition of thought~ (Morris 1970:144f} 
But what of political pluralism? We do find discussions in 
journal articles of the late 1930s and early 1940s of such things 
as administrative participation, regional decentralisation and 
municipal government. But these hardly constitute pluralism of 
the kind which Laski had earlier advocated, and were usually 
incorporated into a broader organisational framework - sometimes 
incorporating the idea of rational planning and control. {1} 
But whatever democratic elements were incorporated, the idea 
of planning the state tended to drift towards idea of rational 
guidance and control. We might recall that in the last chapter, 
the very complexity and differentiation of function that was 
characteristic of modern industrial society was used to argue 
that pragmatically speaking pluralism was necessary. However. 1n 
the 1930s. this same complexity could also be-·put forward as one 
reason {again, by appealing to the pragmatic test} against 
extensive participation of the community in the government and 
management of society. {1) Thus, by the early 1940s we begin to 
1. As an example. of .. the push . to . include .. both popular 
participation and scientific guidance in the- growing 
administrative arm of government, Fries cites the example .of the 
Tennesee Valley Authority. The Act .establishing the TVA was 
singed by .. President Roosevelt in May 1933. {Morison 1965:960) 
Horace S. Fries wrote that at -the TVA employees and citizens were 
trained in the methods of the natural sciences and had become 
"active participants in administrative committees and · plans" 
applying their intelligence to the "shaping of general plans.• 
Here--indeed.,-he-w-rote,--was- ~he -"idea of· the citizen-scientist in 
the making. " _(Fri es 1943: 564} 
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bear about what James Burnham called the "managerial 
revolution", something which bore a strong resemblance to what 
had been called administrative syndicalism more than twenty years 
earlier. (1) As we saw in chapter two, the aim was to take all 
the instruments of production and distribution out of the control 
of the political executive and place them into the hands of well-
trained functional representatives (administrative engineers, 
supervisory technicians, plant coordinators, government bureax 
heads, commissioners and administrators} who would form a 
"professional oligarchy." (Ogg 1942:5} According to this 
theory too, the industrial societies were about to witness the 
reduction or decline of democratic institutions. (Ogg 1942:5) 
(2} But the fact that control would be held, not by the 
political executive, but by managers was seen as distinguishing 
this form of social organisation from totalitarian ones. 
10. Criticisms of Rationalism 
It was in this context that there began to appear criticisms 
of rationalism in politics. The criticisms that began to emerge 
are familiar to anyone who has read Oakeshott's Ratjonaljsm in 
Politics and Other Essays. Two Australian critics were P.H. 
1. See James Burnham> The. Managerjal Revolution; ·~ i.£ 
Happening iA ~World. (New York, 1941). On this topic see also 
Henry C. Link, The. Rediscovery of. Han., Mac111illan, London, 1939. 
Where he warned of the dangers of extensive social planning. This 
he argued rested on a mechanistic conception of .. society. and 
tended to assume that man was a weak and passive being. To adopt 
this perspective he wrote, was to prepare the basis for fascism 
because the fascist could take advantage of the passivity of the 
citizenry. (Link 1939:38:47) For a review of this book see Gibb, 
1941, pp. 78-89. 
1. ·On this ·· point see ... Francis G. Wilson, "The Pragmatic 
.Electorate," American ·Po1itjca1-Sdenee Review, Vol. XXXI, No.1, 
February, pp. 12-27 .. ··-·- ... · 
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Partridge (a graduate of the London School of Economics where 
"rationalism" was seen to flourish), and John Anderson, the 
Scottish-born Professor of Philosophy at the University of 
Sydney. We should note here, in relation to Partridge and 
Anderson, that the rhetoric of scientific planning was 
particularly strong in Australian academic circles in the 1930s 
and 1940s. 
Partridge saw this faith in the social sciences a reflection 
of the more general belief that "history can be made to proceed 
according to formula." (Partridge 1941:248) Further to this, 
there was a tendency among social scientists to believe that they 
were able to "perform more skilfully and more disinterestedly" 
the role of political leader. (Partridge 1941:251) Anderson had 
also put this view criticising what he described as these 
"partisans of 'scientific' helpfulness" for viewing themselves 
as "above the battle ... on the side of pure saRientia." (Anderson 
1940a:68) (1) These descriptions help convey the tone of much of 
the literature on social planning and manage to parody well the 
sometimes outlandish claims being made· in - relation to the 
scientific management of social development. However, they are 
also to some degree caricatures. 
Not all of the advocates of social planning can be so 
swiftly dismissed as-rationalists, - Karl Mannheim for example .. 
then at the London School of Economics, was charged with being a 
rationalist by Partridge. (Partridge 1941:-251} As we saw in-the 
1. See also P.H. Patridge. "The Prohlea of a Social Philosophy•, ,. 
Australasian ··Journa\ stf·-Psydwlogy~ujcPhHosophy,.:~~,1:940,'"Vol;; V~- --·--
No~ -1; December. -ppr90-121?"'" 
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second chapter, Mannheim did speak of the elimination of 
politics, and did express the hope that the sphere of the 
rationally controllable in social life was growing and did speak 
··-Of· the·· use.- -0f rational techniques as a response t~--· "naked 
passion". (Mannheim 1951:48} Nevertheless, Mannheim did not 
appear to hold to a sharp dichotomy between the rule of reason 
and the sway of emotion. He wrote, for example, citing Dewey, 
that the "power that can overcome" irrationalism {he mentions 
Sorel as an example of an irrationlist [Mannheim 1936:122ff]}, 
was not mere rationalism, but was refined passions. {Mannheim 
1951:303) 
Further to this, and despite the references to scientific 
control of social development we also find him referring to James 
and Bergson. Once again, it is the language which is telling. 
Mannheim wrote that reality is in "constant flux", a "process of 
becoming." {Mannheim 1936:86:135} Mannheim wrote that it was the 
error of ideologists to believe that humanity could ever reach a 
final resting place because reality "is ever on the move". (Fox 
1938:205} For this reason A.C. Fox wrote, in an article in the 
;\.ustralasian Journal ~ Psychology and Philosophy, that 
Mannheim could sometimes read "like a passage from Bergson." (Fox 
1938:12} (1} 
1. Mannheim wrote that the call for a final "synthesis" was a 
reflex of the "static world view of intellectualism;" wheras, 
he wrote, all.-.things are ever in a "process of becoming .•. the 
only adequate synthesis would be a dynamic one which is 
reformulated from time to time." (Mannheim 1936:135) Although 
it should be noted, that Mannheim made it quite clear he did not 
think that the reality of flux implied pure unintelligibility as 
be claimed Sorel thought. (Mannheim 1936:122-4} 
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We have therefore two contrasting approaches to politics and 
time between which Mannheim sought to steer. At one extreme, we 
have the approach of those irrationalist groups who saw history 
as pure flux and at the other, we have those rationalists who 
. ~ought to transcend time and history and come to rest in a state 
of scientific equilibrium. How then should we relate Mannheim to 
these two positions? At times Mannheim seems to come close to a 
position which holds out the possibility .of the abolition of 
politics and its replacement with scientific or technical 
government. At others, we find Mannheim speaking of both 
knowledge and politics in a way that suggested some Bergsonian 
influence. 
Mannheim is also interesting from the pragmatist point of 
view because he too was elaborating a philosophy, or rather 
social theory, of reconciliation. He was attempting to avoid the 
extreme positions which placed an undue emphasis on either the 
role of the rational or the role of the irrational in social 
life. While Dewey presented his political approach as mid-way 
between a policy of laissez-faire and the totalitarian state, 
Mannheim branded his political theory as the "third ·way" 
something which avoided the "one-sidedness" of communism on the 
- -0ne hand, and individualism on the other~ - (Mannheim 1951:127} 
-{1) 
I do not want to over-emphasize the 1>ragmatic · strains - in·· 
Mannheim's thought - at least, I would not want to identify· him 
1. Note that Mannheim also wrote that. "for the modern. man 
pragmatism has become in .... some --respect-s . the inevitable- and 
appropriate outlook." Cited in A.C.. Fox., .. Jh·" 2.10,~--~'!Sonte 
Reflections on. the 'Sociology of Knowledge-~-'!!.r----Australasian 
Journal g1 Psychology A1lSl ·Philosophy, 1938, :.Vot. ... XVI., No.3 •.. 
December, pp. 193-217. 
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too strongly with the sceptical side of pragmatism. Mannheia 
-remained confident in the ability of intellectuals to direct and 
control social life. Indeed. as a German- intellectual very· 
··------·----conscious... of the Nazi experience he saw rational ---1>1anning as---
absolutely essential if social strife were to be avoided. (1) 
This is one of the reasons that planning for freedom was so 
important to Mannheim and this was to be contrasted with the 
limits imposed on the free expression of human energy and 
spontaneity by the plans of totalitarian states. As I suggested 
in chapter two, in the hands of planners the role of the state 
was seen as a modification of Green's prescription that it should 
be a "hindrance of hindrances to the good life"; that is, the 
function of the public service state lay in the "facilitating of 
facilities." (Gibson 1934:121) 
Ta the extent that Mannheim was optimistic about the role 
that intelligent planning Cdn play in social life his attitude 
can be contrasted with the political "realism" of E.H Carr 
--which was also being developed at this time. Indeed, the 
criticisms of "rationalism" were often conducted from a realist 
perspective - one which discounted the role that intellect, and 
more specifically, policy could play in social life and 
emphasised the play of social forces. (2} 
,.-.... ~~---~-·-- .... ~·-· ... --........... --·-"'"---·--;,,, ..~-----------==-·==· ... -... ---·... ··==-·=·==· ·=,;}.;=· ======-'""·.;.._ ... ·_::;;.,.=. ==-=-====-
1. Dewey noted, and this echoes points we have made in an earlier 
chapters, how it was German writers like Karl Mannheim in tlAD. fm4 
Society ill g ~ g,t Recontructjon (he is also probably thinking 
also of Raushching as he refers to his~~ Qi Destruction 
a number of times in the text} who pointed out how mass-
democratization unleashed "irrational elements which have always 
existed in human nature but which bad been kept. under -control.. or - ... 
at least under._ cov..er .•. -~ Hitler obtained mastery in Germany, ;by. '.f; 
procuring for these..eprillitive and irrationaL eleme.nts an organized 
outlet." (Dewey 1942:5-6) _ - ,,~--·- -· ..... 
- 2 .. 0n this point .. see Partridge, 1941 11 pp .. 245.-7~ .. 
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Carr's realism was mainly identified with the study of 
international affairs. We noted in the first chapter that Carr 
was contemptuous of those who saw the Great War as some sort of 
aberration from the true course of history - especially: thosewbo· 
formulated the utopian or idealist approac&. to international 
relations. He believed that utopianism had-led to misguided ~nd 
naive visions of a new international order --· the consequence ·.'·-<>f 
this belief, he thought, was an inability or unpreparedness t'O 
deal with real conflicts when they arose-. 
In reacting against those internationalists who had 
predicted the growth of the moral sphere . in international 
politics after World War One, he argued that morality (and also 
at the melioration of social deliberate policies aimed 
conditions}, could only play a subordinate role, in political 
life. The pursuit of power, self-interest and the eruption of 
sub-conscious impulses were what ultimately determined the course 
that politics would take. Indeed, what was called 11orality in the ... 
field of politics, was often no 11ore than a rationalizaton of ,the 
self-interest of the powerful~ In political life then, morality 
could only be "relative not universal." (Carr 1946:21} 
Quite clearly, there is little room for a sense ~f common 
rationality or 
Yet, Carr did 
social purpose in a world depicted in this 
recognise that there were both practical 
way. 
and· 
conceptual limitations to the realist position so presented. 
Thus, he wrote, that one could not rest "in pure realism" because 
it could not supply us with those motivations or "springs of. 
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action which are necessary even to the pursuit of thought.• (Carr 
1946:89} Carr wrote that intelligent thought, utilises •purpose· 
with observation and analysis. Utopia and reality are thus the 
two facets of political science.• (Carr 1946:10} 
But Carr remained enough of a realist to deny to that there 
can be any real harmonising or balancing of the utopian and 
realistic elements in political life; at best one can only 
achieve what Ronald Niebuhr called "tentative and uneasy 
compromises" between them. (Carr 1946:100} Indeed, Carr wrote 
that the very excitement and tragedy of political life springs 
from this process, where realism and utopianism are constantly 
seeking to invade and dominate each other. (Carr 1946:93} Given 
the limited scope which he accorded social purposes or policies, 
one would have to say that the role he accorded to the 
intelligentsia in directing social life 
than that hoped for by Mannheim or Dewey. 
was far more limited 
This brief discussion~of the ideas of Carr shows that his 
realism, like the supposed rationalism of Mannheim, must be 
qualified. It would be rather difficult to set up these two 
thinkers and their approaches in stark contrast to·each other. 
This is because Carr's espousal of the relativity of morals, in 
~ Twenty Year' Crisis was inspired by Mannheim's historical· 
relativism in Ideology AW1 Utopia -·an intellectual debt Carr 
acknowledged in the preface to his text. (Carr 1946:.ix) · 
But contrasting their ideas is to some extent a useful 
exercise. In a sense, Kannhei•'s~ rationalis11 and Carr's· reaH:Slt · -
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can also be seen as standing at the opposite ends of the 
pragmatist spectrum with Mannheim placing greater emphasis on the 
role of intelligence and Carr placing greater· e11pha.sis on the 
role of will. I would not, however, want to push·this point too 
far - there are significant differences between Carr's realism 
and pragmatist philosophies of will ·on the one hand, and between 
Mannheim's "rationalism" and instr1111entalist or experimentalist 
approaches to social planning on the other. Carr was more of a 
determinist than a voluntarist, and Mannheim appeared to have a 
stronger commitment to the truthful character of the social 
sciences than an instrumentalist would have - to the extent that 
the instrumentalist might see scientific laws as only 
conventionalised patterns of adjustment. 
What is most interesting from the pragmatist point of view, 
is that both of these scholars present their own theories, in 
terms of the conceptual and political worlds that they inhabit, 
as compromises between extremes. Although, it is important· to--
stress that the extremes between which Hannheia and- Carr·· hover·,· 
while bearing some symmetrical relation, ·are not·~educible ·to· 
each other. That is, it is the rhetorical tactic of-c<>111pro1Rise 
between what are presented as false oppositions, as we have seen 
with James, Dewey, Barzun i.t. Al,, and not just the types of 
oppositions that are selected, that these writers have in co111Ron 
and which enables one to see them as to some degree in sympathy 
with the pragmatist tradition. 
Contrasting Mannheim and Carr also demonstrates the way in 
which the pluralist attempt to push for greater internationalisn 
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alongside a more federalistic system had dissipated in 
intellectual circles by the late 1930s. By the 1940s we can say 
that there was something of a return to those very conception~ of 
domestic and international society which the pluralists had 
opposed. That is, while rationalism or c&llectivisD came back 
into fashion in relation to the domestic arena in the 1930s and 
1940s, realism or particularism once more received prominence in 
international thought. 
11. The Pragmatist Political Legacy 
I have shown how pragmatist political thinkers brought 
together both metaphysical and naturalistic theories in order;to 
build a politics of pluralism, in order to provide new answers-to 
questions concerning the individual's relation to the· stat~. I 
have also shown that while this pragmatic political programme was 
connected with liberal thought, in some areas it was highly 
unstable, revealing a virulent strain of activism in ~he form of 
the syndicalist and fascist movements which drew upon its 
voluntarism. To further complicate-the picture, it has been 
argued that an essentially irrationalist and romanticist fascism 
also had an impartial, functionalist aspect and this too was said 
to reveal the influenee of pragmatism. 
That somehow pragmatism and pluralism could be taken to 
contribute to such varied political phen<>1tena needs to ·be· 
explained. In part, the answer pertains to the nature of the 
criticism of pragmatic and pluralistic political thought. That 
is, the complaint was that it was not so much that this or that 
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pragmatist or pluralist advocated political evil but that their 
theories could lead to or embolden the politically violent and 
vicious. In one sense James' philosophy · had· si11ply been 
perverted, in another sense, it was the "fruit of pragmatist· 
philosophy pushed to its logical extreme." (Sabine 1931:213) 
The argument here is that pragmatism had failed its own working 
test; it had degenerated into anarchy and this was followed by 
fascism. (Elliot 1928:x) 
Most of the criticism operated at this level. This is one 
reason why the criticisms of pragmatism and pluralism are often 
ambivalent on the one hand condemning writers such as William 
James for the potential dangers their theories could unleash, 
.while on the other hand conceding that most pragmatists and 
pluralists were of a politically moderate temperament. Thus, what 
was being attacked was often nragmatism or pluraljsm rather than 
any particular author or text. (1} 
But an additional explanation can be provided. I would 
argue that the fact that pragmatist politics could bide behind so 
many masks flows from the slippery quality we have constantly 
attributed to that philosophy. Pluralism too, as a political 
creed, was obviously very adaptible. One would have to say then 
that both pragmatism and pluralis• were bound to provide ample 
material for a number of political movements. 
1. This explains why on the one hand we see many 
writers,including the critics of pluralism, acknowledging that 
most pluralists, with the exception of the syndicalists, were of 
a moderate political tempera11ent, while at the same time 
expressing concern about pluralism. (Ellis 1927:585,· Barnes 
1925:141, Elliot 1924:267, Elliot 1928:431} , , 
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But one would have to baulk at the suggestion that a 
pragmatic pluralism possessed an internal logic that, when put 
into action, unleashed an unstoppable political process that 
would ultimately terminate in fascism or even Nazism. We recall 
here that it was really the Jamesian or Bergsonian strain in 
pluralism that some found objectionable. (Although we should 
remember how Follett found in their philosophies something quite 
different.) It was the pragmatist philosophy of will, more so 
than pluralism, that was s~en as possessing this internal logic 
which would push political life to the brink of tyranny and 
domination by dictators or powerful business interests. And this 
was because that philosophy was tentative or evasive on the 
matter of philosophical foundations. 
Yet if a reluctance to connect one's political theory or 
system to any solid foundation guarantees the descent into 
either chaos or dictatorship, then few theories or systems can 
escape unscathed. It should be noted that what is a solid 
foundation for one thinker proves too flimsy for another. 
Indeed, as we have seen, pluralists themselves were all too 
ready to accuse both historical and contemporary figures such as 
Hobbes,· Austin and Bosanquet of somehow contributing or leading 
to an authoritarian state and resultant international conflict. 
If Laski could condemn Hegel for creating Bismarck (of" rather, 
Bismarck as he was depicted by his critics) then Laski must take 
responsibility (according to the logic of Elliot's argument), 
for Mussolini. But such a suggestion would be ludicrous. Too 
many other factors intervene to establish a direct link between a 
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political theory and political violence and domination. We 
should also note that in the midst of intellectual arguments 
positions are often misunderstood. This is why much intellectual 
discussion about the nature of the state in this period was a 
debate between straw-men. The putative enemies of pluralism were 
to some degree fabrications - as were the depictions of 
pluralists and pragmatists as giving enthusiastic support to 
violent political acts. 
These points should not stop us asking questions about the 
role of theory and philosophy and its relation to politics - an 
issue that has come up repeatedly in this study. We may ask. 
although with some reservations, whether theory or philosophy 
should be made safe for liberalism or democracy? It remains true 
that some ideas can be, and are sometimes intended to be, 
dangerous to or subversive of the existing social order. Richard 
Rorty, a philosopher greatly interested in the pragmatist 
tradition of thought, has in this regard recommended in 
Contingency. Irony. Solidarity. (1989) some sort of intellectual 
division of labour. 
Rorty would have those philosophers who speak of social 
solidarity or justice assigned the role of public intellectuals; 
while those whose main interest is in the pursuit of self-
creation (and whose ideas may prove unsettling or inappropriate 
when injected into the political arena) would be asked to 
"privatize" their activities. (Rorty 1989:197) But Rorty's 
solution seems both odd and politcally naive. Odd, because his 
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idea of what should or should not be a matter of public interest 
seems somewhat arbitrary. Naive, because ideas have a habit·-0f 
jumping out of their box, as Arthur 0. Lovejoy long ago observed. 
This is not to reify ideas and see them as swimming freely 
through social waters; it is simply to say that people talk. 
Conversation is carried on and during its course certain ideas, 
perhaps taken out of context, are absorbed into the social 
matrix and come to have a life outside the academy. 
Rorty is right, however, in stressing the point that 
practical or political problems require practical solutions and 
that they can never be solved by theories in themselves. This is, 
in many respects, a restatement of what pragmatists or the 
pragmatically inspired were saying in their discussions of 
politics, jurisprudence and economics back in the early part of 
this century. 
Yet this injunction to be pragmatic or experimental when it 
comes to political or social affairs may beg as many questions as 
it answers. I say this because, as I have demonstrated, there was 
no single nor clear-cut pragmatic response to social and 
political problems of the inter-war years and beyond. Pragmatic 
solutions ranged from calls to political activism to cqlls for 
the introduction of techniques of social and economic management. 
What then can we say about the pragmatist legacy except that 
it is manifold? I said earlier that it has been described as a 
philosophy of reconciliation. But I think that 
demonstrated that it failed to hold the philosophical or 
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political centre which many claimed for it. In this ~ontext, 
Papini's description of prag•atism as a •corridor• philosophy ·is 
perhaps more accurate; for as a philosophy it is the point · of 
intersection of any nUJ1ber of other strands of thought. To enter 
into the world of pragmatist thought is to have any n111tber of 
conceptual doors opened - doors which branch off in all sorts of 
unexpected directions. 
It is not surprising then that pragmatism could proceed in 
many strange political directions. Perhaps all that the pragmatic 
approach to politics could demonstrate, however inadvertently, 
was that it is in the nature of political life, as Roberto 
Michels once wrote, to be caught between the "extreme limits" of 
freedom and authority: between these the "pendulum oscillates 
unceasingly." (Michels 1927:772) 
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Chapter 7: Pragmatism and Econo•ics 
1. The Problem of Rationalism 
A discussion of the impact of prag11atis• would not be 
complete without mentioning its importance to developments in 
economic thought and policy. In America the influence of 
pragmatism in the area of economic theorising was evident in the 
early 1920s. Indeed, we could go back even earlier in the case of 
Thorstein Veblen. The American economist Frank Knight noted in 
1923 that there was a push by economists to interprehtbe "vogue 
of pragmatism". (Knight 1923:61) Sabine several years later 
observed that pragmatism "acted as a ferment" within the 
discipline of economics, just as it had in the area of legal 
theory. (Sabine 1930:865) The adoption of the pragmatist point 
of view, as well as more generally terms and metaphors drawn from 
the areas of process metaphysics and modern physics, was 
important for some economists in helping them reconceptualise 
economic reality. Furthermore, prag11atis.11 was also of 
assistance to some economists in their challenge to what they saw 
as an undue preoccupation with theorising. But before I 
directly address these topics, and in order to enhance our 
understanding of how "pragmatist" economics developed, I need to 
aake a few brief co-ents about the more general social and,,, 
methodological contexts which the discipline of ~ economics 
inhabited in the 1920s and 1930s. 
...... 
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I pointed out in the last chapter that the influence of 
pragmatism had dissipated by the late 1930s and early 1940s. 
Certainly, its pluralistic strain had all but disappeared in the 
midst of the rush towards social democracy - an ideal which, as I 
have previously mentioned, grew increasingly attractive given the 
mass economic insecurities of the 1930s. There were very 
pragmatic reasons for supporting this ideal. As Keynes observed, 
it was necessary to make capitalism •ore efficient in the 
provision of social goods in order to decrease the attractions of 
communism and fascism; social efficiency, he argued, was all the 
more important in a world in which existing social arrangements 
were no longer seen to have the blessing of God. (1) In addition 
to this, the social democratic ideal was central to the rhetoric 
of governments during the Second World War; the "promise of a 
better future" had to be made in order to inspire the community 
in its struggles against the enemy. {Burton 1943:34) 
Nevertheless, I did suggest that there were still pragmatic 
nuances to be found in those authors and intellectual movements 
which began to achieve prominence in the late 1930s. There were 
traces of prag•atism's scepticism and its emphasis on will to be 
found in a range of intellectual trends, fro• the political 
"realism" of E.H. Carr to existentialis•. In the case of social 
scientists, however, it was prag•atis• in its •ore sober and 
1. Robert Skidelsky cites Keynes as saying that economic 
was necessary if "irreligious capitalis• is 
defeat religious comaunis••. {Skidelsky 1983:15) A 
was •ade by an Australian scholar, W. G. Duncan, 
•great econo•ic inequalities.• jeopardized the 
intervention 
ulti•ately to 
similar point 
who wrote, 
maintenance 
"attainment 
of democracy and freedom because they prevented the 
of kindred ideals•. (Duncan 1934:13) 
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scientific mood that was mostly in evidence in the English-
speaking world at that time. So sober in fact, that pragmatism 
in this form could also be referred to as rationalism - something 
against which both James and Dewey had usually positioned 
themselves. 
But the rationalism that we begin to hear so much about in 
the late 1930s does not really refer to the pragmatist's old 
metaphysical foes - these being the monistic block-universe and 
Newtonian conceptions of science. For when Partridge, Oakeshott 
and others began to talk about rationalism what they were 
describing was not only an intellectualist belief in the 
commanding power of reason but also a more general, although 
related, political disposition. That is, a rationalist was one 
who averred that social forces are amenable to rational guidance 
and control. More importantly rationalism entailed the belief 
that society should be ruled only by those who have the capacity 
to reason correctly. Thus, when we speak of rationalism in this 
sense, we are not so much designating an epistemology but 
invoking a political term of approbation or abuse. 
The danger of treating rationalism in this context as purely 
an epistemology is that traditionally rationalism and empiricism 
are of ten opposed to each other because the latter relies on 
deductive modes of reasoning while the other appeals to raw 
experience. Yet many so-called rationalists whom we find among 
social scientists in the 1930s were very keen to display their 
empirical credentials. One 
"rationalization movement". 
example was the 
which advocated the 
so-called 
scientific 
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planning of industry and society and which appealed explicitly to 
empirical procedures. (Brady 1933:3-6} 
However, if we simply treat rationalism at least in this 
context a description of the belief that a government run by 
armies of experts (be they priests, philosophers or social 
scientists) can somehow make society both more equitable and 
equable then this contradiction disappears. For whether such a 
system is designed under the stimulus of inductive or deductive 
modes of reasoning may be irrelevant; what we have in either case 
is essentially a formulaic approach to the running of society. 
The second point I want to make in this regard, is that some 
of those who claimed to be positivistically or empirically 
minded were only empiricists or positivists in the weak or loose 
senses of 
positivism 
those terms. We are not speaking here of the 
or radical empiricism which Mach and Poincare 
developed, which James imbibed and which could be so subversive 
of the scientific ideals of certainty and impartiality. Indeed, 
as I noted in chapter two, being a self-declared positivist might 
aean nothing more than asserting the need for research to become 
positive, factual or empirical. 
There was little immersion in the detail of empiricist or 
positivist epistemologies by the would-be social scientists who 
used this vocabulary of factual research. This is shown by the 
way in which words such as the real and the empirical could be 
jumbled together as if they entailed the same thing. They did 
not, as I have suggested in previous chapters. The serious or 
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consistent positivist or empiricist refused to speak about 
reality because reality was a •etaphysical concept for which 
there could be no test. It is curious then that the terms 
positivism or empiricism are sometimes now used as pejoratives, 
ref erring to an unsophisticated belief that knowledge is 
accumulated as a result of a disinterested examination of the 
real; whereas we are all supposed to know that, to repeat that 
popular but vacuous phrase of the 1920s, everything is relative. 
This understanding of positivism or empiricism is the legacy 
of earlier and repeated corruptions of the meanings of these 
terms. In particular, the these terms were used in order to dress 
up rather crude pseudo-scientific methodologies. 
This is not to suggest that the received image of positivism 
or empiricism is a complete fabrication. Empiricists, as I have 
noted, were often tempted to seize the realist crown and thus 
shifted from making claims about experience to making claims 
about reality. And positivists, especially logical positivists, 
often did sound arrogant in their dismissal of metaphysical 
issues and normative values; logical positivism did turn into 
something which looked like the cult of science. As we have 
seen, James was not inclined towards this version of positivism 
and later developed a much broader conception of what the 
empirical could entail. Nevertheless, the rational did meet the 
empirical in his writings to the extent that he adopted 
verificationist methods in order to test experiential material. 
To the extent that pragmatists e•braced experimental or 
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scientific aethods, and here Dewey is •ore relevant than James, 
they sat close by the positivists. Indeed, by the late 1930s we 
can say that both pragmatism and radical empiricis• had been 
tamed under the steady hand of the later positivisa. The 
importance of this point in relation to our final discussion is 
that it is precisely this sort of pragmatism which was being 
embraced by economists and all those with an interest in the 
administration of social affairs in the 1930s. 
The preceding comments should not be taken to suggest that 
the other side of pragmatism which I have explored (the side 
which stresses the role of will and impulse and conceives of 
reality as process) was not important to economic thought. In 
fact, it is the influence of this sort of pragmatism on economics 
which I want to examine in this chapter. Indeed, what I want to 
show is that in order for economics to become pragmatic in the 
more conservative or scientific sense of the term, 
first embrace pragmatism's more metaphysical aspects. 
explain why as we proceed. 
2. The Econmics of Crisis 
it had to 
I shall 
My previous discussions suggest that economics was by no 
means the only social science in which we can see the imprint of 
both of the major aspects of pragmatism. But it was economics, 
above all, which provided the gateway through which prag•atist 
ways of thinking entered into policy-aaking circles. This 
intermingling of pragmatist philosophy with economic thought adds 
a further dimension to our study in that it demonstrates that 
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pragmatist philosophy had some impact on day to day life. This 
becomes clearer when one considers that in the 1930s economics 
became one of the main tools of the statesman - and therefore 
became a dominant language in political circles. What we are 
witnessing here then is a redefinition of what political activity 
should involve. Morgenstern wrote that "economic policy is 
essentially politics ig, tb.,g. ~sense." (Morgenstern 1937:141) 
As we saw in chapter two, some went even further in depicting 
politics as an essentially irrational activity and something 
which could and should be eliminated by sound economic 
management. 
Here I would also draw attention to Keynes' prediction in an 
essay appearing in the Political Quarterly in April 1932 in which 
he said that economists, whom he said were at the time among the 
most incompetent scientists, would become "the most important 
group of scientists in the world" in the post-war era. (Keynes 
1971:91) That they would become so Keynes saw as partly 
dependendent on their grasp or understanding of a less than 
perfect economic reality - one which rendered their older models 
illusory. (Keynes 1971:92) 
In this judgement Keynes was proved right - training in 
economics did come to be considered a very important 
qualification for public service in the post-war era. In 
relation to this I would argue that pragmatist ways of thinking 
played a not insignificant role in the incarnation of the 
economist as prince. Mainly, because pragmatism helped economists 
to adjust or adapt their vocabulary in ways that aade their 
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discipline better able to explain practical difficulties. 
But perhaps we should stop at this point and ask why it was 
the economist who was able to assume the mantle of prince. Or to 
put it less obscurely, why did economists achieve such prominence 
in policy and political circles in the 1930s? The obvious 
answer relates to the economic problems experienced by 
industrialised nations during those years. One thing that stands 
out in this regard is that in the late 1930s in the English-
speaking 
defined 
world the word crisis increasingly seems to have been 
in economic terms or was related to economic 
difficulties. There was talk of economic, financial and monetary 
crises with great frequency in both newspapers and journal 
acticles. 
I am not suggesting that this was the only context in which 
the term was used - my discussion of the use of the term in 
chapter one would contradict such an assertion. In particular, 
the term had deep resonances for European intellectuals - as we 
have seen in the examples drawn from Husserl, Valery and others. 
Indeed, the dark undertones that the word had in their works 
lingered on in intellectual circles in contintental Europe well 
after the Second World War was over. I also pointed out in 
chapter one that this more profound understanding of crisis was 
also evident among intellectuals in English-speaking countries. 
But the important point here is that in the midst of depression 
in countries such as America, England and Australia crisis 
largely caae to refer, sometimes without qualification, to 
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economic crisis. (1) 
I also pointed out in chapter one that the Second World War 
had generated a lot of crisis literature; but in the English-
speaking world at least, this literature did not seem to be 
tinged with the same sense of hopelessness and despair that 
accompanied similar material which grew up around~the Great War. 
I think this is partly because intellectuals in Britain and 
America and elsewhere felt that the war against Germany and her 
allies was backed by a much greater degree of moral authority 
than was the war of 1914. (Ogg 1942:3) Partly for this reason, 
the term crisis, when used to describe the Second World War 
(again I am here only speaking of English-speaking countries) was 
often intended to ref er to a very serious but nevertheless 
passing phase rather than to the end of civilisation. The fact 
that promises of a better future were being made to the citizens 
and soldiers of the allied contries is also I think testimony to 
that. (Ogg 1942:15) 
The rhetoric of economic crisis was also characterised by 
hope rather than despair. When economists spoke of crisis they 
usually presumed that it was passing or that with the right sort 
of treatment it could be overcome. For example, Keynes' four 
articles entitled "The Means to Prosperity" (which appeared in 
1. There are countless examples of the use of the word crisis in 
relation to economic difficulties in the 1930s. Some examples are 
l'hg, Crisis Q.t.~ Pound by J. Taylor Peddie, Macaillan, London, 
1932, Iha~ Econo1ic Crisis 1929-31, Paul Einzig, Macmillan, 
London, 1932 and Economic Progress AJMt Economic Crisis, Johan 
Akerman, Macmillan, London, 1932. 
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Ihi, Iil!WA in March 1933), while underlining the seriousness of 
the economic situation did express a certain confidence that with 
the aid of intelligence difficulties could be overcome. (Keynes 
1983:335ff) This underscores the importance of the greater 
emphasis on empirical methods and statistical techniques by 
economists. These allowed economists to give shape to the crisis. 
Furthermore, by expressing it in terms of measurable magnitudes 
the way was left open for crisis to be spoken of as something to 
be managed and whose course could be plotted. We can contrast 
this with the much more elusive understandings of crisis that 
were being spoken of by philosophers and theologians and which 
were obviously rather difficult to translate into actual policy -
even where they were intended to be. Thus, I would argue that it 
is precisely because economists could plausibly explain current 
difficulties and offer a way of overcoming them that economics 
became a dominant mode of political discourse. 
But in order to achieve this elevated position the 
discipline had to undergo changes - at least this was the 
perception. As I have suggested in chapter two, economics was 
being strongly condemned from both inside and outside the 
discipline for not being practical enough and for not paying 
enough attention to experience. Economists were accused of 
suffering fro• some sort of theoretical affliction which rendered 
them incapable of coming to terms with the real world. This 
affliction also prevented them from keeping up with develop•ents 
in science - the very area they fought so bard to emulate. It is 
precisely at this point that the influence of pragaatis• is 
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paramount because of its repetoire of arguments which asserted 
that theory should only be an instrument of practice. The 
Austrian economist Oskar Morgenstern wrote in his Limits Qi 
Economics that if economics was to earn the right call itself an 
empirical science then it had to contribute to "the mastering of 
practical life." (Morgenstern 1937:4} 
What this meant was that all the old economic models and 
metaphors had to be (to use a pragmatist term} unstiffened. That 
is, before the economist could really capture and explain crisis 
there had to be an actual expansion and stirring up of the 
meanings the economist gave to economic life - something that 
happened in part under the stimulus of pragmatist philosophy. 
This is why the pragmatist influence in economics was also 
manifest in contests over metaphysical ideas (such as the notion 
of the will and of the plasticity of the universe}. Thus, at 
the centre of debates about the philosophy of economics through-
out the period there were often atte•pts to pull economics away 
from a static and deterministic metaphysics towards one that is 
indeterministic and dynamic. Although of course, these moves 
were only intended to loosen the boundaries around the 
discipline rather than to cause its wholesale collapse. 
3. Pragmatism, Ethics and Economics 
We could argue that pragmatism and economics are natural 
allies. As we saw, Elliot described Dewey's pragmatism as an 
economic philosophy because it upheld the biological values of 
survival and efficiency. To explain this we should note that 
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even James• philosophy can be said to have "economic" objectives, 
insofar as it is concerned with the fulfilment of wants and 
desires. As for the pragmatic method, it can be seen as a rule of 
economy or efficiency - a means of •aximising happiness whilst 
avoiding pain as auch as possible. Indeed, it was because 
pragmatism was purely an "economic" philosophy that Elliot 
thought it a philosophy of fascism, because on his reading 
fascist modes of social organisation were aimed solely at the 
survival, growth and efficient running of the social organism. It 
is also for this reason that pragmatism was so often called the 
philosophy of the businessman. Thus, whether the pragmatic 
approach underpins a liberal or collectivist society - whether it 
is used to serve the interests of the individual or the 
collectivity - its values and methods remain essentially the 
same. In summary then, pragmatist philosophy and economics are 
comparable to each other because both aim at the manipulation of 
the external environment to obtain some end; both embrace the 
notion that utility is the best means by which to assign value. 
Clearly, from what I have said in previous chapters, this 
restricted understanding of pragmatism is not one that I can 
support. Dewey, for instance, did not set out to design a 
philosophy fit only for ruthless businessmen and demagogues. As 
we saw, Dewey's point was that if philosophers or ethicists 
neglected the real• of practical activity then it would be over-
run by precisely such people. (1) 
1. Again, pointing to this stress on ethical iapulses would seea 
to contradict Elliot's claim that we are here dealing with a 
purely "economic" philosophy. Indeed, Elliot's own definition of 
what constitutes "economic" values suggests a rather too limited 
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Furthermore, one of the reasons for making economics 
pragmatic (as was also the case in similar discussions of 
politics and jurisprudence) was to make prescriptive claims about 
how an economically just or fair society should be organised. 
That is, adopting a pragmatist stand could sometimes be a way of 
placing the values of love and charity at the centre of economic 
arguments. 
When framed like this, the critique of traditional economics 
could begin to sound like something flowing from the pen of a 
late 19th century new liberal or ethical idealist. Dewey 
certainly argued that the role of economic institutions, be they 
private or public, was to assist in the growth of the human 
personality, as we saw in chapter six. Although we should recall 
that Dewey saw this growth as ongoing rather than as proceeding 
to a final goal. (Dewey 1957:186) 
One of the advantages of pragmatism as an approach to things 
was that it allowed one to quietly and convincingly slip in and 
out of a range of arguments. In attempting to refute laissez-
faire economics, pragmatists did not have to rely (or have to be 
seen to rely) solely on arguments which rested on the basis of 
principle. Equally, to the extent that they presented themselves 
as being scientifically-minded, they did not have too careful 
about sounding disinterested. Nor did they have to run shy of 
practical or political criteria in putting their arguments. 
understanding of the or1g1n and development of the discipline 
itself. That is, its development in relation to moral philosophy 
and as what Adam Saith described as a branch of the science of 
the legislator. See Adam Smith, Wealth ~ Nations, Book IV, 
Introduction. 
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Pragmatism, if one likes, provided a covering law for 
argumentative flexibility and eclecticism. It allowed one to mix 
empirical, moral and political criteria all together. 
However, I should stress that the emphasis on the moral 
failures of laissez-faire was not as common amongst social 
scientists as amongst philosophers or religiously committed 
intellectuals. We should recall here my discussion in chapter 
two of the fact that great stress was laid on scientific or 
empirical refutations of the policy of laissez-faire. (1) 
Supposedly scientific or factual arguments in favour of socialism 
or social democracy were at times seen as pretentious. It was 
the empirically minded argwnents which were seen at least by 
social scientists as being the most persuasive in relation to 
arguments in favour of social planning. (2) Whether they were as 
important for politicians and the populace is, of course, another 
question. 
4. Science, Economics and Pragmatism 
We should note that there had been in the 1920s a •ovement 
of reaction against the treatment of economics as a positive 
science (and more generally the conflation of "intelligent 
conversation" with scientific discourse) precisely because it led 
to the exclusion of •oral considerations from the realms of 
economic thought. (Knight 1922:456) Such an exclusion meant that 
econo•ics was, like positivisa generally, reduced to an •·ethics 
1. See Morgenstern for an argument against the "scientific" 
nature of both socialisa and liberalisa. Morgenstern, 1937, Cb. 
III. 
429 
of power' a la Nietzsche, that is, the complete rejection of any 
true 'ethics.'" (Knight 1923:613) As we have seen, pragmatists 
were also accused of descending to this level of amorality. Yet, 
once more, we find Dewey rejecting such a narrow understanding 
of pragmatis• and instrUJRentalism. He too noted how economists, 
having been told that "their subject-matter was merely material", 
seemed to think that they "could be 'scientific' only by 
excluding all reference to distinctively human values". (Dewey 
1930:283) Like Knight, he thought the social consequences of 
this were disturbing. Dewey wrote that a utilitarianism which 
treated ends as "merely instrumental" denied value, and resulted 
in an "obnoxious materialism" which brutalised economic life. 
(Dewey 1957:171) 
But the responses to this value problem varied. Knight, 
for instance, attempted to refute the claim that economics was a 
positive science which could or should exclude references to 
human interests or values. His argument was that while science 
in the natural sciences required data that stayed put, this was 
not true in the nature of economic data. In explaining this 
point, Knight wrote that the data of economics were not merely 
material; economics dealt with wants and utilities and these were 
above all values. And like all values, these were things which 
grew and changed; they were fluid and could not rendered as 
scientific datWR. (Knight 1922:456) 
For this reason, Knight wrote, economists would be better 
served if they expressed their arguments in the for• of aesthetic 
criticism; by •eans of •suggestion rather than logical statement, 
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in figurative rather than literal language"; he wrote that the 
principles of economics should be apprehended by means of 
"sympathetic interpretation" instead of pure "intellectual 
congnition." (Knight 1922:481) (1) 
Another American economist Allyn A. Young argued si•ilarly 
saying that economics should become more like literary and 
historical writings. (2) Young wrote that economics, like 
historical knowledge, should provide us with •judgement and 
insight" - those sorts of unconscious and intuitive forms of 
knowledge which cannot be expressed as rules. (Young 1925:158) 
Young also doubted the worth of the discipline's scientific 
aspirations, if this meant that economists should be value 
neutral. A functional or pragmatic economics, he wrote, was one 
where research was driven by both intellectual curiosity and 
human interests. Economists, he suggested, had overlooked the 
actual processes of scientific endeavour where the motivations 
which lay behind research were never purely intellectual. Indeed, 
he wrote, bias could-~ven serve as an •energizer" or "catalytic 
agent." (Young 1925:152,161) It could lead to an understanding 
of one's subject matter that no "tautologically sterile" nor 
1. In relation 
are really the 
discourse is 
1923:616) 
to this point Knight wrote that the "tough-ainded" 
weak-minded for the scientific view of intelligent 
unable to convey true understanding. (Knight 
2. Morgenstern made a similar point in relation to the social 
sciences as a whole. He wrote: "Strange as it may seem, the 
relevance of the artistic turn of mind is particularly great in 
the social sciences where they are concerned with the 
understanding and control of ~ behaviour." (Morgenstern 
1937:5) 
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"aridly descriptive" account could provide. (Young 1925:162} (2} 
In this context, the importance of pragmatism for Young, moreso 
than for Knight, was that it demonstrated that morality and 
science were not incompatible; for it had demonstrated that pure 
science, was a "fiction" fit only for the "Academy of Laputa." 
(Young 1925:162} 
Quite obviously economists did not for the most part give up 
their scientific pretensions in order to become literary critics; 
they saw themselves as dentists (to use Keynes' description) 
rather than artists. In a sense, the art versus science 
dichotomy became superfluous. As we have seen with Dewey, it 
became possible, especially after 1927 when Heisenberg's physics 
was being imported into philosophy and other areas, to argue 
(however illegitimately) that in science as well the data were 
not stable and the observer was no longer neutral to the results 
of his experiments. Indeed, as I have already suggested, this 
dichotomy became unnecessary precisely because the nature of 
science was being reconceptualised in ways that brought it much 
closer to those forms of knowledge which Knight and Young were 
talking about. 
Neverthelesss, as I have suggested in relation to social 
scientists as a whole, there was a degree of aabivalence on the 
part of economists in relation to questions of value. For with 
the community increasingly turning to economists for answers 
they had to show an active interest in social affairs. There was, 
we should remeaber, a great deal of criticisa of the discipline 
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in the public arena for its aloofness on matters of public policy 
and its failure to provide practical business advice. 
(Morgenstern 1937:8) Yet economists also had to maintain an air 
of wisdom and authority if they were to be listened to; an 
explicit appeal to human values or a declaration of one's own 
interest would threaten to undermine their image of impartiality 
and hence their credibility as co1111unity advisers. This was a 
dilemma common to many social scientists at this time, in 
particular to those entering the bureaucracy and becoming part of 
a new expert elite. (1) The need to overcome this dilemma is 
precisely why we hear the ridiculous claim at the time by 
advocates of economic planning that they were scientists rather 
than socialists. 
This dilemma must have particularly concerned economists, 
for a great deal of methodological literature began to appear, 
especially during the depression years. Morgenstern suggests that 
methodological controversies over the place of values in 
economics, the status of economics and the relation of economic 
theory to practice preoccupied economists in the 1930s. 
Morgenstern states that this was demonstrated by the fact that 
methodological discussions were usually included in the 
introductory chapters of most standard works and text-books at 
this time. As well as this, methodological controversies also 
inspired a body of more specialist works (Morgenstern 1937:153ff) 
It is also worth noting that these debates about the relation 
1. See Chapters V •The Problem of Official Independence• and XI 
•Looking Forward• in F.A. Bland's Plannning 1b.i, Modern ~. 
Angus & Robertson, Sydney, 1937 for discussions of this and 
related issues. 
433 
between theory and practice and between facts and values 
continued well into the 1940s when the vast plans for economic 
reconstruction were being or were about to be put into place. 
(1) 
However, unlike some of the arguments which appeared in the 
1920s, some of which I have just examined, in the 1930s the 
tendency even among those critical of orthodox economics was not 
to reject scientific modes of discourse wholesale but only to 
modify them. There did of course, continue to appear in the 1930s 
works which radically challenged positivistic conceptions of 
economics or which claimed that economic researchers could not 
entirely exclude questions of value; however, what we also find 
frequently appearing, especially in the war years, was the rather 
more cautious assertion that the economist as social planner was 
1. The writings of Carl Menger, Nassau Senior, J.E. Cairnes, J.N 
Keynes and Max Weber are considered the authoritative sources for 
these debates. In the 1930s a new body of literature also 
appeared. See for example, Lionel Robbins' book, ~ ~ ~ ~ 
Nature W!d, Significance g,t Economic Science, London, 1932; A. 
Lowe Economics ~ Sociology, ~ fl§A LQJ;, Co-operation iJ1. .t1Ml 
Social Sciences, London 1935; Frank Knight llw. Ethics ~ 
Competition, London, 1935. On the application of economics see 
Edwin Cannan, All Economist's Protest, London, 1937, A,C. Pigou's 
Economics ~Practice, London, 1935 and W.H Butt's Economists 
~ th.i. Public. ~ ~ g1 Competition ~ Opinion, London, 1936. 
See also Chapter X "The State and Economic Policy" of 
Horgenstern's I.b.,Q. Limits g,f. Economics, 1937, London. Some 1940s 
discussion of the distinction between the positive and the 
normative in economics and its role in government can be seen in 
E. Ronald Walker's [xml Econo1ic Theory tg, Economic Policy. 
University of Chicago, 1943. Walker was professor of economics at 
the University of Tasmania and was a policy adviser to the N.S.W. 
and Tasmanian governaents. For reviews of and com11ents on ,this 
book see A. H Tange in the Ecopomic Record, Vol. XX, No. 38, 
June, 1944, pp.285-90; J.A. La Nauze in IWl Australian Quarterly, 
June, 1944, pp. 113-8 and P. H. Patridge "Theory and Practice in 
the Social Sciences", 1Ju1. Australasian Journal ~Philosophy Wld, 
Pscychology, Vol. xxiii, Nos. 1-3, Deceaber, 1945, pp. 90-121. 
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simply putting his expertise in the service of the co1111onweal. 
Why this increasingly became the case I will later discuss. 
5. The Relevance of Economics 
As suggested in the preceding passages, aside from · the 
question of values the other most pertinent and pressing issue 
was the asserted irrelevance of economics to political problems. 
Paul Homan (who wrote on the American institutional economists 
Veblen and Wesley C. Mitchell) offered what sounded very much 
like a pluralist argument against monism when assessing the 
relevance of economics. He wrote in the Quarterly Journal ~ 
Economics that there was a growing "sense of inadequacy" on the 
part of economists in meeting the problems generated by the 
"increasing complexity of economic life." (Homan 1928:337) 
The reason why economics was perceived to be so irrelevant 
to modern industrial life was because it still adhered to those 
mechanical metaphors derived from Newtonian physics. These 
metaphors had been adopted so that economics could "achieve 
scientific form". (Homan 1928: 337) (l) As we saw in chapter two, 
it was these metaphors that were seen to give economics what 
Young called its "bad metaphysical odour." (Young 1925:156) 
The argument was that these metaphors led to the view that 
the economic syste• was a machine governed by universal laws. It 
1. On this same point see Dewey, 1930 p. 221 and Sabine, 1930, 
p.869. Note also that this criticism persisted well into 
the 1930s and 1940s. J.O. Shearer in a review of T.W. 
Hutchinson's Ille. Significance a.wl ~Postulates gf. Ecgnomic 
Theory wrote of the lack of "functional significance" of 
econo•ics' "glittering edifice." (Shearer 1939:136) Partridge 
was writing in 1945 of how economic methods were still haunted by 
the ghost of a "rational", "a priori" science composed of "pure 
deductive systems.• (Partridge 1945:96) 
435 
was a system which possessed, as Keynes derisively put it, 
"inner harmony" and was "self-balancing". (Keynes 1932:92) Of 
course, to the extent that these mechanical abstractions were 
only intended to be regulative ideals there was no problem. But 
the argument was that economists had taken what was only an 
analogy to be an actual description of what normal economic life 
should actually be. All other forms of social life, Sabine 
wrote, had thus come to be seen as "as mere variants or 
aberrations of the type." (Sabine 1930:869) But as I said, the 
new view was that the sharp contours of economic theory no longer 
fitted the now somewhat fuzzy world of economic practice. 
Economics, Sabine wrote, had come to move in a world of "unreal 
abstractions and mythological entities." (Sabine 1930:869) 
The criticisms of the pragmatists were not entirely 
disinterested. Dewey, for example, objected to mechanical 
analogies to the extent that they were used to give scientific 
justification to the political doctrine of laissez-faire. Dewey 
even argued that "Laissez-faire was the logical conclusion" of 
economics' Newtonian heritage. This was because that science 
depicted the world as a machine which ran by itself. (Dewey 
1930:212) [f the economy were such a machine then it followed 
that any interference it its natural workings or sequence could 
only be harmful. (1) 
1. Morgenstern wrote of the "unfortunate" tendency among those 
who approach economics using the a priori method "to identify 
economic theory with a particular system of economic policy.• 
Whereas he argued that given that such theories could neither be 
confirmed nor refuted empirically, such a conflation was 
illegitimate. "The limits to the use of the a priori method in 
economics", he wrote, "must be strictly drawn and strictly 
observed." (Morgenstern 1937:10) 
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Changing the direction of econoaic tbought and policy 
involved dislodging those metaphors which had become so ingrained 
in the mental habits of economists. It was this task, that 
pragmatists and many others set out to undertake. The 
metaphorical creations which were being rejected were described 
by the Swedish economist Johan Akerman as the economic law of 
recurrence or periodicity symbolised by the pendulum (and as 
expressed in David Ricardo's "cast iron wage level" and Thomas 
Malthus' law of population) and the belief that the economic 
system bas its own natural sequence which results in equilibrium 
or the stationary state (as with the planetary system) as 
symbolised by the scales. (Akerman 1932:7ff) 
It was the classical economists Malthus (in his ~ Q.D. 
Population 1798), Ricardo (in his Princinles Q.t. Political Economy 
~ Taxation 1817) and John Stuart Mill (in his Principles Q.t. 
Political Economy [1848]) who were seen as responsbible for 
confusing the laws of physics with the laws of economics. They 
had cast what should have been specific working principles into 
veritable laws of nature untouched by human will. They became, as 
the Harvard scholar Ralph H. Eaton wrote, "inescapable" 
determinants of social behaviour. (Eaton 1921b:385) He saw these 
mechanical abstractions as irrelevant because they so greatly 
simplified econo•ic life, and as dangerous because they 
encouraged pessimism and fatalism. Eaton wrote that "social 
fatalism" was the "policy of laissez-faire." (Eaton 1921b:380) 
(1) 
1. Eaton's essay called Social Fatalis1 was an explicit attack on 
classical economics fro• the prag•atic point of view. In 
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One might of course, dispute this reading of these thinkers' 
works. For example, one could argue that Malthus, Ricardo and 
Mill were not the complete pessimists that they were claimed to 
be. Furthermore, these thinkers were not completely divorced 
from the realm of practical affairs. Ricardo, for exa•ple, was a 
meaber of the House of Commons. (Although Alfred Marshall would 
write that despite this the exposition of his principles was 
"abstract and unsystematic." [Marshall 1920:813]} (1) 
Again, we are to some extent witnessing the construction of 
straw-men. And of course, the point of constructing straw-men 
and knocking them down is to apparently clear the way for the 
particular, his objection was that classical economics denied 
human beings a choice and the consequence of this was fatalism. 
He wrote that the significance of the mechanical analogy was that 
society comes to be seen as an "abstract entity" governed by 
certain laws and principles "which exercise compulsion upon the 
human beings who compose it", because "at any time in its 
history" they "must obey one, and only one set of laws." (Eaton 
1921b:381) The consequence of this analogy was "Malthusian 
pessimism" which haunted social thinking in the nineteenth 
century; the fatalism of Ricardo's work in the field of 
distribution and Hill's social dynamics. (Eaton 1921b:384) For 
Eaton Mill's work resulted in a kind of "economic entropy" 
something which bore "witness to the exactness with which he 
followed the mechanical analogy", for his notion of the 
"'irrestible necessity that the stream of hwaan industry should 
finally spread itself out into an apparently stagnant sea•• was 
seen as a •necessity like that of the second law of therao-
dynamcs." Eaton noted that this law was not invented at the 
time Hill was writing but the fact that he had come up with 
something similar, he wrote, showed only how closely he had 
followed the mechanical analogy. (Eaton 1921b:384) 
1. Marshall cited a letter Ricardo wrote to Malthus in Hay, 1820 
which he notes was the same year that Malthus released his 
Princin1es g,L Political Economy considered liJ;,h. ~ ~ tg, ~ 
practical application. The letter stated: "Our differences may in 
some respects, I think, be ascribed to your considering •Y book 
as more practical than I intended it to be. My object was to 
elucidate principles, and to do this I imagined strong cases, 
that I might show the operation of those principles.• (Marshall 
1920:813) 
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rearrangement of intellectual and political priorities. This is 
exactly what we witness in the 1920s and 1930s. As I suggested, 
what we see are more and more depictions of the existing 
discipline as out of touch with a new and complex reality. This 
was sometimes attributed to the too zealous application of 
physical analogies, sometimes to a false conception of science 
and sometimes to political motives. 
That economics had little to say about the real world was a 
point which became particularly laboured in the 1930s. The 
failure of governaents to deal with the economic slump was 
attributed to a preponderance for abstract economic theorising 
among economists as well as their adherence to out-dated 
analogies. Economic theory had come to be seen as rationalism ~ 
excellence - and a useless rationalism at that. We should note 
that this was as much a political as an intellectual struggle. 
Challenging the direction of economic thought was also part of a 
challenge to the those who pushed for a return to policies of 
laissez-faire after the First World War. This was a debate which 
became both intellectually and politically heated with the onset 
of the depression. (1} 
Thus, Akerman wrote that eliminating these old ways of 
thinking and restoring free-will to its rightful place was 
crucial in the face of economic crisis. {Akerman 1933:165f) The 
1. See for example, John Strachey in D1£ Co1jng St+Mfgle ~ 
~ in which he wrote at the end of a chapter entitled "Back 
to the Market?": "Even the ghosts of these ideas do not walk. 
They are laid for ever. For the epoch of human history and the 
material conditions which alone gave them life have passed away 
down the irreversible stream of time. Only the least historically 
minded men on earth, only English economists, could dream of 
their resurrenction." Cited in Souter, 1933, p. 123n. 
439 
Australian economics professor and adviser to governments E. 
Ronald Walker, who also described himself as a pragmatist, wrote 
that the "fictionary state" cannot provide a foundation for 
serious economic studies as it ignored the "ugly reality" of 
economic life. (Walker 1929:117 Walker 1936:131) Herbert Von 
Beckerath, of the University of North Carolina and Duke 
University, wrote an essay in the Pbjlosopbjcal Review called 
"Economic Thought and Economic Evolution". In it he said that a 
"positivistic and pragmatic world" had largely "lost the use for, 
and the interest in, neat and comprehensive philosophical 
systems, either of an idealistic or rationalist scientific kind." 
(Von Beckerath 1937:584) 
This is not to say that there were no economists intent on 
insisting on the scientific exactness of the discipline. Figures 
such as Lionel Robbins in ~ Essay QD. ~ Nature ~ Significance 
Q.1 Economic Science, (1932) and the Austrian economists F. A. von 
Hayek and Joseph A. Schumpeter (Robbins discusses these Viennese 
economists in his own text) are notable examples and it was they 
who were subject to attack by pragmatists and the more generally 
sceptical. (1) (Morgenstern, for example, did not describe 
himself as a pragmatist - he did however, show an interest in 
Whitehead's philosophy of science.) 
One thing that is interesting about the debates between 
Robbins and his opponents is that they were in a sense debates 
about which sorts of metaphors are appropriate to a scientific 
1. For an example of Schumpeter's views see his article 
Instability of Capitalism", Economic Journal, September, 
pp. 368ff and Hayek in Prices ~ Production, Routledge· 
Paul, 1935. p.31-2. 
"The 
1928, 
Keg an 
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study of economics. Of course, this was implicit rather than 
explicit - and depended to a great extent on what figures were 
actually ~ as metaphors. Of course, consideration of the role 
of metaphor in economics predated these debates. In the 19th 
century Nassau Senior called for the elimination of antique 
organic analogies because of their metaphysical resonances; 
mechanical metaphors, however, did not seem to be seen in this 
light. But in the 20th century, both Robbins and Schwapeter were 
arguing for the elimination of all metaphors and fictions from 
economics, including terms such as statics and dynamics - terms 
which have mechanical significance derived from Newtonian 
mechanics, but which also came to refer in the late 18th and 
early 19th century to things called "social forces". [Eaton 
1921b:380]) Some of the opponents of Robbins and the 
mathematical school, on the other hand, began to insist that 
biological, or more specifically, evolutionary metaphors should 
be the basis on which economics is built; this argument was put 
not only because biological metaphors were seen to have greater 
descriptive power, but also because it was believed that reality 
was in essence a vital force. (1) 
1. On these points see Ralph William Souter, Prolegomena lg, 
Relatiyity Ecopo1ics, ColWlbia University Press, New York, 1933, 
Chapter V, especially p.22n, where he discussed the role 
analogies in economics and Schumpeter's attitude towards them. 
See p. 98 for related colllllents on the attitude of Hayek and 
Robbins to the role of fictions in economic theory. Note that 
similar confusions arose when in an attempt to avoid biological 
analogies the word "organisation" was substituted for social 
organism when both share the same biological origins. (Souter 
132:36n) 
441 
6. New Metphors for Old 
As the preceding comments suggest, placing the biological 
metaphor at the centre of economic thought was one way in which 
the discipline could be rebuilt from the ground up. Indeed, 
Homan wrote that one of the key signs of the great changes that 
the discipline of economics was supposed to be undergoing was the 
introduction of the language of biology and the rejection of the 
mechanical analogy. (Homan 1928:337) 
Of course, biological metaphors were not new to economics. 
They and mechanical metaphors have a long history of inter-play 
in that discipline. Statics and dynamics have a mechanical 
significance but they have a biological significance as well. In 
addition to this, the biological or organic metaphor is highly 
flexible. It may be deterministic or it may not. For example, 
Eaton wrote that in the late 19th century biological metaphors 
were reflected in talk of such things as "'super-organic 
evolution', social adaption, and the 'social organism'", 
following the work of Lamarck, Spencer and Darwin. (Eaton 
1921b:380) In this context, the organic analogy could become as 
equally fatalistic as the mechanical one. For it could lead to 
the belief in a biological law which states the inevitability of 
the struggle for survival. (Eaton 1921b:387) (1) Of course, 
evolutionary theory could also be used to make the ethical point 
1. Eaton cited the example of Benjamin Kidd's Social Eyolution, 
Macmillan, 1895. Kidd wrote: "The law of life has always been the 
same from the beginning - ceaseless and inevitable struggle and 
competition, ceaseless and inevitable selection and rejection, 
ceaseless and inevitable progress." (Eaton 1921b:387) 
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that industrial life is not a •echanical aggregate of discrete 
parts but is organic or co-operative in nature. It could also be 
used, in conjunction with this, to insist that society was 
evolving towards a final perfection. But even where the organic 
analogy was used for the purpose of promoting social welfare and 
harmony in defiance of forms of social fatalism, there remained 
a tendency towards finalism. That is, Eaton suggested, the 
biological analogy remains deterministic to the extent that 
evolutionary theory is used to tells us that history can only 
move in one direction (progressive or regressive), at any given 
time. (Eaton 1921b:380) Whether this pre-determined path leads to 
misery or happines, Eaton's claim was that it still denied human 
beings the ability to choose. 
However, by 1920 the organic analogy was being developed in 
an entirely new way by Alfred Marshall. His usage did not suggest 
fatalism or the inevitability of strife, but was more suggestive 
of the possibilities and potentialities that life opens up. This 
conception appeared most famously in Marshall's statement in the 
preface to the eighth edition of his Principles g1 Economics, in 
·~ which he wrote that: 
The main concern of economics is thus with human beings who 
are impelled, for good and evil, to change and progress. 
Fragmentary statical hypotheses are used as temporary 
auxiliaries to dynamical - or rather biological 
conceptions; but the central idea of econo•ics, even when 
its Foundations alone are under discussion, •ust be that of 
living force and movement. (Marshall 1920:xv} (1) 
1. Also note Marshall's other comments about the importance of 
the biological metaphor and the relation between statics and 
dyna•ics. He wrote: "The Mecca of the economist lies in economic 
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While many economists at the time might have regarded this 
metaphorical flourish on Marshall's part as a sign of his lack of 
theoretical rigour, it was a conception of economic life that 
certainly excited so•e interest among economists in the 1920s and 
1930s - notably Keynes. It was a conception that could also 
derive philosophical support from all those theories of creative 
emergence and evolution that are identified with the works of 
Whitehead, Alexander and Bergson. It was also a conception that 
was sometimes identified with James' metaphysics. Thus, the 
biological metaphors that were important to economics from the 
1920s onwards are those which emphasised the importance of 
process in reality. Insofar as mechanical analogies (such as 
supply and demand curves) could be admitted, they were seen, as 
the Australian scholar Herman Black put it, as abstractions from 
what was in reality an "organic economic evolution." (Black 
1934:295) 
We should note here too that in the case of dynamics we can 
demonstrate how the mechanical analogy is similarly flexible. 
Although this was not often explicitly recognised because 
•echanism was so often identified with the dull and lifeless. 
Nevertheless, when a word such as dynamical was used to describe 
biology rather than in economic dynamics. But biological 
conceptions are more complex than those of mechanics; a volume on 
Foundations must therefore give a relatively large place to 
mechanical analogies; and frequent use is made of the term 
'equilibriWB', which suggests something of statical analogy. This 
fact, combined with the predominant attention paid in the present 
voltllle to the normal conditions of life in the modern state, has 
suggested the notion that its central idea is 'statical', rather 
than 'dynamical'. But in fact is is concered throughout with the 
forces that cause movement: and its key-note is that of dynamics, 
rather than statics.• (Marshall 1920:xiv) 
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the economic system it could suggest an entirely different 
conception to that asociated with equilibriWI theory - perhaps a 
much faster and more turbulent economic machine. 
Furthermore as we have seen. mechanical analogies could be 
recast. as they were by Dewey who described the• as instruments 
or tools rather than as objects of sheer wonder; they may be 
regarded as mere instruments which are used for specific purposes 
in the course of pratical activity. This conception. which is 
derived from the Bergsonian and pragmatic depiction of man as a 
tool-making animal. casts a whole new light on the place of 
economic theory. For in this case, economics becomes something of 
which we should neither fear nor worship - it is another tool for 
living and something which is the product of our creative powers. 
This goes to the heart of the pragmatist arguments in relation to 
economic theorising and suggests that, rather than pragmatism 
being a subset of economics, as Elliot suggested, it is economics 
which is a subset of pragmatism. We should also note here that 
it was with this functional understanding of economics that the 
pragmatist was able to reconcile or bring together the biological 
and mechanical dimensions of life - although the organic remains. 
as Marshall's description suggests. the well-spring for our 
mechanical conceptions. 
7. Institutional Econo•ics 
Both mechanical and biological analogies were used to 
emphasise the uncertain. complex and willed character of economic 
life in the institutional economics of the Americans Thorstein 
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Veblen and Professor Wesley C. Mitchell. (Sabine 1930:867-875} 
We should note that institutional economics, like pragmatist 
philosophy which it was seen as an expression of, possessed both 
scientific values (having its origin in the British empirical 
tradition) and metaphysical values (with its sometime emphasis on 
the role of hWlan will in a plastic universe). 
That is, institutional economists attempted very detailed 
and strictly factual descriptions of the workings of specific 
institutions (relying heavily, in Mitchell's case, on the use of 
statistics}. Yet they also imaiined these institutions as 
springing from the same evolutionary source and emphasized the 
importance of the-human will, in varying ways, in creating an 
economic reality. 
··. Veblen is a case in point. His work was highly descriptive 
or factual at times, yet he also placed at the foundation of his 
economics the concept of organic evolution. (Sabine 1930:869} 
Furthermore, he appeared to regard economic institutions as the 
creations of mind. Veblen's treatment of the activity of mind 
was, however, cast in psychological terms and he regarded his 
evolutionary analogy as descriptive of a real material process. 
In so far as it.is~~ science in the current sense of the 
term, any science, such as economics, which has to do with 
human conduct, becomes a genetic inquiry into the human 
scheme of life; and where, as in econoaics, the subject of 
inquiry is the conduct of man in his dealings with the 
material means of life, the science is necessarily an 
inquiry into the life-history of material civilisation, on a 
more or less extended or restricted plan ... Like all human 
culture this material civilisation is a scheme of 
institutions - institutional fabric and institutional 
growth. (Veblen 1919:240-1) 
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Others found in Veblen's work the traces of an idealist 
metaphysic precisely because be regarded institutions as •settled 
habits of thought". (Veblen 1919:239) Young described bis 
theory of econo•ic evolution as a series of "systeas of thought 
built up by the unfolding and the synthesis of preconceptions•; 
to this extent he regarded Veblen's theory as Hegelian 
philosophy dressed up in a "modern patois•. (Young 1925:176) (1) 
What we are really talking about in the case of Veblen's 
mind-dependent economic reality is actually a product of certain 
physiological and psychological characteristics. These 
characteristics include our instincts, which set limits on bow 
we respond to the external environment, and most importantly, our 
ability for creative adaptation to the environment. (Sabine 
1930:868} 
In this context, perhaps Bergson's theory of ·creative 
evolution or the instrumentalism of the pragmatists would make 
for a better point of comparison than Hegel's philosophy of mind. 
Indeed, Veblen did read Dewey and we see traces of his 
instrumentalisa in Veblen's emphasis on our capacity to modify 
our environment at will. It is this which most interested 
Veblen, for this capacity is the •ain catalyst for change in the 
economic system - other things like instincts and the material 
environment remaining relatively stable. (Sabine 1930:868) It is 
this process of habituation to outside pressures that creates our 
1. Interestingly, in terms of what we have said of the relation 
between economics, art and pragaatism, Young described Veblen as 
being like an impressionist artist "painting" pictures of the 
econoaic world as he saw it - pictures which revealed that in 
institutional economics, just as in "modern stagecraft ••• a slight 
difference in lighting changes the whole scene.• (Young 
1925:183) ·~ 
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econo•ic institutions. Indeed, for Veblen. institutions are in a 
sense a manifestation of our psychological activity in the sense 
that they reflect habits of thought which have congealed into 
regularised patterns. For Veblen. the institutions which 
determine economic behavior were really a Nmass of 
and socialized habit." (Sabine 1930:868-69) 
accumulated 
But it must be stressed that this mass of habit does not 
harden into an absolute category. The human mind and body keeps 
up its activity. In the course of human development we witness 
the accretion of new skills. bodies of knowledge. forms of taste 
and modes of organization. No equilibrium point is ever reached; 
in economic life Veblen wrote in 1925 "things endlessly grow 
and change." {Veblen 1934:8) 
Any society at any one given time in its history is thus 
made up of a network of these dynamic institutions. Thus. we have 
the image of a moving economic galaxy composed of a constellation 
of economic habits or institutions all of which flow into each 
other and which are all constantly undergoing change. Clearly 
this depiction of the economic world as made up of a multiplicity 
of cultural accretions and habits parallels those pluralist 
theories which held the political world to be •oved by the 
dynamic interactions of group forces. But again, it is not a 
radical pluralism; each institution melts at its edges into other 
institutions. and to this extent we can see the sa•e relations 
of both continuity and discontinuity that we saw in much of the 
pluralist theory and in the analogies on which it was based. 
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The relations I have just outlined also operate within each 
institution as well. Economic institutions grow out of the 
interactions of individuals, but as these interactions harden 
into collective habits, they also come to shape the behaviour of 
individuals within them. What we have here then, in terms of the 
relation between the individual and the institutions he inhabits, 
is the same image of give and take between self and surroundings 
that pragmatists held up as the image of man's relation with 
nature. The point of economic theory then, was to explain these 
changes in economic behaviour which result from the complex of 
forces - "physical and social" - which interact to create new 
habits and therefore modify economic institutions." (Sabine 
1930:867) 
I think there was also a creative evolutionary metaphysic 
being implied here. There was the suggestion that sweeping 
through all our economic institutions is an underlying energy or 
activity - an evolutionary flow. Sabine argued that taken 
together each of these particular economic constellations 
constitutes "the stream of human culture or civilization." 
(Sabine 1930:868) But, as with Bergson's creative evolution, 
while the activity contained within this stream is purposive, as 
a whole the stream follows no pre-ordained path; it bas, Sabine 
wrote, "no end and it has no single cause." {Sabine 1930:868} -
Mitchell did not construct anything like Veblen's holistic 
vision. He concentrated on a description, in which he used both 
statistical and quantitative methods, of the course of a 
particular evolutionary economic institution namely. the 
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business cycle. Nevertheless, we should note the centrality of 
the evolutionary metaphor to Mitchell's understanding. The 
business cycle is just one manifestation of a more general 
process of social evolution .. Most importantly, it is because it 
is evolutionary that the business cycle can not be f roz.en- into- .. a 
series of time sequences or snapshots as some mechanical 
analogies might suggest; there is nothing normal in economic life 
except change. Mitchell wrote of the business cycle, just as 
Veblen wrote of the stream of human culture, 
no particular point and ends at no point, but runs together in a 
continuous motion picture." (Sabine 1930:874) 
Thus we have the all-important depiction of the economic 
world as malleable. It was this point that Mitchell's 
instrumentalism was brought to bear in his analysis. Sabine 
claimed that Mitchell took Dewey's instrumentalism more to heart 
than did Veblen. (Sabine 1930:871) But Mitchell's was not a 
narrow instrumentalism, despite his positivistic emphasis on 
statistical techniques. Furthermore, it was one that placed an 
importance · on the growth of the human personality. ~·Kitchell 
wrote: 
Whether economics is to us a subject of thrilling interest 
or a· dismal pseudo-science depends upon ourselves •.• If we 
come- Eto economics} -thinking of man's long ·struggle ·to 
master his .. own fate, .. then the effo.rt to.-solve-econoai~· 
problems seems a vital episode in human history ..• Seen in 
this perspective, economic speculation represents a stage in 
the growth of mind at which man '.s .effort- to- understand and 
control nature becomes an effort to-understand and control 
himself. (1) 
1.- · "The Prospects of Economics 11 ;= in R.G. Tugwell, Ihi, Trend Qi 
·Economics, 1924, pp.3ff. Cited-in Sabine, 193().--p.87L 
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Mitchell -did not ---however completely dismiss mechanical 
analogies -· where-- they--were -use-f ul. This was especially so, -- ··he 
wrote, when economists were examining "static" problems which, as 
abstractions or inventions of the mindi could "be given a quasi-
mechanical- character." (Mitchell 1927:186} Nevertheless·· he -t~o 
thought that they could be "dangerous guides"; for example, in 
the case of the business cycle, the disturbances which do occur 
are not static in character. If one had to use a mechanical 
-.. ::. - analogy, the best one can say is that there exists in a business 
cycle (especially one undergoing dynamic changes} "an equilibrium 
among numerous forces which are constantly changing, changing at 
different rates and speeds." (Mitchell 1927:186) Mitchell was not 
the only one to attempt to point to the inadequacy of static 
analogies in giving expression to conditions of economic 
turbulence. Another example is the Russian economist N. 
Kondratieff, who also spoke of the limits of static analogies 
because they could not give expression to what both he and 
Mitchell saw as an underlying "dynamics of phenomena"; 
Kondratieff added that a dynamic theory of economic life 
presupposed a reality where things were "always changing, 
perpetually in a state of flux." (Kondratieff 1925:575) 
These comments further illustrate two points I have already 
made ... Firstly.---- that_ mechanical analogies are flexible to the 
degree that they can be made suggest change rather than rest; 
that is, they may be suggestive of kinetic movements which have 
unpredictable outcomes. Secondly, they further demonstrate how 
difficult it can be become to disentagle the mechanical from the 
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organic when concepts o.f -evolutionary activity and dynamic 
phenomena are intertwined. Indeed the word dynamism itself is 
originally a biological conception being derived from the 
Classical-Greek dynamjs meaning power or energy. 
~. The Economics of Time 
The substitution of organic analogies of evolution and terms 
such as flux in order to escape statical or mechanical analogies 
leads us to another important aspect of the change in the 
terminology of economists in the 1930s. That is, the crucial 
recognition and invocation of the time element. (Von Beckerath 
1937:582) Time and duration became central words in many works 
critical of abstract schematisation in economics from both within 
and without the discipline. (1) 
It was argued in this context that economists had evaded the 
problem of time and change. (Black described this evasion as 
being "neurotic" [Black 1934:295]) They had assumed that in a 
mathematically conceived system of universal equilibrium all 
economic forces (all of which were reciprocally conditioning} 
moved and came to rest not only at the same time but also in the 
blink of an eye. To this extent, there was no scope for real 
time, in the sense of passage; nor was there any conception that 
different economic activities .. take different amounts of tiae or 
rather change at different rates of speed. (Note here the two 
1. See also Black who wrote that- -the !'systematic explication-and 
development" of the concept- of -- time was an - "inescapable 
prerequisite" of any genuine appreciation of- •:the-.economic-
problem.•• (Black 1934:294) Again, this stress on time was 
traced back to Marshall's influence~ --See· ,. Redvers-= "Opie.-
r "Marshall's Time Analysis";···~ Economic Journal, June, -1931-.-~--··" , 
different concepts of time;- in the first case tiae is conceived 
452 .:f" 
different concepts of time; in the first case time is conceived 
in psychological ter•s, in the second case it is conceived in 
spatial terms.) Furthermore, even where disturbances or frictions 
were allowed to enter the system (caused by the impact of "new 
dynamic elements" regarded as lying outside it) they were treated 
as if they were absorbed almost instantaneously "into an enlarged 
statically conceived system." (Von Beckerath 1937:580ff) (1) 
There was a great deal of economic literature in the 1930s which 
contrasted the static conceptions of econo•ics with the reality 
of transition and change, both of which bad their source in 
"temporal duration." (Melville 1936:4 Walker 1936:131) Akerman 
wrote that the hour-glass, rather than the pendulum or the scales 
was the most important and fundamental symbol of economic life. 
Akerman wrote that the Heraclitan statement that all things are 
in a "state of flux" should be taken as the "motto for the 
economic investigator" because economic life is eternal movement 
and ceaseless flow. (Akerman 1932:1f) 
As we have seen with Mitchell, this was not to suggest that 
there was no stability in economic processes and that statical 
3na\~sis (alor\~ wiH., Mc.'"hctVlicfl\ q~q\odi<5) shovlJ be to..,pl~+cl/ 
1. As an example of this, Akerman referred to the French 
economist Leon Walras who, he wrote, was able to "describe the 
~ of economic behaviour by means of a comprehensive system of 
equations. Prices, wages, interest, all have their place in this 
spacious building resting on the foundation of a universal 
equilibrium •.. We have here a circulation system too, but the 
notion of equilibrium in this case followed out to its utmost 
li•its. No alteration in the price of goods or in production can 
be conceived without its affecting the entire system; all hang 
together like the links in a chain, all the factors, are, as we 
say, "interdependent". But it is to be observed that this 
reciprocal influence is supposed to take place in a moment. There 
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jettisoned in favour of dynamics. Nevertheless, one can detect a 
tendency on the part of some to over-state the fluxational 
character of economic reality and the consequent inapplica~ility 
. of. static models ... The Rri tish economist Roy Harrod,· for e.xample, 
insisted that economists must learn to "thin.k · dynamically" to 
give expression to the "changing, progressing and fluctuating 
economy"; to think statically, he wrote, was to think "stale, 
flat and unprofitable." (Harrod 1939:15} 
That occasional or even frequent overstatements of this view 
occurred in this context is not surprising. As many observers of 
so-called intellectual revolutions have pointed out, in trying to 
undermine supposed orthodoxies denunciations of the old order 
tend to be somewhat shrill. In addition, assertions as to the 
"newness" of the theory that would replace traditional modes of 
thought tend to be somewhat overstated. We have seen this in the 
case of pragmatists and their challenge to monistic theory and we 
have seen it in the case of pluralists and their challenge to the 
juristic theory of sovereignty. It was no less true in the case 
of economics in the 1930s. 
More importantly, we should be able to see that in economics 
too the vocabulary of pragmatism and process metaphysics became 
is no place in the equation for the passage of time, and, what is 
most serious of all, there is no consideration of the creation of 
new means of production, that is to say, of new capital. It is 
timeless barter that is under investigation, but . not the 
formation of capital." (Akerman 1932:15f} See also L.G •. Melville, 
"The Place of Expectations in Economic Theory", EconR'ic Record, 
Vol. xv, No. 28. June, pp. 1-16 on this point. 
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prominent. We have seen that there was an emphasis on the 
practical nature of knowledge and on the role of time in relation 
to human conduct. 
What should not surprise us in relation to this last point 
is that we also see the deployment against static theories of 
some terms and images derived from modern physics. As I said 
earlier. it was not wholly necessary to argue against the 
presentation of economics as an exact science solely by stressing 
its humanistic or interested character. One could argue. as we 
have already seen in the case of.Dewey and others in relation to 
philosophy, that science simply was not exact anymore and 
further, that the physical analogies that one could draw from it 
were of a different kind to the ones drawn from pre-Darwinian 
conceptions of science. 
So we have a number of things taking place here. First. we 
have a case of metaphorical substitution (that is, the organic 
for the mechanical). Second. we have the recasting of organic 
and mechanical analogies. and third, we also see an attempt to 
bring to bear the new analogies draw from the physical sciences 
upon economics. This last move was very important. The 
biological analogy was still the object {whether in its 
Spencerian or Marshallian form) of some derision. But it was much 
more difficult to proceed with a form of economics built on a 
Newtonian framework - one which invoked universal and invariable 
laws - when that framework was no longer regarded as absolute.and 
final. It was more difficult to claim one•s economics was 
scientifically exact when science itself appeared to be much less 
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so. 
As in some of the other cases I have mentioned in this 
regard, I am not suggesting that what we are seeing here is an 
exact representation of what modern physicists were actually 
saying. Indeed, clearly one could not find agreement even among 
physicists themselves on this topic. Nevertheless, the important 
thing is that a group of intellectuals were able to use the 
developments in modern physics to support their own conception of 
what economic activity might be. {1} 
Thus, it is not surprising that we find economists 
announcing that modern science had undermined the concepts of 
traditional economics. An Australian economist, E.C. Dyason wrote 
that science's "older hypotheses based on abstractions, 
permanance and certainty" had dissolved into a "world of 
complexity, change and doubt." {Dyason 1932:149} 
More specifically, the physical conception of relativity was 
introduced into economic debate in order to deny the absolute 
nature of the quantities and laws that economics . dealt . withw 
Thus, in another article, Dyason wrote how Keynes had, in his 
Treatise o.n.. Money, (1930} reduced money to a mere relative 
1. When I say the word "use" I do not intend to mean that 
physical theories ·Were picked up and manipulated in a -cynical 
fashion to suit a set of intellectual priorities; rather, the 
fact that these terms were picked up and used suggests a belief 
that developments in physics bad genuine conceptual ramifications 
elsewhere. While I do not agree with that notion (at least I do 
not think there is a necessary rel~tion between physical and 
economic theories}, as I said earlier, developments in physics 
certainly had a metaphorical significance .for .economists given 
that classical economics bad partly been ereeted-0n a Newtonian 
base. 
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in accordance with the fashion for Einstein's theory. Dyas on 
wrote that the Treatise had exchanged the search for economic 
quantities or the "fruitless search for index numbers that will 
measure ·real' wages, ·real' output, and ·real' capital" for a 
"technique which deals not so much in economic quantities 
themselves as in the significance of the ever-changing relations 
between them." (Dyason 1931:227) 
Indeed, for Morgenstern the word "relative" was far more 
applicable to economics than to the natural sciences where there 
were still some "constants". (Morgenstern 1937:8) Yet another 
example was the Australian economist L.G. Melville (who was also 
an important policy-maker in Australia in the early war years), 
who wrote that equilibrium theory was "two-dimensional, lacking a 
time dimension"; introducing time was what was Keynes' great 
achievement. (Mel ville 1939: 2) 
One of the most interesting texts I have come across in 
relation to this use of physics to destablilise economic 
orthodoxies was written by Ralph William Souter, called 
Prolegomena t..a. Relativity Economics: An. Elementary ~in th.e. 
the Mechanics and Organics a.i an. Exnandjng Economic Universe. 
(1933) (The title was suggested by Eddington's Ih.e. Expanding 
Unjverse (1932) - a study of the significance of contemporary 
physics.) Souter, a philosophy and economics graduate of the 
Universities of Otago and Columbia, was a keen student of 
Professor Mitchell. 
Souter's text is presented explicitly as a challenge to what 
he calls a "mechanical pseudo-·rationalism'" in economics which 
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excluded dynamic change as opposed to static adjustments from the 
realms of economic causation; that is, dynamic changes were 
treated as exogenous factors while static adjustments were seen 
as endogenous. (Souter 1933:59) He sought to place dynamics at 
the core of economic life. Marshall's description of economic 
life as living movement was pivotal for him in this regard. In 
addition to this, he sought to overturn the positivistic 
separation of fact from value and more generally discredit the 
view of science promoted by economists. (Souter 1933:vii) 
Souter began his argument by stating that positivism had 
collapsed (this was an assertion rather than a statement of 
fact), because the notion of scientific truth was becoming 
increasingly problematic as shown by Heisenberg's theory of 
indeterminacy. [Souter 1933:147]) (Obviously the term positivism 
here did not imply radical empiricism - but meant the exclusion 
of metaphysics and problems of value from the realms of 
scientific investigation. [Souter 1933:2n]) 
As with some of the examples I have listed above, Souter 
invoked relativity theory in order to describe what he saw as the 
true nature of economic relations; furthermore, he 
simultaneously made the point that what we are dealing with here 
is not an analogy. In fact, he claimed that the term economic 
mechanics was of equal rank with the term physical mechanics as 
it "implies ... the kinetics of concrete organic growth and 
adaptation", something which he saw as equivalent to the "general 
categories within the field of ·mechanics'". (Souter 1932:22n} 
Hence, he was stating that relativity is not in this case a 
metaphor at all but accurately describes the relations between 
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economic phenomena. This was a description of economics which he 
claimed predated the appearance of physical relativity, because 
it was present in earlier editions of Marshall's Priniciples. (1) 
Souter explained what he thought was Marshall's concept of 
economic relativity as follows: 
It is naive and inadequate to try to sPoreoate 'static 
adjustments' from 'dynamic changes'; in the last resort, 
this distinction is purely relative t.Q th.a standpoint and 
assumptions Q.f th.a scientific 'observer'. It bas n.a. meaning 
except in terms of the 'frame of reference' which, in the 
employment of the method 'not quite accurately called the 
statical method', the economist bas temporarily selected as 
'the centre' of the economic universe. (Souter 1933:21} 
One thing that Souter was suggesting was that statics and 
dynamics were not necessarily in opposition to each other 
especially where physicists had themselves broken down the 
opposition between time and space. And in economics, as in 
physics there was a space-time continuum - an "economic space-
time (price-quantity-time), continuum." (Souter 1933:21f) (2) 
1. The statement be Marshall that Souter drew upon appears as 
follows in the Eighth Edition of his Principles: "We thus 
approach by gradual steps towards the difficult problem of the 
interaction of countless economic causes. In the stationary state 
all the conditions of production and consumption are reduced.to 
rest: but less violent assumptions are made by what is, not quite 
accurately, called the statical method. By that method we fix our 
minds on some central point: we suppose it for the time to be 
reduced to a stationary state; and we then study in relation to 
it the forces that affect the things by which it is surrounded 
and any tendency there may be to equilibrium of these forces." 
Marshall. Principles. p.369. 
2. For a review of this book see H.D. Black in the Economic 
Record. VoL x, No. 19, December. 1934. pp. 293-1······-' 
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Souter's text is interesting for us not just because of this 
use of the Einstein's theory but also because combined a 
number of the themes I have been exploring in relation to 
intellectual life in the 1920s and 1930s. What we find being 
brought together in this text are the metaphysical theories of 
Bergson and Alexander (that is, the view of reality as creative 
evolution or emergence}; the pragmatism of James and Dewey as 
well as developments in modern physics (the theory of relativity 
and the doctrine of indeterminacy}; and the interpretations of 
these developments by philosphers of science such as Whitehead 
and Eddington. (1} 
The way in which Souter explained the relation between 
organics and mechanics was very Bergsonian and pragmatic. As I 
noted earlier, in the pragmatist and Bergsonian schema it is life 
and the creative impulse that is foundational for everything 
else. They are, prior to and foundations for mechanism. Hence 
the priority of biological or rather vital conceptions and 
metaphors over mechanical ones. Thus, static analysis (and this 
1. Souter's text is sprinkled with references. to Whitehead's 
Adventures ~ ~ in which he wrote that "The Certainties of 
Science are a delusion ... Whenever some new mode of observational 
experience is obtained the old doctrines crumble into a fog of 
inaccuracies." {Souter 1933:198,100.h For an example of Souter'S··· 
use of Alexander's SRace. ~and ~see p.111; for his use 
of Eddington's Ibg Nature tl the. Phvsical World p. 114f. Bergson 
and Dewey are referred to on p. 117. Souter was aware of the 
·controversy over the meaning of relativity. He noted the 
differences between Einstein and Planck - who continued to hold 
to the "universality of the principle of causation - and 
Schroedinger and Heisenberg and their followers. He wondered 
whether both groups were "right in the abstract. The scientific 
difference between them may be merely one of optimism and 
pessimism.• (Souter 1933:147} 
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is a point that comes out in a number of writers we have examined 
including Mitchell) merely abstracts from the underlying dynamics 
or flux - which themselves are manifestations of the life force. 
Thus, statical analysis is only ~ abstract mechanics o.f 
organic economic evolution." (Souter 1933:38) 
The other imporant reason why it was necessary to emphasise 
the organic character of economic activity was of course, to 
stress social or organic inter-dependence. Although here, the 
creative aspects of the evolutionary analogy could be played 
down. That is, we are not so much talking here of the creative 
power of particular individuals or groups (which was how Sorel 
used Bergsonian philosophy) but the creative powers of whole 
communities working together. Hence, Souter counterposed the 
ideal of a "cooperative commonwealth" to both "mechanical 
individualism" as well as an to atomistic dynamics - the latter, 
as I said, being a way in which the syndicalists approached 
dynamism as a political doctrine. (Souter 1933:98) But I should 
stress that the foundation does not rest on the functional 
necessity of organic interdependence as we saw with Duguit. 
Rather, Souter's conception of a co-operative commonwealth is 
closer to Fol1ett's ideal society which I examined in the last 
chapter. For his commonwealth would appear to also have its 
basis in psychology. He also relied on James' suggestion that 
individual experiences do spread out and interweave or blend with 
each other. (Souter 1933:1070) (Although again, I would suggest 
·that this- vision is cmore holistic than J1111es. himself might 
allow. l-
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It would be impossible not to ask where Keynes fits into 
these conceptions of economics. He above all was seen as 
providing that new vocabulary which was requiredin the face .o-f 
the 1930s equivalent of J.G. Pocock's Machiavellian moment. As I 
noted, Keynes himself (whom Souter described as a "super-
pragmatist" [Souter 1933:98n]) considered biological metaphors 
highly appropriate to descriptions of economic life. Indeed,·· he 
wrote in his A Treatise Qil ~ (1930) that biological 
analogies were superior to physical analogies when explaining 
dynamic phenomena at the later stages of economic reasoning. (1) 
Souter claimed that Keynes was only following Marshall whose 
equilibrium theory Keynes had wrongly interpreted as having an 
""essentially static character.'" (Souter 1933:98) (Marshall 
himself denied the notion that his central idea is statical. 
[Marshall 1920:xiv]) Nevertheless, Souter saw Keynes as assisting 
in the birth of the ideal of the cooperative commonwealth 
although he was prevented by his own liberal bias-from seeing it. 
(Souter 1933:95f) (2} 
1. For comments by Keynes on this matter see A Treatise Qil ~. 
vol. ii, p.406. Of Keynes' interpretation of Marshall, Allyn 
Young wrote: "I do not see how one who looks backward through 
smoked glasses can look forward with open and clear eyes." 
Quarterly Journal of. Economics, February, 1925, pp. 170-1. See 
also Jensen •J M Keynes as Marshallian" Journal gt Economic 
Issues, vol. xvii no. 1 March, 1983, pp. 67-92, for a somewhat 
-dissenting view. 
2. In this regard note Keynes' oft-quoted statement in an 
article in ~ ~ Statesmen 28/1/39 where he wrote: "The 
question is whether we are preparedto move out of the nineteenth 
century laissez faire state into an era of liberal ·socialism,~ by 
which I mean a sys tell where we hope to proJAote -socia1--.and 
' ' economic justice whilst respect and protecting the individual ..... ~ 
his freedom of choice, his faith, .his mind and its expression, 
his enterprise and his prosperity." -···· - - - --,.-··· · 
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But what most concerns us is the fact that some saw Keynes 
as failing to fully embrace economic dynamics. Melville saw 
Keynes' General Theory g,t Employment Interest ~ ~ as an 
attempt to express "two conflicting ideas. the one static and the 
other dynamic". (Melville 1939:2} It was the static view which 
Melville considered to have won out in that text. He wrote that 
the dynamic approach was "struggling for expression" in 
discussion of such things as the principle of effective demand. 
savings and investment, the propensity to consume and the 
marginal efficiency of capital. It even burst forth 
"triumphantly" in the discussion of expectations and employment. 
But Keynes surrendered to the static or "equilibrium view-point 
in formulating his statement of the general theory." (Melville 
1939:2} Thus, Melville concluded that while Keynes had made a 
"brilliant start in formulating a theory suitable for a dynamic 
world" he had remained imprisoned by old ways of thinking. 
(Melville 1939:2) 
9. The Psychology of Time 
We should note here that consideration of the time element 
in economic activity required an understanding of the processes 
of human psychology. At any given moment there are all sorts of 
intimations about what the future might bring. But we are. as 
Leonard Webb said, neither "onmiscient" nor "even abreast of the 
knowledge of the time". (Webb 1926:436) The time element, while 
it may suggest appropriate courses of action, also aay conceal 
the "true" forces at work at any given moment in history. This 
situation can be contrasted with the mathematical depictions of 
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an ideal market which involves perfect, instantaneous and 
frictionless inter-communication amongst all traders. (Knight 
1923:591) Furthermore, we should note that at any given moment 
the progress of time also involves the "unmasking of the 
immediate past." (Morgenstern 1937:14) The result is the inter-
related phenomena of expectations and uncertainty. Time permits 
us to have expectations about the future but simultaneously 
pushes uncertainty upon us. Thus, in the field of economic 
activity, time also holds out both danger and opportunity. 
As an added factor, our uncertainties and expectations about 
the future play a part in shaping what will happen; that is, each 
action that we perform in this regard, be it physical or verbal, 
may alter the shape of economic phenomena even before that action 
has been completed. It is this too, and not just the fact of 
ignorance, that makes uncertainty or unpredictability an 
existential condition and expectations, insofar as on this view 
we have the capacity to reorganise experience, a real 
possibility. 
Of course, there were different ways of approaching 
uncertainty. It could be regarded, for example, as disruptive 
rather than ruinous. Hence, as Mitchell noted,- the "fruits" of 
this uncertainty (concerning, for example, what people will buy 
and at what prices} may simply be prudent action. However, 
Mitchell also noted that uncertainty (which he regarded as "all-
pervading" [Mitchell 1927:156}) may becoae manifest in 
0 emotional ·.,aberrations of business judgements and competitive 
illusions", both of which go to explain the course of the 
business cycle. (Mitchell 1927: 157) --
Indeed; -- -Knight - - wrote that because of the fact of 
uncertainty and our irrational responses to it, the economic 
system, when "left to itself ... 'collapses' at frequent intervals 
through violent oscillations" rather than achieving equilibrium. 
(Knight 1923:601) Thus time, in conjunction with human 
psychology, - may complicate- or- disrupt what would otherwise be---a-
smooth path towards economic equilibrium; economic development 
becomes both discontinuous and indeterministic. (Morgenstern 
1937:106) 
Not everyone saw human responses to uncertainty as being so 
irrational that economic collapse was inevitable. Nevertheless, 
there was a degree of emphasis placed upon human irrationality. 
One of the intellectual causes of this interest was the 
developments within the area of psychology. For example, the 
psychological notion of the herd instinct was used to explain why 
the business cycle tends to oscillate so sharply. Psychological 
theories were quite important to those challenging conceptions 
of the all-knowing and utility maximising self {as we have seen 
in relation to contract theory) . Eaton -- f<>r --exa111ple 0-··cited~ 
McDougall's Social Psychology where he dismissed classical 
political economy and its hedonistic postulates as a "'a tissue 
of false conclusions drawn from false psychological 
assumptions'". (Eaton 1921b:_385}_{1)_ .Young also cited McDougall. 
1. See McDougall, Social Psychology, p.11. Cited in Eaton, 1921b.-
P. 385. 
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noting that he rejected these postulates in favour of a broader 
range of "instinctive propensities" which included such things .as 
fear, panic, excitement and sympathy. McDougall argued that our 
minds or instincts had created all our social and economic habits 
and institutions. (Young 1925:176 McDougall 1920:11:240 
Furthermore, while classical theory may have been applicable in 
times past when these instincts were few - under the pressure of 
modern life they had proliferated. Economically speaking people 
were seen as complexes of selves or instincts. What this meant 
was that men, Young wrote, now had many different ways of 
"feeling, thinking, and acting in their market dealings with each 
other", thus adding further to economic uncertainty. (Young 
1925:176) (Although we should note that this last point might 
contradict the social psychologist's notion of the herd 
instinct.} 
It was in the 1930s in particular that psychological 
factors began to be widely incorporated into economics, although 
they had been important to the Austrian subjective schoa-1., .. of 
economists. The main psychological factor considered in the 1930s 
was the dominance of expectations.. In this context. -Keynes' -work 
was exemplary. Keynes, in his essay "The Gener.al The.ary of 
Employment" put centre-stage words such as "utter doubt", 
precariousness, panics, hopes and fears. (Keynes 19l7: 222)· (1) 
1. In relation to this aspect of Keynes' work see,.... Geoffrey 
Harcourt, 1984, "Economics as a discipline", History gt Politjcal 
Economy, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 480..,.520 and Bans S .. Jensen·, "J M 
Keynes as Marshallian" Journal ~ Econowiic Issues, voL· xvii no • 
. . ! .March, .. _ 1983 .-::---PP- 6 7-92. Keynes •""work. was . .also held--up· as .an 
- .. -- -- example---be~ause ···-<>f its empirieal----quali ties:.: ,_ (Von ··-Becker a th 
1937: 584} 
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Partly as a result of the impact of Keynes' work, others began to 
write in a similar vein. Melville claiaed that any dynamic and 
"realistic" economic analysis would treat the "minds of 
individuals" as an integral "part of the economic environment". 
(Melville 1939:4-12) (1) Further to this, Melville wrote that 
demand curves are the expression of subjective thoughts or 
particular mental outlooks and that their shape can quickly be 
changed for both "rational" or "irrational" reasons. (Melville 
1939:10) 
At this point, we can ask whether this foregrounding of 
instinct, temporality and uncertainty might leave us with a 
rather bleak form of economic nihilism where any form of action 
is impossible or futile. We could ask whether we can have any 
economic system at all. (Morgenstern 1937:28) 
Alan Coddington would later make a similar point in 
relation to the ~·General Theory. In its embrace of both 
economic statics and dynamics Coddington argued that it gave 
expression to the conflict between the principles of order and 
chaos. This was because, as Melville suggested, it sometimes 
lurched towards nihilis• and at other times reached for a system 
of order. (Coddington 1973:162) Indeed, Coddington has noted the 
way in which what be calls "fundamentalist" Keynesians have 
elevated the "indefiniteness• contained within economics "to a 
methodological principle", the result being an economics of 
process where no aodel of the economic situation can be fully 
specified. (Coddington 1976:1263) 
1. See also Morgenstern on 
1937:104:158) 
these points. (Morgenstern 
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In this context, we should also note here how Piero Mini, in 
a fascinating study of the origins of economic philosophy, 
compared Keynes' notion of "animal spirits,. and propensities to 
Bergson's ~Jan and Schopenhauer's will. This was because he 
thought all of these notions gave expression to the 
indeterminant character of life while also suggesting we remain 
aspiring creatures. (Mini 1974:254} 
Mini does not suggest (for he too views Keynes as a 
pragmatist in the philosophical sense) that Keynes leads us 
towards utter nihilism and scepticism in relation to economic 
affairs. (Mini 1974:228ff) For if his sort of economic 
pragmatism in one guise uncovers the problem of contingency, in 
another guise it also offers a way out. That is, as a pragmatist 
economist one might well begin by positing plasticity but then 
one would have to proceed onto the instrumental phase and look at 
ways of moulding or shaping experience in accordance with our 
needs. One would thereby seek to build stability within a process 
of change. 
Indeed, according to Keynes we cannot help but seek 
stability. Mini writes that in Keynes' theory the search for 
order is forced upon us by a combination of the pressure of 
necessity and our own "animal drives" which force us to act 
conventionally - to overlook the "awful fact" of ignorance and 
act "as if" behaviour were determined by rational calculation. 
(Mini 1974:264) (This coupling of psychological and biological 
imperatives also sounds rather like Duguit.) It is through 
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acting conventionally that we introduce some degree ot oraer ana 
certainty into the system. In this context. as Mitchell wrote. 
we can look at the whole of an economic system of co-operative 
endeavour as something which has evolved "under the pressure of 
uncertainty" - an attempt to introduce stability and order into 
a generally inhospitable environment. (Mitchell 1927:157) 
Mitchell explained how a modicum of order and predictability 
is achieved in his examination of the various functions served by 
the price mechanism. He wrote that prices help direct our 
otherwise plastic energies and impulses. That is, prices dam up 
our productive energies; they connect and direct them in certain 
ways "amidst the million channels into which these energies might 
flow." (Mitchell 1927:116) As a related point, we should note 
that prices make public or solidify our wills and desires and 
establish hierarchies of values. As such, the information that 
they bear provides some basis or firm ground for rational action 
because it allows "control of economic activity by accounting." 
(Mitchell 1927:116) 
10. The Function of Theory 
There are two points which we should return to at this 
stage. First. there was a complaint that too often the pragmatic 
origins of economic theory had been. due to a metaphorical 
confusion. elided. Rather than being seen as a tool to help us 
along in practical life it was theory itself which came to be 
seen as truth underlying the economic system; economic .life 
became the pale imitation of shimmering theoretical forms. 
Morgenstern parodied this attitude among certain economists in 
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saying that a priori theorising would only work if one were able 
to ignore the flux of experience and "lock oneself in a room and 
invent the world of facts, adopting the attitude that if theory 
and reality did not then agree, so much the worse for reality. " 
(Morgenstern 1937:10) This is no doubt hyperbole; but the point 
is a serious one. That is, while theory may be helpful it must 
occupy a subordinate position in the field of practical activity. 
That these points needed to be made and were made frequently 
shows that economics and economists had begun to play a 
significant role in public life. Truth, or what was deemed to be 
correct behaviour according to economic theory, thus came to have 
a social significance that it did not have in the area of 
philosophy. It was for this reason that there were so many 
vigorous attempts to challenge it. (1) 
Second, there is the point that those who called for a 
pragmatic approach to economics were doing much more than simply 
demonstrating the practical origins of the theory in the struggle 
for survival. For - it is not simply the fact that our impulses 
shape the economic environment that is at stake here. What the 
pragmatically-minded economists wanted to do was to substitute 
"creative imagination", "active planning" and "thought" for 
impulse; to place these motivations "within the very processes of 
experience." (Young 1925:169:170n} (2} 
1. On these and related points see E.E. Ericksen, "Materialism in 
Democracy - Democracy in Culture", Philosonhjcal Review, Vol. LI, 
No.2·9 March' 1942, pp. 124-4<r;--
2. ~aton makes the same point in relation to economic policy 
that---it---is only--by-overcoming fatalism and introducing active 
planning that •an can go on to seize t:be •social struggle for his 
own ends." (Eaton 1921b:389} {1} 
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These same points about the purpose of economics and the 
role of active planning continued to be made through-out the 
1930s and into the 1940s. In 1942, for example, E.E. Erickson was 
asking. following James and Dewey, what "difference would it 
make" to society if we viewed economic life as something that was 
amenable to our intelligence instead of something which had 
developed independently of our intelligence, governed by natural 
laws 
their 
which the masses must inexorably obey however 
consequences. (Ericksen 1942:135-6) The answer 
unpleasant 
to this 
question was that the difference would be that we could work 
together to make a better world. What form the world should take 
is another question again. 
11. Pragmatism and Economic Planning 
The beginnings of economic planning then owed much, not only 
to the idea of the scientific co-ordination of all the factors of 
production and distribution, as articulated by· the 
rationalization movement, but to pragmatic conceptions of active 
willing. In either case, the point of these plans was, as the 
British economist J.R. Hicks noted in a review of Keynes' General 
Theory, to introduce "determinateness into a process of change." 
(Hicks 1936:241} Indeed, it is the·very fluid character of life, 
in conjunction with the potential for human irrationality in 
response to uncertainty that makes some planning necessary. 
But how much determinateness could be introduced was a 
matter of debate. Sabine wrote that pragmatism could not not 
provide one with certainty; it could only claim that "methodical 
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experimentation is surer procedure than fumbling or the mere 
drift of circumstance." {Sabine 1930:875) Furthermore, we should 
note that the ideal of social efficiency does not have to be 
defined in a mechanical way. As the American thinker Stuart Chase 
once wrote, the application of reason to social affairs "does not 
call for a hard, bright, regimented efficiency - except in the 
minds-of soap manufacturers. It calls for the life more abundant 
- for living instead of existing." (Chase 1928:276} Indeed, 
according to one student of administration, it was this type of 
/ YT.;+-~ 1 understanding of efficiency which called for Bergson's el.an.-~~~ 
to be introduced into Australian public administration. {Wood 
1939:161) 
Nevertheless, when the pragmatic approach becomes too 
confident in its instrumental methods and its efficient 
procedures it can begin to transform itself into rationalism. 
After which it eventually stultifies. Others would argue from 
the facts of uncertainty to the need for complete scientific 
planning. Akerman began with a depiction of economic reality as 
flux but also argued the case for economic plannning and implied 
that it could be quite extensive in its scope. {Akerman 1932:17} 
Here the expectation of the degree of determinateness which 
active planning can introduce into social life was greatly 
increased. In this case planning, premised on uncertainty, did 
begin to sound like attempts to rationalize society that 
policy which seeks to introduce into society (albeit, - within the 
limits of its fraaework} "absolute regularity, uniformity, and 
accuracy". (Brady 1933:21:33} - The other thing which followed 
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from this was the tendency to hand over the rei .ns of government 
to those with specialist knowledge or skills. Hence, Von 
Beckerath wrote that once uncertainties are seen to be pervasive 
then it becomes necessary to rely on the "will, insight and 
abilities" of the few persons who are in dictatorial command of 
the whole society. (Von Beckerath 1937: 595} (1) 
There was a problem in this for the pragmatist. For to move 
too far in the direction of planning society would seem to be 
quite out of touch with pragmatism's philosophical roots. The 
idea of complete planning or socialism exhibited all the same 
intellectual rigidities that had been complained about in 
relation to Newtonian mechanics and monistic theories and the 
social policies which flowed from these. It assumed, as the 
pragmatist never would a "static world where needs, processes and 
resources remain unchanged. The opposite is of course the fact." 
(Masey 1934: 91) Furthermore, the concept of extensive 
1. Knight had earlier made the same point. He argued ···that 
precisely because human beings are so irrational there needed to 
be a significant reduction in individual freedom. He wrote: "It 
[laissez-faire] is a confessed failure in the field of promoting 
many forms of social progress, and its functions in this regard 
are being progressively taken over by the social agencies." 
(Knight 1923:595f) For further examples of this view see Sidney 
and Beatrice Webb in Chapter V "Labor" of Whither Mankind,. 
Charles A. Beard (ed.), 1928, p. 134, in which they write. "No 
economist. throughout the wide world, to-day puts his faith in 
laissez-faire. Instead of everything being complacently left to 
the arbitrament of the individual seeking his own advantage, it 
has become accepted that deliberate action needs to be taken, by 
governments and legislatures, or some collective agency, for the 
promotion of the interests of the community as a whole, for the 
future as well as the present." (Beard 1928:134) Keynes too spoke 
of the need for "collective intelligence" or "intelligence and 
deliberation at the centre must supersede the admired disorder o.f 
the 19th century." (Keynes 1982:86)· Although we should note that 
he was by no means a socialist in the context of the times. 
r 
p\Cl't"'\nil'\~ ~CIC..~ bcye~ .,_l-,a+ prca~l'W\q~·is+ 4l'!l'W"\phct Si.S 0~ f"'es~c::lill\ h:i 
the demands of the hour rather than the laying down detailed :J 
plans for the future. (1) 
Yet what we have to explain is why, given pragmatist 
philosophy, ,the pragmatic approach to economic policy did tend 
towards rigidity. I have stressed that pragmatism as a 
philosophy was subject to a number of different pushes and pulls. 
As we have so often seen in areas such as philosophy and 
politics, pragmatism could both depict the world as plastic and 
also as something amenable to control; it could accommodate an 
emphasis on impartial techniques as well as on ideals; and 
finally a pragmatist could be someone who was in equal parts a 
scientist and an activist. All of these pragmatic elements were 
visible in discussions about economic thought and practice in the 
1920s and 1930s. But if the major thesis examined in the last 
chapter was that pragmatism inevitably descended towards 
irrationalism, here the argument --would seem to be that it 
inevitably ascended towards rationalism. 
The more policies or instruments of intervention seemed to 
.. "work" in pragmatic terms, the greater was their status as a set 
---of -neutral techniques for social •anipulati<>n and·control·and >the· 
greater was the status of the economist as scientist. It. was 
this fact that explained the erasure of the very premises of 
uncertainty and the ethical motivation -which underlay the 
pragmatic approach to econoaic management. Ut also explains 
why the practical origins of classical economic_ theories were 
also forgotten) 
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As we have seen, Keynes' work was seen as reflecting the 
tension in the realm of economics between the wi11--to-order--·an&-
the will to chaos - although this is overdraJllatising<iL..:::::_, __ He. can 
also be seen as reflecting the tension between scientifi~ values 
and moral values within the realm of economics. Keynes wrote in 
1932 that it was the main task of economists "to discover, and 
then to do, what is economically sound. This temporary 
concentration on the practical is the best contribution which we 
of today can make towards the attainment of the ideal." (Keynes 
1971:92} This is a very pragmatic statement because it suggests 
the use of practical means for ideal ends. But the problem, as 
we noted in relation to the syndicalists, is that the distinction 
between means and ends is unstable. Means too easily become ends 
- whether those means entail direct action or statistical 
description. 
concentration 
The complaint here might be that a temporary 
on the practical can lead to the complete 
forgetting of the ideal. It was the perceived cleavage between 
human interests and instrumental techniques of social management~ 
one which I think Keynes unintentionally foreshadowed, that would 
concern so many intellectuals after the war. 
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis has investigated some of the intellectual 
debates which took place in Western countries during the interwar 
years. In that context, I isolated a number of themes. First, I 
discussed the preoccupation with crisis and uncertainty after the 
disillusionment caused by the Great War. Second, I examined the 
promotion of social scientific control as the most direct answer 
to crisis. Third, I examined what was called the idealistic 
reaction against science, and discussed the ways in which modern 
physics was seen as giving support to the metaphysical views of 
certain philosophers. I also noted how modern science was seen as 
endorsing the instrumentalist method of the pragmatist. Fourth, 
I discussed the philosophy of pragmatism and the attempts of its 
adherents to bridge the gaps between philosophy and science, and 
morality and science. Fifth, I discussed the development of 
pluralist political theory and its relation to pragmatism. 
Sixth, I addressed what were seen at the time as a number of 
important political implications of both pluralism and 
pragmatism. Finally, I looked at the application of pragmatist 
approaches to economic thought and action. 
This thesis has attempted to characterise the interwar years 
in terms of certain intellectual preoccupations and also to trace 
the development of these. I have not suggested that these 
preoccupations are peculiar to the period. My references to 
material lying outside the period provide evidence that many of 
the ideas current during the interwar years were also current in 
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the periods which preceded and followed it. However, I have 
suggested that these themes were more prominent in the interwar 
years than they were either before or after. My evidence, in this 
regard, has been textual. It has been gathered from a broad range 
of books and prominent journals that were published in the 
English-speaking world during the interwar period. 
I think the numerous statements found in these textsJ that 
the Great War marked the end of an age of progress and certainty ) 
~cticq~5 that there was a widespread perception of crisis among 
Western intellectuals during the interwar years. Other textual 
evidence enables me to say that a strong desire amongst nmany 
intellectuals to apply science to social life continued 
throughout this period. More specifically, the particular debates 
that I have considered about science and politics allows me to 
say that there was a great deal of academic controversy 
surrounding the philosophy of pragmatism during this period. This 
was by no means a simple controversy. Asessing the claims about 
the dangers posed by pragmatist philosophy, in particular the 
political and moral dangers that it was alleged to have let 
loose, has been one of the most difficult parts of this thesis. 
I have endeavoured to test the claims that pragmatism gave 
rise to an irrational pluralist politics (seen as being embodied 
by the syndicalists) against the actual history and development 
of syndicalism and of pluralism in general. In assessing the 
political implications of pragmatis• I have also been forced to 
examine in some depth the complexities of pragmatist epistemology 
and metaphysics, and to determine the significance of 
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developaents in aodern physics for intellectual discussions in 
the interwar period. Further•ore, I have tried to assess the 
claim that even where the pragmatist placed less emphasis on the 
role of will and placed more emphasis on scientific technique it 
still gave encouragement to such things as the 
programme of the fascists. 
political 
Perceptions of crisis and uncertainty provide the context 
for much of the material that is dealt with in this thesis. As I 
have pointed out, the most obvious response to uncertainty was 
the attempt to secure society on the basis of science. The more 
complex and interesting response, however, was the respoase of the 
pragmatists. For them crisis was not due solely to a lack of 
morality or solely to a lack of scientific knowledge. For them 
crisis was the very gap which existed between morality and 
science. It was a gap they claimed they could close with the 
help of their pragmatic method. In promoting this method the 
pragmatists were greatly assisted by the claims that developments 
in modern physics showed truth to be purely instrumental. 
Pragmatists proved persuasive partly because they could claim the 
authority of science for their own approach to philosophical and 
social issues. 
But not all audiences viewed pragmatism as the source of 
salvation. Indeed, I have exa•ined in detail the argUJ1ents of 
those who saw pragmatism as yet another cause of intellectual and 
social crisis. This was because firstly, its metaphysical 
descriptions of the universe as plastic and pluralistic were seen 
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as lending philosophical authority to the political pluralists. 
Pragmatis• was attacked as a recipe for social chaos, and the 
activities of the syndicalists were used as evidence for this. 
But pragmatism was also attacked because of its method. The 
belief that truth does not inhere in things in themselves but is 
constructed by groups or individuals was seen as justifying the 
behaviour of the political~or commercially ruthless. Even where 
the pragmatist advocated a unitary state, he was held to be 
creating the basis for fascism because he did not endow his state 
with a moral purpose. 
I aa not suggesting that this was the only view of 
pragmatism. Nor am I suggesting that pragmatism was a major 
aspect of the fascist movement. Nevertheless, there is sufficient 
evidence to argue that these were points of concern and for that 
reason any historical study of pragmatism cannot overlook them. 
Firstly, these arguments were being published in respected 
journals. Secondly, as I pointed out in chapter 6, the fact that 
Ralph Barton Perry in 1935 sought to refute the claims of Elliot 
and others about pragmatism demonstrates that these arguments 
must have been influential to some degree. Indeed, the asserted 
relation between pragmatism and fascism was only a permutation of 
the description of pragmatism as the philosophy of the business-
•an. This was a description which dogged pragmatism though-out 
its developaent and one which pragmatists were constantly 
denying. 
In many respects, this study has been a history of the idea 
of pragmatism since its appearance in the late 19th century. I 
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have displayed the various •eanings given to the ter• in . the 
course of its career. I have illustrated that the ter• achieved 
widespread popularity in intellectual circles alongside 
notoriety. Furthermore, I have also charted its gradual decline. 
I have shown how pragmatism, by the late 1930s, was shorn of its 
richer meanings and had become a method or approach identified 
with the social planner. It would see• that the debasement of 'the 
term proceeded apace in the 1940s, so that by the end of that 
decade Laski could suggest that pragmatisa, instead of giving 
people the power to act and to reshape their world,...had become an 
instrument of social reaction. This he blamed on the fact that 
neither Dewey nor James had made the true meaning of their 
philosophy presumably clear. He wrote that both James and Dewey 
had: 
Restrained themselves from such explanations as might cast 
doubt on the general validity of things as they are. They 
had, in part, a fear of putting their own thoughts plainly 
before the people because they.did not know what might be 
the consequences of popular understanding ... That is why, as 
doctrine, it either yielded society no results at all, or 
became like Royce's in America, or Bosanquet's in England, 
part of the defensive mechanism of a privileged order. 
(Laski 1948:727) 
In relation to Laski's point we should recall that for the 
critics of pragmatism its message was all too clear, to the 
extent that critics thought it placed too much emphasis on the 
role of human will. This point aside, it certainly was true that 
the word pragmatisa increasingly ca•e to be used in political 
and coamerical contexts to indicate the qualities of 
ruthlessness and toughness. 
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One could argue that the pragmatists' attempts to end the 
divisions in intellectual and social life were futile. To the 
extent to which such divisions existed, they were not widely 
perceived to be a problem or a cause of social breakdown in the 
post-war era. Certainly, the perception that there were gaps in 
Western civilisation persisted in the post-war era. However, this 
view was largely confined to small pockets of intellectuals 
in liberal-democratic societies who were critical of existing 
political and economic arrangements. 
In relation to this last point, we should note that the 
belief that social crisis has its roots in divisions within the 
area of knowledge or in the failure to bring to bear the wisdom 
of philosophers or scientists on social problems is a peculiar 
preoccupation of the intellectual. But whether such beliefs have 
any foundation or not, it would also seem that they only gain a 
wider audience when they are backed by considerable evidence of 
social and economic turmoil. That is why whatever crisis 
literature did appear in the post-war era did not achieve 
anywhere near the same prominence and currency as did the crisis 
literature of the interwar years. 
The debates of the period are also testimony to the 
persistence of the belief that nature has a special place for 
man. Many of the ideas being put forward at this time must be 
read as part of a reaction to the scientific reduction of man's 
place in the scheme of things. This, alongside the development of 
a more secular culture, helps explain the reactions against 
science which I have discussed and which were expressed in 
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Bergson's theory of creative evolution. It explains why 
philosophers hungrily scanned modern physics for spiritual 
revelations or for evidence of the fact that human beings are 
free to make and remake their world. It also explains why 
pragmatists were so keen to marry science and morality. Even 
Dewey, despite the claims that he reduced man to a mere function 
of the environment, suggested that both nature and man were 
animated not just by the same physical energies, but by the same 
spiritual energies as well. 
Dewey's pragmatism, while described by Hook as scientifc, is 
also clearly evidence of the need philosophers felt to rethink 
their relation to the society in which they lived. We have seen 
that scientists were seen to be replacing philosophers as the 
standard-bearers of wisdom. We have also seen that philosophy 
was deemed to be irrelevant to social problems. Furthermore, its 
traditional concerns appeared to have been superceded. It was 
possible to ask what role could traditional philosophy serve in a 
universe without mystery? Under these conditions, it is not 
surprising that considerations of the nature and purpose of 
philosophy arose. It is not surprising that something called 
social philosophy, a conception that was abhorrent to many a 
practising philosopher, was taken seriously. 
This period was also notable for the prestige accorded 
science in intellectual circles. If science had not been so well 
regarded one would never have seen philosophers attempting to 
interpret it in ways that gave justification to their own 
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theories. As a related point, I think that from an examination of 
these debates one would have to insist that the distinction 
between the physical sciences and other forms of knowledge is 
quite sharp. The differences between them are differences of kind 
and not just of degree in relation to their respective capacities 
to verify hypotheses and to predict future events. 
Misinterpretations of modern physics allowed philosophers to 
greatly exaggerate whatever similarities did exist between the 
methods of the physical sciences and the methods of the social 
sciences. Physical science could be depicted as providing just 
another picture or image of the world with no more veracity than 
that of the poet. I think this belief was and is misguided. The 
methods of the physical sciences are more precise than those of 
the philosopher, historian or the social scientist. But this is 
precisely because they deal with inert material. Bergson was at 
least right to argue that it was much more difficult to predict 
in the realm of life. From this it follows that physical science 
and philosophy (or history or the social sciences) are different 
kinds of knowledge. One should not expect one to do the work of 
the other. 
The debates of this period also reveal a great confidence in 
the power of both individuals and governments to improve the lot 
of humankind. For alongside the talk of crisis there was also a 
significant degree of optimism about man's ability to control the 
course of events. Indeed, as I have pointed out, talk of crisis 
was often no more than a preamble to proposing favoured social 
solutions. In particular, the period is notable for the belief 
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that successful adjustments of social relations can be achieved 
where the administrative arm of government is occupied by 
scientifically trained personel. It is in this context that 
critiques of this new rationalism began to make their appearance 
in the late 1930s. 
The debates of this period also reflect a sense of unease 
with the principle of democracy. This was not just due to an 
aristocratic nostalgia for a more refined age. The ambivalence 
about democracy was also expressed in much more modern terms. 
Examples include social psychological theories about the herd 
instinct, the fashion for eugenics and the general belief that 
the masses needed some rational guidance. It think the existence 
of this sentiment amongst certain groups of intellectuals is well 
demonstrated by my discussion in chapter two. At the same time, 
even those who called themselves pragmatists, and who were 
therefore presumably democratically inclined, were not immune to 
this feeling. 
For much the same reason that there was a degree of 
discomfort with the idea of democracy, there was also a degree of 
ambivalence expressed about the idea of politics. We see a number 
of different meanings being given to political activity during 
the period. We have, for instance, seen political activity 
described as essentially a rational activity implying reasoned 
parliamentary participation and debates. This meaning was used 
particularly when comparing political activity to the direct 
action of the syndicalists. 
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But we have also seen political activity described as 
essentially egoistic and selfish and the cause of war and social 
divisions. Here the term politics described aore than 
parliamentary activity, diplomacy or administration of the 
affairs of state. In this context, politics became associated 
with irrationality rather than rationality; it was often regarded 
as something that got in the way of and upset social plans. 
Hence, we hear so much about the need to overcoae politics in the 
1920s and 1930s. What we also see in the latter part of this 
period is the redefinition of political activity as economic 
activity - or rather, the role of government was beginning to be 
defined in relation to economic management. Indeed, it was argued 
that good economic management was necessary in order to stop 
politics from erupting. 
Of the more general points that one can draw from this 
thesis, the most obvious concerns the highly flexib.le character 
of the key terms of intellectual debate. Hy-study demonstrates 
that intellectual debates in the area of philosophy or political 
and social theory were not nearly as directed as they might seem. 
We have also seen that this is a problem for the scientist, who, 
in attempting to describe a theory in non-mathematical terms was 
forced to choose from the suggestive and ill-defined language of 
everyday reality. When teras such as uncertainty and relativity 
were used to describe scientific theories, the urge to eraw 
analogies between the physical and an apparent metaphysical real• 
proved irrestistible. Indeed, many scientists and~-philosophers 
went further than this, believing that science really did have 
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something to say about a deeper and invisible realityi one that 
looked like the reality of the metaphysician. The results of 
this were not entirely futile to the extent that 
misintepretations of modern physics resulted in a degree ,of 
intellectual creativity. However, I also showed that the use some 
philosophers made of •odern physics in promoting their own 
metaphysical theories aroused concern. This was because it was 
feared that spiritual interpretations of nature, especially where 
they appeared to have the backing of science, could give 
encouragement to political irrationality. 
The other thing to observe is that intellectual debates, as 
I have frequently stressed, are often debates between straw-men. 
This becomes particularly obvious when intellectual debates 
escalate or become intense. Part of the reason why certain 
debates have a tendency to escalate is because they are cast in 
terms of mutually exclusive categories. As I noted in chapter 
five, Sabine observed that the debate between the political 
pluralists and the political monists was unnecessarily strident 
because of the tendency of intellectuals to describe their own 
position and the position of their opponent in relation to the 
concepts pluralism and monism. 
such terms one was drawing 
Sabine suggested that in 
lines through political 
intellectual life that in reality did not exist. 
using 
and 
We should also note how the identification of certain 
thinkers with general categories saw a coapression of the 
co•plexity of their thought. Indeed, where thinkers beco•e tied 
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and bound to certain categories they are turned into caricatures. 
PragJRatists were often caricatured as voluntarists or 
irrationalists. Equally however, the pragmatists had begun their 
crusade by caricaturing their opponents as monists or 
rationalists. Intellectual debates in the period of uncertainty 
between the wars were not always characterised by tolerant and 
even-handed discussion. 
There is one other general point which I want to raise in 
relation to these debates. I think they bring into question the 
meaning of the term modernism - a term which has been used to 
describe the overall intellectual tendencies of the period. I 
think we have seen from these debates that to use such a tera 
would be to make one word do too much work. There were too many 
varieties of thought and opinion and too many mutually 
contradictory theories articulated during this period to sum it 
up in one word. This is not to say that there were not links both 
within and between the universes of discourse which existed at 
that time. However, as in James' pluralistic universe, these 
links were often weak and tenuous. The fact that the intellectual 
unity which existed in the debates of this period was only 
partial was often overlooked. This was partly a result of the 
linguistic identity of many of the terms employed in discussions 
in science, philosophy and other areas of intellectual interest. 
It was, however, also a result of the · s~ . attachllent to 
the ideal of the unity of all knowledge. 
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